Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

More documents

Recommendations

Info

86 The True and the Evident 6. If evidence always pertains to judgements, the question arises whether evidence is related to judgement as a specific difference or as an accident. 38 The latter possibility would be excluded at the outset if, as is generally taught, there can be no accidents of accidents. And the former possibility would be excluded if, as is also generally taught, there can be, for any genus, only specific differences which are opposed to each other; for if there are any opposing specific differences falling under the genus of judgement these would certainly be affirmation and denial. 39 But neither affirming nor denying excludes evidence, for some things are affirmed with evidence and some things are denied with evidence. These two doctrines which, as I say, are generally taught, are often advocated by one and the same person; obviously any such person must be mistaken with respect to one or the other of the two doctrines. And perhaps he is mistaken with respect to both; for two judgements, which judge about different objects, would seem to differ, not merely accidentally, but specifically; similarly for two judgements which are concerned with one and the same object and differ with respect to quality. In this case, we are dealing immediately with specific differences which are not opposed. As for the other view, it may be said that, just as a substance is a subject of an accident, so also an accident may be subject of still another accident. The relation of substance to accident differs from that of genus to specific difference in this respect: the accident includes the concept of the substance, and not conversely, just as the specific difference includes the genus, and not conversely; but the substance remains the same individual if the accident falls away, whereas that which is thought under the concept of the genus could not remain the same individual if it changed its specific difference. If a genus were without the specific difference, it would have to exist in co-ordination with some other specific difference; for no genus can subsist as a universal. But the relation of substance to accident is different. If, now, we compare certain accidents with other accidents, for example, if we compare thinking with affirming or denying, the relation would seem to be analogous to that of substance and accident; for the thinking is included in the affirmation and in the denial, whereas the converse is not true. And the thinking can continue to exist without continuing to be an affirmation or a denial. Just as the soul serves as the substratum for the thinking, it would seem that the thinking, in turn, serves as the substratum for the judging. Is it not possible, then, for the judging itself to be the subject of accidental differences, instead of being specifically differentiated? If we perceive or demonstrate something with evidence and if we continue to adhere to it but without direct or indirect evidence, then we would seem to judge the same as before, even though the evidence has not been replaced by any other differentia which is co-ordinated to it. One could hold, therefore, that instead of serving to differentiate the judgement essentially or to determine it specifically, the evidence is related to it as an accident, just as the judging is related to the thinking and the thinking to the soul. 7. It is not my intention to discuss the details of this particular question here. I would remark, however, that we cannot answer the question unless we note that every thinking includes an awareness of the thinker himself and that this awareness is not accidental to him. And if a person having an evident insight has an awareness of his insight, then he is aware of himself as a person judging with evidence. The question arises whether he must have, beyond this, still another awareness of himself as one who is judging, but an awareness in which the evidence is not included.
The Evident 87 When that which has been perceived with evidence becomes fixed in memory, then, no matter how the problem of the temporal mode is dealt with, what had earlier been given as a secondary subject is now given as a primary object and the accompanying inner perception is directed upon the recollection. And when a theorem which has been proved becomes fixed in memory, but without the proof which conferred the evidence upon it, then the belief in it without the earlier motivation would seem a different object. If I remember that the theorem has been proved, then again the inner perception of this recollection must be distinguished from the earlier inner perception of the mental process itself which I now remember. 40
Page 2 and 3:
Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5:
Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7:
x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9:
xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 10 and 11:
INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
Page 12 and 13:
xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15:
xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17:
xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19:
xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21:
xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23:
xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25:
I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27:
4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29:
6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31:
8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33:
10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35:
12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37:
14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39:
16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41:
II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43:
III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45:
22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47:
24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49:
26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51:
28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53:
30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55:
32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57:
34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 106 and 107: 84 The True and the Evident would s
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137: 114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139: 116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141: 118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143: 120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145: 122 Notes these consequences, which
Page 146 and 147: 124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149: 126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151: INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153: 130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155: 132 Index propositions; see content
show all

Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?