Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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xvi Introduction<br />
to <strong>the</strong> confusion.* <strong>Brentano</strong> touched upon this confusion in volume 2 of his Psychologie<br />
(appendix VII, p. 15 2ff.) * <strong>and</strong> in <strong>the</strong> fourth selection of <strong>the</strong> present book (originally an<br />
appendix to <strong>the</strong> first edition of Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, 1889). 2 Windelb<strong>and</strong><br />
never freed himself from <strong>the</strong> error of treating <strong>the</strong> “realm of values” as a realm of unreal<br />
objects.<br />
But <strong>Brentano</strong> was to expose <strong>the</strong> fictions <strong>and</strong> hypostatizations to which we are led by<br />
such substantival expressions as “truth”, “eternal truth”, “value”, <strong>and</strong> “meaning”. <strong>The</strong><br />
renunciation of all such fictions is foreshadowed in <strong>the</strong> final four selections in Part One; it<br />
is more clearly seen in <strong>the</strong> letters <strong>and</strong> dictations which are assembled in Part Two.<br />
4. <strong>The</strong> final four selections of Part One were originally notes appended to <strong>the</strong> first edition<br />
(1889) of Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis; <strong>the</strong>y are omitted or abbreviated in subsequent<br />
editions of <strong>the</strong> same work.† <strong>The</strong>y are not directly relevant to <strong>the</strong> problem of <strong>the</strong> origin or<br />
source of our knowledge of value <strong>and</strong> preferability; <strong>Brentano</strong> had used <strong>the</strong> publication<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Ursprung merely as an occasion to set forth his critique. <strong>The</strong>se selections, which<br />
were notes 21, 22, 23, <strong>and</strong> 27 respectively of <strong>the</strong> original edition of <strong>the</strong> Ursprung, are:<br />
“Descartes’ Classification of Mental Phenomena”; “Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s Error with respect to<br />
<strong>the</strong> Classification of Mental Phenomena”; “Sigwart’s <strong>The</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> Existential <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Negative Judgement”; <strong>and</strong> “On <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong>”.<br />
In this context, I may call attention to <strong>the</strong> polemic against Windelb<strong>and</strong>, particularly <strong>the</strong><br />
fourth point, which is discussed in <strong>the</strong> explanatory notes at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> book.<br />
<strong>The</strong> polemic against Sigwart’s concept of existence is not only of historical interest; its<br />
criticism of <strong>the</strong> correspondence <strong>the</strong>ory is even more penetrating than <strong>the</strong> one to be found<br />
in <strong>the</strong> lecture on truth. I have included <strong>the</strong> selection on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong> despite <strong>the</strong> fact that it is<br />
included in <strong>the</strong> second edition of Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. <strong>The</strong> essay had been<br />
overlooked in its original context <strong>and</strong> has not yet been sufficiently noticed. In this essay we<br />
have for <strong>the</strong> first time an attack upon construing <strong>the</strong> evident in terms of any kind of feeling;<br />
in recent years this very point has been cited as one of <strong>the</strong> contributions of Husserl’s attack<br />
upon psychologism.* We shall return to <strong>the</strong>se questions below.<br />
* Compare Rickert, Der Gegenst<strong>and</strong> der Erkenntnis, 6th edn, p. 205: “<strong>The</strong> knowing subject does<br />
not ‘turn toward’ reality in order to become <strong>the</strong>oretically valuable; but it should turn toward<br />
<strong>the</strong>oretical value if it is to know reality.”<br />
* All references to <strong>Brentano</strong>’s Psychologie vom empirischen St<strong>and</strong>punkt are to <strong>the</strong> 1925 edition,<br />
edited by Oskar Kraus, <strong>and</strong> published by Felix Meiner at Leipzig. <strong>The</strong> 1925 edition, in two volumes,<br />
includes <strong>the</strong> Psychologie vom empirischen St<strong>and</strong>punkt of 1874, <strong>the</strong> Von der Klassifikation<br />
der psychischen Phänomene of 1911, <strong>and</strong> an appendix selected from material dictated by <strong>Brentano</strong><br />
between 1915 <strong>and</strong> 1917.—R.M.C.<br />
† <strong>The</strong> first edition was published by Duncker <strong>and</strong> Humblot at Leipzig in 1889, <strong>the</strong> second by Felix<br />
Meiner at Leipzig in 1921, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> third by Felix Meiner in 1934; <strong>the</strong> second <strong>and</strong> third editions<br />
were edited by Oskar Kraus. <strong>The</strong> original edition was translated by Cecil Hague as <strong>The</strong> Origin of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Knowledge of Right <strong>and</strong> Wrong (Constable, London 1902).—R.M.C.<br />
* See, for example, “Phänomenologie und Kritizismus”, by F. Klein, in Heidelberger Abh<strong>and</strong>lungen,<br />
edited by Hoffman <strong>and</strong> Rickert, No. 21.