Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

VI
ON THE EVIDENT
(Fragment of 12 July, 1915)
1. Every judgement that is evident is either directly or indirectly evident. First of all, it is
essential to characterize the directly evident in more detail.
2. Some directly evident judgements are judgements of fact; the others are truths of
reason, or insights. 41 The knowledge that I think is an example of the first class; the law of
contradiction an example of the second.
3. Every affirmative judgement that is directly evident belongs to the first class.
4. And all these are inner perceptions. None of them pertains to anything other than the one
who is judging. 42
5. When we recall an earlier experience, we may have a confident belief and judge directly,
not indirectly. 43 But the judgement lacks evidence. For it is possible to prove that we could
have exactly this recollection even if that of which we are convinced had not occurred. The
proof, like that of Descartes, would be based upon the lack of external evidence. 44
6. If it is asked, then, whether directly evident affirmative judgements must always be made
as judgements in the modus praesens, the answer must be in one sense affirmative. But we
should not overlook the fact that the present is possible only as the end of a past, or as the
beginning of a future, or as the transition from past to future. Hence whatever is affirmed as
present cannot be affirmed without being related to a duration of time, which extends into
the past or into the future, even though one may not be able to determine exactly just how
far the duration extends. The earlier or later existence of our self is necessarily included in
the perception of this indeterminate extent.
7. But it is true that our directly evident affirmative judgements are restricted to knowledge
of our self, and that they are restricted to the present. No moment of the past or of the
future can be said to be assured with the same direct evidence that a moment of the present
can be assured. However near such a past or future moment may be thought to be to the
present, there is always some other moment which lies between it and the present; hence
there will be a lapse of time which does not extend to that past or future moment but which
is sufficient to constitute the present.
8. It is certain that we possess a directly evident affirmative knowledge within the narrow
confines indicated, and what is more, that within those limits we never lack such knowledge.
Whenever we are mentally active, this mental activity is an object of inner perception. And
it is perceived with evidence. To be sure, our perceptions are not always equally distinct.