Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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The True and the Evident
6. If evidence always pertains to judgements, the question arises whether evidence is related
to judgement as a specific difference or as an accident. 38 The latter possibility would be
excluded at the outset if, as is generally taught, there can be no accidents of accidents. And
the former possibility would be excluded if, as is also generally taught, there can be, for
any genus, only specific differences which are opposed to each other; for if there are any
opposing specific differences falling under the genus of judgement these would certainly
be affirmation and denial. 39 But neither affirming nor denying excludes evidence, for some
things are affirmed with evidence and some things are denied with evidence. These two
doctrines which, as I say, are generally taught, are often advocated by one and the same
person; obviously any such person must be mistaken with respect to one or the other of the
two doctrines. And perhaps he is mistaken with respect to both; for two judgements, which
judge about different objects, would seem to differ, not merely accidentally, but specifically;
similarly for two judgements which are concerned with one and the same object and differ
with respect to quality. In this case, we are dealing immediately with specific differences
which are not opposed. As for the other view, it may be said that, just as a substance is a
subject of an accident, so also an accident may be subject of still another accident. The
relation of substance to accident differs from that of genus to specific difference in this
respect: the accident includes the concept of the substance, and not conversely, just as the
specific difference includes the genus, and not conversely; but the substance remains the
same individual if the accident falls away, whereas that which is thought under the concept
of the genus could not remain the same individual if it changed its specific difference. If
a genus were without the specific difference, it would have to exist in co-ordination with
some other specific difference; for no genus can subsist as a universal. But the relation
of substance to accident is different. If, now, we compare certain accidents with other
accidents, for example, if we compare thinking with affirming or denying, the relation
would seem to be analogous to that of substance and accident; for the thinking is included
in the affirmation and in the denial, whereas the converse is not true. And the thinking can
continue to exist without continuing to be an affirmation or a denial. Just as the soul serves
as the substratum for the thinking, it would seem that the thinking, in turn, serves as the
substratum for the judging. Is it not possible, then, for the judging itself to be the subject
of accidental differences, instead of being specifically differentiated? If we perceive or
demonstrate something with evidence and if we continue to adhere to it but without direct
or indirect evidence, then we would seem to judge the same as before, even though the
evidence has not been replaced by any other differentia which is co-ordinated to it. One
could hold, therefore, that instead of serving to differentiate the judgement essentially or to
determine it specifically, the evidence is related to it as an accident, just as the judging is
related to the thinking and the thinking to the soul.
7. It is not my intention to discuss the details of this particular question here. I would
remark, however, that we cannot answer the question unless we note that every thinking
includes an awareness of the thinker himself and that this awareness is not accidental to
him. And if a person having an evident insight has an awareness of his insight, then he
is aware of himself as a person judging with evidence. The question arises whether he
must have, beyond this, still another awareness of himself as one who is judging, but an
awareness in which the evidence is not included.