Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University

Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University

dataspace.princeton.edu
from dataspace.princeton.edu More from this publisher
09.04.2013 Views

settlements in the Americas. 19 The argument for commercial freedom, Weststeijn contends, “was perhaps the most important ideological legacy of the rise, decline and fall of Dutch Brazil.” 20 This chapter will suggest a very different legacy of the debate over free trade, namely the WIC's decision to enter the trade in slaves. Although scholars have long recognized that the company's first forays into the slave trade were in 1636—the same year that the States General re-imposed a monopoly on trade to Brazil—and that slaves were listed as one of only three items excluded from free trade in the States General's resolution that lifted the monopoly in 1638, there has been no effort to explain what relationship, if any, there was between these two highly significant, essentially contemporary developments. 21 By looking closely at the negotiations themselves, rather than the rhetorical arguments found in printed pamphlets, the chapter tries to tease out this relationship and to show its importance for our understanding of both company politics and the longer-term evolution of Dutch participation in the slave trade. This requires methodically re-examining the debate over free trade to Brazil and connecting it to the debate over free trade to Angola that began only four years later. It also requires focusing more carefully on the mediators, rather than the antagonists, and on the give and take and compromise of practical politics. In particular, it requires being sensitive to the ways that seemingly discrete and un-related issues can suddenly become contingent during the course of negotiations. The chapter argues that the debates over free trade—to both Brazil and Angola—were primarily debates over colonial politics, rather than trade, and that successive decisions to open 























































 19 Ibid., 11. Smith's quotation is taken from vol. 2, book IV, chapter 7. See Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 117. 20 Weststeijn, “Dutch Brazil and the Making of Free Trade Ideology,” 12. 21 Boxer treats these two issues sequentially, but does not analytically connect them. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 75–84. Richard Tuck remarks on the coincidence of the two issues in Grotius' De Jure Belli et Pacis, published in 1625: “It is significant that the first major public expression of a strong rights theory to be read in Protestant Europe should have contained both a defence of slavery and absolutism and a defence of resistance and common property in extremis.” Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 80. Cited in Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 194. 
 177

and close trade to private merchants were driven by the States General's interests in populating and defending Brazil at the least possible public expense. Slavery was part of both considerations. The first section of the chapter shows that the company's plans to raise additional private capital in 1636 stalled in the face of shareholder frustration with the policy of free trade to Brazil, and that the States General's decision to reinstate the monopoly that December was motivated by its desire to avoid assuming the financial burden for the war. The next section explores the States General's concerns about disorder in Brazil itself on the even of Johan Maurits’ arrival. By reconstructing the relevant committees, it establishes the active role played by noblemen and other officials in The Hague who supported monopoly, military expansion, and slavery as the best means to secure the colony. The following section examines the decision within the Heren XIX to reopen the trade in 1638 and in particular at a compromise proposal presented by the States of Holland. Though a victory for Amsterdam, the chapter shows that this proposal was in fact accepted on Maurits' recommendation, and that it contained important provisions to appease Zeeland by attracting additional private capital and formally recognizing the company's monopoly on the trade in slaves. The last section analyzes the way that the Heren XIX planned for and organized the slave trade during the period 1637-1645. The conclusion suggests a framework for thinking about how this trade evolved from a solution to problems in Dutch Brazil to a source of commercial profit in its own right. 2. Monopoly and Private Capital The States General's decision to re-impose the company's monopoly in December of 1636 dates back to the beginning of 1635 and was intimately linked to plans for a verhoging (augmentation 
 178

and close trade to priv<strong>at</strong>e merchants were driven by the St<strong>at</strong>es General's interests in popul<strong>at</strong>ing<br />

and defending Brazil <strong>at</strong> the least possible public expense. Slavery was part of both<br />

consider<strong>at</strong>ions. The first section of the chapter shows th<strong>at</strong> the company's plans to raise additional<br />

priv<strong>at</strong>e capital in 1636 stalled in the face of shareholder frustr<strong>at</strong>ion with the policy of free trade<br />

to Brazil, and th<strong>at</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>es General's decision to reinst<strong>at</strong>e the monopoly th<strong>at</strong> December was<br />

motiv<strong>at</strong>ed by its desire to avoid assuming the financial burden for the war. The next section<br />

explores the St<strong>at</strong>es General's concerns about disorder in Brazil itself on the even of Johan<br />

Maurits’ arrival. By reconstructing the relevant committees, it establishes the active role played<br />

by noblemen and other officials in The Hague who supported monopoly, military expansion, and<br />

slavery as the best means to secure the colony. The following section examines the decision<br />

within the Heren XIX to reopen the trade in 1638 and in particular <strong>at</strong> a compromise proposal<br />

presented by the St<strong>at</strong>es of Holland. Though a victory for Amsterdam, the chapter shows th<strong>at</strong> this<br />

proposal was in fact accepted on Maurits' recommend<strong>at</strong>ion, and th<strong>at</strong> it contained important<br />

provisions to appease Zeeland by <strong>at</strong>tracting additional priv<strong>at</strong>e capital and formally recognizing<br />

the company's monopoly on the trade in slaves. The last section analyzes the way th<strong>at</strong> the Heren<br />

XIX planned for and organized the slave trade during the period 1637-1645. The conclusion<br />

suggests a framework for thinking about how this trade evolved from a solution to problems in<br />

Dutch Brazil to a source of commercial profit in its own right.<br />

2. Monopoly and Priv<strong>at</strong>e Capital<br />

The St<strong>at</strong>es General's decision to re-impose the company's monopoly in December of 1636 d<strong>at</strong>es<br />

back to the beginning of 1635 and was intim<strong>at</strong>ely linked to plans for a verhoging (augment<strong>at</strong>ion<br />


 178

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!