Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Notes 103<br />
single characteristic. Mental <strong>and</strong> physical things, indeed n-dimensional things, can be subsumed<br />
under <strong>the</strong> concept of “thing”, or “entity”; but what characteristics could a physical thing or a mental<br />
thing have in common with <strong>the</strong> “impossibility of a round square” or a “past pleasure”? <strong>The</strong>se are<br />
not to be subsumed under one concept. O<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>the</strong> word “entity” would be equivocal, sometimes<br />
referring to things <strong>and</strong> sometimes to non-things. <strong>The</strong> question is discussed in Part IV.<br />
16 <strong>The</strong> defect in <strong>the</strong>se detailed arguments consists in <strong>the</strong> following: <strong>Brentano</strong> proceeds from <strong>the</strong><br />
concept of correct (richtig) or fitting (as he had done in Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Section<br />
22), instead of proceeding from <strong>the</strong> concept of <strong>the</strong> evident or insightful (einsichtigen) judgement;<br />
but <strong>the</strong> concept of <strong>the</strong> correct can be acquired only by an appeal to a judgement which is seen to<br />
be correct, or seen to be evident. <strong>Brentano</strong> had always held, however, that we can give an account<br />
of correct <strong>and</strong> incorrect only by reflecting on <strong>the</strong> evident judgement (or, in <strong>the</strong> emotive sphere, by<br />
reflecting on emotions which are, analogously, correct or right, <strong>and</strong> incorrect or wrong). In Vom<br />
Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, all reference to “true <strong>and</strong> false”, “right <strong>and</strong> wrong”, is reduced to<br />
judging that is seen to be correct <strong>and</strong> to loving or hating that is seen to be correct.<br />
Elements of different <strong>the</strong>ories are lined up here in a somewhat disorderly manner. An older conception<br />
which derives from Aristotle connects <strong>the</strong> correct with <strong>the</strong> convenient or with <strong>the</strong> fitting,<br />
<strong>and</strong> a later, more progressive <strong>the</strong>ory reduces <strong>the</strong> correct to <strong>the</strong> evident, to that which is insightful.<br />
We must stay with this later doctrine. For it alone sheds light on <strong>the</strong> question: What is truth?<br />
17 It is clear that <strong>Brentano</strong> was here trying to improve upon Aristotle’s definition of truth—to<br />
transform it without completely ab<strong>and</strong>oning it. But this half-way measure is astonishing in view<br />
of <strong>the</strong> fact that, even <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>Brentano</strong> based <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of knowledge upon <strong>the</strong> concept of evident<br />
judgement, just as he based <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of value upon that of correct emotion.<br />
18 We say of a judgement that it fits, corresponds to, or harmonizes with its object provided that <strong>the</strong><br />
judgement is true; <strong>and</strong> we say of a judgement that it is true provided that <strong>the</strong> judgement is evident,<br />
or that we believe that it corresponds to an evident judgement with respect to its quality, or that<br />
we believe that an evident judgement that is concerned with <strong>the</strong> same object could not possibly<br />
be of a different quality. This is <strong>the</strong> consequence of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s later doctrine which emerges more<br />
<strong>and</strong> more clearly in <strong>the</strong> essays that follow, <strong>and</strong> which we must defend against <strong>the</strong> older doctrine<br />
that was advanced in <strong>the</strong> lecture on truth. Two judgements are said to correspond qualitatively (or<br />
formally) if both are affirmative, or both are negative, <strong>and</strong> if <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> same temporal mode.<br />
19 What holds of evident judgement also holds of correct emotion. Any discussion of correct<br />
or right in <strong>the</strong> sphere of emotive phenomena derives its meaning from evident judgement. We<br />
call an emotion suitable to its object, or fitting to its object, if it is seen to be correct, or if we<br />
believe that no emotion that is seen to be correct <strong>and</strong> that is directed upon <strong>the</strong> same object could<br />
possibly have a different quality. In saying of something that it is “good” we mean that no attitude<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> object o<strong>the</strong>r than love, or positive evaluation, could possibly be seen to be correct.<br />
“Good” is a syncategorematic word, like “being” <strong>and</strong> “non-being”. Compare <strong>the</strong> Introduction<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Notes to <strong>the</strong> new edition of Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (3rd edn, Leipzig 1934);<br />
see also <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Psychologie, Vol. II, as well as <strong>the</strong> later essays in <strong>the</strong> present volume.<br />
Hence <strong>the</strong> complete opposite of what is said in <strong>the</strong> text is true. It is not that <strong>the</strong> correctness of loving<br />
<strong>and</strong> hating depends upon whe<strong>the</strong>r or not we love <strong>the</strong> good or hate <strong>the</strong> bad; <strong>the</strong> truth of <strong>the</strong> matter is<br />
just <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r way round. And to say that our emotion fits or corresponds to <strong>the</strong> object again, is only<br />
to say, that <strong>the</strong> emotion is right or correct. <strong>The</strong> basic point is that <strong>the</strong> emotion is seen to be correct. We<br />
say of an object that it is good or bad if it fits an emotion which is right—a correct emotion. One does<br />
not first recognize <strong>the</strong> value <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n recognize <strong>the</strong> emotion as correct; it is, again, <strong>the</strong> converse that<br />
is true. What we call a value or a good is whatever may be <strong>the</strong> object of a correct emotion; we know<br />
that any qualitatively (formally) different emotion directed upon such an object is one that cannot<br />
possibly be correct. This was <strong>Brentano</strong>’s later view.