Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Notes 105<br />
“objective” or “state of affairs” (<strong>the</strong> state of affairs that something A is, or that it is not). <strong>The</strong> analogue<br />
holds true in <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> correspondence between valuation <strong>and</strong> value, states-of-value, valuecontents,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> like. <strong>Brentano</strong> had not yet become completely aware of <strong>the</strong> fictitious character of<br />
<strong>the</strong>se modes of speaking.<br />
25 Instead of speaking of a “correct inference” from false premises, one should speak of <strong>the</strong> correct<br />
conception of <strong>the</strong> so-called “rule of inference”. To call <strong>the</strong> inference itself formally correct or formally<br />
true is inadvisable <strong>and</strong> misleading. Compare Hillebr<strong>and</strong>, Die neuen <strong>The</strong>orien der kategorischen<br />
Schlüsse; compare also notes 7 <strong>and</strong> 38.<br />
26 From this point on, <strong>the</strong> entire correspondence or “adaequatio” <strong>the</strong>ory is capable of refutation.<br />
Any such <strong>the</strong>ory, including <strong>the</strong> one presented in <strong>the</strong> text, is untenable, because it is absurd, indeed<br />
ridiculous, to hope to compare <strong>the</strong> thing with <strong>the</strong> judgement in which <strong>the</strong> thing is known. For <strong>the</strong><br />
thing in question would have to be known before <strong>the</strong> comparison could be made. Yet every <strong>the</strong>ory<br />
intending to trace back <strong>the</strong> concept of <strong>the</strong> “true” to <strong>the</strong> concepts of being “appropriate”, “fitting”,<br />
“suitable”, or <strong>the</strong> like, tacitly implies that such a comparison must be made.<br />
27 <strong>The</strong> concept of a thing is not to be confused with that of an existent. We derive <strong>the</strong> concept of<br />
thing from any intuition of outer, or inner, perception; “thing” is <strong>the</strong> most general concept that <strong>the</strong>re<br />
is. But we speak of “<strong>the</strong> existent” or of “that which has belng” only when we assert of some thing that<br />
it is; “existence” <strong>and</strong> “existent” are thus related to <strong>the</strong> judging attitude <strong>and</strong> to affirmation in particular.<br />
We will not discuss <strong>the</strong> ways in which some recent philosophers have played with <strong>the</strong> words “Being”,<br />
“Dasein”, <strong>and</strong> “Existence”, except to note that, if a <strong>the</strong>ory has anything new to offer, it should not be<br />
expressed in words which have traditionally been used in o<strong>the</strong>r senses.<br />
28 <strong>The</strong> principle according to which any conceptual investigation must ultimately go back to<br />
intuition is what finally enabled <strong>Brentano</strong> to dispose of <strong>the</strong> doctrine of irrealia.<br />
29 <strong>Brentano</strong> here expressly states that to every thought (Denken) <strong>the</strong>re corresponds, as a correlate,<br />
that which is thought about (das Gedachte). <strong>Brentano</strong> always insisted that when we think about a<br />
horse, we think about <strong>the</strong> horse <strong>and</strong> not about <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> horse; but he is saying here that <strong>the</strong>re is<br />
a correlation between <strong>the</strong> thinking-of-a-horse <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> horse as something which is thought about. I<br />
mention this because by <strong>the</strong> time he wrote <strong>the</strong> letter of 17 March, 1905, which is printed below, <strong>the</strong><br />
latter doctrine had become so foreign to him that he questioned whe<strong>the</strong>r he had ever enunciated it.<br />
According to his later views, <strong>the</strong> “A-as-something-which-is-thought-about” is a linguistic <strong>and</strong> not a<br />
conceptual correlate of “That which is thinking about A”.<br />
30 <strong>The</strong> fragment breaks off with <strong>the</strong> additional phrase, “And similarly in <strong>the</strong> case of judgement,<br />
‘<strong>The</strong>re is…’” <strong>The</strong> manuscript was written certainly not after 1901, <strong>and</strong> most probably long before.<br />
This is confirmed by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>writing does not yet show any indication of diminishing<br />
eyesight <strong>and</strong>, even more strongly, by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> general train of thought is <strong>the</strong> same as that of<br />
<strong>the</strong> lecture on truth.<br />
31 <strong>The</strong> Deskriptive Psychologie which <strong>Brentano</strong> announces here exists up to now only in <strong>the</strong> form of<br />
unpublished lectures. In 1911 <strong>Brentano</strong> prepared a new edition of Book Two of his Psychologie vom<br />
empirischen St<strong>and</strong>punkt <strong>and</strong> added supplementary material; see Chapter VII, “On <strong>the</strong> Impossibility<br />
of Regarding Judgement <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Emotions as forming a single basic category” (Vol. II, p. 15 2).<br />
32 Concerning those compound or double judgements, see Volume II of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie, p.<br />
183, <strong>and</strong> “Miklosich über subjektlose Sätze” published in 1883 <strong>and</strong> translated as “Miklosich on<br />
Subjectless Propositions”, in <strong>the</strong> appendix to <strong>The</strong> Origin of <strong>the</strong> Knowledge of Right <strong>and</strong> Wrong<br />
(London 1902), Cecil Hague’s translation of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis.<br />
33 On <strong>the</strong> concept of intensity, see <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein (Vol. III<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Psychologie) <strong>and</strong> his Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie (Leipzig 1907).<br />
34 <strong>Brentano</strong> would now approach Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s doctrine somewhat differently. Windelb<strong>and</strong> had<br />
said that <strong>the</strong> statement “<strong>The</strong>re is freedom” does not ascribe to freedom <strong>the</strong> kind of being that “<strong>The</strong>re<br />
is a God” ascribes to God. He had also held that substances do not have <strong>the</strong> same type of being as do<br />
properties or activities. But <strong>Brentano</strong> never accepted any such distinction between modes of being;