Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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116 Notes<br />
in <strong>the</strong> sentence “<strong>The</strong> tree is an object per se” it functions autosemantically, as I have indicated in my<br />
introduction to Vol. I of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie. “<strong>The</strong> tree is my intentional object” is synsemantic in more<br />
than one respect, since <strong>the</strong> word “object” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> word “is” both function only synsemantically. For<br />
<strong>the</strong> point is, not that <strong>the</strong> tree is an object, but that I am one who has <strong>the</strong> tree as an object, i.e. that I<br />
am one who is thinking of a tree. And this is also true if <strong>the</strong> tree exists. “Being an object” is not a<br />
predicate which is ascribed to <strong>the</strong> real tree; it is a denominatio mere extrinseca.<br />
Husserl says that “<strong>the</strong> non-existence, or <strong>the</strong> conviction of <strong>the</strong> non-existence”, of <strong>the</strong> object thought<br />
about cannot deprive <strong>the</strong> thinking of its object (Ideen, p. 185). But this means only that <strong>the</strong> conviction,<br />
this judgement of <strong>the</strong> “reduced perception”, does not affect <strong>the</strong> thinking as such. <strong>The</strong> more one<br />
reflects on all this, <strong>the</strong> more clearly one realizes that <strong>the</strong> talk about “bracketing” yields only ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />
unclear metaphor <strong>and</strong> not an analysis.<br />
It requires no great phenomenological insight to realize that <strong>the</strong> tree per se might be consumed in<br />
flames, while <strong>the</strong> intentionally existing tree, or <strong>the</strong> tree “in phenomenological reduction” remains<br />
untouched (Ideen, p. 184). It has never yet occurred to anyone to take out fire insurance to protect<br />
his “idea of a tree”.<br />
10 Marty is not entirely consistent in his treatment of <strong>the</strong> so-called “irrealia”. To be sure, he follows<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong>’s doctrine with respect to <strong>the</strong> analysis of form words such as “colour”, “redness”, etc. He<br />
believes, however, that he must acknowledge empty space <strong>and</strong> time as entia irrealla; see A.Marty,<br />
Raum und Zeit (Halle 1916), especially pp. 92 ff. On page 97 Marty says: “We should count as<br />
abstracta, <strong>and</strong> hence as fictions, not only colour, quality, quantity, <strong>and</strong> such like, but also similarity,<br />
difference, equality, causality, as well as existence, non-existence, possibility, necessity, impossibility,<br />
being present, being future, <strong>and</strong> even being coloured, being spatially located, <strong>and</strong> such like.” In view<br />
of <strong>the</strong>se concessions, Marty is hardly consistent in adding, “But I definitely do not count <strong>the</strong> contents<br />
of judgement among such fictions.” He holds that, in <strong>the</strong> case of every negative judgement, <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
a state of affairs constituting <strong>the</strong> basis or justification for asserting <strong>the</strong> judgement or for asserting it<br />
apodictically. But this last desperate attempt to uphold <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of “states of affairs” <strong>and</strong> “contents<br />
of judgements” is a contradiction in terms. For “state of affairs” ei<strong>the</strong>r signifies <strong>the</strong> things, concerning<br />
which we judge ei<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>y are or that <strong>the</strong>y are not, or it signifies <strong>the</strong>ir “existence” or “nonexistence”.<br />
But Marty, like <strong>Brentano</strong>, indeed even before <strong>Brentano</strong>, referred to <strong>the</strong> “existence” <strong>and</strong><br />
“non-existence” of things as fictions. See <strong>Brentano</strong>’s letter to me, dated 31 October, 1914, <strong>and</strong> my<br />
comments upon it. Recently <strong>the</strong> doctrine of “states of affairs” has come to play a role in experimental<br />
psychology; Bühler, for example, constructs his philosophy of language on <strong>the</strong> assumption of “states<br />
of affairs”, as does Lindworsky.<br />
11 This passage is concerned with <strong>the</strong> connection between modo recto <strong>and</strong> modo obliquo; for fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
details see <strong>the</strong> appendix <strong>and</strong> index to Vol. 11 of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie.<br />
12 According to Marty, <strong>the</strong> content of judgement is most naturally conceived as that which provides<br />
<strong>the</strong> objective basis of <strong>the</strong> correctness of <strong>the</strong> judgement, or, more exactly, as that without which our<br />
attitude could not be said to be correct or adequate. <strong>The</strong> content of <strong>the</strong> judgement “A is”, according<br />
to this conception, would be “<strong>the</strong> being of A”; that of <strong>the</strong> judgement “A is B”, would be “<strong>the</strong> being-B<br />
of A”; <strong>and</strong> so on. See A.Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und<br />
Sprachphilosophie (Halle 1908), p. 294 <strong>and</strong> elsewhere; see index under “Inhalt”.<br />
13 See <strong>the</strong> Appendix to Vol. II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie <strong>and</strong> “Neue Abh<strong>and</strong>lungen aus dem Nachlass”, in<br />
<strong>the</strong> same volume, especially selection XIV <strong>and</strong> those that follow.<br />
14 “Thing” (Reales), or “res”, is a term indicating <strong>the</strong> most general concept which can be abstracted<br />
from our intuitions. <strong>The</strong> expression encompasses not only inanimate things, but everything that can<br />
be thought about at all. Ordinary language has no fixed universal term for this concept o<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
<strong>the</strong> pronoun “something” (etwas). Aristotle believed that <strong>the</strong>re is no such most general concept.<br />
“Thing” is not to be confused with “actual”, since one may say of many things that <strong>the</strong>y are not<br />
actual; but everything that is actual, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, is a thing. See <strong>the</strong> Introduction to Vol. I of <strong>the</strong><br />
Psychologie.