Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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94 Appendix 1: On the General Validity of Truth and the Basic Mistakes (3) Naturally the situation would be entirely different if one were to prove that there is a topoid of four or more dimensions. For then there would be an analogue of our threedimensional geometry; and such a discipline (if we think of geometry as a science of bodies) would belong with the natural sciences. There is one point of view from which, even today, the so-called metamathematical considerations might be classified along with geometry. This is the practical one of division of work. It is the one Marty indicated, in his important address as Rector, in order to prove the unity of philosophy. Indeed nothing more is necessary in order to show that, from this practical point of view, knowledge of metamathematics and knowledge of geometry are intimately connected. But it is essential to note that this point of view must be distinguished from the theoretical one. I would refer you to Marty. 15 A certain economy is also required in logic considered as an art; this would seem to me to preclude such logic going into metamathematical doctrines. At least if the logic is a general logic. A logic adapted to the practical discipline just referred to should give detailed consideration to those artifices designed to compensate for the failure of our intuition in connection with the fourth dimension and such like. I have in mind, in particular, the method of projection into a three-dimensional space. II Draft of a letter from Brentano to Husserl On Pure Logic 16 Florence, 30 April, 1905 If I understand correctly, you would hope to take all those evident truths which are said to be conceptually illuminating and unify them within a special theoretical discipline, and you would call this discipline “logic”. That there are such conceptually illuminating truths is beyond doubt. And it is undeniable that, as such, they have something in common. But you must admit yourself that they cannot possibly be unified. To what extent you hope to succeed in this is still not sufficiently clear to me. Nor is the leading thought sufficiently clear. It is not supposed to be a practical one; it is all supposed to be done in a purely theoretical interest. Anything that is known may well be of some theoretical interest. Knowledge, even of the most insignificant kind, is a good. But much of it, from the theoretical standpoint, is relatively worthless. The historian who does not exclude from his account most of the things that he finds to have happened is dull and vapid. But so too for the one who is concerned with general laws. How absurd it would be to prepare a book which contained nothing from beginning to end but multiplications of numbers taken at random. Yet each would express a general law.
Appendix 1: On the General Validity of Truth and the Basic Mistakes 95 What is it, then, that determines the value of certain truths and indicates that they are more worthy than others to be considered for their own sake and to be combined into a purely theoretical discipline? What Aristotle required above all was this: if we are to be concerned with the necessary properties of some general concept, then there must be certain objects which fall under that concept. This requirement seems justified. Where it is not fulfilled, everything becomes a mere exercise for the wits. And it explains satisfactorily why Aristotle, and those who came after him, never tried to mark off, as a separate theoretical discipline, a science of those truths which merely illuminate concepts and which contain no assertoric, empirical data. If this is what it is that you want to do now, I can hardly feel that it is reasonable. The term “logic” in particular is not to be recommended. The term has a fixed and wellestablished meaning. Why make it ambiguous? The scientific thinker, after all, is concerned to remove those ambiguities we already have. As for the investigations which some would call “metamathematical”, I am certainly aware of their value; I do confess, however, that I regard it as absurd to interpret a continuum as a set of points. Mathematicians allow themselves, within certain limits, to make use of absurd fictions with impunity. And this is highly relevant to a practical logical interest. It was those speculations on possible topoids of more than four dimensions which finally made evident the empirical character of a space of three dimensions. Even Leibniz was found to be in error, having held that Bayle’s ideas on worlds of more than three dimensions were impossible a priori. But the most ingenious of mathematicians, such as Euler and Descartes, never considered mathematics as being an end in itself. It is not surprising, therefore, that your Felix Klein, weary of excursions into metamathematics, should turn to the technological applications of mathematics. These are the reasons which keep me from accepting all the observations in your kind letter, and not a tendency towards what you call “psychologism”.
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
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12 The True and the Evident this ex
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14 The True and the Evident be give
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16 The True and the Evident referen
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II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
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III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
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22 The True and the Evident somethi
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24 The True and the Evident Psychol
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26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
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28 The True and the Evident logicia
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30 The True and the Evident which i
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32 The True and the Evident There i
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34 The True and the Evident Are we
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36 The True and the Evident way. On
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38 The True and the Evident It is c
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40 The True and the Evident is basi
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Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137: 114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139: 116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141: 118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143: 120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145: 122 Notes these consequences, which
Page 146 and 147: 124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149: 126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151: INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153: 130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155: 132 Index propositions; see content
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