Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Notes 121<br />
Thus we have developed <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis that “<strong>the</strong> non-being of a thing” is not <strong>the</strong> name of anything<br />
which can be affirmed or denied or even thought about. <strong>The</strong> same is true of “<strong>the</strong> being of a thing”, of<br />
its “possibility” <strong>and</strong> “impossibility”, <strong>and</strong> so on. All <strong>the</strong>se expressions, which make up <strong>the</strong> greater part<br />
of Kant’s Table of Categories, are merely synsemantic terms (or synsemantica); <strong>the</strong>ir function in language<br />
may be indicated by analyses similar to that just given. We see at <strong>the</strong> same time that Kant may<br />
have had a vague idea of all this, when he tried to relate his categories to <strong>the</strong> table of judgements.<br />
41 As is well known, Hume <strong>and</strong> Mill deny <strong>the</strong> strict concept of causal efficacy.<br />
42 Despite <strong>Brentano</strong>’s penetrating criticism of Marty’s later work, we must not lose sight of <strong>the</strong><br />
fact that <strong>Brentano</strong> himself was significantly influenced by Marty. Marty had immediately drawn<br />
consequences from <strong>Brentano</strong>’s rejection of <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian doctrine of “forms”, but <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
acknowledged <strong>the</strong>se only after considerable resistance.<br />
43 As early as <strong>the</strong> year 1909,1 had corresponded with <strong>Brentano</strong> on <strong>the</strong>se questions, without allowing<br />
myself to become convinced. After <strong>the</strong> death of Marty in 1914, <strong>the</strong>re began a more intensive<br />
correspondence. <strong>Brentano</strong> set forth his reasons once again with great patience, <strong>and</strong> I stubbornly<br />
adhered to my untenable position. This apparent blindness on my part, which is now incomprehensible<br />
to me, tried <strong>Brentano</strong>’s patience to <strong>the</strong> utmost, but it did not deter him from developing his<br />
argument. It was responsible for <strong>the</strong> good-natured ridicule which is manifested here <strong>and</strong> elsewhere.<br />
44 I have been able to ascertain <strong>the</strong> following from <strong>the</strong> correspondence between <strong>Brentano</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
Marty. <strong>The</strong> subject-matter of <strong>the</strong> correspondence was Marty’s investigation into language <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
various questions to which <strong>the</strong>se investigations led. It was Marty who set all <strong>the</strong> problems: thus he<br />
posed <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>Brentano</strong> <strong>and</strong> described his own attempts at solving <strong>the</strong>m. <strong>Brentano</strong> would <strong>the</strong>n reply,<br />
sometimes agreeing, <strong>and</strong> sometimes not agreeing; in this way a lively debate ensued. During <strong>the</strong><br />
course of this debate, <strong>Brentano</strong> proposed <strong>the</strong> “far-reaching <strong>the</strong>sis” mentioned in <strong>the</strong> letter to Marty<br />
of March 1901 (<strong>the</strong> first selection in Part II of <strong>the</strong> present book): <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis, namely, that grammatical<br />
abstracta, such as “redness’, “colour”, “virtue”, “size”, (i.e. <strong>the</strong> so-called Aristotelian “form words”),<br />
are “fictions of speech” which do not <strong>the</strong>mselves designate anything. “To speak of a redness which<br />
is inherent in <strong>the</strong> thing <strong>and</strong> which constitutes <strong>the</strong> thing as something red”, <strong>Brentano</strong> had written, “is<br />
to misconceive that property of general concepts which is revealed only through experience.” Marty<br />
agreed at once <strong>and</strong> accepted <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory himself; see Anton Marty, Die “logische”, “lokalistische”<br />
und <strong>and</strong>ere Kasus<strong>the</strong>orien (Halle 1910), pp. 94 ff. Indeed, Marty not only agreed, but immediately<br />
(1901) drew <strong>the</strong> important consequence that even <strong>the</strong> so-called “contents of judgement” are linguistic<br />
fictions (where <strong>the</strong> content of <strong>the</strong> judgement “A is” would be <strong>the</strong> being of A, or that A is, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
content of <strong>the</strong> judgement “A is not” would be <strong>the</strong> non-being of A, or that A is not). At first <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
rejected this consequence. As late as 1903, he wrote to Marty: “<strong>The</strong> non-things are not fictions. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
are concomitants; that is to say, <strong>the</strong> non-things are only logical consequences of <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
are (or are not) certain things, things which come into being, persist, <strong>and</strong> pass away, entirely on <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own.” “But non-things are dependent for <strong>the</strong>ir actuality upon things.” And as late as 1904, it was<br />
Marty who wrote to <strong>Brentano</strong>: “It would be a mistake to suppose that true negative judgements have<br />
an objective correlate which is analogous to that of affirmative judgements. If it is true that A is, <strong>the</strong>n<br />
<strong>the</strong>re is an object which corresponds to <strong>the</strong> idea of A; but if it is true that A is not, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
object which corresponds to <strong>the</strong> idea of A. We must not adopt <strong>the</strong> fiction of supposing this ‘non-being<br />
of A’ to be an object.” On 10 September of this same year (1904), <strong>Brentano</strong> replied in <strong>the</strong> following<br />
way: “I have made a new attempt at treating <strong>the</strong> entia rationis as fictions, thus denying that <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
such things. It looks as though this can be carried out completely. We must underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation<br />
in terms of <strong>the</strong> stenogrammatical character of our language: a single word may express a wealth of<br />
intellectual activity. <strong>The</strong> ideas of reflection—<strong>the</strong> being of A, <strong>the</strong> existing A, <strong>and</strong> such like—appear<br />
to be non-things.” “<strong>The</strong> old view required that <strong>the</strong>se entia rationis be thought about only along with<br />
certain things. But <strong>the</strong> new view says that only <strong>the</strong> things can be thought about.” “By denying that<br />
<strong>the</strong> form words are true, names (names of what truly exists), <strong>the</strong> new view is prepared to forbid <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
use, as having no proper function in <strong>the</strong> language.” <strong>The</strong> strange thing is that Marty proceeded to reject