Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Notes 123
10 Brentano means that the proponent of psychologism, in the sense in which “psychologism” is a term
of reproach, confuses a judgement’s being evident with the fact that the members of a certain species
of living things are more or less generally determined to judge in a certain way. See the discussion
of Husserl’s theory and its origin, in Part II of the Introduction to the present book. And compare
the two essays on the evident that follow (the fifth and sixth essays of Part IV) and the Appendix.
11 To say that there is no possibility of error in the case of a judgement that is evident and certain is
to say this: it is impossible for anyone who contradicts that judgement to be judging with evidence.
And to say that it is impossible for one contradicting the judgement not to be in error, is to say this:
it is impossible for anyone who judges with evidence to contradict an evident judgement. In other
words, the expressions “there is no possibility of error” and “it is impossible for one who contradicts
the judgement not to be in error” come to the same thing.
12 See the discussion of Sigwart, in Part I and Part I, note 53. Compare O.Kraus, “Die ‘kopernikanische
Wendung’ in Brentanos Erkenntnisund Wertlehre,” Philosophische Hefte (1929), No. 3.
13 Compare Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 136 ff., and elsewhere.
14 Compare Psychologie, Vol. II, Appendix IV, p. 147 and Appendix IX, p. 169.
15 Brentano himself had held this view earlier; see paragraph 4 of the criticism of Windelband, in
Part I. The grounds for the earlier view and for Brentano’s subsequent criticism of it are set forth in
detail in a letter to O.Kraus, dated 14 September, 1909, and published in the introduction to Vol. I of
the Psychologie (p. xlvi); see also pp. 162 ff. of the same book.
16 See the Appendix to the present book and the editor’s comments.
17 The word “nothing” is obviously not an autosemantic expression. See O.Kraus, review of
Hermann Cohen’s Schriften, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No. 30 (1929); “Über Nichts und Alles” (in
Kraus’s Wege und Abwege der Philosophie, Prague 1934).
18 The word “activity” is here used in contrast with “faculty” or “capability”—actus in contrast with
potentia. But this “activity” is obviously something which is brought about, a passio in the Aristotelian sense.
19 In the most general sense of the term res, encompassing what is mental as well as what is extended.
20 Compare the discussion of time in Vol. III of the Psychologie.
21 Brentano means it would be a mistake to suppose that, if one speaks of something past, one is
thinking, not of a thing, but of an ens rationis called “a past thing”.
22 I believe that Brentano is here saying that we do not owe our possession of the truth to a
comparision of our knowledge with a thing.
23 All these attempts have been touched upon in the earlier criticisms. If one wished to apply
the “adaequatio” theory to past and future things and yet avoid the fiction of “being in the past”
and “being in the future”, one would have to proceed from things which exist and draw upon their
causal relations to earlier and later things. The text is directed against this latter consequence.
24 See the comment on paragraph 24 of the lecture on truth and what is said, in Part I, note 2,
concerning Windelband’s definition and the fact that he was more or less getting at something correct.
Brentano kept to the ordinary interpretation of the term “rule”, but Windelband, as is apparent from
the passage cited in the Präludien, understood it by reference to our normative consciousness.
25 One could consistently add, at this point, that it would be advisable to discard the thesis altogether.
And this is what is said in the next essay.
26 One can list certain types of judgement which are directly evident and with respect to which
any doubt would be entirely unreasonable; for example, the law of contradiction and certain axioms
pertaining to space and time. If, in a given case, there is danger of erroneously taking a judgement to
be one that is evident, we can properly reassure ourselves if the judgement in question agrees with
one of those which are not exposed to any such danger. But in certain cases this help may not be
available. There are further details in the following selections on the evident.
27 The expression “someone who is judging correctly” is here meant to refer to one who judges with
evidence. Thus the entire statement tells us that any reference to truth must involve the thought of