Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University
Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University
Recife in early May of 1646. It was an inauspicious beginning for a government that would hobble along for almost eight years, until the colony was definitively relinquished to Portugal. The council that had taken more than two years to build, and another six months to cajole and deploy, arrived late and was incapable of restoring order. When Schonenborch, Haecxs, Van Goch, and Van Beaumont returned to the Republic with the last remaining Dutch soldiers in January of 1654 they faced both public scorn and the threat of legal prosecution. 105 Many scholars have linked the failure of a Dutch empire in the Atlantic to the Republic's problems finding sufficient colonists to settle in the Americas. 106 The same might be said of its problems recruiting colonial administrators. The problem—at least in 1645—was not only that the company had become overstretched by its various colonial responsibilities, but that the Dutch elite could not reach agreement on the individuals appropriate to govern an extensive land colony. Senior members of the magistracy were simply not interested in the post of President in Brazil, preferring instead to avoid the risks associated with life and military service in the colonies and to remain closer to the centers of power at home. 107 Members of the Dutch nobility—at least some of whom believed themselves to be uniquely qualified to serve as colonial officials—refused to work “in the service of merchants.” In Alexander van der Capellen's view, the solution lay in greater centralization of colonial affairs and the subordination of merchant interests to those of the States General. But neither he nor the other noblemen around the Prince of Orange and the States General were powerful enough to enforce this view. The company's directors, meanwhile, were eager to more carefully hem-in the activities of colonial officials and, above all, to save money. Those merchants who traded 105 Trouwers died shortly after arriving in Brazil. See Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 266. 106 See, for example, Pieter C. Emmer and Wim Klooster, “The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800: Expansion Without Empire,” Itinerario 23 (1999): 48-69. 107 Jaap Jacobs, “Incompetente Autocraten? Bestuurlijke Verhouding in de Zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse Atlantische Wereld,” De Zeventiende Eeuw 21, no. 1 (2005): 64–78. 169
privately to Brazil, legally or illegally, were shut out of the deliberations altogether, and thus limited their activities to openly opposing the company's efforts to exert any authority whatsoever. Amidst this cacophony of perspectives and interests, the administration of Brazil languished, creating the opportunity for a revolt. If the story itself is remarkable, its core elements are actually quite familiar. Spanish colonial institutions were riven by conflicts between representatives of the Old Nobility and the letrados (educated commoners) who increasingly filled the ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. In the 1570s Juan de Ovando, President of the Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias, attempted to replace the retiring Viceroy of Peru with a letrado candidate, in part to save money. His proposal drew the ire of senior noblemen who believed such positions should be reserved for members of the military aristocracy, and ultimately his proposal was rejected by the King. 108 In England, the alliance between gentry and merchant investors in commercial companies occasionally broke down, as in the late 1610s, when gentry “factions” ousted merchants from senior positions in both the Virginia and Bermuda Companies. Their effort to effect a similar coup in the more solidly merchant East India Company failed; the company's minutes reflect that certain “gentlemen” were scolded for attempting to takeover the company's management, which was described as a “business proper only for merchants.” 109 The language of these disputes, and the worldviews they represented, is almost precisely the same. Noblemen in the United Provinces never had the power that they did in either Spain or England, but their role was quite significant. As this chapter has shown, Dutch noblemen played many different roles in the management of the WIC, both at home and abroad. These include what Fritz Redlich somewhat imprecisely referred to as “mercantile public administration,” as well as their more obvious role 108 Poole, Juan de Ovando, 159–160. 109 Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise & Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575- 1630 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 49. 170
- Page 129 and 130: thus shows the political—as oppos
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priv<strong>at</strong>ely to Brazil, legally or illegally, were shut out of the deliber<strong>at</strong>ions altogether, and thus<br />
limited their activities to openly opposing the company's efforts to exert any authority<br />
wh<strong>at</strong>soever. Amidst this cacophony of perspectives and interests, the administr<strong>at</strong>ion of Brazil<br />
languished, cre<strong>at</strong>ing the opportunity for a revolt.<br />
If the story itself is remarkable, its core elements are actually quite familiar. Spanish<br />
colonial institutions were riven by conflicts between represent<strong>at</strong>ives of the Old Nobility and the<br />
letrados (educ<strong>at</strong>ed commoners) who increasingly filled the ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. In<br />
the 1570s Juan de Ovando, President of the Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias, <strong>at</strong>tempted to<br />
replace the retiring Viceroy of Peru with a letrado candid<strong>at</strong>e, in part to save money. His proposal<br />
drew the ire of senior noblemen who believed such positions should be reserved for members of<br />
the military aristocracy, and ultim<strong>at</strong>ely his proposal was rejected by the King. 108 In England, the<br />
alliance between gentry and merchant investors in commercial companies occasionally broke<br />
down, as in the l<strong>at</strong>e 1610s, when gentry “factions” ousted merchants from senior positions in<br />
both the Virginia and Bermuda Companies. Their effort to effect a similar coup in the more<br />
solidly merchant East India Company failed; the company's minutes reflect th<strong>at</strong> certain<br />
“gentlemen” were scolded for <strong>at</strong>tempting to takeover the company's management, which was<br />
described as a “business proper only for merchants.” 109 The language of these disputes, and the<br />
worldviews they represented, is almost precisely the same. Noblemen in the United Provinces<br />
never had the power th<strong>at</strong> they did in either Spain or England, but their role was quite significant.<br />
As this chapter has shown, Dutch noblemen played many different roles in the<br />
management of the WIC, both <strong>at</strong> home and abroad. These include wh<strong>at</strong> Fritz Redlich somewh<strong>at</strong><br />
imprecisely referred to as “mercantile public administr<strong>at</strong>ion,” as well as their more obvious role<br />
<br />
108 Poole, Juan de Ovando, 159–160.<br />
109 Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise & Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575-<br />
1630 (Cambridge: Harvard <strong>University</strong> Press, 1967), 49.<br />
170
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