Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Appendix 1: On <strong>the</strong> General Validity of Truth <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Basic Mistakes 93<br />
Whoever really makes an evident judgement really knows <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>and</strong> is certain of<br />
it; whoever really knows something with direct evidence is directly certain of <strong>the</strong> truth.<br />
This is unaffected by <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> knower, as a person judging, came into being, is<br />
subject to causation, <strong>and</strong> is dependent upon <strong>the</strong> particular cerebral organization which he<br />
happens to have. To <strong>the</strong> one who judges with evidence, <strong>the</strong> truth is secured in itself, <strong>and</strong><br />
not by reflection on any such preconditions. If <strong>the</strong>re is anyone who believes that this is<br />
contradictory, he is mistaken. If he were to try to make <strong>the</strong> contradiction analytically clear,<br />
he would end up with <strong>the</strong> discovery that he is guilty of confusing concepts. For it is one<br />
thing to say that <strong>the</strong> person who judges with evidence is caused <strong>and</strong> conditioned as such<br />
a person, <strong>and</strong> it is an entirely different thing to say that, if he were o<strong>the</strong>rwise caused <strong>and</strong><br />
conditioned, he might judge <strong>the</strong> contrary with similar evidence. So <strong>the</strong>re is no contradiction<br />
involved in seeing into something directly, acquiring this insight as a result of some cause<br />
<strong>and</strong> under very complicated conditions, <strong>and</strong> yet having no idea at all of <strong>the</strong>se causes <strong>and</strong><br />
conditions.<br />
Having <strong>the</strong> insight is itself sufficient to assure one that no one else could have a contrary<br />
insight. 11 Even <strong>the</strong> omnipotence of God could not make it possible; <strong>the</strong> very assumption is<br />
absurd <strong>and</strong> inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> concept of evidence.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is no need at all to postulate any such thing as a truth in itself or a judgement in<br />
itself. <strong>The</strong>re are only particular individuals who judge <strong>and</strong> only particular individuals who<br />
judge with evidence; what <strong>the</strong>re is, no matter what area we are talking about, can consist<br />
only of things that are individually determined.<br />
What you call “psychologism” is essentially <strong>the</strong> of<br />
Protagoras. This is ana<strong>the</strong>ma to me, as it is to you. But this does not mean that we should<br />
countenance a realm of entities of reason. It is unfortunate that a mind such as that of <strong>the</strong><br />
highly respected Bolzano should have soared too high <strong>and</strong> lost its way at this point. For <strong>the</strong><br />
supposition of such a realm can be shown to be absurd. 12<br />
But I do wish you good fortune in your intellectual contact with this noble <strong>and</strong> sincere<br />
thinker. Even <strong>the</strong> errors of such a person are more instructive than are <strong>the</strong> truths which may<br />
occasionally be found in <strong>the</strong> glib talk of o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
This is a long letter, <strong>and</strong> yet I am afraid it is too short to convince you or to make my<br />
position clear in every point. And so I hope all <strong>the</strong> more that you will be able to appreciate<br />
<strong>the</strong> intention of my remarks. I am confident of your continued good will.<br />
In sincere friendship,<br />
F.B.<br />
P.S. I think I ought to add still ano<strong>the</strong>r word about <strong>the</strong> place of ma<strong>the</strong>matics among <strong>the</strong><br />
various scientific disciplines. Under what <strong>the</strong>oretical st<strong>and</strong>point are we to regard <strong>the</strong> laws<br />
which concern <strong>the</strong> relationships among magnitudes? I would answer:<br />
(1) From <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical point of view not every truth is worthy of being an object<br />
of scientific investigation. We are forced to practise a certain economy which takes into<br />
account <strong>the</strong> importance of a question in relation to our total underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>the</strong> universe.<br />
This point of view may justify neglecting all, or almost all, of <strong>the</strong> so-called laws of<br />
metama<strong>the</strong>matics , 13<br />
(2) O<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>the</strong>se laws should be classified only as falling within psychology, being<br />
special cases of <strong>the</strong> evident knowledge of what things are contradictory. 14