Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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Introduction xv<br />
<strong>The</strong> introduction of this doctrine of irrealia <strong>and</strong> of so-called “states of affairs” (existences,<br />
non-existences, possibilities, impossibilities, etc.) was necessary in order to preserve <strong>the</strong><br />
correspondence <strong>the</strong>ory. <strong>Brentano</strong> was later to give up this doctrine; yet it was destined to play<br />
a significant role in <strong>the</strong> philosophical movements that were to grow out of <strong>Brentano</strong>’s thought.<br />
<strong>The</strong> second selection—<strong>the</strong> fragmentary “Being in <strong>the</strong> Sense of <strong>the</strong> <strong>True</strong>”—shows <strong>the</strong><br />
earlier doctrine in its classic form. One can see that at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> selection was written,<br />
<strong>Brentano</strong> took <strong>the</strong> linguistically equivalent expressions, “<strong>The</strong>re is someone contemplating<br />
an A” <strong>and</strong> “<strong>The</strong>re is an A which is being contemplated” to indicate correlative entities.<br />
2. <strong>The</strong> selections presented here are so arranged as to indicate <strong>the</strong> gradual emancipation<br />
from both <strong>the</strong>ories—<strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of <strong>the</strong> adaequatio rei et intellectus <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of<br />
irrealia. Strictly speaking, <strong>the</strong> lecture on truth contains <strong>the</strong> key to <strong>the</strong> refutation of <strong>the</strong><br />
correspondence, or adaequatio, <strong>the</strong>ory. In Section 5 8b we find one consideration which<br />
would reduce any such <strong>the</strong>ory to absurdity. <strong>Brentano</strong> here points out—<strong>and</strong> again in Part Two<br />
of <strong>the</strong> book—that every such <strong>the</strong>ory implies that where <strong>the</strong>re is a judgement constituting<br />
compares <strong>the</strong> knowing judgement with <strong>the</strong> thing that is known. 1<br />
knowledge <strong>the</strong>re must also be a comparative judgement, constituting knowledge, which<br />
3. In <strong>the</strong> first essay <strong>Brentano</strong> enters into a controversy with Windelb<strong>and</strong>. He agrees with<br />
Windelb<strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian <strong>the</strong>ory is not sufficient, but he contends that Windelb<strong>and</strong>,<br />
in his attempt to free himself from <strong>the</strong> concept of truth as “being adequate, suitable, or<br />
appropriate”, goes too far in trying to conceive it in terms of being in “an agreement with<br />
a rule of thinking”. Windelb<strong>and</strong> thinks that, with this concept of a rule or norm, he catches<br />
<strong>the</strong> essence of Kant’s “Copernican revolution” <strong>and</strong> that Kant himself had ab<strong>and</strong>oned <strong>the</strong><br />
correspondence <strong>the</strong>ory. <strong>Brentano</strong> easily shows, with abundant documentary evidence, that<br />
Windelb<strong>and</strong> has really transformed <strong>the</strong> views of his master. But <strong>Brentano</strong> goes too far in his<br />
critique of Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s “Kantian” <strong>the</strong>ory, for in one important point Windelb<strong>and</strong> is close<br />
to <strong>the</strong> later teaching of <strong>Brentano</strong>: <strong>the</strong> insightful judgement, i.e., <strong>the</strong> judgement as it ought<br />
to be, <strong>the</strong> judgement which is justified, is taken to be <strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard of truth <strong>and</strong> falsehood,<br />
of correctness <strong>and</strong> incorrectness.<br />
In saying that truth consists in a way of thinking which accords with a rule that ought<br />
to be followed, Windelb<strong>and</strong> is far from being entirely clear. But in saying that <strong>the</strong> mind<br />
brings its own norm to consciousness, he is speaking in terms which could also be used to<br />
express <strong>the</strong> doctrine on which <strong>Brentano</strong> had been lecturing for years. Indeed <strong>the</strong> following<br />
passage from Windelb<strong>and</strong>’s Präludien (p. 47) agrees with <strong>Brentano</strong>’s views, almost to <strong>the</strong><br />
letter: “<strong>The</strong> only thing that philosophy can do is to extract this normative consciousness<br />
from <strong>the</strong> flux of our empirical consciousness <strong>and</strong> to rely upon direct evidence; it is in this<br />
direct evidence that <strong>the</strong> normative consciousness, once it has been brought to light, has<br />
<strong>the</strong> efficacy <strong>and</strong> validity which it ought to have for every individual.” But this is as far<br />
as <strong>the</strong> agreement goes, for Windelb<strong>and</strong> is unable to distinguish <strong>the</strong> “ought” of judgement<br />
from <strong>the</strong> “ought” of feeling <strong>and</strong> willing; <strong>the</strong> fact that a judgement which ought to be—i.e.,<br />
an insightful judgement—is at <strong>the</strong> same time a judgement which ought to be valued adds