Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Notes 113<br />
made phenomenognostically—phenomenologically—with reference to <strong>the</strong> act of thinking. For <strong>the</strong><br />
distinction brings up <strong>the</strong> question whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> thing that I am thinking about exists or not. And this<br />
question can be answered only by considering <strong>the</strong> acts of judgement which pertain to <strong>the</strong> thing I am<br />
thinking about. When our concern is only with thinking, <strong>the</strong>n we should not take acts of judgement<br />
into account.<br />
2 <strong>The</strong> report on <strong>the</strong> Fifth International Psychological Congress (Rome 1905) contained many<br />
typographical errors, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Brentano</strong>’s lecture Von der psychologischen Analyse der Tonqualitäten had<br />
been ra<strong>the</strong>r badly garbled. This lecture contains <strong>Brentano</strong>’s “Zweikomponentenlehre” which he had<br />
formulated long before Revesz. For fur<strong>the</strong>r details, see <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie<br />
(Leipzig 1907), <strong>and</strong> Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein (Vol. III of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie), Part I.<br />
3 <strong>The</strong> nature of Höfler’s remarks, against which <strong>Brentano</strong>’s polemic is directed, may be ga<strong>the</strong>red<br />
from <strong>the</strong> wording of <strong>the</strong> letter. <strong>Evident</strong>ly he had attributed <strong>the</strong> following <strong>the</strong>ory to <strong>Brentano</strong>: that<br />
someone who thinks of A has, as his object or content, “<strong>the</strong> A which is thought about”, where “object”<br />
<strong>and</strong> “content” are used synonymously. Compare my edition of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie, particularly Vol. I,<br />
where <strong>Brentano</strong> emphasizes (e.g., p. 172) that hearing has a content, or object, different from <strong>the</strong><br />
hearing itself—namely, <strong>the</strong> sound <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> heard sound. But <strong>the</strong>re are passages in <strong>the</strong> Psychologie<br />
which might be misunderstood (e.g., Vol. I, pp. 31 <strong>and</strong> 177). It is certain, however, that <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
always held that we hear <strong>the</strong> tone <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> heard tone, we believe in God <strong>and</strong> not in <strong>the</strong> believed-in<br />
God, we deny God <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> denied God. But he had held earlier that <strong>the</strong>re is a certain correlation<br />
between <strong>the</strong> intentional relation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> object of this relation. (See <strong>the</strong> Introduction to Vol. I of <strong>the</strong><br />
Psychologie.)<br />
In Höfler’s Congress lecture (Atti, Rome, 1906, p. 327) we also find <strong>Brentano</strong> criticized for using<br />
“content” <strong>and</strong> “intentional object” synonymously. Of course this is a matter only of terminology. But<br />
to avoid ambiguity, it is preferable not to speak of “content” in connection with judgements, where<br />
it is customary to say of two judgements, having <strong>the</strong> same object, that <strong>the</strong>y may differ in content,<br />
depending upon whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y are affirmative or negative, assertoric or apodictic. Marty spoke of<br />
<strong>the</strong> contents of judgements in a wholly different sense, using <strong>the</strong> term synonymously with “state of<br />
affairs” (Sachverhalt) or “objective” (Meinong).<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is no terminological agreement whatever in this area. Unfortunate as this may be, no respectable<br />
psychologist or epistemologist who uses <strong>the</strong> expression “content of consciousness” would<br />
make <strong>the</strong> mistake to which <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> Rehmke school refer (most recently Heyde, in <strong>the</strong><br />
Journal Grundwissenschaft, Vol. IX). According to Rehmke <strong>and</strong> his followers, “content of consciousness”<br />
implies that consciousness must be spatial, like a container or vessel. I may reassure<br />
him that <strong>the</strong> “inner linguistic form” has not seduced us into taking <strong>the</strong> word in this way. Strictly<br />
speaking, one could not even use our German word for thinking—i.e., “Vorstellen”—without<br />
giving rise to <strong>the</strong> suspicion that we intend a kind of spatial confrontation (Vor-sichHinstellen).<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> does admit that <strong>the</strong> term “content” should not be used as a synonym for “object”. In<br />
Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene (1911), now Vol. II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie, <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
states that it is advisable not to use “content” for object of thought: “No one could possibly<br />
say that, because <strong>the</strong> judgements ‘God exists’ <strong>and</strong> ‘God does not exist’ have <strong>the</strong> same object, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
also have <strong>the</strong> same content” (p. 39). Never<strong>the</strong>less it is now customary to speak of <strong>the</strong> “content”<br />
of a concept (of a conceptual idea) <strong>and</strong> to distinguish it from its range or extension (Umfange).<br />
Marty discusses <strong>the</strong> term “content” in considerable detail in his Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung<br />
der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie (Halle, 1908). This term, which has<br />
been so greatly used <strong>and</strong> misused, does indeed receive still ano<strong>the</strong>r meaning from Marty, insofar<br />
as he uses it synonymously with “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt) <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong> way in which Meinong<br />
<strong>and</strong> Russell use “objective”. On this point, <strong>the</strong>re is much critical material in my edition of<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong>’s Psychologie. In <strong>the</strong> editions of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie, <strong>and</strong> elsewhere, I have made it a rule<br />
never to interpret “content” as synonymous with “object”, despite <strong>the</strong> fact that even now one often<br />
speaks of <strong>the</strong> content of visual sensation, meaning <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>the</strong> coloured thing which we intuit.