Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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124 Notes someone who is judging with evidence. But this is not to say that to assert that a statement is true is to assert that there is someone who judges with evidence. Obviously the latter would be “psychologism”. 28 In thinking of a person who believes in the devil, I am thinking of the person in modo recto and of the devil in modo obliquo. A correct belief in someone who believes in the devil does not in any way imply a belief in the devil. 29 The dictation contains “impossible(unmöglich)” in place of “possible”; obviously the one taking the dictation did not correctly hear what Brentano was saying. 30 The word “affirmative” has been inserted; evidently it was not heard by the one taking the dictation. 31 The final statement contains the solution to the whole problem. The statement which immediately precludes it, like some of the formulations in other essays (e.g. the preceding selection which was dictated at a later date), attempts to rescue the “adaequatio” principle by taking it to say that the judgement “A is” is correct if A is, and that the judgement “A is not” is incorrect if A is not. But this is more or less a tautology and, as indicated in note 106, hardly satisfactory. In this context I would like to call the reader’s attention to Anton Marty’s Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 204 ff. Marty there defends the view that the concept of existence involves a relation to the truth of a judgement, and indeed to an affirmative judgement. In criticizing this, Jerusalem requires that the concept of existence be reduced to that of the evident judgement. But Marty believes that the concept of existence may be explicated without reference to evidence; it is sufficient to relate it to the concept of truth. Marty held that truth, or correctness, consisted in the judgement having some kind of correspondence in relation to existence or non-existence. Jerusalem was right, however, at least to the extent of holding that one cannot speak of truth without reference to an evident judgement. But it is enough to think of someone judging with evidence and to believe that no one making a contrary judgement can judge with evidence. 32 That is to say, every judgement of inner perception is evident in spite of the fact that, by its very nature, it can be evident only to one person; hence evidence cannot consist in the fact that many people agree. 33 In such cases there is no clear and distinct conception. But there can be no doubt that the chord is heard. On Descartes, see Vol. III of the Psychologie, Part I, Chap. 3. 34 Brentano does not apply the term “evident” to those emotions that are seen to be correct; he reserves the term for judgements that are seen to be correct. 35 Compare Part IV, note 11. 36 The term “insight (Einsehen)” is preferable when one is speaking of a priori evidence and where the term “understanding (Verstehen)” would be used. See O.Kraus, “Geisteswissenschaft und Psychologie”, in Euphorion, Vol. 28 (1927). 37 Compare the discussion of the concept of probability in Franz Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis (Leipzig 1925), appendix, especially p. 177, and note 45, on p. 209. 38 The question could also be put in this way: Is the evidence of a judgement related to the judgement in the way a property (accident) is related to the thing that has the property (as colour is related to what is extended) or in the way in which a species is related to its genus (as what is red is related to what is coloured)? It could be asked whether these alternatives exhaust all the possibilities. Is there also a possibility that the evident judgement—the judgement constituting the knowledge—contains the judgement as a dependent and inseparable element, whereas the blind judgement which agrees with it may exist separately, on its own? Analogously, a three-dimensional body may be contained in a four-dimensional body as a dependent boundary or limit, and a three-dimensional body may also exist independently and on its own. I touch on the question here only because Brentano indicates, later on in the article, that he does not there complete his discussion of the problem. A similar question arises in connection with the relation of judgement and emotions to the ideas or thoughts which are included in them. 39 For further details, see Brentano’s Kategorienlehre (Leipzig 1933), ed. Alfred Kastil. 40 We may briefly summarize these considerations: Brentano here considers only the possibilities that the evidence is an accident of the judging and that it is a specific difference of the judging. The
Notes 125 latter would be impossible, if judgement were a genus having only specific differences which exclude each other, as the specific differences of affirming and denying exclude each other. But this is not the case, since the judging relation may be specified in other ways; for example, it may be specified according to its object. Hence it might be possible to think of evidence as a specific difference of judgement. Brentano believes, however, that such a possibility must be ruled out; if a thing loses its specific difference, the difference must be replaced by another, since nothing can exist as a universal. But an evident judgement may cease to be evident without thereby becoming a universal. Hence the only remaining possibility is that evidence is to be thought of as an accident of the judgement; for if an accident falls away from a subject, it is not necessary that the subject acquire something else in its place. But Brentano does not feel that the question has been entirely settled. Thus he calls attention to the fact that, in the case of secondary consciousness, if the evidence falls away then the judgement is changed; this could be reconciled with saying that evidence is an accident of judgement only if two secondary perceptions could fit into each other, so to speak; in which case, the perception of the entire evident judgement would include another secondary perception of the judgement apart from its evidence, and this latter would underlie the former as a substratum. Such considerations, then, lead back to the third possible solution, mentioned at the end of the previous note. 41 The dictation reads “factual judgements” (tatsächliche Urteile), but what is intended is “vérités de fait”, or assertoric judgements. 42 For further details see Part I of Vol. III of the Psychologie, i.e., Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein. 43 To remember something means, according to this, to believe that one has experienced suchand-such states of consciousness, and to believe this directly or immediately, that is, without any motivation, but with a certain blind impulse. In other cases of believing about the past, however, one’s belief is based upon certain documents, reports, or other indications; in such cases one believes indirectly and trusts in the reliability of these signs of what is past. 44 “Lack of external evidence” here means: lack of evidence from external perception. 45 Compare Vol. II of the Psychologie, Appendix, p. 142, and Vol. III, note 15, p. 131. 46 That is to say, the question arises whether that which is empirically valid for us—namely, the restriction of direct factual knowledge to knowledge of the perceiver himself—is also valid, without exception, for all knowing beings. 47 Compare Oskar Kraus: Franz Brentano, mit Beiträgen von Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl (Munich 1919). 48 Compare Vol. III of the Psychologie, Chap. I, Sect. 8. 49 At this point the dictation breaks off. Probably the following is what was meant: our rational knowledge, which is always a matter of a priori apodictic denial, implies simple assertoric denial; similarly, a universal and unconditional knowledge of necessity, though not within the reach of human beings, would imply simple assertoric affirmation. See Brentano’s Versuch über die Erkenntnis. APPENDICES (References 1–20) 1 When Brentano speaks of logic as an “Art”, he is referring to an applied art, a in the sense of the Greek philosophers, an ars cogitandi. 2 To understand Brentano’s defence against the accusation of “psychologism” and his own objections to Husserl’s views, we need not ask whether the characterization in the letter corresponds to Husserl’s later point of view. 3 This is the principal point of Husserl’s critique.
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
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12 The True and the Evident this ex
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14 The True and the Evident be give
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16 The True and the Evident referen
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II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
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III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
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22 The True and the Evident somethi
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24 The True and the Evident Psychol
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26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
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28 The True and the Evident logicia
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30 The True and the Evident which i
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32 The True and the Evident There i
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34 The True and the Evident Are we
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36 The True and the Evident way. On
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38 The True and the Evident It is c
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40 The True and the Evident is basi
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Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
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44 The True and the Evident concept
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46 The True and the Evident 13. But
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48 The True and the Evident each of
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50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
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I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
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II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
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III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
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58 The True and the Evident When do
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60 The True and the Evident I have
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62 The True and the Evident the con
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64 The True and the Evident to supp
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66 The True and the Evident degree
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68 The True and the Evident concept
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70 The True and the Evident non-exi
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Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137: 114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139: 116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141: 118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143: 120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145: 122 Notes these consequences, which
Page 148 and 149: 126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151: INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153: 130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155: 132 Index propositions; see content
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