Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Notes 107<br />
has lifted <strong>the</strong> veil only enough for us to see some of <strong>the</strong> paradoxical consequences of this <strong>the</strong>ory.”<br />
Meanwhile, however, <strong>Brentano</strong>’s suggestions enabled Hillebr<strong>and</strong> to write <strong>the</strong> book on Die neuen<br />
<strong>The</strong>orien der kategorischen Schlüsse (Vienna 1891). J.P.N.L<strong>and</strong>, who was not at all close to <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
as a philosopher, understood <strong>the</strong> new <strong>the</strong>ory of judgement <strong>and</strong> inference much better than Windelb<strong>and</strong><br />
did. See J.P.N.L<strong>and</strong>, “<strong>Brentano</strong>’s Logical Investigations”, Mind, I (1876), pp. 284–292; compare also<br />
Anton Marty’s Gesammelte Schriften, Halle a. S. 1916–1920.<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> discussed L<strong>and</strong>’s criticism in a letter dated 15 April, 1876, which is reproduced in large<br />
part in Vol. II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie (p. 288). L<strong>and</strong> had said that all categorical statements—<strong>and</strong> hence<br />
those beginning with “all”—presuppose <strong>the</strong> existence of a subject. <strong>Brentano</strong> had originally held that<br />
A-statements have only one possible interpretation <strong>and</strong> that this is purely negative, as explained in <strong>the</strong><br />
previous note. He conceded to L<strong>and</strong>, however, that <strong>the</strong>re are also A-statements which may be interpreted<br />
as affirming <strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong>ir subjects, in which case such moods as Bamalip <strong>and</strong> Darapti<br />
remain valid. But L<strong>and</strong> was entirely mistaken if he intended to deny that <strong>the</strong>re are A-statements which<br />
serve only to express pure <strong>and</strong> often apodictic denials. Geometric statements in no way presuppose<br />
<strong>the</strong> existence of <strong>the</strong> structures or forms with which <strong>the</strong>y are concerned. For fur<strong>the</strong>r details see Vol. II<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie, p. 248 <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> notes on pp. 284–6 of that work.<br />
L<strong>and</strong> had defended his view in this way: When we say “No stone is alive” or “All men are mortal”<br />
we presuppose <strong>the</strong> existence of stones or of men; in making <strong>the</strong>se statements we are not concerned<br />
with <strong>the</strong> possible properties of purely problematic men or stones (op. cit., p. 291). It is true, as indicated<br />
above, that in <strong>the</strong> natural sciences statements of this sort do include an affirmation. “All men<br />
are mortal” says (1) that <strong>the</strong>re are men <strong>and</strong> (2) that <strong>the</strong>re is nothing which is a man <strong>and</strong> not mortal.<br />
Similarly for those statements of geometry which are concerned with <strong>the</strong> three-dimensional space<br />
in which we live, but such statements—e.g., those that speak of ideal tetrahedrons—can be applied<br />
only approximately. But we are also acquainted with geometries which are concerned with manifolds<br />
having more than three dimensions, <strong>and</strong> we do not know, <strong>and</strong> cannot know, whe<strong>the</strong>r such manifolds<br />
are actual; <strong>the</strong> objects of non-Euclidean geometry, moreover, are entirely problematic.<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> had added <strong>the</strong> following lines to <strong>the</strong> letter referred to above: “And what of statements<br />
which contradict each o<strong>the</strong>r—‘Some angels are damned by God’ <strong>and</strong> ‘No angel is damned by God’?<br />
According to all logic up to now, one of <strong>the</strong>se must be true. But if <strong>the</strong>re are no angels, <strong>the</strong>n, according<br />
to L<strong>and</strong>’s view, both would be false.”<br />
It should be noted that it is L<strong>and</strong>’s view <strong>and</strong> not <strong>Brentano</strong>’s which conflicts with <strong>the</strong> traditional<br />
doctrine that, of two contradictory statements, one must be true. According to L<strong>and</strong>’s view <strong>the</strong> statement<br />
“No angel is damned by God” would be false if <strong>the</strong>re were no angels, for on his interpretation<br />
<strong>the</strong> statement is equivalent to “<strong>The</strong>re are angels <strong>and</strong> none of <strong>the</strong>se is damned by God”.<br />
39 Except for <strong>the</strong> footnote on Miklosich, I have omitted <strong>the</strong> critique of Sigwart from <strong>the</strong> second<br />
edition of Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis; for <strong>the</strong> critique has no direct relevance to <strong>the</strong> problems<br />
of value <strong>the</strong>ory with which <strong>the</strong> Ursprung is concerned <strong>and</strong>, as will be seen in what follows, <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
was later to give up some of <strong>the</strong> views which <strong>the</strong> note expresses. <strong>The</strong> note is not without value,<br />
however, for it contains a telling criticism of Sigwart’s doctrine <strong>and</strong> it is essential for underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />
those earlier views of <strong>Brentano</strong> which still survive in <strong>the</strong> writings of most of his followers.<br />
40 Now republished in Anton Marty, Gesammelte Schriften (Halle 1918), edited by J.Eisenmeier,<br />
A.Kastil, <strong>and</strong> O.Kraus, Vol. II, Part I.<br />
41 <strong>Brentano</strong>’s remarks are taken from note 25 of <strong>the</strong> first edition of Vom Ursprung sittlicher<br />
Erkenntnis; this part of <strong>the</strong> note does not appear in <strong>the</strong> second edition, for reasons that are explained<br />
in <strong>the</strong> Introduction to that edition. What is said in <strong>the</strong> note is not relevant to <strong>the</strong> context of that<br />
work, nor does it correspond to <strong>Brentano</strong>’s later point of view. But it is relevant to <strong>the</strong> present work.<br />
42 <strong>Brentano</strong> here defines <strong>the</strong> “existent” as that in relation to which <strong>the</strong> affirmative judgement is true<br />
or correct. His later <strong>the</strong>ory gives us a more exact formulation of <strong>the</strong> thought behind this definition.<br />
According to <strong>Brentano</strong>’s later <strong>the</strong>ory, such expressions as “existence”, “being”, “existing”, are<br />
synsemantic, having no meaning by <strong>the</strong>mselves; that is to say, “existence” <strong>and</strong> “being” do not name