Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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104 Notes<br />
20 Later <strong>Brentano</strong> declares this to be false. One can refer only to things; for only things can be<br />
objects of thought. <strong>The</strong>re is a detailed <strong>and</strong> complete account of this topic in <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Psychologie,<br />
Vol. I, Introduction, Vol. II, Appendix 9, <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong> later essays in <strong>the</strong> present book.<br />
21 Truth is not a real property of judgement unless one underst<strong>and</strong>s by “truth” simply <strong>the</strong> property of<br />
being evident or of being insightful (einsichtig). Since one cannot take “truth” in <strong>the</strong> latter way (<strong>and</strong><br />
it is not so taken in <strong>the</strong> lecture), it is clear that in speaking of truth one is concerned with an apparent<br />
attribute or characteristic. Such apparent attributes are what <strong>the</strong> scholastics called denominationes<br />
extrinsecae, marks from <strong>the</strong> outside, so to speak. In referring to <strong>the</strong> truth of a judgement that is not<br />
evident, one has in mind ei<strong>the</strong>r that this blind judgement corresponds with respect to quality to some<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r judgement that is evident, or else that an evident judgement could not possibly contradict it.<br />
Compare <strong>the</strong> Introduction.<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> says in <strong>the</strong> text: “<strong>The</strong> judgement itself may not undergo any change; but it will become true<br />
if <strong>the</strong> thing in question comes into being, <strong>and</strong> it will cease to be true if <strong>the</strong> thing is destroyed.” Suppose,<br />
for instance, I judge that it is raining. <strong>The</strong> rain stops, I do not revise my judgement, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> judgement<br />
is thus transformed from one which is true into one which is false. If “true” <strong>and</strong> “false” were real predicates,<br />
or real properties of <strong>the</strong> judgement, this would constitute a miracle—indeed a contradiction; something<br />
would change its real properties without itself undergoing any change o<strong>the</strong>r than a temporal one.<br />
Thus “true” <strong>and</strong> “false” cannot signify real predicates or attributes. <strong>The</strong>refore, one might argue,<br />
<strong>the</strong>y must signify non-real predicates.<br />
But <strong>the</strong> great progress of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s thinking consists in showing that <strong>the</strong>re cannot be determinations<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r than things—indeed that nonreal determinations cannot even be imagined. What, <strong>the</strong>n,<br />
does it mean to say “<strong>The</strong> judgement is deprived of its truth without its being changed in any way”?<br />
I believe <strong>the</strong> answer is roughly this: “<strong>The</strong> judgement ‘It is raining’ ceases to be true.” And what this<br />
means, when put clearly <strong>and</strong> explicitly, is: “From now on a judgement which affirms rain cannot possibly<br />
be evident.” Our statement is an apodictic rejection of evident judgements affirming rain.<br />
22 One must object to <strong>the</strong> view that analytic judgements, <strong>and</strong> specifically cognitions a priori, refer<br />
to objects devoid of real content. <strong>The</strong> principle of contradiction, for instance, no matter how it is<br />
formulated, refers to things.<br />
23 At <strong>the</strong> time <strong>Brentano</strong>’s view was as follows: <strong>The</strong> coming into being or passing away of something<br />
that has “no real content” (Gehalt) <strong>and</strong> is thus not a thing is always tied to <strong>the</strong> coming into being <strong>and</strong><br />
passing away of that which is a thing. A deprivation, for instance, comes into being when some thing<br />
passes away, <strong>and</strong> a deprivation passes away when <strong>the</strong> corresponding thing comes into being. Thus an<br />
empty space comes into being when certain bodies pass away or change <strong>the</strong>ir location. And an empty<br />
space passes away if certain bodies come into being or change <strong>the</strong>ir location. An object of thought<br />
comes into existence when one thinks, <strong>and</strong> it passes away when one stops thinking. It is noteworthy<br />
that <strong>Brentano</strong> had always held that <strong>the</strong> coming into being <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> passing away of <strong>the</strong> so-called nonthings<br />
is bound up with <strong>the</strong> coming into being <strong>and</strong> passing away of things. He did believe, at <strong>the</strong><br />
time of <strong>the</strong> lecture on truth, that “An empty space comes into being” conveys something o<strong>the</strong>r than<br />
“Some physical object passes away”, <strong>and</strong> that “My lack of money begins today” conveys something<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r than “Today I am devoid of all money”, or “Today <strong>the</strong> last of my money is gone”. He took <strong>the</strong><br />
statements to be logically equivalent <strong>and</strong> yet he considered <strong>the</strong>m psychologically <strong>and</strong> conceptually<br />
different. According to <strong>the</strong> later doctrine, however, <strong>the</strong> statements express <strong>the</strong> same thought but in<br />
different ways; in each case <strong>the</strong>re is a relation to a thing, in <strong>the</strong> one example a relation to matter that<br />
changes or moves, in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r example a relation to money which changes its owner, <strong>and</strong> so on. See<br />
additional details below <strong>and</strong> <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Vom Dasein Gottes, p. 42.<br />
<strong>The</strong> germ of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s later view, which rejects irrealia, even as possible objects of thought, is<br />
contained in this doctrine of <strong>the</strong> dependence of non-things upon things.<br />
24 What <strong>Brentano</strong> is doing here is essentially this: he replaces <strong>the</strong> doctrine of correspondence<br />
between thought <strong>and</strong> object (rei et intellectus) by that of <strong>the</strong> adequacy (fittingness, propriety) of<br />
thought to <strong>the</strong> existent or non-existent. This is what most of his students designate as adequacy to an