Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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110 Notes<br />
given in some way or o<strong>the</strong>r. It would be necessary to assume ei<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong> criterion may be found in<br />
some property of ideas, in which case <strong>the</strong> criticism offered in <strong>the</strong> text is valid, or else that <strong>the</strong> criterion<br />
is known in some o<strong>the</strong>r way, in which case <strong>the</strong>re would be an infinite regress. Conventionalists, such as<br />
Dingler, are aware of this fact; but <strong>the</strong>y go wrong when <strong>the</strong>y say that it constitutes a reductio ad absurdum<br />
of a properly conceived <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> evident <strong>and</strong> when <strong>the</strong>y speak of <strong>the</strong> resulting “collapse of science”.<br />
57 Husserl’s polemic against construing <strong>the</strong> evident in terms of a feeling (Logische Untersuchungen,<br />
Vol. I, Section 49, <strong>and</strong> Vol. II, Section 39) may be traced back to <strong>the</strong>se observations. See <strong>the</strong><br />
Introduction to <strong>the</strong> present book.<br />
58 This entire passage is of fundamental importance in connection with <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of truth <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> evident. See note 5 5.<br />
59 <strong>Brentano</strong> is far from wanting to deny that <strong>the</strong> defects of language have had unfortunate results<br />
upon <strong>the</strong>orizing about logic. His logic note-books contain a voluminous chapter about <strong>the</strong> dangers<br />
of language in its effect upon our thinking. <strong>The</strong> remark in <strong>the</strong> text is concerned only with cases that<br />
Sigwart discusses, which are not appropriate examples.<br />
60 Meinong defended <strong>the</strong> concept of “evident surmises”. See <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Versuch über die Erkenntnis,<br />
p. 209.<br />
PART TWO (References 1 to 28)<br />
1 In <strong>the</strong> course of his correspondence on <strong>the</strong> problem of <strong>the</strong> formation of general concepts,<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> had attempted to formulate a law which would indicate <strong>the</strong> relative nature of all simple<br />
concepts. He had accepted <strong>the</strong> traditional doctrine which holds that such words as “Size”, “Redness”,<br />
“Equality”, etc., are logical names, i.e., that <strong>the</strong>y signify concepts. But since redness cannot be<br />
conceived except as <strong>the</strong> redness of something, <strong>Brentano</strong> taught that “redness” (Röte) <strong>and</strong> “thing<br />
having redness” (Röte-Habendes) are correlative pairs of concepts. Since “Redness”, “Colour”,<br />
“Size” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like are nothing but <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian forms (“it is by virtue of <strong>the</strong>ir largeness that<br />
large things are large”), <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory could be considered only as one type of attempt to justify <strong>the</strong><br />
Aristotelian <strong>the</strong>ory. Each of <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian forms has as its correlate that which has <strong>the</strong> form. A<br />
set of questions raised by Marty caused <strong>Brentano</strong> to revise this <strong>the</strong>ory. <strong>The</strong> result appears in <strong>the</strong><br />
text. See also <strong>Brentano</strong>: Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung, pp. 46 ff. (“Ursprung der Ideen”),<br />
<strong>and</strong> A.Marty: Die “logische” usw. Kasus<strong>the</strong>orien, pp. 93 ff. Compare Part III, note 44 below.<br />
<strong>The</strong> sprachkritische reform, initiated by this letter of 1901, is one of <strong>the</strong> most significant achievements<br />
in epistemology <strong>and</strong> should be capable of settling <strong>the</strong> conflict between nominalism <strong>and</strong> realism.<br />
See <strong>the</strong> references to Vaihinger’s radical <strong>the</strong>ory of fictions in <strong>the</strong> index of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie,<br />
Vol. II.<br />
2 In o<strong>the</strong>r words, <strong>the</strong>re is no such thing as “space” or “time”; <strong>the</strong>re is only “<strong>the</strong> spatial” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>the</strong><br />
temporal”. And <strong>the</strong>re is no “virtue”, but <strong>the</strong>re are “<strong>the</strong> virtuous”. See Vols. II <strong>and</strong> III of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie,<br />
<strong>and</strong> section 21 of <strong>the</strong> following selection.<br />
3 “Man”, “animal”, “stone”, “house”, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like, signify concepts; but <strong>the</strong> grammatical abstracta<br />
<strong>and</strong> synsemantica (“humanity”, “size”, “form”, ‘justice”, “beauty”) do not. See <strong>the</strong> appendix of Vol.<br />
III of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie.<br />
4 “Indicating what we have in mind” (Anzeigen, was wir im Gemüte hegen) is what Marty called<br />
<strong>the</strong> “secondary intention” of <strong>the</strong> speaker. He took <strong>the</strong> “primary intention” to be that of producing a<br />
certain mental event in <strong>the</strong> listener. <strong>The</strong> primary intention of using a name would be to call up an<br />
idea; that of making a statement would be to produce a judgement; <strong>and</strong> that of coaxing, ordering, or<br />
requiring would be to produce certain feelings or emotions. Some of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s discussions of <strong>the</strong><br />
purpose of language are similar to <strong>the</strong> views of Marty. See Marty’s Untersuchungen, etc., Halle 1908.