Franz Brentano_The True and the Evident.pdf

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INTRODUCTION by OSKAR KRAUS I. ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE BOOK AND ITS SUBDIVISIONS 1. The essays collected in this book do not constitute a systematic statement of one and the same doctrine; they present Brentano’s thinking in its living development. Brentano’s epistemology had been based upon the Aristotelian theory; but the lecture on truth, which is the first selection published here, shows that even in 1889 he was not entirely satisfied with Aristotle. Brentano had revised the Aristotelian theory of judgement and in consequence found it necessary to criticize the view that truth consists in an adaequatio rei et intellectus. In addition to synthetic, categorical judgements of the form “S is P”, there are also, according to Brentano, simple, thetic judgements of the form “S is”. Contrary to the Aristotelian theory, these thetic judgements, even when they are true, cannot be said to combine what is combined in reality, or to separate what is separated in reality. One can say of such judgements only that they accept something or that they reject something. Hence according to the conclusion of this early lecture, a judgement is true provided either that it says, of something that is, that it is, or that it denies, of something that is not, that it is. Since every synthetic judgement is logically equivalent to a thetic judgement (“S is P” is equivalent to “SP is”), this particular definition of truth, representing Brentano’s earlier views, was sufficiently comprehensive. Nevertheless it was untenable, and Brentano could not permanently conceal this fact from himself. It had always been characteristic of his theory of knowledge to proceed on the basis of the insightful judgement, or the judgement that is seen to be correct. For a considerable period of time, however, he felt that one could remain within the Aristotelian tradition by interpreting truth or correctness in terms of correspondence, adequacy, or appropriateness—this in contradiction with his own view. Even the break with tradition which is heralded by the work of Descartes (whom Brentano held in high esteem) and which is even more clearly set forth by Spinoza, was not enough to emancipate him from this ambiguous interpretation. It was Brentano’s conception of the existential proposition which required him to modify the correspondence theory of Aristotle; this modification may be seen in the first two selections here and also, to some extent, in the fifth. According to the modified theory, true judgements are no longer said to correspond with things and their properties; they correspond instead with the being or the non-being of things—with their existence or nonexistence. In Section 57 of the lecture on truth, the first of these selections, Brentano explicitly states that he would explicate the truth of an affirmative judgement by means of the correlative concept of the existence of the object, and that he would explicate the truth of a negative judgement by means of the correlative concept of the non-existence of the object.
Introduction xv The introduction of this doctrine of irrealia and of so-called “states of affairs” (existences, non-existences, possibilities, impossibilities, etc.) was necessary in order to preserve the correspondence theory. Brentano was later to give up this doctrine; yet it was destined to play a significant role in the philosophical movements that were to grow out of Brentano’s thought. The second selection—the fragmentary “Being in the Sense of the True”—shows the earlier doctrine in its classic form. One can see that at the time the selection was written, Brentano took the linguistically equivalent expressions, “There is someone contemplating an A” and “There is an A which is being contemplated” to indicate correlative entities. 2. The selections presented here are so arranged as to indicate the gradual emancipation from both theories—the theory of the adaequatio rei et intellectus and the theory of irrealia. Strictly speaking, the lecture on truth contains the key to the refutation of the correspondence, or adaequatio, theory. In Section 5 8b we find one consideration which would reduce any such theory to absurdity. Brentano here points out—and again in Part Two of the book—that every such theory implies that where there is a judgement constituting compares the knowing judgement with the thing that is known. 1 knowledge there must also be a comparative judgement, constituting knowledge, which 3. In the first essay Brentano enters into a controversy with Windelband. He agrees with Windelband that the Aristotelian theory is not sufficient, but he contends that Windelband, in his attempt to free himself from the concept of truth as “being adequate, suitable, or appropriate”, goes too far in trying to conceive it in terms of being in “an agreement with a rule of thinking”. Windelband thinks that, with this concept of a rule or norm, he catches the essence of Kant’s “Copernican revolution” and that Kant himself had abandoned the correspondence theory. Brentano easily shows, with abundant documentary evidence, that Windelband has really transformed the views of his master. But Brentano goes too far in his critique of Windelband’s “Kantian” theory, for in one important point Windelband is close to the later teaching of Brentano: the insightful judgement, i.e., the judgement as it ought to be, the judgement which is justified, is taken to be the standard of truth and falsehood, of correctness and incorrectness. In saying that truth consists in a way of thinking which accords with a rule that ought to be followed, Windelband is far from being entirely clear. But in saying that the mind brings its own norm to consciousness, he is speaking in terms which could also be used to express the doctrine on which Brentano had been lecturing for years. Indeed the following passage from Windelband’s Präludien (p. 47) agrees with Brentano’s views, almost to the letter: “The only thing that philosophy can do is to extract this normative consciousness from the flux of our empirical consciousness and to rely upon direct evidence; it is in this direct evidence that the normative consciousness, once it has been brought to light, has the efficacy and validity which it ought to have for every individual.” But this is as far as the agreement goes, for Windelband is unable to distinguish the “ought” of judgement from the “ought” of feeling and willing; the fact that a judgement which ought to be—i.e., an insightful judgement—is at the same time a judgement which ought to be valued adds
Page 2 and 3: Routledge Revivals The True and the
Page 4 and 5: Translated from the German WAHREIT
Page 6 and 7: x Contents To Anton Marty, 2 Septem
Page 8 and 9: xii Preface fortune to be able to c
Page 12 and 13: xvi Introduction to the confusion.*
Page 14 and 15: xviii Introduction of view—just a
Page 16 and 17: xx Introduction 9. The dictations o
Page 18 and 19: xxii Introduction These irrealia, o
Page 20 and 21: xxiv Introduction 13. Ehrenfels has
Page 22 and 23: xxvi Introduction The motivation be
Page 24 and 25: I ON THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH (Lecture
Page 26 and 27: 4 The True and the Evident 9. What,
Page 28 and 29: 6 The True and the Evident 16. In t
Page 30 and 31: 8 The True and the Evident No furth
Page 32 and 33: 10 The True and the Evident of cert
Page 34 and 35: 12 The True and the Evident this ex
Page 36 and 37: 14 The True and the Evident be give
Page 38 and 39: 16 The True and the Evident referen
Page 40 and 41: II BEING IN THE SENSE OF THE TRUE (
Page 42 and 43: III DESCARTES’ CLASSIFICATION OF
Page 44 and 45: 22 The True and the Evident somethi
Page 46 and 47: 24 The True and the Evident Psychol
Page 48 and 49: 26 The True and the Evident Unfortu
Page 50 and 51: 28 The True and the Evident logicia
Page 52 and 53: 30 The True and the Evident which i
Page 54 and 55: 32 The True and the Evident There i
Page 56 and 57: 34 The True and the Evident Are we
Page 58 and 59: 36 The True and the Evident way. On
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38 The True and the Evident It is c
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40 The True and the Evident is basi
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Part Two TRANSITION TO THE LATER VI
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44 The True and the Evident concept
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46 The True and the Evident 13. But
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48 The True and the Evident each of
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50 The True and the Evident 8. Such
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I ON THE SO-CALLED “IMMANENT OR I
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II ENS RATIONIS AND ENS IRREALE To
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III IN OPPOSITION TO THE SO-CALLED
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58 The True and the Evident When do
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60 The True and the Evident I have
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62 The True and the Evident the con
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64 The True and the Evident to supp
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66 The True and the Evident degree
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68 The True and the Evident concept
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70 The True and the Evident non-exi
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Part Four THE LATER VIEW AS SET FOR
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74 The True and the Evident 6. And
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76 The True and the Evident 14. Any
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II ON THE MEANING OF “VERITAS EST
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80 The True and the Evident that re
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82 The True and the Evident in whic
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84 The True and the Evident would s
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86 The True and the Evident 6. If e
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VI ON THE EVIDENT (Fragment of 12 J
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APPENDICES
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92 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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94 Appendix 1: On the General Valid
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2 ON THE ORIGIN OF THE ERRONEOUS DO
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NOTES by Oskar Kraus
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100 Notes between saying (i) that i
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102 Notes and futural thinking are
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104 Notes 20 Later Brentano declare
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106 Notes he held instead that the
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108 Notes any kind of a thing, and
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110 Notes given in some way or othe
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112 Notes 15 “Meaning” is here
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114 Notes The Rehmke school refuses
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116 Notes in the sentence “The tr
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118 Notes 24 Compare the letter abo
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120 Notes 39 Brentano’s expressio
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122 Notes these consequences, which
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124 Notes someone who is judging wi
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126 Notes 4 Brentano’s hope of le
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INDEX abstracta, 63-4, 71, 162, 178
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130 Index Husserl, E., xv, xvi, xvi
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132 Index propositions; see content
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