Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Appendix 2: On <strong>the</strong> Origin of <strong>the</strong> Erroneous Doctrine of Entia Irrealia<br />
rejects a round square <strong>and</strong> who does so with evidence. 19 I am aware of myself as someone<br />
who rejects correctly. (<strong>The</strong> one who denies is himself something positive: Leibniz.)<br />
4. <strong>The</strong> history of all this is tied up with <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian doctrine that truth is adaequatio<br />
rei et intellectus. In De Anima 6 <strong>the</strong> question is raised: When is something true? 20 Answer:<br />
If a thing has a certain attribute, <strong>the</strong>n I judge truly <strong>and</strong> correctly if I judge that <strong>the</strong> thing<br />
has <strong>the</strong> attribute—if I thus combine what is combined in reality. If <strong>the</strong> thing does not have<br />
<strong>the</strong> attribute, <strong>the</strong>n I judge truly if my judgement denies <strong>the</strong> attribute of <strong>the</strong> thing—if I thus<br />
separate what is not combined in reality.<br />
But <strong>the</strong>re is also a knowledge which is not compound. For it is not necessary that I<br />
combine ideas. What is it that I do in such a case? I simply have an idea <strong>and</strong> accept or affirm<br />
it Aristotle, Metaphysics, Θ, 10, 1051b, 17). And what if I simply reject or deny? Aristotle<br />
may have intended to touch on this with <strong>the</strong> following words: My own<br />
conjecture is that he meant to say this: In <strong>the</strong> case where a thing is thought about <strong>and</strong><br />
correctly rejected, <strong>the</strong>re is nothing. In that stage of my thinking, I was not sufficiently clear<br />
about this point <strong>and</strong> assumed that <strong>the</strong> doctrine of <strong>the</strong> adaequatio rei et intellectus should be<br />
extended to apply in <strong>the</strong> case of negative judgements, as though such a judgement had, as<br />
its objective correlate, <strong>the</strong> non-being of that which is correctly rejected.<br />
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