NOTES by Oskar Kraus
INTRODUCTION (References 1 to 10) Notes 99 1 <strong>The</strong>re are modern <strong>the</strong>ories of knowledge which are nothing but correspondence <strong>the</strong>ories in disguise—for example, those <strong>the</strong>ories which would rely, not upon evidence, but upon “verification”, i.e., upon a comparison between a judgement <strong>and</strong> a state of affairs (or <strong>the</strong> facts, or what is actual). A comparison with <strong>the</strong> empirically given is itself an act of judgement, which can be ei<strong>the</strong>r false or correct; <strong>and</strong> one cannot make <strong>the</strong> comparison unless one already knows both <strong>the</strong> judgement <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact. 2 In <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Würzburg lectures on ontology, given prior to 1872, we find <strong>the</strong> following passage: “One may correctly characterize truth in <strong>the</strong> following way: Truth (or knowledge) is goodness or perfection in judgement, just as beauty is goodness or perfection of thought or idea (Vorstellung) <strong>and</strong> virtue <strong>the</strong> goodness or perfection of will (or desire).” This is <strong>the</strong> way in which Windelb<strong>and</strong> was later to speak. 3 Wherever <strong>the</strong>re is a belief in ideal <strong>and</strong> unreal objects, reasons of <strong>the</strong> sort that <strong>Brentano</strong> cites may be said to be at work: ordinary language is a practical <strong>and</strong> not a <strong>the</strong>oretical instrument; its influence is misleading, for it was not formed for <strong>the</strong> purposes of philosophy. But <strong>the</strong> philosopher must make use of ordinary language as long as <strong>the</strong>re is no characteristica universalis grounded upon an adequate psychological analysis. 4 <strong>The</strong> negative judgement is <strong>the</strong> source of our apparent references to non-being <strong>and</strong> to nothing. By denying this fact, one is led to <strong>the</strong> nonsensical mysticism of Heidegger’s “Nichts-<strong>the</strong>orie”, with its delusion that in certain moods <strong>and</strong> feelings we can “contemplate <strong>the</strong> essence of nothingness”. This is discussed in “Über Nichts und Alles” in Wege und Abwege der Philosophie (Prague 1937), by O.Kraus. 5 This principle is not to be confused with Höfler’s <strong>the</strong>sis (a product of misunderst<strong>and</strong>ings), according to which contradictory judgements cannot be made by <strong>the</strong> same subject. 6 According to Husserl (Logische Untersuchungen, 2nd edn, Vol. I, pp. 176–177), <strong>the</strong> law of contradiction, “when properly understood”, says that “of two contradictory propositions (judgementcontents), one is true <strong>and</strong> one is false”. And this, according to him, is to be distinguished from saying: “Of two contradictory judgements, one is correct <strong>and</strong> one is incorrect.” <strong>The</strong> latter is supposed to be merely a consequence of <strong>the</strong> former strict formulation. According to Husserl, when we think of <strong>the</strong> law of contradiction in its strict sense, we need not think of judgements as real acts at all, <strong>and</strong> in no case are judgements <strong>the</strong> objects with which <strong>the</strong> law is concerned. This over-subtle distinction must be rejected as nonsense, if only for <strong>the</strong> following reason: <strong>the</strong> term “correct”, when it is not used to mean <strong>the</strong> same thing as “evident”, is not being used as a real predicate which applies to <strong>the</strong> acts of judgement which we call correct; it functions ra<strong>the</strong>r as a mere denominatio extrinseca, merely expressing <strong>the</strong> thought that a judgement contradicting <strong>the</strong> one called correct cannot possibly be one that is evident, or seen to be correct. <strong>The</strong> principle that, of two contradictory propositions, one is true <strong>and</strong> one is false, tells us no more than this—“when properly understood”. <strong>The</strong> principle of contradiction does not imply that in calling a judgement “true” we are treating <strong>the</strong> judgement as being <strong>the</strong> subject of any kind of predication (<strong>and</strong> to this extent Husserl has a vague notion of what <strong>the</strong> correct view is); still less is <strong>the</strong> principle concerned with ideal propositions or contents of judgement. <strong>The</strong> principle of contradiction is an apodictic denial that <strong>the</strong>re can be an evident judgement which contradicts a judgement called “true”. <strong>The</strong> fictions of our language, however, serve to conceal <strong>the</strong> results of psychognostic analysis. <strong>The</strong> errors to which <strong>the</strong>se fictions may lead are illustrated by Husserl’s doctrine that “<strong>the</strong>” judgement that two <strong>and</strong> two are five (two <strong>and</strong> two are six, two <strong>and</strong> two are seven) is of <strong>the</strong> same sort as “<strong>the</strong>” judgement that <strong>the</strong>re are dragons. His realm of ideal objects, in o<strong>the</strong>r words, is populated not only by every possible “eternal truth” but also by every possible “eternal falsehood”. <strong>The</strong> “pure consciousness” is hardly to be envied, <strong>the</strong>refore, for <strong>the</strong> wealth of its Noëmata. 7 [According to <strong>Brentano</strong>’s <strong>the</strong>ory of judgement, every judgement has an object which <strong>the</strong> judgement ei<strong>the</strong>r affirms or denies (accepts or rejects); two judgements have <strong>the</strong> same object if <strong>the</strong> object that <strong>the</strong> one affirms or denies is <strong>the</strong> same as <strong>the</strong> object that <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r affirms or denies; <strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> same quality if <strong>the</strong>y both affirm <strong>the</strong> object, or if <strong>the</strong>y both deny <strong>the</strong> object.—R.M.C.] We must distinguish
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
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Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
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