Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

118 Notes
24 Compare the letter above of 2 Sept., 1909, and that of 14 Sept., published in the introduction of
Vol. I of the Psychologie. For further details see Vol. II of the Psychologie.
25 It is this particular sentence and its application to the present question which I found difficult; but
it is clarified later in this same letter.
26 If I think about the “non-being of a body” or, differently formulated, if I consider that a body does not
exist, i.e., that there are no bodies, then either I am thinking about the correct rejection or denial of a body
or I am thinking about the incorrect acceptance or affirmation of a body; I am thinking about someone
apodictically rejecting the evident affirmation of a body. Either “There is the non-being of a body” tells us
simply that there are no bodies, or it tells us that the judgement “There is a body” cannot possibly be evident.
27 I had argued: Brentano contradicts himself if he holds that one cannot think about what is a nonthing,
for, in the very fact of expressing this statement, he does think of a non-thing and says of it that
it cannot be thought. But the error was entirely mine. To say that one cannot think of a non-thing is to
say only that one cannot think unless what one is thinking about is a thing. I had asked: “What could
Brentano mean by saying that there are no non-things, that there cannot be any irrealia?” And the
answer is: “No one can judge with evidence that what it is that he accepts or affirms is not a thing.”
28 I had been puzzled by this theory of “implicit thinking”. I told myself that what goes on when I think
about a “sparrow” is this: at times I might think of nothing more than “that which is called sparrow” or
“the creature called sparrow”. Or I might think: a tiny winged creature that peeps. In short, an entirely
unscientific synthesis of concepts. It would be out of the question to say that, in thinking of a sparrow,
one thinks of all the physical parts, or indeed of all the logical parts, i.e., of all those characteristics which
would make up a complete scientific definition of a sparrow. In this way, I contradicted Brentano’s thesis.
The explication, given by this letter and the one that follows, led to the result which I may anticipate
here: The “explicit thought” of a sparrow is to be understood as the thought of all of its essential
characteristics (Merkmale), i.e., of all those conceptual properties which would be ascribed to the
sparrow as a result of a complete acquaintance with it; such a thought would be a clear and distinct
idea of all the sparrow’s physical, logical and other “parts”. But we never have such a totally
explicit thought of a sparrow. If we did have such an explicit thought, then in accepting or affirming
a sparrow, we would do so in accordance with the entire explicit content. But now Brentano
says that when we think about a sparrow and make a judgement with respect to it, the physical and
logical parts are only implicit. This “implicit thinking” and judging is not intended to be a psychological,
phenomenognostic characterization. We are not concerned here with a certain kind of
thinking and judging. Instead we are giving expression to the axiomatic truth that, when a sparrow
is correctly accepted or affirmed, then one could not correctly deny of it any of those characteristics
which a completely explicit thought would include. This is what is meant by Brentano’s statement
that, since the parts of the sparrow are only implicitly thought, they are only implicitly judged.
29 If, in affirming or accepting a sparrow, I were to deny that there are birds, I would contradict myself,
just as I would if I were to deny any of the parts that are essential to a sparrow. If I affirm or accept anything
at all and at the same time reject or deny what is an essential part of that thing or what is one of its essential
characteristics, I would contradict myself. To this extent, the positive judgement does indeed judge in
accordance with the total content. We are not saying that this is something that one takes note of when
one makes a judgement. The point in question is like the law of contradiction in that it is simply axiomatic.
30 If there were such a thing as a distinct thought of a sparrow, then all the parts would have to be
thought (both physical and logical parts—in short, any of the parts which cannot be correctly denied
when the sparrow is correctly affirmed). By exactly the same token, the distinct, explicit thought of
the non-being of a sparrow, if there were such a thought, would have to include all the parts of this
non-being of the sparrow, hence all the parts which cannot be correctly denied when the non-being of
the sparrow is correctly affirmed. If the non-being of a sparrow is correctly affirmed, then one cannot
correctly deny the non-being of a healthy, sick, wild, male, young, old, or female sparrow and a dog,
etc. The non-being of all these things and much more would have to be thought simultaneously with
the distinct thought of the non-being of a sparrow. But all this is manifestly absurd. Moreover, one