Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Notes 117<br />
15 <strong>The</strong> example is not entirely appropriate. A more suitable one appears in paragraph 2. If I merely<br />
think about <strong>the</strong> impossibility of a thing, I think about an apodoctic judgement which correctly rejects<br />
<strong>the</strong> thing. <strong>The</strong> matter is different if one affirms <strong>the</strong> so-called “impossibility” of a thing; in this case one<br />
not only thinks about someone rejecting <strong>the</strong> thing apodictically, but one also rejects it apodictically<br />
oneself. For fur<strong>the</strong>r details, see Vol. II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> introduction to Vol. I.<br />
16 Examples of temporal entia rationis would be <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>the</strong> present, <strong>the</strong> future, <strong>and</strong> also that which<br />
is past (Vergangenes), that which is present (Gegenwartiges), that which is future (Zukünftiges). On<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong>’s phenomenognostic <strong>the</strong>ory of time, see Vol. II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie; see also note 19 below.<br />
17 If Marty’s <strong>the</strong>ory were correct, I could not make <strong>the</strong> judgement “<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> impossibility of A”<br />
without simultaneously rejecting A apodictically.<br />
18 <strong>The</strong> important question for Marty was: What is <strong>the</strong> meaning of <strong>the</strong> sentence “<strong>The</strong> judgement that<br />
‘A is’ is correct”? Marty supposed that correctness referred to <strong>the</strong> adequacy or correspondence of <strong>the</strong><br />
judgement “A is” with <strong>the</strong> “being of A”. <strong>Brentano</strong> <strong>the</strong>reupon replied, “<strong>The</strong> point is not that, if <strong>the</strong><br />
being of A is <strong>and</strong> someone judges A is, he <strong>the</strong>n judges correctly; <strong>the</strong> point is, ra<strong>the</strong>r, that if A is <strong>and</strong><br />
someone judges A is, he <strong>the</strong>n judges correctly.” What does this mean? Simply that if <strong>the</strong> A-affirming<br />
judgement is correct <strong>and</strong> someone accepts or affirms A, <strong>the</strong>n he judges correctly. But to say this is not<br />
to answer <strong>the</strong> question, “What are we to underst<strong>and</strong> by a correct judgement?” <strong>Brentano</strong> immediately<br />
takes this up, however. In any case, what is said here is sufficient to show that “<strong>The</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> being of<br />
A”, correctly understood, says only that “A is”.<br />
19 If I know that a judgement is correct, <strong>the</strong>n I must have judged with insight myself. <strong>The</strong> strict<br />
concept of “correct judgement” is “judgement with insight” or “apprehension”. But one does call<br />
judgements “correct” which are not in fact apprehensions or cognitions <strong>and</strong> which, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,<br />
are not known by anyone actually to correspond with any cognition. We say, for example, that <strong>the</strong><br />
judgement “2 plus 2 is equal to 4” is correct even if no one makes this judgement with insight. In<br />
saying this, we mean only to express our conviction that no one who contradicts <strong>the</strong> judgement in<br />
question could possibly be judging with evidence himself (in any of <strong>the</strong> temporal modes). Compare<br />
<strong>the</strong> letter by <strong>Brentano</strong> which is printed in my introduction to Vol. I of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
introduction to <strong>the</strong> present book.<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> assumes that <strong>the</strong> reader is familiar with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of temporal modes on which he had<br />
been lecturing since 1894–95. He first published his <strong>the</strong>ory in <strong>the</strong> Klassifikation der psychischen<br />
Phänomene in 1911. This note may serve to correct Husserl’s lecture of 1928; <strong>the</strong> editor of <strong>the</strong> lecture<br />
makes no mention of <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory which is <strong>the</strong>re represented as <strong>Brentano</strong>’s had long been<br />
ab<strong>and</strong>oned in favour of a <strong>the</strong>ory of temporal modes. See <strong>the</strong> Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, LXXV<br />
(1930), where I juxtapose <strong>Brentano</strong>’s earlier <strong>and</strong> later <strong>the</strong>ories <strong>and</strong> compare <strong>the</strong>m with Husserl’s.<br />
20 Suppose, for example, that A is in pain <strong>and</strong> that B judges “A is in pain”. In this case B’s judgement is correct,<br />
for it agrees with <strong>the</strong> evident judgement of inner perception whereby A perceives his pain. A judgement<br />
contrary to this perception could not possibly be evident. Suppose now that A’s pain ceases, because A<br />
has lost consciousness, <strong>and</strong> that B’s judgement continues unchanged. An evident judgement referring<br />
to A’s pain can no longer be affirmative, since <strong>the</strong> affirmative judgement of B can no longer be correct.<br />
“<strong>The</strong> being of A begins (or ceases)” means no more nor less than “A begins (or ceases)”. To say<br />
that <strong>the</strong> judgement “A begins (or ceases)” is correct, in those cases where <strong>the</strong> judgement is not itself<br />
made with evidence, is to say no more nor less than this: “From now on, it would be impossible for<br />
anyone, making an evident judgement with respect to A, to reject (or affirm) A”. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, an<br />
evident negative (or affirmative) judgement with respect to A is no longer possible.<br />
21 If it were necessary to grasp <strong>the</strong> being of A in order to apprehend A, <strong>the</strong>n it would be necessary<br />
to grasp <strong>the</strong> being of <strong>the</strong> being of A in order to grasp <strong>the</strong> being of A, etc.<br />
22 See Vol. II of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Psychologie, <strong>and</strong> in particular <strong>the</strong> appendix entitled “Von der psychischen<br />
Beziehung auf etwas, als sekundäres Objekt”.<br />
23 On Plato’s <strong>the</strong>ory of ideas, compare O.Kraus, “Die ‘kopernikanische Wendung’ in <strong>Brentano</strong>s<br />
Erkenntnis- und Wertlehre”, in Philosophische Hefte, Vol. III (1929).