Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Introduction xix
but appeal to the evidence of judgement or valuation—to the judgement or valuation which
is seen to be correct? And if the judgement or valuation is seen to be correct, then what is
accomplished by the assumption of all of these irrealia? If one man makes a judgement
which is seen to be correct and another man makes a judgement which contradicts it,
then it is not possible for the second judgement to be evident or correct. Analogously for
evaluation: if a man makes an evaluation which is seen to be correct, then no other correct
evaluation can contradict it. What more is needed to ensure objectivity and absolute and
general validity?
Actually if we say it is an “eternal truth” that two and two are four, we mean no more
than this: no judgement contradicting the apodictic denial or rejection of a two and two,
which is not equal to four, can possibly be evident. In other words: the apodictic denial
or rejection of a two and two not equal to four, cannot possibly be false. One thus denies
apodictically that there can be an evident judgement denying that two and two are four.*
7. Part Two, entitled “Transition to the Later View”, contains a letter and two essays.
Brentano’s letter, written to Marty in 1901, constitutes a turning-point in the theory of
concepts. From here on, the reform moves closer and closer to the later view which is set
forth in Part Three. Further progress in this direction is manifested in “The Equivocal Use
of the Term ‘Existent’”. This essay, from the year 1904, is of interest from the point of
view of the philosophy of language. It has been superseded in some respects, especially
by Anton Marty’s Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und
Sprachphilosophie (Halle 1908), and there are still rudiments of the correspondence theory
in paragraphs 27, 28, and 29. But this essay signifies an emphatic renunciation of all entia
rationis and irrealia; the concept of “being” or “existing” is now investigated from the
point of view of language. In this selection—more particularly, in a comment which I
have taken from a note dated 16 November, 1905—it is shown that the terms “being” and
“existing” are merely synsemantic and pertain to denominationes extrinsecae (see the index
of Volume 2 of the Psychologie). The selection of 1905, entitled “Language”, although it
is concerned with other topics, contains important material, especially in paragraphs 3 to 5
inclusive, supplementing what has previously been said.
8. Part Three is entitled “The Later View: As Set Forth in Letters”. It consists of selected
passages from Brentano’s letters, which have already been published, in part, in the
Philosophische Hefte (1929).
Brentano is now fully aware of the imaginary nature of so-called ideal objects, unreal
entities, and states of affairs. In this context one may compare the letter of 14 September,
1909, which is published in the Introduction to Volume 1 of the Psychologie, as well as the
essays in the Appendix of that work. The letters to Marty are easy to understand, but those
that are addressed to me are more difficult. I have felt it in order, therefore, to add to my
notes a general synopsis of Brentano’s line of thought.*
* See Brentano’s essays in Part Four.
* I should like to express my thanks to Dr George Katkov for his help in connection with this
synopsis, as well as for his valuable assistance in preparing the present book.