Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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92 Appendix 1: On the General Validity of Truth and the Basic Mistakes but we learn the multiplication tables, which are, again, laws, such as “7×7=49”, telling what factors have what product. One could even be taught the Pythagorean theorem for a mathematics of the continuum and in abstraction from its specific spatial character. What is the point of this? Only that such knowledge is required for calculating and measuring; without it any attempt at measurement would be certain to fail. 6 Every art, to the extent that it is theory and not practice, teaches laws. It goes beyond the spheres of the particular sciences, though in different degrees. A considerable part of the laws of mathematics have the character of the laws just mentioned—i.e., “7×7=49”, and the Pythagorean theorem (considered in abstraction from space). And just what is this character? I answer without reservation: that of the principle of contradiction. We would have a contradiction if there were any 7 which when multiplied by 7 were not to equal 49, or if the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle were not to equal the squares of the other two sides. 7 Surely it would also be contradictory to suppose that the tone colour of the vowel a might not have the overtones which Helmholtz has established. This particular example shows how much the indistinctness of apperception tends to veil such contradictions. We find many more such veils if we enter the sphere of the theory of numbers and the theory of continuity. There are certain large numbers which we cannot even think of in the strict sense; for we think, not of these numbers themselves, but only of their surrogates. And what are we to say of the parts, and of the inner and outer boundaries, of an infinitely divisible continuum? Small wonder, then, that the imperfection of our powers of conception and apperception necessitates the invention of all kinds of ancillary methods. What might well be an immediately enlightening truth 8 is something which we come to know only by way of a roundabout procedure. Hence the art of calculation and measurement, which is such an important and impressive part of logic that it takes up entire textbooks in its own right. And hence, too, the results of all those analyses which lead to the discovery of contradictions in particular cases and which serve as aids for further procedures. But though I cannot believe that the art of logic along with that of measurement draws its truths from any single discipline, I do not hesitate to maintain, now as earlier, that among the theoretical disciplines psychology stands in closest relation to it. 9 What is the general law of contradiction, after all, but this: that whoever (explicitly or implicitly) affirms and denies the same thing, i.e., whoever contradicts himself, thinks absurdly? 10 And the very thing that gives rise to the search for methods of explication is certainly psychological—for what is it but the indistinctness of certain apperceptions and our inability to group certain things in a distinct concept? But you fear that such a conception would make the validity of the truths of logic and mathematics conditional on our own make-up. You believe that the laws of thinking which hold for us might be different from those that would hold for other thinking beings. What would be evident for us might not be evident for them, or indeed the contradiction of what is evident for us might be evident for them. You are certainly right in emphatically rejecting any theory which would thus demolish the concept of knowledge and truth. But you are mistaken if you think that, in giving psychology this position in relation to logic, one has no way of avoiding such an error.
Appendix 1: On the General Validity of Truth and the Basic Mistakes 93 Whoever really makes an evident judgement really knows the truth and is certain of it; whoever really knows something with direct evidence is directly certain of the truth. This is unaffected by the fact that the knower, as a person judging, came into being, is subject to causation, and is dependent upon the particular cerebral organization which he happens to have. To the one who judges with evidence, the truth is secured in itself, and not by reflection on any such preconditions. If there is anyone who believes that this is contradictory, he is mistaken. If he were to try to make the contradiction analytically clear, he would end up with the discovery that he is guilty of confusing concepts. For it is one thing to say that the person who judges with evidence is caused and conditioned as such a person, and it is an entirely different thing to say that, if he were otherwise caused and conditioned, he might judge the contrary with similar evidence. So there is no contradiction involved in seeing into something directly, acquiring this insight as a result of some cause and under very complicated conditions, and yet having no idea at all of these causes and conditions. Having the insight is itself sufficient to assure one that no one else could have a contrary insight. 11 Even the omnipotence of God could not make it possible; the very assumption is absurd and inconsistent with the concept of evidence. There is no need at all to postulate any such thing as a truth in itself or a judgement in itself. There are only particular individuals who judge and only particular individuals who judge with evidence; what there is, no matter what area we are talking about, can consist only of things that are individually determined. What you call “psychologism” is essentially the of Protagoras. This is anathema to me, as it is to you. But this does not mean that we should countenance a realm of entities of reason. It is unfortunate that a mind such as that of the highly respected Bolzano should have soared too high and lost its way at this point. For the supposition of such a realm can be shown to be absurd. 12 But I do wish you good fortune in your intellectual contact with this noble and sincere thinker. Even the errors of such a person are more instructive than are the truths which may occasionally be found in the glib talk of others. This is a long letter, and yet I am afraid it is too short to convince you or to make my position clear in every point. And so I hope all the more that you will be able to appreciate the intention of my remarks. I am confident of your continued good will. In sincere friendship, F.B. P.S. I think I ought to add still another word about the place of mathematics among the various scientific disciplines. Under what theoretical standpoint are we to regard the laws which concern the relationships among magnitudes? I would answer: (1) From the theoretical point of view not every truth is worthy of being an object of scientific investigation. We are forced to practise a certain economy which takes into account the importance of a question in relation to our total understanding of the universe. This point of view may justify neglecting all, or almost all, of the so-called laws of metamathematics , 13 (2) Otherwise these laws should be classified only as falling within psychology, being special cases of the evident knowledge of what things are contradictory. 14
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
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12 The True and the Evident this ex
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14 The True and the Evident be give
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16 The True and the Evident referen
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II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
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III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
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22 The True and the Evident somethi
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24 The True and the Evident Psychol
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26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
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28 The True and the Evident logicia
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30 The True and the Evident which i
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32 The True and the Evident There i
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34 The True and the Evident Are we
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36 The True and the Evident way. On
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38 The True and the Evident It is c
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40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137: 114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139: 116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141: 118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143: 120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145: 122 Notes these consequences, which
Page 146 and 147: 124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149: 126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151: INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153: 130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155: 132 Index propositions; see content
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