Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
82<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>True</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Evident</strong><br />
in which we can refer to things makes it impossible to require that each thing to which a<br />
correct judgement refers be something that exists. <strong>The</strong> requirement holds only in case <strong>the</strong><br />
thing is thought in modo recto, <strong>and</strong> even here it holds, not for <strong>the</strong> negative judgement, but<br />
only for <strong>the</strong> affirmative judgement. 30 It is only in this last case, <strong>the</strong>n, that we can speak of an<br />
agreement in <strong>the</strong> sense of any kind of equality. But if we consider <strong>the</strong> matter more closely,<br />
we shall see that even here we cannot speak of equality or sameness in <strong>the</strong> strict sense of<br />
<strong>the</strong> terms. It is one thing for <strong>the</strong> person who judges to accept or to affirm a tree <strong>and</strong> to think<br />
of it in <strong>the</strong> thought which <strong>the</strong> judgement presupposes; it would be quite ano<strong>the</strong>r thing for<br />
<strong>the</strong> one who judges to be <strong>the</strong> tree.<br />
3. And so we cannot speak in that sense of an adaequatio rei et intellectus. Can we find<br />
some o<strong>the</strong>r interpretation for “adaequatio” which might make <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis more acceptable?<br />
My answer would be that <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>sis tells us no more nor less than this: Anyone who judges<br />
that a certain thing exists, or that it does not exist, or that it is possible, or impossible, or that<br />
it is thought of by someone, or that it is believed, or loved, or hated, or that it has existed,<br />
or will exist, judges truly provided that <strong>the</strong> thing in question does exist, or does not exist,<br />
or is possible, or is impossible, or is thought of…etc. And what all this comes to, strictly<br />
speaking, is <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
Truth pertains to <strong>the</strong> judgement of <strong>the</strong> person who judges correctly—to <strong>the</strong> judgement<br />
of <strong>the</strong> person who judges about a thing in <strong>the</strong> way in which anyone whose judgements were<br />
evident would judge about <strong>the</strong> thing; hence it pertains to <strong>the</strong> judgement of one who asserts<br />
what <strong>the</strong> person whose judgements are evident would also assert. 31