Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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102 Notes<br />
<strong>and</strong> futural thinking are differences not in <strong>the</strong> objects of thought, but in its modality. (He spoke of<br />
“Vorstellungsmodi”.) <strong>The</strong> thing that I think about in <strong>the</strong> present mode can be thought of at some<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r time in <strong>the</strong> past or in <strong>the</strong> future mode. <strong>The</strong> modes of thinking or presentation also affect <strong>the</strong><br />
judgements we make about <strong>the</strong>se things, but in every case what is thought of is itself a thing. When<br />
we think of a past or a future man, we are thinking of a thing—a man—in <strong>the</strong> praeterital or in <strong>the</strong><br />
futural mode. Compare <strong>Brentano</strong>’s doctrine of time <strong>and</strong> temporal modes of presentation (Psychologie,<br />
Vol. II <strong>and</strong> esp. Vol. III), <strong>and</strong> also <strong>Brentano</strong>’s published letters to Marty going back to 1895 (Archiv<br />
für Psychologie, LXXV, Heft 1 <strong>and</strong> 2, 1930). <strong>The</strong> latter also contain a discussion of Husserl’s later<br />
doctrine of modalities.<br />
<strong>The</strong> question that <strong>Brentano</strong> raised here—“Does one expect to find, as a thing external to oneself,<br />
some entity one knows to have perished a long time ago?”—is a question which, at that time, he<br />
answered in <strong>the</strong> negative; he believed that one is here concerned with a non-real entity that once<br />
existed, <strong>and</strong> that one is not concerned with a thing.<br />
11 <strong>Brentano</strong> held at that time that, if I say <strong>the</strong>re is a lack of money, <strong>the</strong>n I have affirmed something,<br />
acknowledged something in judgement; this something is not a “thing” but is <strong>the</strong> lack of a thing, <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> lack of a thing is itself an entity—a non-thing. Things as well as non-things are subsumed under<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept of “entity” (cf. 48). But <strong>Brentano</strong> later realized that this was a mistake. <strong>The</strong> statement<br />
“<strong>The</strong>re is a lack of money” is nothing but <strong>the</strong> linguistic disguise of a denial—“Money is lacking”,<br />
“<strong>The</strong>re is no money”, or “No money is <strong>the</strong>re”, all of which express my disavowal, or denial, of money.<br />
Such expressions as “lack of money” are not names but pseudo-names. <strong>The</strong>y are syncategorematic<br />
(mitbedeutende) expressions; <strong>the</strong>ir role in <strong>the</strong> complete statement is that of expressing a denial <strong>and</strong><br />
not, as <strong>the</strong> language might suggest, an affirmation.<br />
12 <strong>Brentano</strong> speaks here of “impossibilities”, “eternal truths” which subsist (bestehen); he rejects<br />
<strong>the</strong> idea that one might speak here of “entities” or “things” to which a true judgement corresponds.<br />
As may be ga<strong>the</strong>red from <strong>the</strong> following paragraphs, however, he does allow himself to speak of nonthings<br />
or irrealia, <strong>and</strong> he believes that any non-thing may be counted as an “entity” which exists <strong>and</strong><br />
to which our affirmative judgement corresponds. At <strong>the</strong> time <strong>Brentano</strong> did not consider <strong>the</strong> “entity” in<br />
such cases to be a thing; it was a non-real entity. Thus he considered ma<strong>the</strong>matical truths as something<br />
existent, though he did not consider <strong>the</strong>m to be existing things. This is all false; <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that it<br />
has been exposed as such by <strong>Brentano</strong> himself has been obstinately ignored. Contemporary <strong>the</strong>ory<br />
of knowledge <strong>and</strong> especially later “phenomenology” (Husserl’s Ideen <strong>and</strong> Transzendentale Logik)<br />
absorbed <strong>the</strong>se thoughts which had long been surmounted by <strong>Brentano</strong> <strong>and</strong> developed <strong>the</strong>m into a<br />
direction from which <strong>Brentano</strong> himself had parted.<br />
13 It seems, <strong>Brentano</strong> says, that <strong>the</strong> adaequatio rei et intellectus disintegrates because <strong>the</strong>re is no res,<br />
no “thing”, among <strong>the</strong> “eternal truths”, “impossibilities”, etc. to which thought would correspond. But<br />
in <strong>the</strong> following paragraph he holds that entities which are non-real <strong>and</strong> are yet capable of existing<br />
may serve as that to which thought corresponds.<br />
I repeat that this idea is untenable <strong>and</strong> that <strong>Brentano</strong> later rejected it categorically. But <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory<br />
reigns over <strong>the</strong> whole of epistemological literature without anyone taking note of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s (later)<br />
objections.<br />
14 <strong>Brentano</strong> believed, <strong>the</strong>n, that <strong>the</strong> doctrine of <strong>the</strong> adaequatio rei et intellectus is not completely<br />
false; it is to be interpreted, however, not as a correspondence of judging with a res (a thing or entity,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> strict sense of <strong>the</strong> term), but as a correspondence of <strong>the</strong> affirming judgement with something<br />
existent, <strong>and</strong> of <strong>the</strong> denying judgement with something non-existent. Non-things, irrealia, entities of<br />
reason, were thus said to be like things in that <strong>the</strong>y sometimes exist <strong>and</strong> sometimes do not exist.<br />
15 In this context “entity” is <strong>the</strong> most fundamental concept for <strong>Brentano</strong>, under which not only every<br />
thing but also every non-thing can be subsumed. Later <strong>Brentano</strong> rejected this <strong>the</strong>sis. He attempted to<br />
show that “entity” must be a univocal concept, since <strong>the</strong> concept of our consciousness, which always<br />
has something as its object, is univocal. But it would be impossible for “entity” to be a univocal<br />
concept if it were intended to encompass both things <strong>and</strong> non-things, for <strong>the</strong>se would not share a