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Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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Appendix 2: On <strong>the</strong> Origin of <strong>the</strong> Erroneous Doctrine of Entia Irrealia<br />

rejects a round square <strong>and</strong> who does so with evidence. 19 I am aware of myself as someone<br />

who rejects correctly. (<strong>The</strong> one who denies is himself something positive: Leibniz.)<br />

4. <strong>The</strong> history of all this is tied up with <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian doctrine that truth is adaequatio<br />

rei et intellectus. In De Anima 6 <strong>the</strong> question is raised: When is something true? 20 Answer:<br />

If a thing has a certain attribute, <strong>the</strong>n I judge truly <strong>and</strong> correctly if I judge that <strong>the</strong> thing<br />

has <strong>the</strong> attribute—if I thus combine what is combined in reality. If <strong>the</strong> thing does not have<br />

<strong>the</strong> attribute, <strong>the</strong>n I judge truly if my judgement denies <strong>the</strong> attribute of <strong>the</strong> thing—if I thus<br />

separate what is not combined in reality.<br />

But <strong>the</strong>re is also a knowledge which is not compound. For it is not necessary that I<br />

combine ideas. What is it that I do in such a case? I simply have an idea <strong>and</strong> accept or affirm<br />

it Aristotle, Metaphysics, Θ, 10, 1051b, 17). And what if I simply reject or deny? Aristotle<br />

may have intended to touch on this with <strong>the</strong> following words: My own<br />

conjecture is that he meant to say this: In <strong>the</strong> case where a thing is thought about <strong>and</strong><br />

correctly rejected, <strong>the</strong>re is nothing. In that stage of my thinking, I was not sufficiently clear<br />

about this point <strong>and</strong> assumed that <strong>the</strong> doctrine of <strong>the</strong> adaequatio rei et intellectus should be<br />

extended to apply in <strong>the</strong> case of negative judgements, as though such a judgement had, as<br />

its objective correlate, <strong>the</strong> non-being of that which is correctly rejected.<br />

97

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