Teaching and the Decline of Liberty at Credulity and Curiosity in A ...
Teaching and the Decline of Liberty at Credulity and Curiosity in A ...
Teaching and the Decline of Liberty at Credulity and Curiosity in A ...
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The Theaetetus <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Possibility <strong>of</strong> False Op<strong>in</strong>ion 183<br />
first. The argument won't allow us to choose nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. But why does<br />
Socr<strong>at</strong>es suggest, <strong>in</strong>stead, th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> argument won't permit both altern<strong>at</strong>ives? In<br />
particular, if we admit <strong>the</strong> second altern<strong>at</strong>ive, or <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>in</strong> general <strong>of</strong> not<br />
know<strong>in</strong>g wh<strong>at</strong> one knows, why should <strong>the</strong> argument compel us to reject <strong>the</strong> first<br />
altern<strong>at</strong>ive, or to affirm <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion? Why should it tell us not<br />
merely<br />
th<strong>at</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion hasn't been shown to be impossible s<strong>in</strong>ce it would<br />
belong, if it exists, to a class whose possibility <strong>in</strong> general has been admitted<br />
but also th<strong>at</strong> it does exist, <strong>and</strong> exists by a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> logical necessity? To be sure,<br />
our ord<strong>in</strong>ary experience suggests th<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion is an obvious<br />
fact, but experience can't tell us th<strong>at</strong> this fact, if it is a fact, emerges by any ne<br />
cessity. Couldn't <strong>the</strong>re be a world <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> only know<strong>in</strong>g be<strong>in</strong>gs are able not<br />
to know, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed do not know, wh<strong>at</strong> <strong>the</strong>y know, without <strong>the</strong>ir ever hold<strong>in</strong>g<br />
false op<strong>in</strong>ions? Couldn't <strong>the</strong>y have partial knowledge, for example, <strong>of</strong> some sub<br />
ject, like ma<strong>the</strong>m<strong>at</strong>ics, which <strong>the</strong>y would both know <strong>and</strong> not know, <strong>in</strong> a sense,<br />
<strong>and</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y could learn more <strong>and</strong> more about, without <strong>the</strong>ir ever mistak<strong>in</strong>g<br />
one number for ano<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>and</strong> without any falsity <strong>in</strong> any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir op<strong>in</strong>ions (144<br />
b3-4)? Socr<strong>at</strong>es apparently believes th<strong>at</strong> such a case is impossible, or <strong>at</strong> least<br />
impossible as <strong>the</strong> only <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> not know<strong>in</strong>g wh<strong>at</strong> one knows, <strong>and</strong> we must<br />
wonder why. But for now, it is less important to see <strong>the</strong> grounds for this judg<br />
ment than to see its implic<strong>at</strong>ions for <strong>the</strong> argument as a whole. False op<strong>in</strong>ion will<br />
necessarily exist, accord<strong>in</strong>g to this stronger suggestion, if it is possible not to<br />
know wh<strong>at</strong> one knows. Socr<strong>at</strong>es is not, <strong>the</strong>n, tre<strong>at</strong><strong>in</strong>g this possibility merely as a<br />
condition <strong>of</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion though it is th<strong>at</strong> but also as a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> cause, for it<br />
entails th<strong>at</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion must necessarily exist. And if someone were to under<br />
st<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> not know<strong>in</strong>g wh<strong>at</strong> one knows, <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong> it as en<br />
tail<strong>in</strong>g false op<strong>in</strong>ion, he would have a firmer trust <strong>in</strong> his very experience th<strong>at</strong><br />
false op<strong>in</strong>ion exists. For by underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g why false op<strong>in</strong>ion must necessarily<br />
exist, he would also know better th<strong>at</strong> it does <strong>in</strong>deed exist. And he would <strong>the</strong>n be<br />
more truly free <strong>of</strong><br />
Protagoras'<br />
claim th<strong>at</strong> all op<strong>in</strong>ions are true.<br />
Theaetetus, however, didn't notice this subtlety <strong>in</strong> Socr<strong>at</strong>es'<br />
response to him,<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed he could hardly have been expected to, <strong>at</strong> least not without read<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>the</strong> record <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir convers<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> Socr<strong>at</strong>es will l<strong>at</strong>er help Eucleides to write.<br />
And for <strong>the</strong> time be<strong>in</strong>g, Socr<strong>at</strong>es apparently thought it unwise to <strong>in</strong>sist upon this<br />
h<strong>in</strong>t. Instead, he <strong>the</strong>n <strong>of</strong>fered his suggestion about knowledge be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> us as <strong>in</strong> an<br />
aviary a suggestion, as we have seen, which led back to <strong>the</strong> difficulty th<strong>at</strong><br />
Theaetetus had already understood, namely, th<strong>at</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion cannot exist un<br />
less it is possible not to know wh<strong>at</strong> one knows. Now Theaetetus'<br />
trust <strong>in</strong> his ex<br />
perience <strong>of</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong>ir earlier refut<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Protagoras, pre<br />
vent him from deny<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>at</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion exists. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, his youthful<br />
concern for truth protects him from <strong>the</strong> facile "common<br />
sense"<br />
th<strong>at</strong> would grant<br />
th<strong>at</strong> we can not know wh<strong>at</strong> we know, though this seems self-contradictory to<br />
him, merely <strong>in</strong> order to reta<strong>in</strong> his belief <strong>in</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion. While he won't deny <strong>the</strong><br />
existence <strong>of</strong> false op<strong>in</strong>ion, nei<strong>the</strong>r will he say th<strong>at</strong> we can know wh<strong>at</strong> we don't