Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Notes 123<br />
10 <strong>Brentano</strong> means that <strong>the</strong> proponent of psychologism, in <strong>the</strong> sense in which “psychologism” is a term<br />
of reproach, confuses a judgement’s being evident with <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> members of a certain species<br />
of living things are more or less generally determined to judge in a certain way. See <strong>the</strong> discussion<br />
of Husserl’s <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>and</strong> its origin, in Part II of <strong>the</strong> Introduction to <strong>the</strong> present book. And compare<br />
<strong>the</strong> two essays on <strong>the</strong> evident that follow (<strong>the</strong> fifth <strong>and</strong> sixth essays of Part IV) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Appendix.<br />
11 To say that <strong>the</strong>re is no possibility of error in <strong>the</strong> case of a judgement that is evident <strong>and</strong> certain is<br />
to say this: it is impossible for anyone who contradicts that judgement to be judging with evidence.<br />
And to say that it is impossible for one contradicting <strong>the</strong> judgement not to be in error, is to say this:<br />
it is impossible for anyone who judges with evidence to contradict an evident judgement. In o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
words, <strong>the</strong> expressions “<strong>the</strong>re is no possibility of error” <strong>and</strong> “it is impossible for one who contradicts<br />
<strong>the</strong> judgement not to be in error” come to <strong>the</strong> same thing.<br />
12 See <strong>the</strong> discussion of Sigwart, in Part I <strong>and</strong> Part I, note 53. Compare O.Kraus, “Die ‘kopernikanische<br />
Wendung’ in <strong>Brentano</strong>s Erkenntnisund Wertlehre,” Philosophische Hefte (1929), No. 3.<br />
13 Compare Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 136 ff., <strong>and</strong> elsewhere.<br />
14 Compare Psychologie, Vol. II, Appendix IV, p. 147 <strong>and</strong> Appendix IX, p. 169.<br />
15 <strong>Brentano</strong> himself had held this view earlier; see paragraph 4 of <strong>the</strong> criticism of Windelb<strong>and</strong>, in<br />
Part I. <strong>The</strong> grounds for <strong>the</strong> earlier view <strong>and</strong> for <strong>Brentano</strong>’s subsequent criticism of it are set forth in<br />
detail in a letter to O.Kraus, dated 14 September, 1909, <strong>and</strong> published in <strong>the</strong> introduction to Vol. I of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Psychologie (p. xlvi); see also pp. 162 ff. of <strong>the</strong> same book.<br />
16 See <strong>the</strong> Appendix to <strong>the</strong> present book <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> editor’s comments.<br />
17 <strong>The</strong> word “nothing” is obviously not an autosemantic expression. See O.Kraus, review of<br />
Hermann Cohen’s Schriften, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No. 30 (1929); “Über Nichts und Alles” (in<br />
Kraus’s Wege und Abwege der Philosophie, Prague 1934).<br />
18 <strong>The</strong> word “activity” is here used in contrast with “faculty” or “capability”—actus in contrast with<br />
potentia. But this “activity” is obviously something which is brought about, a passio in <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian sense.<br />
19 In <strong>the</strong> most general sense of <strong>the</strong> term res, encompassing what is mental as well as what is extended.<br />
20 Compare <strong>the</strong> discussion of time in Vol. III of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie.<br />
21 <strong>Brentano</strong> means it would be a mistake to suppose that, if one speaks of something past, one is<br />
thinking, not of a thing, but of an ens rationis called “a past thing”.<br />
22 I believe that <strong>Brentano</strong> is here saying that we do not owe our possession of <strong>the</strong> truth to a<br />
comparision of our knowledge with a thing.<br />
23 All <strong>the</strong>se attempts have been touched upon in <strong>the</strong> earlier criticisms. If one wished to apply<br />
<strong>the</strong> “adaequatio” <strong>the</strong>ory to past <strong>and</strong> future things <strong>and</strong> yet avoid <strong>the</strong> fiction of “being in <strong>the</strong> past”<br />
<strong>and</strong> “being in <strong>the</strong> future”, one would have to proceed from things which exist <strong>and</strong> draw upon <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
causal relations to earlier <strong>and</strong> later things. <strong>The</strong> text is directed against this latter consequence.<br />
24 See <strong>the</strong> comment on paragraph 24 of <strong>the</strong> lecture on truth <strong>and</strong> what is said, in Part I, note 2,<br />
concerning Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s definition <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that he was more or less getting at something correct.<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> kept to <strong>the</strong> ordinary interpretation of <strong>the</strong> term “rule”, but Windelb<strong>and</strong>, as is apparent from<br />
<strong>the</strong> passage cited in <strong>the</strong> Präludien, understood it by reference to our normative consciousness.<br />
25 One could consistently add, at this point, that it would be advisable to discard <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis altoge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />
And this is what is said in <strong>the</strong> next essay.<br />
26 One can list certain types of judgement which are directly evident <strong>and</strong> with respect to which<br />
any doubt would be entirely unreasonable; for example, <strong>the</strong> law of contradiction <strong>and</strong> certain axioms<br />
pertaining to space <strong>and</strong> time. If, in a given case, <strong>the</strong>re is danger of erroneously taking a judgement to<br />
be one that is evident, we can properly reassure ourselves if <strong>the</strong> judgement in question agrees with<br />
one of those which are not exposed to any such danger. But in certain cases this help may not be<br />
available. <strong>The</strong>re are fur<strong>the</strong>r details in <strong>the</strong> following selections on <strong>the</strong> evident.<br />
27 <strong>The</strong> expression “someone who is judging correctly” is here meant to refer to one who judges with<br />
evidence. Thus <strong>the</strong> entire statement tells us that any reference to truth must involve <strong>the</strong> thought of