Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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xxiv Introduction<br />
13. Ehrenfels has proposed an objection, <strong>and</strong> this will throw light upon our problem.<br />
Suppose <strong>the</strong>re are certain things which, for one reason or ano<strong>the</strong>r, are entirely inaccessible<br />
to any knowledge, positive or negative; it is impossible, say, to find out whe<strong>the</strong>r or not<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is a diamond weighing exactly 100 kilograms. Hence nei<strong>the</strong>r a judgement affirming<br />
such a diamond nor one denying it can be brought into contradiction with what is evident.<br />
And <strong>the</strong>refore, according to what we have said above, both judgements—<strong>the</strong> one affirming<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re is such a diamond <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> one denying it—would have to be called “true”. And<br />
both would have to be called “false” as well, since nei<strong>the</strong>r an affirmative nor a negative<br />
judgement about this diamond could be evident.<br />
<strong>The</strong> objection is easy to answer. Let us suppose that <strong>the</strong>re is such an unknowable<br />
diamond. <strong>The</strong>n if it were possible for someone to know about <strong>the</strong> diamond, <strong>the</strong> knowledge<br />
could not possibly be negative—<strong>the</strong> knowledge could not be a judgement that denies or<br />
rejects <strong>the</strong> diamond. But it would be a mistake to say that, if <strong>the</strong>re were such knowledge<br />
of <strong>the</strong> diamond, it could not possibly be affirmative. Hence, on our assumption about<br />
<strong>the</strong> unknowable thing, an evident denial is impossible for two reasons. First, our general<br />
assumption (that <strong>the</strong> diamond is unknowable) precludes <strong>the</strong> possibility of any knowledge<br />
about <strong>the</strong> thing. But secondly, our additional assumption (that <strong>the</strong>re is such a diamond)<br />
implies that even if such knowledge were possible, it could not be knowledge which is<br />
negative. But <strong>the</strong>re is only one reason for saying that affirmative knowledge about <strong>the</strong> thing<br />
is impossible—namely, our assumption that <strong>the</strong> thing is unknowable.*<br />
Inaccessibility to our knowledge, <strong>the</strong>n, is no reason for concluding that <strong>the</strong> negative<br />
judgement is true. For what we have been saying is this: a true judgement about a thing is one<br />
such that, whe<strong>the</strong>r or not knowledge about <strong>the</strong> thing is possible, knowledge contradicting<br />
<strong>the</strong> judgement is impossible. <strong>The</strong> affirmative judgement about <strong>the</strong> unknowable diamond,<br />
although it is a judgement which cannot be evident, is one which we must call true. For,<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r or not it is possible to know anything about <strong>the</strong> diamond, negative knowledge<br />
contradicting <strong>the</strong> affirmative judgement is impossible.<br />
14. It should be sufficiently clear from what has preceded that we are far from immersing<br />
logic in <strong>the</strong> psychology of evidence.† We have noted that, in saying of a judgement that it<br />
is true, we are not predicating evidence of <strong>the</strong> judgement; indeed, we are not predicating<br />
anything of <strong>the</strong> judgement. But <strong>the</strong> assertion “Such <strong>and</strong> such a judgement is true”<br />
unavoidably contains <strong>the</strong> thought of an evident judgement—<strong>the</strong> thought, namely, that any<br />
judgement contradicting <strong>the</strong> one that is being called “true” cannot possibly be evident: one<br />
apodictically denies that any such judgement is evident. What is asserted, <strong>the</strong>n, may also<br />
be expressed by saying that it is impossible for an evident judgement to contradict <strong>the</strong> one<br />
that is being called “true”. In saying this we are not merely expressing something which<br />
is logically equivalent to <strong>the</strong> statement that <strong>the</strong> judgement is true; we are expressing its<br />
meaning, its sense, what must be thought if <strong>the</strong> statement is to be understood.<br />
Husserl, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, would connect <strong>the</strong> “concept” of truth with <strong>the</strong> “possibility<br />
of evident judgement”, saying that a true judgement is one such that it is possible for it<br />
* By altering our second assumption <strong>and</strong> supposing now that <strong>the</strong>re is no such diamond, we arrive<br />
at analogous results, mutatis mut<strong>and</strong>is.<br />
† See Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I, p. 184.