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Rockets and People<br />
standard armaments and used only for military transport, or at most, for airborne<br />
operations. However, during the first days of the war, in the general confusion,<br />
squadrons of TB-3s were fecklessly hurled against attacking German columns.They<br />
became easy and safe prey for Me-109s. By that time, Me-109s were equipped with<br />
20-millimeter guns and had a maximum speed of 570 kilometers per hour, as<br />
compared <strong>to</strong> the 7.62-millimeter machine guns on the TB-3s, whose maximum<br />
speed was 250 kilometers per hour! Even the new Tupolev TB-7, which could<br />
reach speeds up <strong>to</strong> 430 kilometers per hour at an altitude of 8,600 meters, could<br />
not break away from Me-109s at middle altitudes. Our DB-As were also incapable<br />
of flying away from Messerschmitts at low altitudes.<br />
The bombers could be saved at a high altitude, where bombing accuracy<br />
sharply deteriorated, or under cover provided by our own fighters. Our fighters,<br />
however, were not capable of accompanying the heavy bombers round-trip, or of<br />
fighting along the way.The flight range for bombers by 1935 had reached 2,800<br />
kilometers (for the Boeing B-17), but the range for fighters was barely 600 kilometers.That<br />
is why the discussion was extremely heated as <strong>to</strong> whether there was<br />
a need for a large bomber fleet comprised of heavy and long-range bombers.<br />
Subsequent events showed that, in and of themselves, bombers were not capable of<br />
providing supremacy in the air given a well-organized anti-aircraft defense. Moreover,<br />
the strategic bombing of Germany did not have a decisive influence on the<br />
course of the war. Douhet’s theory did not prove its value during World War II.<br />
Supremacy in the air was gained using fast, well-armed, high-speed fighters; highspeed<br />
bombers; dive-bombers; and ground attack aircraft.<br />
The discussion then at Fili with Alksnis three and a half years before the beginning<br />
of World War II essentially had <strong>to</strong> do with the role of the strategic air force<br />
in a future war. For some reason, the fact that a war was inevitable did not disturb<br />
any of us.We all believed that this was the natural development of the his<strong>to</strong>rical<br />
process of the world’s first proletarian dicta<strong>to</strong>rship’s struggle with the hostile, capitalist<br />
world.<br />
Bolkhovitinov and those around him, and for that matter the entire Air Force<br />
leadership, unders<strong>to</strong>od that the 800-plus TB-3s had seen their day and that the<br />
future was for aircraft like the Flying Fortress, the American giant with four 1,200horsepower<br />
engines and a takeoff weight of 26,760 kilograms. It was armed with<br />
thirteen large-caliber (12.7-millimeter) machine guns and carried over 2,700 kilograms<br />
of bombs at a range of 2,730 kilometers. The crew included five gunners<br />
who were supposed <strong>to</strong> provide 360-degree protection against fighters.The intention<br />
was that when a large number of these Fortresses were flying in formation,<br />
supporting one another, they would create a curtain of fire that was impenetrable<br />
<strong>to</strong> fighters.That was the reasoning of the Americans who designed the B-17, and<br />
that is what our theoreticians thought.<br />
Agreeing that the obsolete TB-3s needed <strong>to</strong> be replaced and that there was<br />
clearly no need for such monsters as the TB-4, Alksnis then spoke in favor of<br />
combining the properties of a bomber and a fighter.This was the first time I had<br />
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