Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Introduction xxiii<br />
one who judges with evidence does not constitute <strong>the</strong> meaning of <strong>the</strong>se words. <strong>The</strong> point<br />
is, ra<strong>the</strong>r, that <strong>the</strong> locutions in which <strong>the</strong>se words are used cannot be understood without<br />
thinking of one who judges with evidence.<br />
What do we mean when we speak of “one who is judging truly”? <strong>The</strong> concept of<br />
“justified in itself”—or, what comes to <strong>the</strong> same thing, “completely correct”, “perfectly<br />
right”, “judgement of insight”, “insightful judgement”, or “knowing judgement”—is drawn<br />
immediately from intuition. In analogy with what is generally true of <strong>the</strong> acquisition of<br />
concepts, <strong>the</strong> distinguishing mark of such judgements st<strong>and</strong>s out when <strong>the</strong>y are contrasted<br />
with judgements which lack this mark. No psychologistic investigation of <strong>the</strong> natural<br />
causes of judgement <strong>and</strong> no “transcendental” investigation of <strong>the</strong> logical presuppositions<br />
of judgement can reveal to us <strong>the</strong> nature of knowledge. <strong>The</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of knowledge must be<br />
based upon <strong>the</strong> concept of <strong>the</strong> evident judgement.<br />
But it is essential to recognize this distinction: although all insightful judgements are<br />
true, not all true judgements are evident. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, no two judgements having <strong>the</strong><br />
same object can contradict each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time be such that both of <strong>the</strong>m are<br />
evident. 5 Here we have an ultimate insight—one that is axiomatic, a priori, <strong>and</strong> apodictic.<br />
No evident judgement can contradict ano<strong>the</strong>r evident judgement; hence <strong>the</strong> general validity<br />
of out knowledge is secured, absolutely <strong>and</strong> a priori.<br />
But we say that <strong>the</strong>re are “true” judgements which are not evident. For <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
judgements which resemble those that are evident in <strong>the</strong> following respects: <strong>the</strong>y can never<br />
be brought into contradiction with an insight; we may accept what follows from <strong>the</strong>m; <strong>and</strong><br />
so <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> same practical value as do judgements which are evident. We may thus<br />
consider <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>se judgements cannot contradict what is evident <strong>and</strong> look upon it<br />
fictitiously as though it constituted a characteristic of <strong>the</strong> judgements <strong>the</strong>mselves. We may<br />
<strong>the</strong>n construct a term—a denominatio extrinseca—which applies not only to insightful<br />
judgements but also to those blind judgements which cannot be brought into contradiction<br />
with any insightful judgement. Both types of judgement, nei<strong>the</strong>r of which can contradict<br />
what is evident, may be said to be true. And from this it follows that, although all insightful<br />
judgements are true, not all true judgements are evident.<br />
We can now see why it is that <strong>the</strong> truth of a judgement is generally taught to be a matter<br />
of logic <strong>and</strong> not a matter of psychology. For <strong>the</strong> grammatical predicate “true” does not<br />
indicate any real property of <strong>the</strong> judgement; hence it does not indicate any psychological<br />
property, such as that of being evident. <strong>The</strong>re is no act of judgement which refers directly<br />
to any so-called true judgement. 6<br />
One may see <strong>the</strong> justification of what we have said if one notes that a judgement, without<br />
itself being altered in <strong>the</strong> slightest, may change from true to false. Thus I may judge “it is<br />
raining” <strong>and</strong> continue so to judge after <strong>the</strong> rain has ceased. But if in saying, “<strong>The</strong> judgement<br />
A is true”, we are not in fact predicating anything of <strong>the</strong> judgement A, what is it that we<br />
are saying? We are rejecting <strong>the</strong> possibility of <strong>the</strong>re being an evident judgement which has<br />
<strong>the</strong> same object as <strong>the</strong> judgement called “true” but which does not have <strong>the</strong> same quality<br />
as <strong>the</strong> judgement called “true”. 7 We are apodictically denying or rejecting any judging<br />
consciousness which is judging with evidence but which is not making a judgement of <strong>the</strong><br />
same quality as <strong>the</strong> one that we are calling “true”.*<br />
* See <strong>the</strong> references under “richtig” in Vol. 2 of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Psychologie.