Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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122 Notes these consequences, which he had earlier drawn himself, and persisted in his opposition to them for the remainder of his life. To be sure, unlike the later Brentano, Marty never held that, in the cases at issue, only realia are thought about, or that only realia can be thought about. The assertion that “form words” are not true names concerns such words as “size” and “redness”—in short, the so-called grammatical abstracta. These play an important role in the philosophy of Aristotle; he takes them to be logical names, indicating the “form” or “actuality” in virtue of which the potential becomes actual and the inherent possibilities in things are realized. See Brentano’s Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung (Leipzig 1911). In 1901, Brentano came to see that these “form words” are merely synsemantic expressions. And this conclusion, as we have noted, led him to see that other grammatical names (e.g. “being”, “non-being”, “possibility”, “impossibility”, etc.) are not true logical names and that these too are synsemantica; hence it is a mistake to suppose that they signify the meaning of any concept. See the letter to Marty dated March 1901 (at the beginning of Part Two of this book) and the letter dated 1 March, 1906 (the second letter in Part Three). 45 According to Brentano, external perception (i.e., the sensation of seeing, of hearing, and of the third sense, under which he subsumes all other sensory experiences) is not merely a matter of presentation or thought; it also involves belief in the colours, sounds, and other qualities—but the belief is blind and thus lacks evidence. (See Vol. III of the Psychologie.) This peculiar instinctive perceptual belief is also to be found in animals; anyone who doubts this would find it difficult to account for animal behaviour. 46 Brentano here refers to the biography of Marty which I had prepared as an introduction to Marty’s Gesammelte Schriften (Halle, 1916–1920). The biography is also published separately: Oskar Kraus, Anton Marty: sein Leben und seine Werke (Halle 1916). At that time I was still siding with Marty on these questions. 47 The distinction between those judgements that are “merely true” and those that are “logically justified” is of fundamental importance. A judgement that is “merely true” and not logically justified may be called a true judgement which is blind. Its truth can be ascertained only by comparing it with some judgement which is in itself justified or evident. When such comparison is not possible, we may still speak of “a true judgement that is not evident”. This would mean that the judgement is one such that no evident judgement about the same object could possibly contradict it; every evident judgement would be in agreement with it. See sections 46 ff. of the first essay, “On the Concept of Truth”. PART FOUR (References 1–49) 1 Brentano himself once held this view, as may be seen from the polemic against Windelband in Part One of the present book. See the notes by Professor A.Kastil which constitute the final selection in the Appendix. 2 See the letter to O.Kraus, dated 16 November, 1914. The present essay was written a few days after that letter and elaborates what was said there. 3 On the proof of the impossibility of infinite multiplicities, see F. Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis (F.Meiner, Leipzig 1925), and Vom Dasein Gottes (F.Meiner, Leipzig 1929). 4 Brentano has made a mistake with respect to this point, since Husserl maintains that there is a perception of states of affairs. See Part Two of the editor’s introduction to the present book. 5 Cf. Versuch über die Erkenntnis, p. 44. 6 Cf. Psychologie, Vol. III, Introduction, p. xxi. 7 That these theses do not completely solve the problem is clear from the essay of 5 March, 1915, below. Compare Part III, note 30 concerning the letter to Marty, dated 2 Sept., 1906, and the editor’s Introduction. 8 To anyone familiar with Brentano’s theory of judgement, it is obvious that “to deny the existence of a thing” means only to deny the thing. 9 There are further details in Vol. II of the Psychologie; see Appendix XI, p. 179, “Vom Psychologismus.”
Notes 123 10 Brentano means that the proponent of psychologism, in the sense in which “psychologism” is a term of reproach, confuses a judgement’s being evident with the fact that the members of a certain species of living things are more or less generally determined to judge in a certain way. See the discussion of Husserl’s theory and its origin, in Part II of the Introduction to the present book. And compare the two essays on the evident that follow (the fifth and sixth essays of Part IV) and the Appendix. 11 To say that there is no possibility of error in the case of a judgement that is evident and certain is to say this: it is impossible for anyone who contradicts that judgement to be judging with evidence. And to say that it is impossible for one contradicting the judgement not to be in error, is to say this: it is impossible for anyone who judges with evidence to contradict an evident judgement. In other words, the expressions “there is no possibility of error” and “it is impossible for one who contradicts the judgement not to be in error” come to the same thing. 12 See the discussion of Sigwart, in Part I and Part I, note 53. Compare O.Kraus, “Die ‘kopernikanische Wendung’ in Brentanos Erkenntnisund Wertlehre,” Philosophische Hefte (1929), No. 3. 13 Compare Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 136 ff., and elsewhere. 14 Compare Psychologie, Vol. II, Appendix IV, p. 147 and Appendix IX, p. 169. 15 Brentano himself had held this view earlier; see paragraph 4 of the criticism of Windelband, in Part I. The grounds for the earlier view and for Brentano’s subsequent criticism of it are set forth in detail in a letter to O.Kraus, dated 14 September, 1909, and published in the introduction to Vol. I of the Psychologie (p. xlvi); see also pp. 162 ff. of the same book. 16 See the Appendix to the present book and the editor’s comments. 17 The word “nothing” is obviously not an autosemantic expression. See O.Kraus, review of Hermann Cohen’s Schriften, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No. 30 (1929); “Über Nichts und Alles” (in Kraus’s Wege und Abwege der Philosophie, Prague 1934). 18 The word “activity” is here used in contrast with “faculty” or “capability”—actus in contrast with potentia. But this “activity” is obviously something which is brought about, a passio in the Aristotelian sense. 19 In the most general sense of the term res, encompassing what is mental as well as what is extended. 20 Compare the discussion of time in Vol. III of the Psychologie. 21 Brentano means it would be a mistake to suppose that, if one speaks of something past, one is thinking, not of a thing, but of an ens rationis called “a past thing”. 22 I believe that Brentano is here saying that we do not owe our possession of the truth to a comparision of our knowledge with a thing. 23 All these attempts have been touched upon in the earlier criticisms. If one wished to apply the “adaequatio” theory to past and future things and yet avoid the fiction of “being in the past” and “being in the future”, one would have to proceed from things which exist and draw upon their causal relations to earlier and later things. The text is directed against this latter consequence. 24 See the comment on paragraph 24 of the lecture on truth and what is said, in Part I, note 2, concerning Windelband’s definition and the fact that he was more or less getting at something correct. Brentano kept to the ordinary interpretation of the term “rule”, but Windelband, as is apparent from the passage cited in the Präludien, understood it by reference to our normative consciousness. 25 One could consistently add, at this point, that it would be advisable to discard the thesis altogether. And this is what is said in the next essay. 26 One can list certain types of judgement which are directly evident and with respect to which any doubt would be entirely unreasonable; for example, the law of contradiction and certain axioms pertaining to space and time. If, in a given case, there is danger of erroneously taking a judgement to be one that is evident, we can properly reassure ourselves if the judgement in question agrees with one of those which are not exposed to any such danger. But in certain cases this help may not be available. There are further details in the following selections on the evident. 27 The expression “someone who is judging correctly” is here meant to refer to one who judges with evidence. Thus the entire statement tells us that any reference to truth must involve the thought of
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
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12 The True and the Evident this ex
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14 The True and the Evident be give
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16 The True and the Evident referen
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II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
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III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
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22 The True and the Evident somethi
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24 The True and the Evident Psychol
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26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
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28 The True and the Evident logicia
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30 The True and the Evident which i
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32 The True and the Evident There i
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34 The True and the Evident Are we
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36 The True and the Evident way. On
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38 The True and the Evident It is c
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40 The True and the Evident is basi
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Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
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44 The True and the Evident concept
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46 The True and the Evident 13. But
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48 The True and the Evident each of
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50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
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I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
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II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
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III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
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58 The True and the Evident When do
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60 The True and the Evident I have
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62 The True and the Evident the con
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64 The True and the Evident to supp
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66 The True and the Evident degree
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68 The True and the Evident concept
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70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
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Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137: 114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139: 116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141: 118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143: 120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 146 and 147: 124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149: 126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151: INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153: 130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155: 132 Index propositions; see content
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