Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Introduction xvii<br />
5. <strong>The</strong> basis of epistemology is <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> evident—<strong>the</strong> insightful judgement, <strong>the</strong><br />
judgement which is justified in itself <strong>and</strong> which constitutes knowing. This is <strong>the</strong> topic of<br />
<strong>the</strong> final dictations in Part Four. I shall anticipate two of <strong>the</strong> more frequent objections <strong>and</strong><br />
misunderst<strong>and</strong>ings.<br />
It has been argued that, since one can be mistaken about what is evident, an epistemology<br />
or <strong>the</strong>ory of knowledge which is based upon <strong>the</strong> concept of <strong>the</strong> evident is impossible. But<br />
from <strong>the</strong> fact that we are capable of insightful judgements—judgements which are seen to<br />
be correct—it does not follow that every erroneous or incorrect judgement is seen to be<br />
erroneous or incorrect!<br />
It has also been noted that we sometimes fail to recognize insightful judgements as<br />
such <strong>and</strong> that we sometimes mistake erroneous judgements for those that are insightful.<br />
But this very argument presupposes that <strong>the</strong>re is a distinction between <strong>the</strong> two types of<br />
judgement <strong>and</strong> indeed that we are able to make <strong>the</strong> distinction. For if we did not know, with<br />
respect to some judgements, that <strong>the</strong>y are insightful, <strong>and</strong> with respect to o<strong>the</strong>rs, that <strong>the</strong>y<br />
are erroneous, how could we know that <strong>the</strong> one type of judgement is sometimes mistaken<br />
for <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r? <strong>The</strong> fact that we are able to tell that some judgements are insightful <strong>and</strong> some<br />
are not assures us that we are able to guard against such mistakes, or to correct <strong>the</strong>m.<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> has shown, repeatedly <strong>and</strong> in detail, that it is “an absurd undertaking to try to<br />
use reasoning to guarantee <strong>the</strong> evidence of what is self-evident”.* He has been reproached<br />
for “never having considered <strong>the</strong> problem of <strong>the</strong> logical presuppositions of his so-called<br />
a priori evident judgements”. If he is guilty of this charge, at least he may be said to have<br />
asked why anyone should suppose that <strong>the</strong>re is such a problem. Presumably <strong>the</strong>se mysterious<br />
“logical presuppositions” are <strong>the</strong>mselves known. What is <strong>the</strong> nature of this knowledge,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n? Does this knowledge also have “logical presuppositions”, or is it ultimate—that is to<br />
say, directly evident <strong>and</strong> justified in itself? Surely one is not blind to <strong>the</strong> fact that ei<strong>the</strong>r (i)<br />
we should give up all talk about knowledge, or (ii) we may reason in a vicious circle, or<br />
(iii) we must admit that <strong>the</strong>re is ultimate knowledge—i.e., that <strong>the</strong>re are judgements which<br />
are self-evident <strong>and</strong> justified in <strong>the</strong>mselves. If <strong>the</strong>re is anyone who doesn’t see this, <strong>the</strong>n, as<br />
Aristotle put it, we can only leave him behind.<br />
But our <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> evident is not to be held responsible for <strong>the</strong> transformation it<br />
has undergone in Husserl’s Ideen (with its “adequate” <strong>and</strong> “inadequate” evidence <strong>and</strong> its<br />
“perceptual explosion”); nor is it compatible with Meinong’s “evident surmises”.<br />
6. Kant’s “Copernican revolution” contains a faint suggestion of <strong>the</strong> truth, as I have<br />
indicated elsewhere.* But Kant did not overthrow <strong>the</strong> correspondence <strong>the</strong>ory. He shifted<br />
<strong>the</strong> system of coordinates from <strong>the</strong> object to <strong>the</strong> subject: our knowledge is not a function<br />
of <strong>the</strong> things; <strong>the</strong> things—to <strong>the</strong> extent that <strong>the</strong>y are our phenomena—are a function of our<br />
knowledge. Using <strong>the</strong> terminology of practical reason, we could say that Kant transforms our<br />
knowledge from something heteronymous to something autonomous. But <strong>the</strong> correct point<br />
* <strong>Franz</strong> <strong>Brentano</strong>, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, edited by Alfred Kastil (Felix Meiner, Leipzig<br />
1925).<br />
* O.Kraus, “Die ‘kopernikanische Wendung’ in <strong>Brentano</strong>s Erkenntnis- und Wertlehre”,<br />
Philosophische Hefte, Vol. I, No. 3 (Berlin 1929).