Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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xx Introduction 9. The dictations on the true and the evident, which make up Part Four, present Brentano’s view in its most mature form. They were written during the last years of his life and supplement what is set forth in the letters. There are certain unavoidable repetitions; but in view of the misunderstandings which Brentano’s views still encounter, a certain amount of repetition can do no harm. The Appendix includes an account of the origin of the earlier view; I owe this, along with considerable stimulation, to my friend, A.Kastil. 3 A letter to Husserl, and a fragment which has been found of another letter to Husserl, have been also included. Brentano is here concerned with the nature of mathematical propositions, a question which he repeatedly investigated. The letters touch upon the relation between psychology and logic and protest against a certain misuse of the term “logic”. And, what is more important, they throw light upon what Husserl calls “psychologism” and show that he was mistaken in his criticism of those who would set up logic in relation to psychology: there is no ground for saying that this way of conceiving logic makes “truth” dependent upon our psychophysical organization. With the exposure of Husserl’s confusion, the motivating force behind the bizarre speculations of “phenomenology” is removed. One wonders how long these efforts on the part of a thinker of Brentano’s stature will continue to be neglected. Will German philosophers still refuse to consider and evaluate Brentano’s critique of their phenomenological and transcendental fantasies? And will the phenomenologists and transcendentalists continue to look upon him as the representative of a psychologism long since refuted and reduced to absurdity? Let us try to see just how he is related to this psychologism. II. PSYCHOLOGISM AND PHENOMENOLOGISM 10. Husserl is now thought of as the opponent par excellence of psychologism. His criticism is directed towards philosophers who fall into the following categories: (1) those who would reduce the universal validity of truth to the particular make-up of human beings, or who would contest the universal validity of knowledge;* (2) more particularly, those who would interpret the evident as a kind of feeling;† (3) those who would affirm that the correctness of a judgement consists in something other than its appropriateness in relation to “the truth”;‡ (4) those who would deny that there are “ideal objects”, ideal meanings, propositions (Sätze), states of affairs (Sachverhalte), “ideal unities”, Platonic ideas which “are experienced in acts of ideation”, contents of judgements, and “Affirmates” and “Negates” as ideal unities.* These characterizations of psychologism are taken for the most part from Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, which is supposed to be the basis and point of departure for all * Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd edn (Halle 1913, 1921), Vol. I, pp. 191, 121. † Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 180; Vol. II, Part 2, p. 127. ‡ Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 150, 186, 191. * Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 191, 129. Compare: “As we have said, the number three, the truth which has been named after Pythagoras, and the like, are not empirical particulars or classes of such particulars; they are ideal objects which we grasp ideationally in the correlating activities of counting, judging with evidence, and so on.” (Vol. I, pp. 186–7.)
Introduction xxi the developments and deviations of so-called “phenomenology”. To call Brentano’s theory of knowledge “psychologism”, on the basis of these remarks of Husserl, is fantastic and contrary to all historic truth. Let us compare certain passages from the first edition of Brentano’s Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889) with certain characteristic statements from the second edition of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Brentano (pp. 80–81): “Any judgement which is seen by one person to be true is universally valid; its contradictory cannot be seen to be evident by any other person; and anyone who accepts its contradictory is ipso facto mistaken. What I am here saying pertains to the nature of truth: anyone who thus sees into something as true is also able to see that he is justified in regarding it as a truth for all.” Husserl (Vol. I, p. 191): “And accordingly we have the insight that if we have a genuine insight, then no one else can have a genuine insight which conflicts with it.” Brentano (p. 79): “The peculiar nature of insight—the clarity and evidence of certain judgements—which is inseparable from their truth—has little or nothing to do with a feeling of compulsion…. We can understand what distinguishes it from other judgements only if we look for it in the inner peculiarity of the act of insight itself.” Husserl (Vol. I, p. 189): “Evidence is not a concomitant feeling which, accidentally or otherwise, connects itself with certain judgements. It is not at all a psychical characteristic which simply happens to be attached to a given judgement of some particular class (such as the class of so-called ‘true judgements’).” Brentano (paragraph 11): “The precepts of logic are naturally valid rules of judging; that is to say, we must adhere to them, since the judgement which accords with them is certain and that which does not is exposed to error. Thus we are concerned here with the fact that thought processes which conform to rules are naturally superior to those which do not.” Husserl (Vol. I, p. 157): “The general conviction that the propositions of logic are norms of thinking cannot be entirely unfounded; the self-evidence with which it enlightens cannot be pure deception. Thought which is in accordance with rules has a certain inner superiority which distinguishes these propositions from others.” It is also noteworthy that, in the polemic against psychologism in Volume 1 of the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl does not attack Brentano himself. Nor does he cite Brentano as the source of his critique. 11. This comparison of passages is relevant to the first two of the psychologistic theses referred to above. Brentano’s views on these points are made abundantly clear in the selections that follow. As for the third thesis, which Husserl opposes by appeal to the so-called correspondence theory, Husserl’s argument is taken directly from the writings and lectures of Brentano, who had extended and modified the Aristotelian tradition. This is also true of the fourth point: Brentano had made the assumption of irrealia—of states of affairs (existences and non-existences)—in the first of the selections published here and modified the principle of adaequatio rei et intellectus by saying that our judgements must be adequate to these irrealia. At the time of the lecture, he thus taught that there are certain entities that are not things; his pupils were later to introduce new technical terms. Where others spoke of “states of affairs” or “truths”, Meinong, for example, spoke of “objectives”.
Page 2 and 3: Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5: Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11: INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
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44 The True and the Evident concept
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46 The True and the Evident 13. But
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48 The True and the Evident each of
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50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
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I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
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II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
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III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
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58 The True and the Evident When do
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60 The True and the Evident I have
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62 The True and the Evident the con
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64 The True and the Evident to supp
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66 The True and the Evident degree
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68 The True and the Evident concept
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70 The True and the Evident non-exi
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Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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74 The True and the Evident 6. And
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76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
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II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
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80 The True and the Evident that re
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82 The True and the Evident in whic
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84 The True and the Evident would s
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86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
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VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
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APPENDICES
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92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
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NOTES by Oskar Kraus
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100 Notes between saying (i) that i
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102 Notes and futural thinking are
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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