Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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V<br />
THE EVIDENT<br />
(9 July, 1915)<br />
1. One usually says “This is evident” <strong>and</strong> not “This is evident to me”. Probably because of<br />
<strong>the</strong> faith that what is evident to one is evident to all. And <strong>the</strong> exception proves <strong>the</strong> rule. For<br />
in <strong>the</strong> case of self-awareness, one says “It is evident to me that I exist”; it cannot be directly<br />
evident to anyone else that I exist.<br />
2. That which is called evident is a judgement or <strong>the</strong> content of a judgement. For example,<br />
it is evident that 1+1=2.<br />
We do not say that <strong>the</strong> person judging is evident; we say, ra<strong>the</strong>r, that he judges with<br />
evidence.<br />
Thoughts or ideas cannot be said to be that which is evident, nor can our emotions. 34<br />
3. What is evident cannot be in error. 35<br />
And where something is evident <strong>the</strong>re cannot be doubt. But nei<strong>the</strong>r freedom from error<br />
nor freedom from doubt makes a judgement an evident judgement; an evident judgement<br />
has a characteristic in virtue of which <strong>the</strong> judgement is seen to be correct.<br />
4. “It is evident to me” comes to <strong>the</strong> same thing as “It is certain to me”, “I know this”, or<br />
“I am aware of this”.<br />
<strong>The</strong> expression “I see into it”, however, seems to have a narrower sense. A person may<br />
perceive with evidence that he exists, but we do not say that he sees that he exists. 36 And<br />
<strong>the</strong> expression “I know that so-<strong>and</strong>-so” may have a still narrower sense, when it is used in<br />
connection with our awareness of something that has been demonstrated. But this is not<br />
always so, for linguistic usage often varies in many different ways.<br />
5. To say that an evident judgement is one that is certain is not to deny that a man may<br />
know with evidence that <strong>the</strong>re is something which is probable for him. In such a case, of<br />
course, <strong>the</strong> something is not itself certain; but <strong>the</strong> man does judge with certainty that it<br />
lacks <strong>the</strong> necessary conditions of being certain <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re is something to be said both<br />
for <strong>and</strong> against it. Some believe that in such cases a man judges with less intensity. But this<br />
is not true; o<strong>the</strong>rwise, when <strong>the</strong> probability is one-half, <strong>the</strong> man would have to judge both<br />
pro <strong>and</strong> contra at <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>and</strong> with equal intensity. It is even less reasonable to say<br />
that such a judgement, with a suitably lowered intensity, may be a “correct presumption”<br />
or an “evident presumption”, where correctness <strong>and</strong> evidence are taken to be compatible<br />
with error. Actually some have gone so far as to say that <strong>the</strong>re is such a thing as a “direct<br />
evidence of presumption” which may be ascribed, for example, to memory. This is to make<br />
<strong>the</strong> mistake of supposing that <strong>the</strong>re is a direct knowledge of probability; but actually, as<br />
Laplace observed, every probability is compounded out of knowledge <strong>and</strong> ignorance, <strong>and</strong><br />
to know a probability, one must be aware of both. 37