Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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xxii Introduction<br />
<strong>The</strong>se irrealia, or non-things, are what fall under Husserl’s general “concept” of so-called<br />
ideal objects.<br />
We have already noted that at one time <strong>Brentano</strong> took “existence” <strong>and</strong> “non-existence”<br />
as terms which are correlatives to <strong>the</strong> concept of truth. This doctrine, which <strong>Brentano</strong> long<br />
since ab<strong>and</strong>oned <strong>and</strong> condemned as purely fictitious, is revived in Husserl’s Ideen. Husserl<br />
writes (p. 265): “We recognized that <strong>the</strong> description of <strong>the</strong> essence of consciousness<br />
leads back to <strong>the</strong> description of <strong>the</strong> essence of what it is that one is conscious of in that<br />
consciousness; this conscious correlate of consciousness is inseparable from it <strong>and</strong> yet not<br />
really contained within it.” <strong>The</strong> fact that new terms—“Negates” <strong>and</strong> “Affirmates”—have<br />
been coined for <strong>the</strong>se correlates need not prevent one from recognizing <strong>the</strong> origin of <strong>the</strong><br />
doctrine. To be sure, <strong>Brentano</strong> never deluded himself into believing that <strong>the</strong> supposed<br />
correlates of judgement are <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>the</strong> objects of judgement; Husserl makes this<br />
mistake, however, <strong>and</strong> in so doing is forced to ab<strong>and</strong>on <strong>the</strong> distinction between affirmative<br />
<strong>and</strong> negative judgements, reformulating it as a distinction between <strong>the</strong> supposed objects<br />
of judgement. 4 One finds nothing about “perception of states of affairs” in <strong>Brentano</strong>’s<br />
work.* And <strong>Brentano</strong> is far from thinking of “<strong>the</strong> number three” as an ideal object. It was<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r Bolzano who was responsible for <strong>the</strong>se doctrines. (<strong>Brentano</strong> recognized <strong>the</strong> value<br />
of Bolzano’s work <strong>and</strong> recommended it—not, however, because of <strong>the</strong>se doctrines, but<br />
because of Bolzano’s critical attitude with respect to Kant <strong>and</strong> his affinity with Leibniz.)<br />
After continued research <strong>and</strong> self-criticism, <strong>the</strong> later <strong>Brentano</strong> recognizes that <strong>the</strong><br />
correspondence <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> doctrine of states of affairs, states of value, meanings, ideal<br />
objects, <strong>and</strong> irrealla are mistaken, <strong>and</strong> he rejects <strong>the</strong>m. (Compare <strong>the</strong> third <strong>and</strong> fourth<br />
points in <strong>the</strong> statement of “psychologism” in Section 10 above.) This later view was first<br />
published in 1911, in <strong>the</strong> new edition of <strong>the</strong> Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene, but<br />
it had been set forth in letters to friends <strong>and</strong> students since 1905.<br />
<strong>The</strong> 1925 edition of Volume 2 of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie (which includes <strong>the</strong> third edition of <strong>the</strong><br />
Klassifikation) contains a series of farreaching discussions of <strong>the</strong>se questions taken from<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong>’s unpublished writings. As already noted, <strong>the</strong>se have gone unappreciated up to<br />
<strong>the</strong> present time. Despite <strong>the</strong> attitude of <strong>the</strong> phenomenologists <strong>and</strong> transcendentalists, I am<br />
confident that to compile <strong>and</strong> publish <strong>the</strong>se works, left to us by <strong>the</strong> foremost philosophical<br />
mind of our age, will contribute to <strong>the</strong> regeneration of philosophy. I venture to say that<br />
<strong>the</strong> most significant advance in philosophy since antiquity may be found here: in <strong>the</strong> final<br />
overthrow of <strong>the</strong> correspondence <strong>the</strong>ory; in <strong>the</strong> consequent liberation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong><br />
evident, <strong>and</strong> hence of epistemology, from <strong>the</strong> correspondence <strong>the</strong>ory; <strong>and</strong> finally in <strong>the</strong><br />
realization that <strong>the</strong>re can be awareness or consciousness only of things—that is to say, of<br />
realia or real entities (<strong>the</strong> onta of Aristotle’s <strong>the</strong>ory of categories).<br />
III. WHAT IS TRUTH?<br />
12. Our contention is this: All such expressions as “true” <strong>and</strong> “false”, “correct” <strong>and</strong><br />
“incorrect”, “truth”, “eternal truth”, “objective validity”, <strong>and</strong> “tenability”, function in <strong>the</strong><br />
language only to call up <strong>the</strong> thought of one who judges with evidence. But <strong>the</strong> idea of<br />
* See Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. 2, Part 2, pp. 140, 122.