Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Introduction xxv<br />
to be evident. This “transformation of <strong>the</strong> concept of truth into that of <strong>the</strong> possibility of<br />
evident judgement” is a thought which played a role in <strong>Brentano</strong>’s earlier lectures <strong>and</strong><br />
writings. In one passage in <strong>the</strong> Psychologie (Vol. 2, p. 90), where he takes up <strong>the</strong> problem<br />
of correct evaluation, he asks “whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> object is of such a sort that one could st<strong>and</strong> in<br />
<strong>the</strong> appropriate relation to it”. In <strong>the</strong> notes for his logic lectures of 1875, we read:” ‘<strong>The</strong><br />
object is’ means… that <strong>the</strong> object is to be accepted or affirmed, i.e., that it can be correctly<br />
affirmed.”*<br />
Here we have <strong>the</strong> source of <strong>the</strong> definition of <strong>the</strong> true—or of being in <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong><br />
true—as that which can be correctly affirmed. This was incorporated in <strong>the</strong> writings of<br />
Husserl <strong>and</strong> also in those of Anton Marty.<br />
But this definition is <strong>the</strong> one which is least satisfactory. Among <strong>the</strong> alternatives are:<br />
“that which is to be affirmed (das Anzuerkennensein)”;† Marty’s “that which it is possible<br />
to affirm (das Anerkenntliche)”; “that which is affirmable”, or “worthy of being affirmed<br />
(das Anzuerkenmnde oder Anerkennenswerte)”; <strong>and</strong> “that which ought to be affirmed (das,<br />
was anerkannt werden soll)”. <strong>The</strong> latter expressions come closer to <strong>the</strong> correct one, viz.,<br />
“that, <strong>the</strong> affirmation of which cannot possibly be false”, or “that, <strong>the</strong> denial of which<br />
cannot possibly be evident”.<br />
We have seen that <strong>Brentano</strong> finally rejected all those definitions which refer to <strong>the</strong><br />
possibility of evident affirmation <strong>and</strong> replaced <strong>the</strong>m by those that we have been defending.<br />
But why should we reject <strong>the</strong> attempt to characterize <strong>the</strong> true by reference to a possible evident<br />
consciousness? First, because, as we have already shown, a possible evident consciousness<br />
is not included in <strong>the</strong> so-called concept of <strong>the</strong> true. And secondly, such a definition leads<br />
to <strong>the</strong> monstrous assumption of <strong>the</strong> a priori possibility of an evident consciousness, which<br />
not only is aware of everything that is, but also denies with evidence everything that is not<br />
<strong>and</strong> everything that cannot be. If we were to take this assumption seriously, we should be<br />
led to affirm <strong>the</strong> a priori possibility of an omniscient mind encompassing all vérités de fait<br />
<strong>and</strong> all vérités de raison. And this road, as we know, leads inescapably to <strong>the</strong> ontological<br />
argument for <strong>the</strong> existence of God. 8 Husserl, to be sure, attempts to avoid this consequence<br />
by distinguishing between “real” <strong>and</strong> “ideal” possibility.* He would have it that <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
evidences which are psychologically impossible but which—“to speak in ideal terms”—<br />
constitute a possible psychical experience. <strong>The</strong>se “ideal possibilities of evidence” are<br />
finally transformed, in Husserl’s Ideen, into <strong>the</strong> fiction of a “pure consciousness”. Whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />
it be “pure consciousness”, “transcendental consciousness”, or what, one wishes to avoid<br />
“psychologism” <strong>and</strong> is driven instead into a kind of hyperpsychologism, with its invention<br />
of a fairy-tale hyperconsciousness. All this only because, as we have already said, one<br />
confuses “<strong>the</strong> impossibility of a judgement contradicting a judgement we call ‘true’” with<br />
“<strong>the</strong> possibility of a judgement which is qualitatively <strong>the</strong> same as one we call ‘true’”.<br />
But all <strong>the</strong>se constructions have an element of truth, at least to <strong>the</strong> extent of indicating<br />
that every thought about truth somehow includes <strong>the</strong> thought of an insightful consciousness<br />
(ein einsichtiges Bewusstsein). 9 <strong>The</strong> whole question, however, turns upon this “somehow”,<br />
<strong>and</strong> it is here that both phenomenology <strong>and</strong> transcendentalism go wrong.<br />
* “‘Der Gegenst<strong>and</strong> ist’ bedeutet…das der Gegenst<strong>and</strong> anzuer kennen ist, d.h. dass er mit Recht<br />
anerkannt werden kann.”<br />
† Psychologie, Vol. II, p. 89.<br />
* Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I, p. 185.