Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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84 The True and the Evident would seem, therefore, that the only distinguishing mark with which Descartes is left is the consciousness of an irresistible compulsion. As recently as Mach, it seems to have been held that evidence is bound up with such a compulsion. Mach tells us that he gave up solipsism on the ground that he finds himself absolutely compelled to believe in an external world. But Helmholtz, in his Tatsachen der Auβenwelt, says that solipsism is a possible hypothesis and one which cannot be refuted. And Descartes, unlike Mach, found that that compulsion, which one is supposed to feel, could overcome. If we are left only with this irresistible compulsion, then truth is by no means assured. Sophisms tend to make prisoners. And fools are incapable of freeing themselves from fixed ideas, however absurd. A habit of thought, which has become sufficiently engrained, may deprive a man of his good sense as well as of his freedom. Pascal seems to have thought of evidence, at least in the case of direct judgements, as an irresistible and natural compulsion to make a certain kind of judgement; this led him to the sceptical thought that, as long as we do not know who the author of our nature is, our trust in those judgements which seem to be directly enlightening is entirely unfounded. 6. One may say that these observations are pointless inasmuch as they cannot have any practical results. For if a man is subject to an irresistible compulsion to make a certain judgement, then he will make that judgement, no matter what considerations there may be to the contrary. And therefore—one may argue—this principle will always be valid, so far as he is concerned, as a principle of thought. But this reasoning is clearly unsatisfactory. What if several such principles were to contradict each other? And there actually is such a conflict if, as Pascal supposes, reason tells us it is evident that evident propositions are not to be believed. Here one must believe and one must withhold belief—and thus fall into despair. 7. It is obvious, therefore, that the evidence of a judgement cannot be identified with any irresistible compulsion forcing us to make the judgement. How are we to interpret the concept, then? The correct method is the one that we use in many other cases where we are concerned with a simple mark or characteristic. We will have to solve the problem by considering a multiplicity of judgements which are evident and then contrasting them with other judgements which lack this distinguishing characteristic. This is what we do, after all, when we make clear to ourselves what is red or not red, and what is coloured or not coloured. The type of case that Descartes considered was a case of something really being evident and one having a great variety of instances. It was that of self-perception—our perception of ourselves as thinking, believing, denying, rejoicing, being in sorrow, and so on. But he should not have restricted himself to this type of case. He should have considered the kind of evidence which is exemplified in the apodictic knowledge we have of axioms. In this way he would have made it possible to make a comparison and thus to single out the common mark of evidence; then there would have been no need for further explications of the mark by reference to other attributes which happen to be associated with it. Indeed, as we have seen, one fares better without such attributes than with the “clare et distincte percipio”.
V THE EVIDENT (9 July, 1915) 1. One usually says “This is evident” and not “This is evident to me”. Probably because of the faith that what is evident to one is evident to all. And the exception proves the rule. For in the case of self-awareness, one says “It is evident to me that I exist”; it cannot be directly evident to anyone else that I exist. 2. That which is called evident is a judgement or the content of a judgement. For example, it is evident that 1+1=2. We do not say that the person judging is evident; we say, rather, that he judges with evidence. Thoughts or ideas cannot be said to be that which is evident, nor can our emotions. 34 3. What is evident cannot be in error. 35 And where something is evident there cannot be doubt. But neither freedom from error nor freedom from doubt makes a judgement an evident judgement; an evident judgement has a characteristic in virtue of which the judgement is seen to be correct. 4. “It is evident to me” comes to the same thing as “It is certain to me”, “I know this”, or “I am aware of this”. The expression “I see into it”, however, seems to have a narrower sense. A person may perceive with evidence that he exists, but we do not say that he sees that he exists. 36 And the expression “I know that so-and-so” may have a still narrower sense, when it is used in connection with our awareness of something that has been demonstrated. But this is not always so, for linguistic usage often varies in many different ways. 5. To say that an evident judgement is one that is certain is not to deny that a man may know with evidence that there is something which is probable for him. In such a case, of course, the something is not itself certain; but the man does judge with certainty that it lacks the necessary conditions of being certain and that there is something to be said both for and against it. Some believe that in such cases a man judges with less intensity. But this is not true; otherwise, when the probability is one-half, the man would have to judge both pro and contra at the same time and with equal intensity. It is even less reasonable to say that such a judgement, with a suitably lowered intensity, may be a “correct presumption” or an “evident presumption”, where correctness and evidence are taken to be compatible with error. Actually some have gone so far as to say that there is such a thing as a “direct evidence of presumption” which may be ascribed, for example, to memory. This is to make the mistake of supposing that there is a direct knowledge of probability; but actually, as Laplace observed, every probability is compounded out of knowledge and ignorance, and to know a probability, one must be aware of both. 37
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Routledge Revivals The True and the
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Translated from the German WAHREIT
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x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
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xii Preface fortune to be able to c
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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON T
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xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
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xviii Introduction of view—just a
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xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
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xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
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xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
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xxvi Introduction The motivation be
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I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
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4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
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6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
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8 The True and the Evident No furth
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10 The True and the Evident of cert
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12 The True and the Evident this ex
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14 The True and the Evident be give
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16 The True and the Evident referen
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II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
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III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
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22 The True and the Evident somethi
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24 The True and the Evident Psychol
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26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
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28 The True and the Evident logicia
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30 The True and the Evident which i
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32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
Page 60 and 61: 38 The True and the Evident It is c
Page 62 and 63: 40 The True and the Evident is basi
Page 64 and 65: Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
Page 66 and 67: 44 The True and the Evident concept
Page 68 and 69: 46 The True and the Evident 13. But
Page 70 and 71: 48 The True and the Evident each of
Page 72 and 73: 50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
Page 74 and 75: I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
Page 76 and 77: II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
Page 78 and 79: III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
Page 80 and 81: 58 The True and the Evident When do
Page 82 and 83: 60 The True and the Evident I have
Page 84 and 85: 62 The True and the Evident the con
Page 86 and 87: 64 The True and the Evident to supp
Page 88 and 89: 66 The True and the Evident degree
Page 90 and 91: 68 The True and the Evident concept
Page 92 and 93: 70 The True and the Evident non-exi
Page 94 and 95: Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
Page 96 and 97: 74 The True and the Evident 6. And
Page 98 and 99: 76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
Page 100 and 101: II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
Page 102 and 103: 80 The True and the Evident that re
Page 104 and 105: 82 The True and the Evident in whic
Page 108 and 109: 86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
Page 110 and 111: VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
Page 112 and 113: APPENDICES
Page 114 and 115: 92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 116 and 117: 94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
Page 118 and 119: 2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
Page 120 and 121: NOTES by Oskar Kraus
Page 122 and 123: 100 Notes between saying (i) that i
Page 124 and 125: 102 Notes and futural thinking are
Page 126 and 127: 104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
Page 128 and 129: 106 Notes he held instead that the
Page 130 and 131: 108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
Page 132 and 133: 110 Notes given in some way or othe
Page 134 and 135: 112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
Page 136 and 137: 114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
Page 138 and 139: 116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
Page 140 and 141: 118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
Page 142 and 143: 120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
Page 144 and 145: 122 Notes these consequences, which
Page 146 and 147: 124 Notes someone who is judging wi
Page 148 and 149: 126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
Page 150 and 151: INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
Page 152 and 153: 130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
Page 154 and 155: 132 Index propositions; see content
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