Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University

Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University

dataspace.princeton.edu
from dataspace.princeton.edu More from this publisher
09.04.2013 Views

Republic derived no direct benefit; the burning of ships, towns, sugar mills, and other assets amounted to 7,580,000 guilders. 91 Finally, in the fifth—and most intriguing—section, De Laet attempted to calculate the revenues the King had forfeited as a result of the company's predations, along with the additional “expenses he had incurred to protect against them.” 92 Lost revenues from Pernambuco, Itamaricá, Paraiba, and Rio Grande amounted to 5 million guilders; the attack on Bahia, and the joint Spanish-Portuguese fleet that returned it to Iberian control in 1625, cost a further 10 million guilders. Convoys to protect the annual treasure fleets, newly constructed forts, and ships run- aground because they sailed out of season in an attempt to evade Dutch fleets, added up to 28,500,000 guilders. Here De Laet offered what modern economists would call a form of opportunity-cost reasoning: it was self-evident that the Dutch chipped away at Spanish revenues by blocking trade and seizing or destroying goods, but by continuously applying pressure throughout the Atlantic Basin, De Laet reasoned that the company could impose costs even for events that never took place. 93 Adding the totals from all five sections, De Laet estimated that the King of Spain had sustained damage worth a staggering 118,283,166 guilders, all of which, he argued, might otherwise have been used against the Dutch. Instead, it had made them considerably richer. And De Laet was careful to point out that this had been done on the relatively small initial investment of 7 million guilders, the capital raised by the company in the early and mid-1620s. 94 























































 91 Ibid., 288–291. 92 Ibid., 291. “Op-reeckeninghe vande schaden die de koning van Spagnien heeft gheleden in sijne inkomsten door toe-doen vande compagnie, ende de onkosten die daer tegen heft moeten doen.” 93 I would like to acknowledge my debt on this point to Eric Schliesser, Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ghent. 94 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 4, 293. 
 251

This extraordinary conclusion might strike the modern reader as fundamentally flawed: it is not at all clear why the company’s expenditures on ships and personnel in the first section should be counted as damage done to Spain—a problem that De Laet himself acknowledged when he repeated this sum at the end of the Kort Verhael, in a supplementary section that briefly examined each chamber's expenditures and the total value of the goods the company carried home in trade. 95 But this need not be taken as evidence of confusion. De Laet was manifestly not trying to provide a balance sheet for the company’s income and expenses, as had Specx. A truthful accounting of this information would show considerable losses and thus shine a most unfavorable light upon the company. Instead, by treating as commensurate the activities the company had organized against Spain, De Laet was articulating its role in building the finances and power of the state, at the expense of other states—what Botero and others referred to as grandezza. 96 With its solid quantitative basis, and its intermixture of consumption, investment, and profits from trade, he provided what looks very much like an estimate of the company’s total contribution to the national economy—a concept that would not be employed for another century, and the beginnings of which are conventionally associated with William Petty, some two decades later. 97 That Petty called on De Laet during his stay in Leiden sometime during the summer of 1644, at precisely the moment De Laet would have been completing the Kort Verhael, raises a whole host of intriguing questions about De Laet’s role in stimulating Petty’s 























































 95 Ibid., 294. 96 Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State and The Greatness of Cities, trans. P.J. Waley (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1956); Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 97 McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic. 
 252

This extraordinary conclusion might strike the modern reader as fundamentally flawed: it<br />

is not <strong>at</strong> all clear why the company’s expenditures on ships and personnel in the first section<br />

should be counted as damage done to Spain—a problem th<strong>at</strong> De Laet himself acknowledged<br />

when he repe<strong>at</strong>ed this sum <strong>at</strong> the end of the Kort Verhael, in a supplementary section th<strong>at</strong> briefly<br />

examined each chamber's expenditures and the total value of the goods the company carried<br />

home in trade. 95 But this need not be taken as evidence of confusion. De Laet was manifestly not<br />

trying to provide a balance sheet for the company’s income and expenses, as had Specx. A<br />

truthful accounting of this inform<strong>at</strong>ion would show considerable losses and thus shine a most<br />

unfavorable light upon the company. Instead, by tre<strong>at</strong>ing as commensur<strong>at</strong>e the activities the<br />

company had organized against Spain, De Laet was articul<strong>at</strong>ing its role in building the finances<br />

and power of the st<strong>at</strong>e, <strong>at</strong> the expense of other st<strong>at</strong>es—wh<strong>at</strong> Botero and others referred to as<br />

grandezza. 96 With its solid quantit<strong>at</strong>ive basis, and its intermixture of consumption, investment,<br />

and profits from trade, he provided wh<strong>at</strong> looks very much like an estim<strong>at</strong>e of the company’s total<br />

contribution to the n<strong>at</strong>ional economy—a concept th<strong>at</strong> would not be employed for another<br />

century, and the beginnings of which are conventionally associ<strong>at</strong>ed with William Petty, some<br />

two decades l<strong>at</strong>er. 97 Th<strong>at</strong> Petty called on De Laet during his stay in Leiden sometime during the<br />

summer of 1644, <strong>at</strong> precisely the moment De Laet would have been completing the Kort<br />

Verhael, raises a whole host of intriguing questions about De Laet’s role in stimul<strong>at</strong>ing Petty’s<br />

























































<br />

95 Ibid., 294.<br />

96 Giovanni Botero, The Reason of St<strong>at</strong>e and The Gre<strong>at</strong>ness of Cities, trans. P.J. Waley (London: Routledge & K.<br />

Paul, 1956); Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of St<strong>at</strong>e: The Acquisition and Transform<strong>at</strong>ion of the<br />

Language of Politics, 1<strong>25</strong>0-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge <strong>University</strong> Press, 1992); Richard Tuck, Philosophy and<br />

Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge <strong>University</strong> Press, 1993).<br />

97 McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic.<br />


 <strong>25</strong>2

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!