Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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108 Notes<br />
any kind of a thing, <strong>and</strong> “existing” <strong>and</strong> “having being” are not predicates, referring to any kind of<br />
attribute; each of <strong>the</strong>se words is only a denominatio mere extrinseca. (This is not true, of course, of<br />
such expressions as “an existent”, or “a being”, which are used, not to refer to being in <strong>the</strong> sense of<br />
existing, but to refer to thing or res, in <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian sense.) Compare Vol. II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie,<br />
Appendix XVII, “Vom ens rationis”, <strong>and</strong> see <strong>the</strong> index under “Sein”, “Seiendes”, “Existenz”, etc.<br />
43 <strong>Brentano</strong> is certainly right in saying that “A thing exists” does not imply <strong>the</strong> perceptibility of <strong>the</strong><br />
thing. His examples, however, are unfortunately chosen, for <strong>the</strong>y presuppose that such expressions<br />
as “deprivation”, “possibility”, “future”, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like are not synsemantic but have a meaning of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own. He might better have cited, as examples of what exists without being “perceptible”, <strong>the</strong> inner,<br />
unconscious structure of <strong>the</strong> soul (habitus, as a permanent property) or <strong>the</strong> process of being affected<br />
or coming into being, in <strong>the</strong> case of physical bodies.<br />
44 I. e. one can infer that <strong>the</strong>re is a necessary being, without <strong>the</strong>reby supposing that such a being<br />
must be “perceptible”, in <strong>the</strong> usual sense of <strong>the</strong> word, by itself or by anything else.<br />
45 Strangely enough, <strong>the</strong>re are many physicists <strong>and</strong> Naturphilosophen who would now say nothing<br />
can exist unless it is at least “in principle” observable.<br />
46 <strong>Brentano</strong> here says that <strong>the</strong> statement “Perhaps <strong>the</strong>re is an empty space” is not at all absurd. He<br />
also says explicitly that empty space is not a thing. Hence he seems to have classified empty space<br />
among <strong>the</strong> irrealia which he was later to reject. <strong>The</strong> question turns upon how we are to underst<strong>and</strong><br />
“empty space”. If it is intended to refer to a Newtonian, irreal, infinite empty space, <strong>the</strong>n, according<br />
to <strong>Brentano</strong>’s later view, <strong>the</strong> concept is contradictory (see Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 262 ff., <strong>and</strong> “Raum<br />
und Zeit”, in Kantstudien, Vol. 25, 1920, pp. 1–23). This infinite empty space pertains to <strong>the</strong> so-called<br />
possibility of places, but <strong>the</strong> latter comes to nothing more than <strong>the</strong> fact that spatial things as such are<br />
not absurd or impossible. (For a more precise statement, see <strong>the</strong> Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 254, 266.) But<br />
one might also take “empty space” to refer to a real spatial object having no qualitative determination.<br />
In such a case, empty space would be an extended thing <strong>and</strong> its stages could be regarded as physical<br />
conditions; <strong>the</strong> non-qualified space would <strong>the</strong>n become under certain circumstances <strong>the</strong> bearer of<br />
such states. Empty space, in this latter sense of <strong>the</strong> term, is not a contradictory concept. One could<br />
doubtless say of such empty space that it is a thing <strong>and</strong> that it exists, even though it is not perceptible.<br />
(Compare <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Uber die Zukunft der Philosophie, Leipzig 1929, ed. O.Kraus, pp. 137, 175.)<br />
47 This passage is now of historical interest. It makes clear that in 1889 <strong>Brentano</strong> interpreted<br />
<strong>the</strong> doctrine of intentionality in terms of <strong>the</strong> mental existence of <strong>the</strong> object, thus saying of <strong>the</strong><br />
contemplated centaur (den vorgestellten Zentaur), <strong>the</strong> centaur that is an object of thought, that it<br />
exists as a correlate of <strong>the</strong> act of thinking about a centaur (see <strong>the</strong> second selection in this book<br />
<strong>and</strong> note 29). But he was soon to submit <strong>the</strong>se ideas to criticism. By 1905 he was so far away from<br />
this doctrine that he even expressed doubts, in a letter to Marty, that he had ever held it. Thus he<br />
wrote: “It has never been my view that <strong>the</strong> immanent object is identical with <strong>the</strong> ‘object of thought’.<br />
What we think about is <strong>the</strong> object or thing <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> ‘object of thought’. If, in our thought, we<br />
contemplate a horse, <strong>the</strong> object of our thought is not a ‘contemplated horse’; it is <strong>the</strong> horse itself<br />
which is <strong>the</strong> immanent object—<strong>the</strong> only thing that can strictly be called an object.” (See <strong>the</strong> first letter<br />
in Part III of <strong>the</strong> present book.) But <strong>the</strong> passage in <strong>the</strong> paper on Sigwart cites <strong>the</strong> so-called immanent<br />
object as an example of a non-thing, an entity which is not an in <strong>the</strong> sense of <strong>the</strong> categories, but<br />
is an <strong>and</strong> thus something which may be said to exist. Marty also rejects <strong>the</strong> immanent<br />
object in his Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie<br />
(Halle 1908), but he replaces it by ano<strong>the</strong>r untenable doctrine—that of consciousness as a “process<br />
of assimilation (Verähnlichungsprozess)” with <strong>the</strong> object. Husserl too seems inclined to reject <strong>the</strong><br />
doctrine of <strong>the</strong> immanent object in his Logische Untersuchungen, but he is not entirely consistent,<br />
for he also seems to regard <strong>the</strong> objects of his sensuous intentions as being “real components<br />
(Best<strong>and</strong>stücke) of consciousness” (Vol. II, pp. 238, 244). <strong>The</strong> older doctrine still haunts <strong>the</strong> Ideen<br />
(sections 88, 91) <strong>and</strong> appears in <strong>the</strong> correlative fictions of Noema <strong>and</strong> Noese. <strong>The</strong> Rehmke school,<br />
independently of <strong>Brentano</strong>, takes a strong st<strong>and</strong> against any distinction between object <strong>and</strong> content.