Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Notes 107
has lifted the veil only enough for us to see some of the paradoxical consequences of this theory.”
Meanwhile, however, Brentano’s suggestions enabled Hillebrand to write the book on Die neuen
Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse (Vienna 1891). J.P.N.Land, who was not at all close to Brentano
as a philosopher, understood the new theory of judgement and inference much better than Windelband
did. See J.P.N.Land, “Brentano’s Logical Investigations”, Mind, I (1876), pp. 284–292; compare also
Anton Marty’s Gesammelte Schriften, Halle a. S. 1916–1920.
Brentano discussed Land’s criticism in a letter dated 15 April, 1876, which is reproduced in large
part in Vol. II of the Psychologie (p. 288). Land had said that all categorical statements—and hence
those beginning with “all”—presuppose the existence of a subject. Brentano had originally held that
A-statements have only one possible interpretation and that this is purely negative, as explained in the
previous note. He conceded to Land, however, that there are also A-statements which may be interpreted
as affirming the existence of their subjects, in which case such moods as Bamalip and Darapti
remain valid. But Land was entirely mistaken if he intended to deny that there are A-statements which
serve only to express pure and often apodictic denials. Geometric statements in no way presuppose
the existence of the structures or forms with which they are concerned. For further details see Vol. II
of the Psychologie, p. 248 and the notes on pp. 284–6 of that work.
Land had defended his view in this way: When we say “No stone is alive” or “All men are mortal”
we presuppose the existence of stones or of men; in making these statements we are not concerned
with the possible properties of purely problematic men or stones (op. cit., p. 291). It is true, as indicated
above, that in the natural sciences statements of this sort do include an affirmation. “All men
are mortal” says (1) that there are men and (2) that there is nothing which is a man and not mortal.
Similarly for those statements of geometry which are concerned with the three-dimensional space
in which we live, but such statements—e.g., those that speak of ideal tetrahedrons—can be applied
only approximately. But we are also acquainted with geometries which are concerned with manifolds
having more than three dimensions, and we do not know, and cannot know, whether such manifolds
are actual; the objects of non-Euclidean geometry, moreover, are entirely problematic.
Brentano had added the following lines to the letter referred to above: “And what of statements
which contradict each other—‘Some angels are damned by God’ and ‘No angel is damned by God’?
According to all logic up to now, one of these must be true. But if there are no angels, then, according
to Land’s view, both would be false.”
It should be noted that it is Land’s view and not Brentano’s which conflicts with the traditional
doctrine that, of two contradictory statements, one must be true. According to Land’s view the statement
“No angel is damned by God” would be false if there were no angels, for on his interpretation
the statement is equivalent to “There are angels and none of these is damned by God”.
39 Except for the footnote on Miklosich, I have omitted the critique of Sigwart from the second
edition of Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis; for the critique has no direct relevance to the problems
of value theory with which the Ursprung is concerned and, as will be seen in what follows, Brentano
was later to give up some of the views which the note expresses. The note is not without value,
however, for it contains a telling criticism of Sigwart’s doctrine and it is essential for understanding
those earlier views of Brentano which still survive in the writings of most of his followers.
40 Now republished in Anton Marty, Gesammelte Schriften (Halle 1918), edited by J.Eisenmeier,
A.Kastil, and O.Kraus, Vol. II, Part I.
41 Brentano’s remarks are taken from note 25 of the first edition of Vom Ursprung sittlicher
Erkenntnis; this part of the note does not appear in the second edition, for reasons that are explained
in the Introduction to that edition. What is said in the note is not relevant to the context of that
work, nor does it correspond to Brentano’s later point of view. But it is relevant to the present work.
42 Brentano here defines the “existent” as that in relation to which the affirmative judgement is true
or correct. His later theory gives us a more exact formulation of the thought behind this definition.
According to Brentano’s later theory, such expressions as “existence”, “being”, “existing”, are
synsemantic, having no meaning by themselves; that is to say, “existence” and “being” do not name