Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
118 Notes<br />
24 Compare <strong>the</strong> letter above of 2 Sept., 1909, <strong>and</strong> that of 14 Sept., published in <strong>the</strong> introduction of<br />
Vol. I of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie. For fur<strong>the</strong>r details see Vol. II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie.<br />
25 It is this particular sentence <strong>and</strong> its application to <strong>the</strong> present question which I found difficult; but<br />
it is clarified later in this same letter.<br />
26 If I think about <strong>the</strong> “non-being of a body” or, differently formulated, if I consider that a body does not<br />
exist, i.e., that <strong>the</strong>re are no bodies, <strong>the</strong>n ei<strong>the</strong>r I am thinking about <strong>the</strong> correct rejection or denial of a body<br />
or I am thinking about <strong>the</strong> incorrect acceptance or affirmation of a body; I am thinking about someone<br />
apodictically rejecting <strong>the</strong> evident affirmation of a body. Ei<strong>the</strong>r “<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> non-being of a body” tells us<br />
simply that <strong>the</strong>re are no bodies, or it tells us that <strong>the</strong> judgement “<strong>The</strong>re is a body” cannot possibly be evident.<br />
27 I had argued: <strong>Brentano</strong> contradicts himself if he holds that one cannot think about what is a nonthing,<br />
for, in <strong>the</strong> very fact of expressing this statement, he does think of a non-thing <strong>and</strong> says of it that<br />
it cannot be thought. But <strong>the</strong> error was entirely mine. To say that one cannot think of a non-thing is to<br />
say only that one cannot think unless what one is thinking about is a thing. I had asked: “What could<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> mean by saying that <strong>the</strong>re are no non-things, that <strong>the</strong>re cannot be any irrealia?” And <strong>the</strong><br />
answer is: “No one can judge with evidence that what it is that he accepts or affirms is not a thing.”<br />
28 I had been puzzled by this <strong>the</strong>ory of “implicit thinking”. I told myself that what goes on when I think<br />
about a “sparrow” is this: at times I might think of nothing more than “that which is called sparrow” or<br />
“<strong>the</strong> creature called sparrow”. Or I might think: a tiny winged creature that peeps. In short, an entirely<br />
unscientific syn<strong>the</strong>sis of concepts. It would be out of <strong>the</strong> question to say that, in thinking of a sparrow,<br />
one thinks of all <strong>the</strong> physical parts, or indeed of all <strong>the</strong> logical parts, i.e., of all those characteristics which<br />
would make up a complete scientific definition of a sparrow. In this way, I contradicted <strong>Brentano</strong>’s <strong>the</strong>sis.<br />
<strong>The</strong> explication, given by this letter <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> one that follows, led to <strong>the</strong> result which I may anticipate<br />
here: <strong>The</strong> “explicit thought” of a sparrow is to be understood as <strong>the</strong> thought of all of its essential<br />
characteristics (Merkmale), i.e., of all those conceptual properties which would be ascribed to <strong>the</strong><br />
sparrow as a result of a complete acquaintance with it; such a thought would be a clear <strong>and</strong> distinct<br />
idea of all <strong>the</strong> sparrow’s physical, logical <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r “parts”. But we never have such a totally<br />
explicit thought of a sparrow. If we did have such an explicit thought, <strong>the</strong>n in accepting or affirming<br />
a sparrow, we would do so in accordance with <strong>the</strong> entire explicit content. But now <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
says that when we think about a sparrow <strong>and</strong> make a judgement with respect to it, <strong>the</strong> physical <strong>and</strong><br />
logical parts are only implicit. This “implicit thinking” <strong>and</strong> judging is not intended to be a psychological,<br />
phenomenognostic characterization. We are not concerned here with a certain kind of<br />
thinking <strong>and</strong> judging. Instead we are giving expression to <strong>the</strong> axiomatic truth that, when a sparrow<br />
is correctly accepted or affirmed, <strong>the</strong>n one could not correctly deny of it any of those characteristics<br />
which a completely explicit thought would include. This is what is meant by <strong>Brentano</strong>’s statement<br />
that, since <strong>the</strong> parts of <strong>the</strong> sparrow are only implicitly thought, <strong>the</strong>y are only implicitly judged.<br />
29 If, in affirming or accepting a sparrow, I were to deny that <strong>the</strong>re are birds, I would contradict myself,<br />
just as I would if I were to deny any of <strong>the</strong> parts that are essential to a sparrow. If I affirm or accept anything<br />
at all <strong>and</strong> at <strong>the</strong> same time reject or deny what is an essential part of that thing or what is one of its essential<br />
characteristics, I would contradict myself. To this extent, <strong>the</strong> positive judgement does indeed judge in<br />
accordance with <strong>the</strong> total content. We are not saying that this is something that one takes note of when<br />
one makes a judgement. <strong>The</strong> point in question is like <strong>the</strong> law of contradiction in that it is simply axiomatic.<br />
30 If <strong>the</strong>re were such a thing as a distinct thought of a sparrow, <strong>the</strong>n all <strong>the</strong> parts would have to be<br />
thought (both physical <strong>and</strong> logical parts—in short, any of <strong>the</strong> parts which cannot be correctly denied<br />
when <strong>the</strong> sparrow is correctly affirmed). By exactly <strong>the</strong> same token, <strong>the</strong> distinct, explicit thought of<br />
<strong>the</strong> non-being of a sparrow, if <strong>the</strong>re were such a thought, would have to include all <strong>the</strong> parts of this<br />
non-being of <strong>the</strong> sparrow, hence all <strong>the</strong> parts which cannot be correctly denied when <strong>the</strong> non-being of<br />
<strong>the</strong> sparrow is correctly affirmed. If <strong>the</strong> non-being of a sparrow is correctly affirmed, <strong>the</strong>n one cannot<br />
correctly deny <strong>the</strong> non-being of a healthy, sick, wild, male, young, old, or female sparrow <strong>and</strong> a dog,<br />
etc. <strong>The</strong> non-being of all <strong>the</strong>se things <strong>and</strong> much more would have to be thought simultaneously with<br />
<strong>the</strong> distinct thought of <strong>the</strong> non-being of a sparrow. But all this is manifestly absurd. Moreover, one