Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Introduction xxiii
one who judges with evidence does not constitute the meaning of these words. The point
is, rather, that the locutions in which these words are used cannot be understood without
thinking of one who judges with evidence.
What do we mean when we speak of “one who is judging truly”? The concept of
“justified in itself”—or, what comes to the same thing, “completely correct”, “perfectly
right”, “judgement of insight”, “insightful judgement”, or “knowing judgement”—is drawn
immediately from intuition. In analogy with what is generally true of the acquisition of
concepts, the distinguishing mark of such judgements stands out when they are contrasted
with judgements which lack this mark. No psychologistic investigation of the natural
causes of judgement and no “transcendental” investigation of the logical presuppositions
of judgement can reveal to us the nature of knowledge. The theory of knowledge must be
based upon the concept of the evident judgement.
But it is essential to recognize this distinction: although all insightful judgements are
true, not all true judgements are evident. In other words, no two judgements having the
same object can contradict each other and at the same time be such that both of them are
evident. 5 Here we have an ultimate insight—one that is axiomatic, a priori, and apodictic.
No evident judgement can contradict another evident judgement; hence the general validity
of out knowledge is secured, absolutely and a priori.
But we say that there are “true” judgements which are not evident. For there are
judgements which resemble those that are evident in the following respects: they can never
be brought into contradiction with an insight; we may accept what follows from them; and
so they have the same practical value as do judgements which are evident. We may thus
consider the fact that these judgements cannot contradict what is evident and look upon it
fictitiously as though it constituted a characteristic of the judgements themselves. We may
then construct a term—a denominatio extrinseca—which applies not only to insightful
judgements but also to those blind judgements which cannot be brought into contradiction
with any insightful judgement. Both types of judgement, neither of which can contradict
what is evident, may be said to be true. And from this it follows that, although all insightful
judgements are true, not all true judgements are evident.
We can now see why it is that the truth of a judgement is generally taught to be a matter
of logic and not a matter of psychology. For the grammatical predicate “true” does not
indicate any real property of the judgement; hence it does not indicate any psychological
property, such as that of being evident. There is no act of judgement which refers directly
to any so-called true judgement. 6
One may see the justification of what we have said if one notes that a judgement, without
itself being altered in the slightest, may change from true to false. Thus I may judge “it is
raining” and continue so to judge after the rain has ceased. But if in saying, “The judgement
A is true”, we are not in fact predicating anything of the judgement A, what is it that we
are saying? We are rejecting the possibility of there being an evident judgement which has
the same object as the judgement called “true” but which does not have the same quality
as the judgement called “true”. 7 We are apodictically denying or rejecting any judging
consciousness which is judging with evidence but which is not making a judgement of the
same quality as the one that we are calling “true”.*
* See the references under “richtig” in Vol. 2 of Brentano’s Psychologie.