Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

IV
REFLECTIONS ON THE
THEORY OF THE EVIDENT
(8 July, 1915)
1. Some of our judgements are true and some of them are false. But those which are true
are often unjustified. A judgement is justified only if it enlightens us.
2. But when does a judgement enlighten us? Some would say: only when it has been proved
to be true. But every proof proceeds from premises and with the conviction that if the
conclusion is unjustified the premises must also be unjustified. If the premises are not
enlightening, the conclusion cannot be enlightening either. And if the premises themselves
cannot be enlightening unless they have been proven, then they will require further premises
which are enlightening, and so on ad infinitum.
3. And so if there are any truths which enlighten there must be a truth which is without
proof and which enlightens. What is it, then, that distinguishes such an enlightening truth
from the judgements that are said to be blind?
4. Some say that the judgements which are thus enlightening—and directly enlightening—
are those on which all mankind has agreed. But how would this agreement be ascertained
without a vicious circle? And, since each of us is aware of a different and unique self, how,
on such a theory, could anyone acquire any unique knowledge of himself? 32
5. Others say that the mark of the judgement which is enlightening, as distinguished from
any of those which are not, is simply the fact that there is an irresistible compulsion which
keeps us from giving it up. And they say that we are conscious of this compulsion. When
Descartes wanted to construct his philosophy upon an absolutely firm basis, he decided
at the outset to count as true and as certain only that which he was plainly incapable of
doubting. Hence he would seem to be saying that such a compulsion is the distinguishing
mark. But when he attempted to analyse a case of this compulsion more exactly, he
believed that he had found clarity and distinctness of perception to be the mark of what
is enlightening. His expression is well known: quod clare et distincte percipio verum
est. If “percipere” is interpreted in the sense of “to judge”, and “clare et distincte” in the
sense of “to be enlightening”, then we have nothing more than an idem per idem which
doesn’t get us anywhere. But in another sense of these terms, “percipere” does not take
into account the evidence of negative judgements, and “clare et distincte” does not take
into account those cases in which we may think of some complex thing, but in a wholly
confused manner, without analysing it into its parts; we may be aware that we are thinking
of the thing and we may be thinking about it correctly. This is what happens, for example,
when we hear a vowel or a chord consisting of many primary and secondary tones. 33 It