Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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VI<br />
ON THE EVIDENT<br />
(Fragment of 12 July, 1915)<br />
1. Every judgement that is evident is ei<strong>the</strong>r directly or indirectly evident. First of all, it is<br />
essential to characterize <strong>the</strong> directly evident in more detail.<br />
2. Some directly evident judgements are judgements of fact; <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs are truths of<br />
reason, or insights. 41 <strong>The</strong> knowledge that I think is an example of <strong>the</strong> first class; <strong>the</strong> law of<br />
contradiction an example of <strong>the</strong> second.<br />
3. Every affirmative judgement that is directly evident belongs to <strong>the</strong> first class.<br />
4. And all <strong>the</strong>se are inner perceptions. None of <strong>the</strong>m pertains to anything o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> one<br />
who is judging. 42<br />
5. When we recall an earlier experience, we may have a confident belief <strong>and</strong> judge directly,<br />
not indirectly. 43 But <strong>the</strong> judgement lacks evidence. For it is possible to prove that we could<br />
have exactly this recollection even if that of which we are convinced had not occurred. <strong>The</strong><br />
proof, like that of Descartes, would be based upon <strong>the</strong> lack of external evidence. 44<br />
6. If it is asked, <strong>the</strong>n, whe<strong>the</strong>r directly evident affirmative judgements must always be made<br />
as judgements in <strong>the</strong> modus praesens, <strong>the</strong> answer must be in one sense affirmative. But we<br />
should not overlook <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> present is possible only as <strong>the</strong> end of a past, or as <strong>the</strong><br />
beginning of a future, or as <strong>the</strong> transition from past to future. Hence whatever is affirmed as<br />
present cannot be affirmed without being related to a duration of time, which extends into<br />
<strong>the</strong> past or into <strong>the</strong> future, even though one may not be able to determine exactly just how<br />
far <strong>the</strong> duration extends. <strong>The</strong> earlier or later existence of our self is necessarily included in<br />
<strong>the</strong> perception of this indeterminate extent.<br />
7. But it is true that our directly evident affirmative judgements are restricted to knowledge<br />
of our self, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y are restricted to <strong>the</strong> present. No moment of <strong>the</strong> past or of <strong>the</strong><br />
future can be said to be assured with <strong>the</strong> same direct evidence that a moment of <strong>the</strong> present<br />
can be assured. However near such a past or future moment may be thought to be to <strong>the</strong><br />
present, <strong>the</strong>re is always some o<strong>the</strong>r moment which lies between it <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> present; hence<br />
<strong>the</strong>re will be a lapse of time which does not extend to that past or future moment but which<br />
is sufficient to constitute <strong>the</strong> present.<br />
8. It is certain that we possess a directly evident affirmative knowledge within <strong>the</strong> narrow<br />
confines indicated, <strong>and</strong> what is more, that within those limits we never lack such knowledge.<br />
Whenever we are mentally active, this mental activity is an object of inner perception. And<br />
it is perceived with evidence. To be sure, our perceptions are not always equally distinct.