Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
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84<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
would seem, <strong>the</strong>refore, that <strong>the</strong> only distinguishing mark with which Descartes is left is <strong>the</strong><br />
consciousness of an irresistible compulsion.<br />
As recently as Mach, it seems to have been held that evidence is bound up with such a<br />
compulsion. Mach tells us that he gave up solipsism on <strong>the</strong> ground that he finds himself<br />
absolutely compelled to believe in an external world. But Helmholtz, in his Tatsachen der<br />
Auβenwelt, says that solipsism is a possible hypo<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>and</strong> one which cannot be refuted.<br />
And Descartes, unlike Mach, found that that compulsion, which one is supposed to feel,<br />
could overcome.<br />
If we are left only with this irresistible compulsion, <strong>the</strong>n truth is by no means assured.<br />
Sophisms tend to make prisoners. And fools are incapable of freeing <strong>the</strong>mselves from fixed<br />
ideas, however absurd. A habit of thought, which has become sufficiently engrained, may<br />
deprive a man of his good sense as well as of his freedom. Pascal seems to have thought of<br />
evidence, at least in <strong>the</strong> case of direct judgements, as an irresistible <strong>and</strong> natural compulsion<br />
to make a certain kind of judgement; this led him to <strong>the</strong> sceptical thought that, as long as<br />
we do not know who <strong>the</strong> author of our nature is, our trust in those judgements which seem<br />
to be directly enlightening is entirely unfounded.<br />
6. One may say that <strong>the</strong>se observations are pointless inasmuch as <strong>the</strong>y cannot have any<br />
practical results. For if a man is subject to an irresistible compulsion to make a certain<br />
judgement, <strong>the</strong>n he will make that judgement, no matter what considerations <strong>the</strong>re may be<br />
to <strong>the</strong> contrary. And <strong>the</strong>refore—one may argue—this principle will always be valid, so far<br />
as he is concerned, as a principle of thought. But this reasoning is clearly unsatisfactory.<br />
What if several such principles were to contradict each o<strong>the</strong>r? And <strong>the</strong>re actually is such<br />
a conflict if, as Pascal supposes, reason tells us it is evident that evident propositions are<br />
not to be believed. Here one must believe <strong>and</strong> one must withhold belief—<strong>and</strong> thus fall into<br />
despair.<br />
7. It is obvious, <strong>the</strong>refore, that <strong>the</strong> evidence of a judgement cannot be identified with any<br />
irresistible compulsion forcing us to make <strong>the</strong> judgement. How are we to interpret <strong>the</strong><br />
concept, <strong>the</strong>n? <strong>The</strong> correct method is <strong>the</strong> one that we use in many o<strong>the</strong>r cases where we<br />
are concerned with a simple mark or characteristic. We will have to solve <strong>the</strong> problem by<br />
considering a multiplicity of judgements which are evident <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n contrasting <strong>the</strong>m with<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r judgements which lack this distinguishing characteristic. This is what we do, after all,<br />
when we make clear to ourselves what is red or not red, <strong>and</strong> what is coloured or not coloured.<br />
<strong>The</strong> type of case that Descartes considered was a case of something really being evident<br />
<strong>and</strong> one having a great variety of instances. It was that of self-perception—our perception<br />
of ourselves as thinking, believing, denying, rejoicing, being in sorrow, <strong>and</strong> so on. But he<br />
should not have restricted himself to this type of case. He should have considered <strong>the</strong> kind<br />
of evidence which is exemplified in <strong>the</strong> apodictic knowledge we have of axioms. In this way<br />
he would have made it possible to make a comparison <strong>and</strong> thus to single out <strong>the</strong> common<br />
mark of evidence; <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>re would have been no need for fur<strong>the</strong>r explications of <strong>the</strong> mark<br />
by reference to o<strong>the</strong>r attributes which happen to be associated with it. Indeed, as we have<br />
seen, one fares better without such attributes than with <strong>the</strong> “clare et distincte percipio”.