Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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106 Notes<br />
he held instead that <strong>the</strong> word “is” has a single meaning in <strong>the</strong> statements “<strong>The</strong>re is a God”, “<strong>The</strong>re is<br />
a substance”, “<strong>The</strong>re is a property or quality”. But at <strong>the</strong> time he wrote <strong>the</strong> criticism of Windelb<strong>and</strong> he<br />
did believe that such words as “deprivation”, “possibility”, “truth”, <strong>and</strong> “freedom” are categorematic,<br />
<strong>and</strong> hence that one could think about a deprivation, <strong>and</strong> accept or reject it, just as one may think about<br />
a physical thing, or about a man, or God. But later investigations (see <strong>the</strong> appendix of Vol. II of <strong>the</strong><br />
Psychologie) indicated that <strong>the</strong> words in question have only a syncategorematic use. <strong>The</strong> lecture<br />
on truth, at <strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> present book, implies that <strong>the</strong> statement “<strong>The</strong>re is a deprivation,<br />
or absence, of gold” affirms an “irreal” object of thought—that it affirms <strong>the</strong> “absence of gold” or<br />
<strong>the</strong> “non-existence of gold”. But according to <strong>Brentano</strong>’s later view, <strong>the</strong> statement rejects or denies<br />
something; “<strong>The</strong>re is an absence of gold” is only ano<strong>the</strong>r way of saying “<strong>The</strong>re is no gold”. And<br />
what is denied or rejected is always some thing, whe<strong>the</strong>r it be gold or water or whatever. <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
would also add this: if we are to express ourselves strictly, we should not speak of <strong>the</strong> meaning of<br />
<strong>the</strong> expressions “is” <strong>and</strong> “is not”; we should speak ra<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> synsemantic uses of such words.<br />
And <strong>the</strong>se uses may be very different: in <strong>the</strong> sentence “<strong>The</strong>re is a God” <strong>the</strong> word “is” is used to<br />
express an affirmation, but in “<strong>The</strong>re is an absence or deprivation” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>The</strong>re is an impossibility”<br />
it is used to express a denial or rejection, which in such cases happens to have <strong>the</strong> linguistic form of<br />
an affirmation. <strong>Brentano</strong>’s criticisms of his own earlier doctrine are set forth very clearly in a letter<br />
which I have included in my introduction to <strong>the</strong> Psychologie (Vol. I, pp. xliv–liv).<br />
35 <strong>Brentano</strong> is here calling attention to <strong>the</strong> fact that when <strong>the</strong> word “is” is used syncategorematically<br />
as a copula, in order to express an affirmation, it has nothing to do with that sense of “being” which<br />
is synonymous with “object” or “thing” <strong>and</strong> which does function as a genuine name. It would be well<br />
if this equivocation in <strong>the</strong> term being could henceforth be avoided.<br />
36 A simple <strong>the</strong>tic judgement, according to <strong>Brentano</strong>, is adequately expressed in <strong>the</strong> forms “<strong>The</strong>re<br />
is an A” or “<strong>The</strong>re is not an A”, or even in <strong>the</strong> forms “<strong>The</strong>re is an AB” or “<strong>The</strong>re is not an AB”. A<br />
compound predicative judgement (a “double-judgement”) would be put as “A is B” or “A is not B”.<br />
<strong>The</strong> traditional logic misconceives <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> latter judgements; it takes <strong>the</strong>m to be single<br />
judgements (as <strong>Brentano</strong> had done at first) <strong>and</strong> not as consisting of two judgements. Thus it takes “A<br />
is B” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>The</strong>re is AB” to be different verbal expressions of <strong>the</strong> same judgement; just as <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
had taught, in 1874, that “Some man is sick” has <strong>the</strong> same meaning as <strong>the</strong> existential statement<br />
“<strong>The</strong>re is a sick man”. But if <strong>the</strong>re are “double-judgements”, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> proper way to express <strong>the</strong>m is<br />
in <strong>the</strong> form “A is B”—“Some man is sick”. In <strong>the</strong> latter judgement a man is accepted or affirmed <strong>and</strong><br />
it is said of him that he is sick. But “<strong>The</strong>re is a sick man”, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, is <strong>the</strong> proper expression<br />
for a simple <strong>the</strong>tic judgement, in which <strong>the</strong> object of a syn<strong>the</strong>sis of ideas—“sick man”—is simply<br />
acknowledged.<br />
37 According to Windelb<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> statement “<strong>The</strong> rose is a flower” may be thought of as being like<br />
<strong>the</strong> statement “All roses are flowers” <strong>and</strong> consequently he believed it to mean <strong>the</strong> same as “<strong>The</strong>re<br />
is no rose which is not a flower” or “<strong>The</strong>re is no rose which is a non-flower”. <strong>Brentano</strong> says, on<br />
<strong>the</strong> contrary, that “<strong>The</strong> rose is a flower”, as well as “All roses are flowers”, expresses a twofold<br />
judgement: one judgement which accepts or acknowledges a rose, <strong>and</strong> a second judgement which<br />
rejects or denies roses which are non-flowers. In o<strong>the</strong>r words, one must take account of <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />
statements beginning with “all” may have two different senses. Sometimes <strong>the</strong>y may express what is<br />
merely a negative judgement. For example, <strong>the</strong> judgement expressed by “All triangles are such that<br />
<strong>the</strong> sum of <strong>the</strong>ir angles is 180 degrees” is a purely negative apodictic judgement which does not assert<br />
that <strong>the</strong>re is such a thing as a triangle; <strong>the</strong> judgement is true, <strong>and</strong> yet <strong>the</strong>re cannot be anything that is<br />
actually made up of three absolutely straight lines. But when one says “All men are mortal” <strong>and</strong> “All<br />
roses are flowers”, one is expressing <strong>the</strong> judgements (1) that <strong>the</strong>re are men <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re are flowers<br />
<strong>and</strong> (2) that <strong>the</strong>re are no men who are not mortal <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re are no roses which are not flowers. It<br />
was in 1883, so far as I know, that <strong>Brentano</strong> first published this interpretation of “all” statements.<br />
38 Windelb<strong>and</strong> had written: <strong>Brentano</strong> “proposes in a very mysterious way that <strong>the</strong> traditional<br />
<strong>the</strong>ory of inference may be revolutionized on <strong>the</strong> basis of a <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> nature of judgement, but he