Teaching and the Decline of Liberty at Credulity and Curiosity in A ...

Tacitus'
Teaching and the Decline of Liberty
at Rome 201
problem in the reign of Nero, where it became a serious difficulty. Militarily, the
world was at peace. There were only three revolts of unpacified provincials
during the entire reign in North Africa, Gaul,
crushed more or less effectively by Tiberius'
continued Augustus'
policy of leaving Germany
and Thrace and these were
vigilant local commanders. Tiberius
and Parthia to their own internal
contentions and occasionally fomenting them. The single war fought against the
Germans in the early part of the reign was abandoned by the cautious and suspi
cious Tiberius, who, like his successors, feared a successful commander more
than he desired expansion (cf. 1.3.6 and 1. 1 1 .4). Tacitus devotes a portion of the
first book to a sedition in the armies of Illyria and Germany; the soldiers who
revolted were not citizens but mercenaries and conscripted slaves who shared
grievances but no political ambition.8
It is generally true of the period we study
(as opposed to later periods, as comes to light in the Historiae) that the army re
mained loyal to the Julio-Claudian who was ruling. Such was the legacy of Cae
sar and Augustus. Such it remained as long as that family held power.
We begin our study of Tiberius'
politics with the first session of the Senate he
called after Augustus' death.9 There Tacitus, while revealing
surface formalities
for what they were, penetrates the consolidation of power which was then begin
ning. Tiberius appeared to respect the Consuls, "as if in the old Republic,
resolute [ambiguus] to
and ir
rule"
(1.7.3). But the primacy he conceded them was in
swearing loyalty to him. The words of the edict by
together were "few and very modest in
sense."
which he called the Senators
Tacitus contrasts his hesitation
and apparent diffidence in the Senate with his alacrity in assuming the command
of the Praetorian Guard and communicating with the armies, as though he had al
ready obtained the Principate. Someone might say, this is power politics and it is
all hypocrisy the orders to the army reveal the truth and the modest words
were empty. But were they so empty, after all? Tiberius was not merely seeking
power, he was seeking to consolidate it in the face of possible present and future
rivals. What he needed to forestall them was legitimacy.10
To receive power at
the request of the Senate would give him that legitimacy.
8. The one exception is the German army which offered to make Germanicus emperor if he
would see that their demands were granted. His prompt and decisive refusal sufficed to make them
forget this suggestion which they never mention again (1.35.3)- The threat that some member of the
ruling house might tempt the armies to revolt remains a cause of fear throughout the years the dynasty
ruled, from Tiberius to Nero.
9. We do not consider the murder of Agrippa Postumus primumfacinus novi principatus (1.6), as
we are convinced that Tiberius was not responsible, nor does Tacitus claim he was, for we take
propius vero as still depending on credible erat. The story hints at the guilt of Livia, whom Sallustius
warned not to divulge the arcana imperii, and seems to show as much what the Romans of that day
were capable of believing about their ruling family as what was actually done. I am glad to acknowl
Professor David
edge my gratitude to an unpublished paper, "Political Succession in the Annals,"
by
Bolotin. I owe this and not a few other insights of this essay to his acute analysis. See also Albert
Pappano, "Agrippa Postumus,"
Classical Philology 36(1940:43-44.
10. Bolotin, "Political Succession."
See also Myron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 2. "The central question in political succession is
that of legitimacy: By what right does the successor