Dissertation_A Bick_May 25 - DataSpace at Princeton University

GOVERNING THE FREE SEA:
THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL POLITICS, 1618-1645
Alexander Bick
A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
Advisor: Anthony Grafton
September 2012

© Copyright by Alexander Bick, 2012. All rights reserved.

Abstract
This dissertation takes a micro-historical approach to examine a single meeting of the board of
directors of the Dutch West India Company (WIC) in the fall of 1645. At this meeting the
directors learned that Portuguese planters in northeastern Brazil had risen in open revolt, a
development that would cripple the company’s new Atlantic empire. By meticulously
reconstructing negotiations over five months—based on ordinary and secret minutes,
memoranda, notes, diaries, letters, pamphlets, newspapers, and printed books—the dissertation
reveals the decision-making mechanisms and institutions employed by a joint stock company to
rule a major colony in the New World. It explores the nature of the WIC’s relationship to the
decentralized organs of the Dutch state and—in contrast to familiar images of the sober Dutch
merchant—demonstrates both the important role played by the Dutch nobility and the use and
adaptation of Iberian models for colonial administration. It examines the specific role of the
Leiden scholar Johannes de Laet and, looking back at earlier meetings in the company’s history,
reinterprets negotiations over the company’s charter and the relationship between arguments
over free trade and slavery. In opposition to explanations that emphasize regional conflicts
within the United Provinces or the inability to attract settlers, the dissertation explains the
collapse of Dutch Brazil as resulting from long-standing tensions between merchants and
noblemen and a consequent failure to recruit new leadership for the colony during the summer
and fall of 1645. The dissertation proposes close examination of negotiation and compromise as
a new method for studying political history.
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Contents
Abstract iii
Contents iv
Acknowledgements vi
List of Illustrations x
List of Tables xi
I. Introduction: The Meeting as a Site of Analysis
1. Introduction 1
2. The West India Company and the Dutch Atlantic 7
3. Meetings and the Practice of Politics 19
4. Preview of the Argument 29
5. A Note on Sources 36
II. News from Brazil: The Political Geography of Information
1. Introduction 41
2. The Revolt and the Circulation of News 47
3. The Heren XIX and the Politics of Information 59
4. Johannes de Laet as “Information Master” 78
5. Conclusion 90
III. A Council of the Indies for the Dutch Republic?
The Origins of a Company Board
1. Introduction 93
2. Competing Drafts for the WIC Charter 98
3. How many is XIX? The Politics of Representation 111
4. The Role of the States General 121
5. Conclusion 127
iv

IV. “In the Service of Merchants”:
The Selection of a New Colonial Government
1. Introduction 131
2. Institutional Reform and the New Council 139
3. The Failed Search for a President 146
4. Merchants, Magistrates, and the Politics of Administration 155
5. Wolter Schonenborch and the Rituals of Office 162
6. Conclusion 167
V. Free Trade and African Slavery: The Politics of Monopoly
1. Introduction 172
2. Monopoly and Private Capital 178
3. Decision-Making at the States General 186
4. Compromise in the Heren XIX 200
5. Planning for the Slave Trade 210
6. Conclusion 218
VI. Imaginary Economies: Lobbying and the Rhetoric of Numbers
1. Introduction 223
2. Calculating the Value of the New World 230
3. History Counts 241
4. Conclusion 256
VII. Conclusion: The Fall of Dutch Brazil 261
Bibliography 269
v

Acknowledgements
This project has benefitted enormously from the guidance, conversation, and financial support I
have been fortunate enough to receive over the course of research and writing. Looking back, it
seems almost absurd to call the work my own, as if learning and expression were things one does
by oneself, without the probing questions, frequent suggestions, and gentle refutations that have
given this dissertation its shape. I would like to thank first the members of my committee:
Anthony Grafton encouraged me to come to Princeton, introduced me to the late Renaissance,
and presciently asked what role the nobility might have played in early modern commerce. Linda
Colley insisted that I be more precise in deploying the word “empire.” Jaap Jacobs steered me
towards colonial politics, shared sources, and provided guidance throughout. Adam Beaver
pressed me to be more comparative and provided essential sources for the history of imperial
Spain. Although not on my committee, Anne Goldgar entertained my request for a tutorial by
phone and thereby gave me the tools to begin my own research in Dutch history.
The vast majority of this research was done in Leiden and The Hague. Kasper van
Ommen graciously took me in as a fellow at the Scaliger Instituut and introduced me to the
collections of the Leiden Library. Henk den Heijer served as my Fulbright advisor and answered
a litany of questions about the history of the WIC. Ben Teensma gave me a glimpse of the great
tradition of textual discovery that is still going on today. Lucia Werneck Xavier patiently taught
me how to navigate the WIC archives, which she may know better than anyone else, and, along
with Bruno Miranda, corrected my gross oversimplifications of Brazilian history. I thank them
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for making the archive such an enjoyable place to work and learn. I would like to thank the many
archivists who helped to locate documents, decipher difficult passages, and explain local history
and politics.
I benefitted greatly from conversations within the larger Dutch scholarly community.
Oscar Gelderblom and Victor Enthoven each demanded that I pay more attention to Dutch
merchants and trade. Eric Schliesser organized a reading group on Pieter de la Court from which
I profited immensely and where I had the opportunity to meet Arthur Weststeijn and Jan
Hartman. Ernst van den Boogaart shared the fruits of his long study of Dutch Atlantic culture.
Michiel van Groesen invited me to an important conference on Dutch Brazil and helped me to
think about the circulation of news. Rolf Bremmer shared new research on Johannes de Laet.
Martine van Ittersum gave excellent advice and her book on Grotius and the Dutch East India
Company remains a model. Harro Maas encouraged me to think more clearly, especially about
economics in practice. I am grateful also for conversations with Cátia Antunes, Paul Hoftijzer,
Dirk van Miert, Jaap Nieuwstraten, Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, and Huib Zuidervaart, and to Silvia
Zwaaneveld, Floor Westendorp, Maud Westendorp, and Rudi Westendorp for sharing their home
with me during research in Leiden.
Beyond the Netherlands, I have been fortunate to study or discuss the ideas in this
dissertation with David Armitage, Ann Blair, Holly Brewer, Liam Brockey, Bill Bulman,
Graham Burnett, Peter Cocks, Diogo Ramada Curto, Robert Darnton, Stephen Ellis, Mike
Feigelson, Allison Games, Tim Hochstrasser, Nick Jahr, Rob Jenkins, Marjoleine Kars, Mark
Kishlansky, Henriette de Bruyn Kops, Jamie Kreiner, Peter Lake, Clement Levalloise, Tiago
Mata, Jordan McIntyre, Mary Morgan, Chris Moses, Danny Noorlander, Steven Pincus, Emma
Rothschild, Joan-Pau Rubiés, Ariel Rubin, Linda Rupert, Neil Safir, Ben Schmidt, Bill Sewell,
vii

Jacob Soll, George Stocking, Erik Thomson, and Maurizio Viroli. In his absence Carl
Wennerlind allowed me to teach, and thus in effect to take, his seminar on “Capitalism and the
Enlightenment” at Barnard College. Further afield, Chris DeCorse invited me to join an
archaeological survey led by Sam Spiers at Komenda, west of Elmina on the Gold Coast.
Nick Popper and Theo Dunkelgruen each gave a nod to the more unconventional of my
proposed methodologies, at the expense of something much less interesting. Both of them, along
with Will Deringer, Christienna Fryar, Glenn Huekel, Rachael Lammers, Tom Leng, Noah
Millstone, Dael Norwood, Margaret Schotte, Aaron Tugendhaft, and Annie Twitty read and
offered essential comments on chapter drafts or their workshop predecessors.
I was instructed in the Dutch language by Wijnie de Groot, René Wezel, and Robbert
Joon, and in early modern Dutch paleography by Agnes Dunselman, Kees Stahl, and Emmanuel
Kreike. Chris Heezackers, Nick Popper, and John Byron Kuhner all generously assisted
translating letters from Latin; Diana Brown and David Parker did the same for correspondence in
Portuguese. Jordan Smith’s work to enter books and articles into Zotero was both timely and
extremely helpful.
Finally, my family: in addition to their enormous patience and encouragement, my
parents, Diana Brown and Mario Bick, traveled twice to Washington, DC during the final phases
of writing to critique chapter drafts and help me shape them into a cohesive argument. And
Nealin Parker, who must contend with a modern empire during normal business hours, offered
loving support, assisted with tables and illustrations, and read over every single word of the text.
I share the honor of completing this project with them.
Funding to support my research was provided by the Department of History, the Center
for Human Values, and the Graduate School at Princeton University, as well as the Princeton
viii

Institute for International and Regional Studies. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge an Andrew
W. Mellon Fellowship in Humanistic Studies, a Brill Fellowship from the Scaliger Instituut in
Leiden, and a Fulbright Fellowship supported by the Netherlands-America Foundation.
Earlier versions of material in the dissertation were presented at conferences or
workshops sponsored by Birkbeck College, Columbia University, the European University
Institute in Florence, Harvard University, the History of Economics Society, the Omohundro
Institute for Early American History and Culture, Princeton University, the Scaliger Instituut, the
Sixteenth Century Studies Society, and the Universiteit Utrecht. I gladly acknowledge these
opportunities to share my work and the helpful and constructive feedback I received from
conference participants. Portions of Chapters Three and Four of the dissertation previously
appeared in the introductory essay to the Grote Atlas van de West-Indische Compagnie, Deel I:
De Oude WIC, 1621-1674, edited by Bea Brommer and Henk den Heijer (Den Haag: Atlas
Maior, 2011).
ix

List of Illustrations
1. Het West-Indische Huis, Middelburg 2
2. Vergaderzaal van het Oost-Indisch Huis in 1768 24
3. Resolutien van de Vergadering van de Heren XIX te Middelburg 37
4. Portrait of Count Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 43
5. Courante uyt Italien ende Duytschlandt, &c., September 2, 1645 55
6. Portrait of Johannes de Laet, 1642 66
7. Portrait of Willem Usselincx, 1637 94
8. Map of Mauritstaad and Recife, c. 1645 132
9. Portrait of Jacques Specx 147
10. Portrait of Alexander van der Capellen 151
11. Portrait of Christoffel Artichewski 201
12. The Attack on Elmina in 1625 215
13. Nieuwe Wereldt ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien 245
x

List of Tables
1. Delegates to the fall 1645 meeting of the Heren XIX 62
2. Agreement between Middleburg, Vlissingen, and Veere, 1624 117
3. Seating order in the Heren XVII of the VOC 123
4. Seating order in the Heren XIX of the WIC 123
5. Seating order for the delegations at the States General 124
6. Possible seating at the Heren XIX 124
xi

1. Introduction
Chapter One
The Meeting as a Site of Analysis
The meeting began on the morning of Saturday, September 9, 1645. Assembled around the table
in an upper-floor room at the West-Indisch Huis (West India House) in central Middelburg were
representatives from each of the five chambers of the Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie
(Dutch West India Company, or WIC)—Amsterdam, Zeeland, North Holland, the Maas, and
Groningen—along with several delegates dispatched by the States General in The Hague to
“assist in the proper management of the company.” 1 Since its founding in 1621, the company’s
board of directors, the Heren XIX (Gentlemen Nineteen) met two or three times each year to
review correspondence, reconcile accounts,
1 The WIC was composed of five chambers. As discussed in Chapter Three, each chamber was itself composed of
shareholders and directors from multiple cities: Amsterdam represented Leiden, Haarlem, and Deventer, among
others, while the Maas included Delft, Dordrecht, and Rotterdam. Zeeland consisted of Middelburg, Vlissingen,
Veere, Tholen, and Zierkzee. North Holland included Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Alkmaar, Edam, Medemblik,
Monnickendam, and Purmerend. The chamber of Groningen also represented the Ommelanden (literally,
surrounding countryside) and Vriesland. For clarity of exposition, throughout this dissertation the chambers are
referred to simply as Amsterdam, Zeeland, North Holland, the Maas, and Groningen. The citation about the role of
representatives from the States General to the meeting of the Heren XIX is taken from the Nationaal Archief, Den
Haag (hereafter NA) 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Letter from David Baute and N. van der Merct, Directors of the Zeeland
Chamber, to the States General, August 11, 1645. The original text reads: “omme in de vergaderinge de saecken van
de Comp. ten besten te helpen derigeren.” This language mirrors that in the WIC charter, Article 18. Transcribed
and translated versions of the complete charter can be found in the Kiliaen van Rensselaer, Van Rensselaer Bowier
Manuscripts: Being the Letters of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, 1630-1643, and Other Documents Relating to the Colony
of Rensselaerswyck, ed. Arnold J. F. van Laer (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908). Unless indicted
otherwise, all translations from Dutch, Portuguese, and French are my own.
1

Illustration 1. Het West-Indische Huis, Middelburg, where the fall meeting of the Heren XIX took
place in 1645. Built in 1520, it was previously used by the English Company
of Merchant Adventurers. Engraving from the private collection of the author.
2

approve appointments, and coordinate military and diplomatic strategy. 2 The previous meeting,
held in Amsterdam in April and May, had been particularly rancorous, with sharp disagreements
over management of the slave trade and uncertainty over who would be selected to serve as
President of the Hoge Raad (High Council) responsible for governing Dutch Brazil. It was hoped
that the new setting would cool tempers and permit resolution of these and many other pressing
matters. Once the necessary formalities had been exchanged, a copy of the company’s charter
read aloud, the hours set and the fines for tardiness agreed upon, the delegates turned to urgent
correspondence that had arrived only days before from Brazil. What they found would transform
the character and extent of the company’s empire and, with it, the course of Atlantic history. 3
That morning the directors read that Portuguese settlers in Pernambuco, the center of the
Dutch colony in northeastern Brazil, had risen in open revolt. 4 Within a matter of months the
territory under the company’s control—which by the early-1640s had grown to include seven of
the fourteen original Portuguese captaincies—would be reduced to only a handful of coastal
forts. 5 The dispatch of two relief fleets in 1646 and 1647, each including thousands of soldiers,
did not succeed in reclaiming lost ground. In 1649, Andries Bicker (1586-1652), one of
Amsterdam's four burgemeesters (mayors) and an influential voice in the city council, dismissed
any further assistance to the colony: “I don’t suspect anything good can come of it,” he is
2 The translation “Gentlemen Nineteen” is standard in the literature, although some authors have preferred “Lords
Nineteen.” The word “Heer”—literally “Sir”—was used to address property-owning males of non-noble as well as
noble birth. It should not be confused with the more restrictive sense of “gentleman” used to refer to members of the
English gentry.
3 This account is taken from the opening pages of the minutes of the meeting. NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, no. 20,
fols. 1-53. Resolutien van de vergadering van de Heren XIX te Middelburg, 9 September-16 Oktober, 1645.
4 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 58. The classic account of the revolt remains C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). See also Hermann Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: um Capitulo
da Historia Colonial do Seculo XVII, trans. Pedro Celso Uchoa Cavalcanti (São Paulo: Companhia Editora
Nacional, 1938); Evaldo Cabral de Mello, ed., O Brasil holandês, 1630-1654 (São Paulo: Penguin-Companhia,
2010).
5 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654.
3

eported to have said; any money sent there “might as well be thrown into the water.” 6 His
conclusion would doom the WIC and what had been a thirty-year effort to cultivate Brazil as the
centerpiece of a Dutch empire stretching from the New World to West Africa. Dutch forces
would withdraw from Brazil in defeat in 1654 and the States General finally relinquished any
claim to the colony as part of a peace agreement with Portugal signed in 1662. 7
In retrospect, the failure of the “Brazilian adventure” appears inevitable: we have come to
think of the Dutch as merchants, rather than conquistadores or settlers. Countless visitors to
Dutch cities in the seventeenth century commented on the soundness of their financial
institutions, the range and quality of goods available for sale, and the “order and exactness” with
which the Dutch conducted their business. 8 William Temple observed that among the Dutch,
“profit [is] more in request than honor,” while a hundred years later Adam Smith concluded that
in Holland, “it is unfashionable not to be a man of business.” 9 Historians—both in the
Netherlands and abroad—have followed suit, focusing on trade to the exclusion of any other
activity. 10 To take but one of many examples, the historian Anthony Pagden writes that
The Dutch, although they became an object of intense scrutiny by the British, were never until the
nineteenth century an imperial power in any meaningful sense, nor ever regarded themselves as
such. The claim by English royalists in the 1660s that the Republic of Holland was seeking a
Universal Monarchy of the sea was an oxymoron. As every imperialist knew, ‘empire’ implied
rulership, and that, on the British and Dutch understanding of the law of nations, could not be
exercised at sea. 11
6 Copye vande Resolutie van ve Heeren Burgemeesters ende Raden tot Amsterdam. Op’t Stuck van de West-Indische
Compagnie (Amsterdam, 1649). A manuscript copy can be found in the Library of Congress, mm 82004179, no. 3.
The original text reads: “ick niet bevroeden datter ijets goedts aff komen sall, ende sall alle t geldt in t water
gesmeten sijn.”
7 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 253.
8 The last phrase is taken from one of the most famous observers of Dutch society, Sir William Temple,
Observations upon the United Provinces of The Netherlands, ed. George Clark (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
9 Ibid., 97; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1963), 76. The original edition was published in Edinburgh in 1776.
10 Otto van Rees pointed out this tendency as early as the 1860s. See his, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in
Nederland tot het einde der Achttiende Eeuw, vol. 2 (Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon, 1868), 1.
11 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). On English fears of a Dutch "empire of the sea," See also Steven C. A. Pincus,
4

However narrowly one defines “meaningful sense,” Pagden's assertions that the Dutch neither
exercised rulership nor ever regarded themselves as an imperial power can only be sustained by
casting the long shadow of the 1660s back onto the first half of the seventeenth century. 12 During
this period—in effect the heart of the Golden Age—companies chartered by the States General
seized and attempted to govern the world's richest sugar colony and quite self-consciously
pursued strategies of either conquest or settlement in places as diverse as the Caribbean, southern
Chile, the Hudson and Delaware Valleys, the West Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope,
Ceylon, and the Indonesian Archipelago. 13 In the Atlantic, at least, this strategy ultimately failed,
but erasing the ambitions that lay behind it makes it difficult if not impossible to understand the
competing interests that animated Dutch overseas expansion in the first place and why, even in
1649, more than half of Amsterdam's city council disagreed with Bicker and argued in favor of
spending the city’s money to save Dutch Brazil. 14
What were the company’s aims in Brazil? Who were the men gathered around the table
in Middelburg in the fall of 1645? What models did they draw on in formulating their plans, and
how did they reach collective decisions on commercial and imperial policy? What assistance did
they draw from the Dutch state—or, posed somewhat differently, how did a joint stock company
and a decentralized republic notorious for its particularism share the responsibilities of governing
an overseas empire? Finally, what might this relatively brief episode be able to tell us about the
Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
12 Here I follow Boxer, who argued that the failure of Dutch Brazil was hardly inevitable, or at least that it hardly
appeared so to contemporaries in the early 1640s. See Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 109.
13 C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800, (New York: Knopf, 1965). See also Henk den Heijer, De
Geschiedenis van de WIC (Zutphen: Walburg, 2002); Femme Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company: Expansion
and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003).
14 Of the 36 members of the Amsterdam city council, 17 voted in favor of rescuing Brazil, eleven voted against, and
eight were either absent on the day of the vote or had deceased. See Copye vande Resolutie van de Heeren
Burgemeesters ende Raden tot Amsterdam. Op’t Stuck van de West-Indische Compagnie.
5

nexus of commerce and power for which the Dutch would subsequently become famous? These
are the central questions that motivate the dissertation that follows.
Answering them requires a careful re-examination of politics within the WIC and a
radical reassessment of the collapse of Dutch Brazil that began in 1645. The dissertation
proceeds in an unconventional fashion: focusing tightly on negotiations in the Heren XIX in
Middelburg over a period of only six weeks, it offers an intimate look at how policy was made
and recovers the worldview of the company's directors at the height of their power, on the
precipice of a disaster that they still believed could be averted. 15 This is made possible by the
survival of detailed minutes for the meeting—one of the only complete sets of minutes that
escaped fire and rag merchants in the nineteenth century, and the only meeting for which
scholars can consult both ordinary and secret minutes. Read in conjunction with surviving
minutes from other meetings of the Heren XIX, as well as notes, letters, reports, memoranda, and
the diaries or memoires of individuals who participated in the proceedings, these minutes offer
an important alternative to the printed record as a source for reconstructing company politics.
Self-consciously, and perhaps somewhat unfashionably, the dissertation examines imperial
history from the perspective of a corporate boardroom. This perspective reveals actors, such as
the nobility, who have been overlooked in the history of Dutch overseas expansion, and
connections, such as that between debates over free trade and slavery, that have either escaped
notice or been misunderstood in earlier accounts. And it offers an alternative explanation for why
15 Linda Colley and Emma Rothschild have recently pioneered a new perspective on empire that draws on the
intimate experience of, respectively, women and families in the eighteenth century. While quite different from this
approach, this dissertation draws inspiration from their concern with reconstructing a coherent, intimate view of
empire. Linda Colley, The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh: A Woman in World History (New York: Pantheon, 2007);
Emma Rothschild, The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century History (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2011).
6

Dutch Brazil failed based on close analysis of negotiation as a method for studying politics. Just
as in the ball park or the cock ring, much of the Dutch Republic surfaces in the boardroom. 16
2. The West India Company and the Dutch Atlantic
The WIC, and the broader Dutch commercial world of which it was part, emerged during a
transitional period in European history, what Eric Hobsbawm famously called the “crisis of the
seventeenth century.” 17 The rise of the United Provinces coincided with the relative decline of
Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese influence, political and religious strife in England and France,
and warfare, economic stagnation, and demographic collapse in Germany and Central Europe as
a result of the Thirty Years’ War. Despite fighting their own protracted conflict against the
Habsburg Monarchy from 1568, and hosting a large refugee population in the main cities of
Holland and Zeeland, the United Provinces became substantially wealthier and increasingly
politically assertive. 18 The Union of Utrecht in 1579 created a military alliance between the
seven rebellious provinces and rapidly transformed the States General into a standing instrument
of government. 19 By the first decade of the seventeenth century, Amsterdam’s population had
grown three-fold and the city had overtaken Antwerp as the center of global commerce and
finance—a position it would retain until at least the early 1670s, if not considerably longer. 20 In
16
The allusion is of course to Clifford Geertz’s analysis of the cock fight: "As much of America surfaces in a ball
park, on a golf links, at a race track, or around a poker table, much of Bali surfaces in a cock ring." See “Deep Play:
Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 417.
17
E. J. Hobsbawm, “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660: Essays from Past and
Present, ed. Trevor Aston (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 5–58.
18
Oscar Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse Kooplieden en de Opkomst van de Amsterdamse Stapelmarkt, 1578-1630
(Hilversum: Verloren, 2000).
19
Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
20
Ibid.; Jan de Vries and A. M. van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of
the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The
Economic Decline of Empires (London: Methuen, 1970).
7

Europe the Dutch Republic is emblematic of the shift from the Mediterranean to northwestern
Europe and the Atlantic as the center of power and commerce; in the Atlantic itself the Dutch
were both literal and figurative intermediaries between a century of largely uncontested Iberian
authority and the emergence of England and France as major colonial powers in North America,
the Caribbean, and West Africa. 21
The general outlines of the Republic's overseas expansion at the end of the sixteenth
century are now well established. 22 Following the sack of Antwerp by troops under the Duke of
Parma (1545-1592) in 1585 and new restrictions on northerners' access to the Lisbon market in
the 1590s, merchants in the rebellious provinces chose to seek independent access to colonial
products. This was made possible in part by the financial and intellectual capital that protestant
refugees brought with them from Antwerp, and in part by the presence in the north of a large
merchant marine that could be outfitted for the long journeys to Asia and the Americas. 23
Already in the 1560s the Florentine traveler Lodovico Guicciardini had noted that Holland
“exists principally upon its fishing and shipping” and counted “more than 800 good large sailing
ships,” along with another “600 other ships and boats which they call fishing busses.” 24 This
fleet gave Holland and Zeeland a dominant position in the herring fisheries and in the bulk trades
in grain and timber with the Baltic. The combination of the relative advantages of southern and
northern Netherlandish industries allowed the Republic to move into the “rich trades” and to
centralize important commercial functions including warehousing, finance, and the exchange of
21 The best general account of the Dutch Republic remains Israel, The Dutch Republic.
22 Jonathan Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). See also Riches
from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817, ed. Johannes Postma and Victor
Enthoven, 1996.
23 Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse Kooplieden en de Opkomst van de Amsterdamse Stapelmarkt, 1578-1630.
24 Lodovico Guicciardini, “Description of the Low Countries,” in The Low Countries in Early Modern Times, ed.
Herbert Harvey Rowen (London: MacMillian, 1972), 10.
8

commercial and geographic information. 25 If, as Simon Schama has shown, the Dutch elite
would become increasingly uneasy with their worldly success, in the first decade of the
seventeenth century they showed every intention “to become as rich as the Spaniards.” 26
Chartered companies played a central role in this process. 27 Already in the early 1590s
companies were organized in Amsterdam, Delft, Enkhuizen, Middelburg, and Rotterdam to trade
in Asian spices. In 1602 the States General brought these companies together to form the
Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (United East India Company, or VOC), a decision
intended to limit competition, strengthen the Republic, and increase pressure on Portuguese
rivals. 28 Discussions to create a company for the West Indies began around the same time, but
were postponed as a condition of the Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain (1609-1621). The WIC
therefore was not established until June of 1621. Fort Nassau, several miles east of the
Portuguese stronghold of Elmina on the Gold Coast, and the settlement at New Netherland on the
Hudson River, both established in the 1610s, were also folded into the new company. 29
Just as the Treaty of Tordesillas had divided the world between East and West, the States
General effectively divided the world between the two chief Dutch companies. However, as
many historians have noted, there were important differences between the VOC and the WIC. 30
25
Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740; Maurice Aymard, ed., Dutch Capital and World Capitalism:
Capitalisme Hollondais et Capitalisme Mondial (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
26
Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (New York:
Knopf, 1987). The quotation is from the French envoy Buzanval, cited in Violet Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam
in the Seventeenth Century, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science LXVII
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950), 26.
27
Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740.
28
On the VOC, see F. S. Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers,
2003).
29
Enthoven, Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817; Simon Hart,
The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company: Amsterdam Notarial Records of the First Dutch Voyages to the
Hudson (Amsterdam: City of Amsterdam Press, 1959); J. K. J. Jonge, De Oorsprong van Neerland’s Bezittingen op
de Kust van Guinea (’s-Gravenhage, 1871).
30
Pieter C. Emmer, “The West India Company, 1621-1791: Dutch or Atlantic?,” in Companies and Trade, ed.
Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1981), 71–95; Henk den Heijer, De
9

Although the VOC frequently used violence to gain access to Asian markets, including attacks
on Portuguese ships—for the defense of which the jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) became
famous—it engaged primarily in trade. 31 Between 1602 and 1795, it was able to generate both
substantial profits and consistent dividends for its shareholders. The WIC, by contrast, was from
the outset designed to serve as an instrument in the war against Spain and to attack Spanish
settlements in the New World. Merchants immediately recognized the enormous risks involved
in this strategy and were slow to invest: it took almost three years to raise an initial capital of
seven million guilders, the same sum the VOC had raised in less than a month. 32 And merchants'
concerns were not without foundation. Despite the seizure of a Spanish treasure fleet by Piet
Heyn (1577-1629) in 1628 and a string of military successes in the late 1630s and early 1640s,
the WIC was chronically beset by financial problems; in 1674 it was finally declared bankrupt
and reorganized. The Second WIC, created the same year, never attempted to replicate the grand
designs of the first company and concentrated instead on the trade in gold and slaves. It was
finally dissolved in 1791. 33
Scholars disagree on the reasons for the WIC's failure. A generation of historians writing
in the late 1950s and early 1960s focused primarily on internal politics. W. J. van Hoboken
argued that, while the WIC proved a valuable military asset, “From an economic point of view it
was, on the contrary, a weak vessel and much under the influence of ancient provincial and
Geoctrooieerde Compagnie: De VOC en de WIC als Voorlopers van de Naamloze Vennootschap (Amsterdam:
Stichting tot Bevordering der Notariële Wetenschap, 2005).
31
Martine Ittersum, Profit and principle: Hugo Grotius, natural rights theories and the rise of Dutch power in the
East Indies, 1595-1615 (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
32
J. G. van Dillen, Van Rijkdom en Regenten: Handboek tot de Economische en Sociale Geschiedenis van
Nederland tijdens de Republiek (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 150. During the first half of the
seventeenth century 10 Dutch gulden— translated throughout the dissertation as "guilders," but in the literature also
commonly referred to as "Florins"—were equal to approximately 60 Flemish pounds or £1 sterling. Ordinary
soldiers in WIC employment received between 10-15 guilders per month in wages. Johan Maurits, Governor
General of Dutch Brazil from 1637-44, received 1,800 guilders per month, plus expenses. A good ship of 300 lasts
could be purchased for 25,000 guilders.
33
Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC.
10

municipal particularism.” Its “rise and decline,” he continued, “were to a large extent determined
by political factors.” 34 Of cardinal importance was the rift between immigrants from the southern
Netherlands and native northerners. The former tended to be strict Calvinists, sympathetic to the
Counter-Remonstrants in the great political and religious schism of the 1610s, monarchists, and
in favor of continuing the war against Spain. The latter, by contrast, favored the Arminian cause,
promoted urban and provincial liberties, and were satisfied to let go of any territorial claim to the
south. As Johan Elias showed long ago, the fall of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1577-1619) and
the triumph of the Counter-Remonstrants in 1619 created a political constellation extremely
favorable to the WIC, and many of the company's early directors were in fact southerners from
Antwerp. 35 However, with the rise of the Libertine party in the late 1620s, and especially the
Holland-born brothers Cornelis (1592-1654) and Andries Bicker (1586-1652), the city of
Amsterdam became hostile to the company. Van Hoboken concludes that the city’s opposition to
rescuing Brazil, which the Bickers continued to view as a project of “Brabanters and Walloons,”
was decisive. 36 Ideology and faction thus bore the greatest responsibility for the company's
collapse.
Van Hoboken's interpretation elicited a swift reaction from the economic historian J. G.
van Dillen, who argued that, although southerners and the Counter-Remonstrant faction played
an important role in the early years, this was hardly the case by the 1630s and 1640s. 37 The main
troubles lay in the company's chronic financial situation, which Cornelis Bicker—who reportedly
sold all his shares in 1629, at the height of the market—foresaw earlier than most. In particular,
34 W. J. van Hoboken, “The Dutch West India Company; the Political Background of Its Rise and Decline,” in
Britain and the Netherlands: Papers Delivered to the Oxford-Netherlands Historical Conference, 1959, ed. J. S.
Bromley and E. H. Kossman (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), 41–61.42.
35 Johan E. Elias, Geschiedenis van het Amsterdamsche Regentenpatriciaat (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff,
1923). See also Jan den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
36 Van Hoboken, “The Dutch West India Company; the Political Background of Its Rise and Decline,” 60.
37 J. G. van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 74
(1961): 145–171.
11

Van Dillen argued that over time the economic interests of Amsterdam and Zeeland began to
drift apart. Zeeland was concerned that an end to hostilities with Spain might lead to the re-
opening of the River Scheldt, and thus competition from Antwerp, and was threatened by the
growing importance of Rotterdam, to which the English Merchant Adventurers had moved in
1636. 38 By contrast, especially after 1640, Amsterdam's merchants had developed a profitable
trade with Portugal and in the Mediterranean that was better served by peace than by war. Van
Dillen pointed out that the “system of apportioning the great companies into regional chambers
[...] worked to protect the smaller trading cities from the magnetic power of Holland, and
especially Amsterdam.” 39 It was therefore in Zeeland's interest to maintain the company and its
monopoly, while Amsterdam’s interests lay in free trade.
At a more general level, Van Dillen rejected as “utopian” what he interpreted as Van
Hoboken's nostalgia for the Dutch colony in Brazil—a nostalgia shared by two of the colony's
greatest historians, the German Hermann Wätjen and the Englishman Charles Boxer. 40 Boxer in
particular argued that the loss of Brazil might have been averted if Amsterdam had shown
greater concern in the late 1640s, for instance by organizing a blockade of Bahia to end
Portuguese support to the revolt. 41 To Van Dillen this was absurd: the company could never have
enforced a monopoly on its main export, sugar, and, despite the considerable efforts of Johan
Maurits van Nassau-Siegen (1604-1679), the charismatic Governor General of Dutch Brazil from
1637-1644, the company could never attract the number of settlers necessary to develop and
38 The Merchant Adventurers first moved from Middelburg to Delft in 1621. On the Merchant Adventurers, see
Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas
Traders, 1550-1653 (London: Verso, 2003).
39 Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek,” 167. “Het systeem van de indeling der
grote compagnieen in regionale Kamers—dat alleen in onze Republiek bestond—werkte al seen bescherming van de
kleinere handelscentra tegende zuigkrachtvan Holland, in ‘t bijzonder van Amsterdam.”
40 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654; Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um Capitulo da
Historia Colonial do Seculo XVII.
41 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 255-258.
12

defend the colony. 42 Economic interests and constraints, in other words, were far more important
than ideology or faction in explaining the company's failure.
More recent studies have echoed these themes, but in line with historiographical trends,
especially in the United States, they have shifted to exploring the company's fate in an Atlantic
context. 43 While this has brought Dutch expansion history into a productive conversation with
the histories of other European powers over the longer period 1500-1800, it has diverted
attention away from the company itself. In a special issue for the Dutch journal Itinerario,
published in 1999, Pieter Emmer and Wim Klooster argued provocatively that there never had
been a Dutch Atlantic. 44 “A real Dutch empire incorporating an integrated set of colonies and
trading forts on both sides of the Ocean,” they wrote, “only existed for a period of fifteen years,
between 1630 and 1645.” Both before and after, Dutch merchants focused on trade, but the
cultural, demographic, commercial, and political impact of Dutch activities was quite limited. In
the face of growing English naval superiority, the Dutch could never impose a coherent Atlantic
system. 45 This interpretation, in turn, has been criticized by Victor Enthoven. Whereas Emmer
and Klooster argued that cooperation between Dutch merchants and other Europeans was
evidence for the absence of a genuinely “Dutch” Atlantic, Enthoven interprets this as evidence
for the ubiquity of Dutch merchants and their influence as middlemen and brokers, especially in
the Caribbean and Virginia. The WIC, which “played no role whatsoever” in the trades in
tobacco and sugar, two of the most important Atlantic commodities, “was never a big player in
42
Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek,” 168-70.
43
For a recent summary review, see Victor Enthoven and Martine Julia van Ittersum, “Review Article: The Mouse
that Roars: Dutch Atlantic History,” Journal of Early Modern History 10, no. 3 (2006): 221-230.
44
Pieter C. Emmer and Wim Klooster, “The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800: Expansion Without Empire,” Itinerario 23
(1999): 48-69.
45
This interpretation may be convincing for the eighteenth century, but it hardly serves to explain the Dutch failure
to build an Atlantic empire in the first half of the seventeenth century, up to and including the Second Anglo-Dutch
war, when the Dutch navy under Cornelis Tromp and Michiel de Ruyter scored numerous important victories over
both England and Spain. C. H. Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (London:
Longmans, 1957).
13

the Western Hemisphere.” 46 Far from explaining the company's collapse, Enthoven treats it as
insignificant.
As a result, over the past half-century very little research has been done on the company,
and Van Dillen's complaint about the “scarce literature over its internal history” remains as true
today as it was when he wrote in the early 1960s. 47 There are a number of excellent studies of
Dutch colonies or trading outposts in New Netherland, the Caribbean, Brazil, and, to a lesser
extent, West Africa, and a single detailed study of one of the company's five chambers,
Groningen. 48 But the debates over company politics and organization have advanced relatively
little. An important exception is the work of Henk den Heijer, who has published both a book-
length history of the WIC and a comparative analysis of the WIC and VOC as forerunners of the
modern limited liability partnership. 49 In the last three years there also have been studies of
individual directors: Janny Venema has written a new biography of Killaen van Rensselaer
(1586-1643), patroon (landholder with manorial rights) of the most successful settlement in New
Netherland; Ben Teensma has produced an elegant edition of a newly discovered manuscript by
the Leiden scholar and director Johannes de Laet (1581-1649); and Jaap Jacobs has written a
short life-sketch of Pieter Stuyvesant (c. 1612-1672), Director General of Curaçao and New
46 Enthoven and Van Ittersum, “Review Article: The Mouse That Roars: Dutch Atlantic History,” 222.
47 Van Dillen, 150.
48 A sample of these studies, organized regionally, includes Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic
and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Van Cleaf Bachman, Peltries or
Plantations: The Economic Policies of the Dutch West India Company in New Netherland, 1623-1639 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); Jaap Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland: A Dutch Settlement in Seventeenth-
Century America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Janny Venema, Beverwijk: A Dutch Village on the
American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Cornelis Christiaan Goslinga,
The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971);
Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um Capitulo da Historia Colonial do Seculo XVII; Boxer, The
Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654; E. van den Boogaart, Hendrik Richard Hoetink, and Peter James Palmer Whitehead,
eds., Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, 1604-1679: A Humanist Prince in Europe and Brazil: Essays on the
Occasion of the Tercentenary of His Death (The Hague: Johan Maurits van Nassau Stichting, 1979); Henk den
Heijer, Goud, Ivoor en Slaven: Scheepvaart en Handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika, 1674-
1740 (Zutphen: Walburg, 1997).K Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika, 1600-1650: Angola, Kongo en São
Tomé (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000).
49 Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC; Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie.
14

Netherland, as the prelude to a full-length biographical treatment. 50 These new works are already
changing the way we think about the WIC, but there is still much work to be done to tie together
the various threads and provide a coherent synthesis.
Except for two now dated works on Willem Usselincx (1567-1647), the early advocate
for creating a Dutch company for the West Indies, almost no research has been done in the field
of intellectual history. 51 Benjamin Schmidt’s excellent study of the relationship between anti-
Spanish narratives and the evolution of Dutch images of the New World is an important
exception. 52 In a subsequent article Schmidt has argued for an alternative approach to Atlantic
history that asks
not if the term and circumstances of an Atlantic system apply, but if they were applied at the
time. Here the issue is not so much whether the Atlantic world of trade and expansion existed, but
whether an idea of the Atlantic existed and how this idea might have articulated a distinctly
Dutch (in this case) sense of Atlantic space. 53
This approach has the virtue of referring back to the categories of the actors themselves: while
Schmidt uses it to explore representations in printing and map-making, it could equally be
applied to the outlook of the company’s board of directors, for whom the Atlantic existed in the
concrete form of the boundaries delineated in the company’s charter. 54 The question is how they
conceived of this space as a commercial and imperial resource, what if any moral dilemmas and
50
Janny Venema, Kiliaen van Rensselaer (1586-1643): Designing a New World (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren,
2010); Johannes De Laet, Suiker, Verfhout & Tabak: Het Braziliaanse Handboek van Johannes de Laet, 1637, ed. B.
N. Teensma (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2009); Jaap Jacobs, Petrus Stuyvesant: Een Levensschets (Amsterdam:
Bakker, 2009).
51
J. Franklin Jameson, Willem Usselinx: Founder of the Dutch and Swedish West India Companies (New York: G.
P. Putnam’s Sons, 1887).; Catharina Ligtenberg, Willem Usselinx (Utrecht: A. Oosthoek, 1914).
52
Benjamin Schmidt, Innocence Abroad: The Dutch Imagination and the New World, 1570-1670 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
53
Benjamin Schmidt, “The Dutch Atlantic: From Provincialism to Globalism,” in Atlantic History: A Critical
Appraisal, ed. Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 164.
54
For thinking about the relationship between agency and historical method, see William H. Sewell Jr., Logics of
history: social theory and social transformation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
15

anxieties it generated, and what plans they made to profitably integrate and govern its various
parts.
A better understanding of these problems will help to inform not only Dutch history, but
also broader debates about the diffusion of ideas and practices within seventeenth century
Europe. Especially important here is England, where Joyce Appleby has taught us that the Dutch
served as a major “source of evidence” for merchants’ analysis of economic problems and where
proposals for a West India Company on the Dutch model were floated repeatedly in Parliament
from the late 1620s to the early 1640s. 55 Jacob Soll’s work on France and Erik Thomson’s on
Sweden show that the Dutch example was influential there too, if somewhat later, as part of what
Istvan Hont has identified as a consistent project by European territorial monarchies to
appropriate and reproduce the advantages of overseas commerce. 56
At the same time, historians have tended to interpret the Dutch as a source for
commercial ideology, without examining the sources on which the Dutch themselves drew. Eco
Haitsma Mulier has shown the powerful influence of Venice on Dutch political thought in the
seventeenth century, as the ideal model for a stable maritime republic. 57 But for establishing and
governing colonies in the New World surely Spanish or Portuguese models would have been
more appropriate, as J. H. Elliot has shown to be the case in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
55 Joyce Oldham Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978); John C. Appleby, “An Association for the West Indies? English Plans for a West India
Company 1621-29,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History XV, no. 3 (May 1987): 213-241; Karen
Ordahl Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993); Ted McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009); Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland’s Glory (London: Harper Press, 2008).
56 Jacob Soll, “Accounting for Government: Holland and the Rise of Political Economy in Seventeenth-Century
Europe,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History XL, no. 2 (Autumn 2009): 215-238; Erik Thomson, “The Dutch
Miracle, Modified: Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Commercial Governance and Imperial War in the Early-
Seventeenth Century,” Gratiana 30 (2009): 107-130; Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and
the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).
57 Eco O. G. Haitsma Mulier, The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the Seventeenth Century, trans.
Gerard T. Moran (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1980).
16

England. 58 In his sweeping history of European colonization, first published in 1770, the abbé
Guillaume-Thomas Raynal observed that the Dutch had taught Spain and Portugal a lesson in the
benefits of industry and commerce:
But the two nations that had subdued the East and West Indies, neglected arts and agriculture.
They imagined everything was to be obtained by gold, without considering that it is labor alone
that procures it: they were convinced, though late, and at their own expense, that the industry
which they lost, was more valuable than the riches they acquired; and the Dutch taught them this
severe instruction. 59
This quotation represents the reforming attitude and supreme confidence of the late eighteenth
century. But two centuries earlier, when Spain and Portugal ruled the seas, might not the Dutch
have learned some lessons from them as well?
Equally important to these questions of inter-imperial learning is to re-evaluate the
political geography of the Dutch Republic itself. With some exceptions, non-Dutch scholars have
tended to read the history of Amsterdam or of Holland as representative of the United Provinces
as a whole. 60 Amsterdam was by far the wealthiest and most populous of Holland's cities, and the
Province of Holland paid slightly more than 58% of the States General’s total budget, so the
emphasis is not unjustified. But other parts of Holland did not always share Amsterdam's views
and other provinces differed dramatically from Holland in language, social structure, and
outlook. The failure to take a wider geographical perspective is particularly problematic in the
case of the WIC, which (compared to the VOC) drew a disproportionate amount of its initial
58 J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006); See also Sophus A. Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political
Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).
59 The quotation is based on the English translation of 1777 as excerpted in Henry C. Clark, Commerce, Culture, &
Liberty: Readings on Capitalism Before Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003), 613. A complete modern
edition in English is Guillaume Thomas Raynal, Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of
the Europeans in the East and West Indies, trans. J. O. Justamond, vol. 1 (New York: Negro Universities Press,
1969).
60 An important exception is Israel, The Dutch Republic.
17

capital from Zeeland in the south and Groningen in the north, and from Arnhem, Deventer, and
other towns along the German border. 61 These towns, for example, provided the bulk of the
noblemen who filled the States General’s armies and were most directly affected by the war. 62
Despite this complicated political geography, Van Dillen, Van Hoboken, and others have
focused largely on the antagonism between Zeeland and Holland, and especially Amsterdam.
There is no question that this antagonism was of cardinal importance, but it tells us little about
the role of the other provinces in providing crucial support to positions taken by Amsterdam and
Zeeland or pushing specific policies of their own. In addition, the discussion thus far has looked
at company politics through the lens of the provinces, rather than the chambers themselves, in
effect denying any agency to either the directors or the company’s board—the two groups legally
charged with the management of the company. Did the Amsterdam chamber, which included
several strong advocates for Brazil, as well as representatives from both Leiden and Haarlem,
share the views of the Amsterdam city council? We simply don't know, and this constrains our
ability to understand company politics.
Even more opaque is the role played by the States General. Several scholars, including
Boxer and Den Heijer, frequently refer to the States General’s role in guiding company politics,
but without indicating either who was involved or whether within circles in The Hague there
developed a particular perspective on West Indian affairs. 63 Henk van Nierop has shown how
some members of Holland's nobility devoted themselves to serving on committees in the States
General, and Paul Knevel has described the evolution of a professional class of lawyers, scribes,
61 Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740.
62 On the military frontier, see Willem Frijhoff and Marijke Spies, 1650: Hard-Won Unity, Dutch Culture in a
European Perspective (Assen: Royal van Gorcum, 2004), 152-155.
63 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654; Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC.
18

and other functionaries who staffed the institutions of government in The Hague. 64 What role did
these individuals play in the company? Van Dillen’s argument about interests is predicated on
the observation that the company’s directors were, with the exception of De Laet, ordinary
“money-grubbing” merchants. 65 But this hardly applies to noblemen and courtiers such as Johan
van Goch (c. 1581-1637), Gerard van Arnhem (1598-1645), and Hendrik van der Capellen (c.
1591-1659) who for at least three decades both represented the States General in the meetings of
the Heren XIX and controlled discussions of the company’s affairs in the States General. It also
fails to take account of the Princes of Orange, Maurits of Nassau (1567-1625) and Frederik
Hendrik (1584-1647), who strongly supported the company, often wrote letters on its behalf, and
played a crucial role mediating compromises between its five chambers. 66 A fresh understanding
of company politics that can address these questions requires looking inside the company.
3. Meetings and the Practice of Politics
How does one look inside a company? The answer has much to do with the survival of sources.
For the VOC the scholar can consult nearly unbroken series of meeting minutes and
correspondence, often in duplicate, for a nearly two hundred-year period from 1602-1796. 67 By
contrast, the papers of the WIC were largely destroyed by fire or sold to rag merchants in the
mid-nineteenth century. 68 What little remains is housed in the company’s own archive and in a
64
H. F. K. van Nierop, Van Ridders tot Regenten: de Hollandse Adel in de Zestiende en de Eerste Helft van de
Zeventiende Eeuw (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1990); Paul Knevel, Het Haagse Bureau: 17-eeuwse
Ambtenaren tussen Staatsbelang en Eigenbelang (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2001).
65
Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek,” 157. Van Dillen uses the term
“geldwolven.”
66
Kees Zandvliet, Maurits: Prins van Oranje (Zwolle: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam en Uitgeverij Waanders, 2000); J.
J. Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, Prins van Oranje: een Biografisch Drieluik (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1978).
67
NA 1.04.02.
68 Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC.
19

number of document series within the archives of the States General at Nationaal Archief in The
Hague. 69 Outside of these collections there are remarkably few private papers, personal
correspondence, or journals and memoires composed by company directors—what Dutch and
German historians refer to as egodocumenten (literally, “ego documents,” or those in which the
author records his or her personal experiences and perspective). 70 This dearth of sources,
especially compared to those for studying other European elites, makes reconstructing directors’
ideology and outlook especially difficult. In a recent edited collection on the Self-Perception of
Early Modern Capitalists, the Dutch economic historian Clé Lesger lamented the fact that,
“Although the city housed a large trading community, early modern Amsterdam's merchants
have left us almost no documents in which they explicitly express their worldview.” Even
apparently promising sources such as the papers of the merchant and regent Cornelis Pietersz.
Hooft (1581-1647), Lesger continues, “are mainly comments on resolutions passed by municipal
or provincial authorities.” 71
The fragmentary and largely bureaucratic nature of these documents has discouraged
many scholars. Nevertheless, a key hypothesis motivating this dissertation is that the
deliberations of municipal and provincial authorities—or, in this case, the WIC's board of
directors, which mirrored their structure—can be more creatively mined than they have been thus
far. The records of these deliberations are especially rich for two reasons: first, meetings played a
69 Individual documents or bundles of documents related to the company can also be found scattered throughout
Dutch city and provincial archives, or abroad. Collections in the United States with holdings of material related to
the WIC include, among others, the New York Public Library, the Huntington Library, the Library of Congress, the
University of Pennsylvania Libraries, and the John Carter Brown Library.
70 Rudolf Dekker, “Egodocumenten tot 1814: Egodocumenten van Noord-Nederlanders van de Zestiende tot Begin
Negentiende Eeuw,” 1993, http://www.egodocument.net/egodocumententot1814.html; Lucia F. Werneck Xavier,
“Het Gebruik van Egodocumenten en Nederlands Brazilië: de Memorie van Kolonel Christoffel Arciszewski,” in
Brazilië in de Nederlandse Archieven, 1624-1654, ed. Marianne L. Wiesebron (Leiden: Research School CNWS,
2008), 130–149.
71 Clé Lesger, “Merchants in Charge: The Self-Perception of Amsterdam Merchants, ca. 1550-1700,” in The Self-
Perception of Early Modern Capitalists, ed. Margaret C. Jacob and Catherine Secretan (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), 75-76.
20

particularly important role within the oligarchic and decentralized political structure of the
United Provinces and, second, meetings offer a largely untapped source for examining the
practical negotiation of policy.
John Kenneth Galbraith is said to have quipped that “meetings are indispensable when
you don't want to do anything,” but in the Dutch Republic they were in fact the heart and soul of
politics. As many historians have pointed out, the Dutch Republic was a meeting society. 72
Following the revolt from Habsburg authority in the 1560s, and several abortive efforts to attract
the protection of another European monarch, the Treaty of Utrecht created a system of
government in which urban and provincial assemblies, represented at the States General, were
largely responsible for decision-making. This system—which built upon, among other things, a
long tradition of locally managing water-works—enhanced the power of urban magistrates in
relation to the remaining elements of the nobility and increased the importance of committees,
boards, and other representative bodies for deliberating on issues of public concern. 73 It gave rise
to what Wilbert van Vree calls “Europe's first meeting class” and, with it, a relatively horizontal
political system in which discussion and consensus, rather than hierarchy and command, played
a central role. 74 It was not simply that the Dutch met often, or that so many people participated in
these meetings, but that meetings were constituitive of political authority to a greater extent than
elsewhere in Europe.
Among Dutch historians, this aspect of political culture is referred to as discussieculture
(discussion culture), a concept that helps to explain both the relatively open and inclusive
72 Wilbert van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization: The Development of Modern Meeting Behaviour
(London: Leicester University Press, 1999); Hank te Velde, Dennis Bos, and Maurits Ebben, eds., Harmonie in
Holland: het Poldermodel van 1500 tot Nu (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008). A recent summary can be found in
Frijhoff and Spies, 1650: Hard-Won Unity.
73 Te Velde, Bos, and Ebben, Harmonie in Holland: het Poldermodel van 1500 tot Nu.
74 Van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization, 107.
21

character of Dutch political institutions and the sometimes slow, even dysfunctional pace of
political decision-making. With power and authority scattered among dozens of city councils,
provincial assemblies, synods, admiralties, and the States General, the state itself was less a
clearly defined locus of sovereignty or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force than it was, in
effect, a system of meetings. 75 As Anne Goldgar has shown, this system created serious
problems when one needed swift resolution to a particular problem: in the wake of the Tulip
Bubble, which popped in 1637, litigants were referred from one assembly to the next, and
sometimes back again, before they were able to find redress for their petitions. 76 In cases relating
to foreign policy or war this could be quite damaging, though, as Guido de Bruin has pointed out,
the deliberative nature of decision-making may have offered important advantages as well:
First, the large number of voting provinces [within the States General] and parts guaranteed a
careful process of decision-making and a consistent line of policy, contrasting favorably with the
politics of the absolute monarchies. Second, the stratified process of decision-making fostered a
large measure of involvement from provincial and local authorities, an unusual interest on the
part of the public and, consequently, a reasonable inclination to cooperate, unlike the monarchies.
Third, the broad base of participation considerably reduced the influence of political corruption. 77
Thus, De Bruin concludes, “the form of government in the Dutch Republic does not deserve the
negative judgment it has received from foreign contemporaries, eighteenth-century reformers,
and nationalist historians.” 78
De Bruin and Van Vree have both shown the extent to which power was exercised not
only in formal assemblies, but in the smaller ad hoc committees to which many issues were
75
The reference is to Max Weber’s well-known definition of the state in his essay “Politics as a Vocation”: “Today,
however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory.” On the variety of state forms in early modern Europe, see Hendrik
Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
76
Anne Goldgar, Tulipmania: Money, Honor, and Knowledge in the Dutch Golden Age (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007).
77
Guido de Bruin, Geheimhouding en Verraad: de Geheimhouding van Staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek,
1600-1750 (’s-Gravenhage: SDU Uitgeverij, 1991), 616.
78
Ibid.
22

eferred during the course of discussion. 79 In contrast to the larger meetings, these committees
were staffed disproportionately by leading regents or noblemen, and by a growing cadre of semi-
permanent functionaries that served the States General and other bodies. 80 The committee
system, which grew in importance during the stadholdership of Frederik Hendrik in the 1630s
and especially the 1640s, helped to streamline decision-making and to preserve secrecy. 81 It also
created opportunities for external influence and manipulation, either by the stadholder and his
affiliates or by specific interest groups. The Province of Holland, for example, was famous for
attempting to force important decisions in the States General into committees it could control, or
into the corridors, offices, or inns where deputies lodged in order to ensure outcomes in its own
favor. 82
These practices highlight the interplay between formal and informal power within
meetings and other deliberative bodies. Just as the Collegio in Venice could take no decision
concerning expenditures of more than 25 ducats, but in practice wielded significant authority by
virtue of its responsibility to clear any legislation to be approved in the Senate, rules binding the
conduct of meetings in the Dutch Republic had important implications for the ways that
decisions were made in practice. 83 In the States of Holland, for instance, the ridderschap (council
of noblemen), which represented the nobility and surrounding countryside, always spoke first,
followed by the city of Dordrecht. The first speaker set the tone for the entire discussion, a fact
rooted in a longer history, before the Revolt, of maintaining consensus as a counterweight to the
79 Ibid.; Van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization.
80 Knevel, Het Haagse bureau.
81 Pieter Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century: Part 1, 1609-1648 (London: Ernest Benn, 1961), 133–
139; Robert Fruin, Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek (’s-Gravenhage,
1901: Martinus Nijhoff, 1901), 179–183; Israel, The Dutch Republic, 542.
82 Quoted in Van Vree, 169.
83 Filippo de Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early Modern Politics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 38.
23

Illustration 2. Vergaderzaal van het Oost-Indisch Huis in 1768. Drawing by Simon Fokke, 1771,
Gemeentearchief, Amsterdam. A meeting of the Heren XVII (Gentlemen Seventeen), the board of
directors of the Dutch East India Company. There is no
similar image for the Heren XIX, the board of directors of the West India Company.
24

influence of Habsburg authority. 84 Similar forms of informal power were associated with seating,
recording resolutions, and chairmanship, which was either fixed or rotated following precise
rules in each of the various provincial and national assemblies.
In this way meetings provide a particularly useful lens on the practice of politics, defined
as the give-and-take of negotiation on specific policies by individuals or groups with divergent
priorities or interests. Although the chambers and boards of directors of the VOC and the WIC
are often mentioned in the literature on discussieculture, an approach that focuses on meetings
has yet to be applied to the history of either company
in any systematic way. In fact, the composition and procedures of the Heren XIX are still poorly
understood and the body is largely invisible in many histories.
There are, of course, important limitations to this approach. Minutes tend to include only
the final resolution of debates that lasted many days or even months, with only very short
sentences indicating when agreement could not be reached and further deliberation was
postponed until a later date. This may have helped to avoid public airing of disputes, and thus to
promote an image of harmony within the elite, but it also makes it difficult if not impossible to
reconstruct the positions taken by individuals or groups, or, in many instances, to grasp precisely
which elements of a proposal were acceptable, and which ones eluded consensus or majority
support. 85 Similarly, while minutes often name the participants and the subject to be discussed in
committee, they provide little or no direct information on decision-making within these smaller
groups, or in the corridors and inns referred to above. Finally, in several assemblies, and
especially the States General, delegates were sworn to express positions negotiated in advance at
the local, chamber, or provincial level, so that the discussion captured in minutes and other
84 Van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization, 143.
85 De Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, 18.
25

ecords must be traced backwards—a process that mirrors the delegates' own frequent trips home
to consult with and receive new instructions from their principals. These and other limitations
make it critically important to embed meeting records within a broader matrix of sources,
including, when available, particuliere notulen (private meeting notes) taken by meeting
participants, letters, memoranda, journals, memoirs, and contemporary printed documents such
as pamphlets and newspapers.
Nevertheless, an approach that focuses on the meeting as a site of analysis offers an
important alternative to traditional methods for analyzing commercial and imperial politics. In
contrast to older institutional studies, it permits analysis of informal authority and face-to-face
interaction, what the sociologist Erving Goffman referred to as the “organization of experience,”
as distinct from the “organization of society.” 86 In Goffman’s work, individuals reach a working
consensus on what they are supposed to do, and sometimes even whom they aspire to be, in
practice. This is constrained by formal rules, but it permits a certain amount of improvisational
performance and reciprocal influence, where the outcome of any given interaction is not
necessarily known at the outset. That much of this interaction is, in effect, routine or even banal
does not detract in any way from its power for exposing issues of social status, self-perception,
method, and (though Goffman would not necessarily have used this term), ideology. Like the
laboratory or the office, the history of the boardroom is in need of a new set of analytical tools. 87
With these tools in hand it becomes possible to identify new debates and to re-examine debates
that already have attracted significant attention, focusing on negotiation and creative compromise
86 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1986), 13. See also Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Revised. (New York: Anchor
Books, 1959).
87 Peter Becker and William Clark, eds., Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and
Bureaucratic Practices (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). See also Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope:
Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
26

ather than the opposition between two fixed positions, one of which must ultimately be deemed
victorious. 88
Analysis at the level of meetings thus also offers an alternative to the Cambridge School
approach. Quentin Skinner, John Pocock, and their many followers have developed a powerful
methodology for understanding texts in the history of political thought as “speech acts,” which
both encapsulate a coherent set of ideas and engage directly and often polemically with a broader
set of texts. 89 By focusing on, but also slowly expanding, the Western canon, their approach has
helped to reconstruct the language and central pre-occupations of early modern European
political discourse. It has proven of only limited use in the United Provinces, however, where
there are relatively few canonical thinkers whose work can be treated in this fashion. Martin van
Gelderen has done so for the early texts of the Dutch Revolt, and Martine van Ittersum has
produced a masterly study that places Grotius’ arguments for the free sea within the context of
his work for the VOC in the first decade of the seventeenth century. 90 Arthur Weststeijn's new
study of Pieter de la Court addresses the intersection of political and economic thought even
more closely. 91 There is, however, no study that approaches the synthesis of David Armitage's
Ideological Origins of the British Empire. 92 It is hard to agree with Henry William Spiegel's
bizarre claim that, despite their flourishing economy, “the Dutch produced no economic thinker
88
On negotiation and compromise in the Dutch context, see John H. Grever, “Louis XIV and the Dutch Assemblies:
The Conflict About the Hague,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 7, no. 2 (May 1982): 235–249.
89
The classic statement is Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and
Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53; See also Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1: The
Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment:
Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
90
Martin van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992); Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle.
91
Arthur Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism in the Dutch Golden Age: The Political Thought of Johan & Pieter
de La Court (Leiden: Brill, 2012). Unfortunately this book appeared too late to be consulted for this dissertation.
92
Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire.
27

of note.” 93 But it is clear that the Dutch Republic did not generate a printed source base akin to
that in England, where merchants and others involved in commercial affairs composed literally
thousands of pamphlets and books during the seventeenth century. Between Grotius at the
beginning of the century and De la Court in the 1660s is a rather large gap—one that, among
other things, overlaps almost exactly with both the height of the Golden Age and the heyday of
the WIC.
To access this important period requires expanding our conception of the text and the
methods we use to examine politics and political ideas. 94 Here meeting minutes are approached
as a sort of collective text, authored by the Heren XIX and the WIC as an institution; within this
text can be read both arguments in favor of specific policies and the ways that mediating figures
and institutions helped to forge political consensus and reach mutually acceptable outcomes.
Rather than highly polished rhetoric, one finds the rough and tumble of practical politics. This is
not the same as writing a collective biography of the company's directors, though one is badly
needed. Instead it uses their active participation in collective decision-making as a resource for
reconstructing the core assumptions that underlay their approach to political, commercial, and
imperial problems. It turns out that a number of prominent writers do appear in Middleburg
including, most importantly, Johannes de Laet. As Anthony Grafton has shown, individuals like
De Laet—whose published works were influential in their own day, but fly somewhat under the
radar of modern scholarship—can prove extremely useful for understanding early modern ideas,
93 Henry William Spiegel, The Growth of Economic Thought, 3rd ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 97.
See also Thomson's comment that "modern scholarship has almost entirely neglected Dutch thought about
commerce in the seventeenth century, at least until Pieter de la Court's Maxims or even Bernard Mandeville."
Thomson, “The Dutch Miracle, Modified. Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Commercial Governance and Imperial
War in the Early-Seventeenth Century,” 109-110.
94 Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller, trans. John Tedeschi and
Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
28

practices, and institutions. 95 By studying the records of the meetings in which these individuals
participated we expand the universe of texts and create an entry point for re-evaluating central
problems in WIC politics, and politics within the Dutch Republic more generally.
4. Preview of the Argument
The dissertation is organized into five substantive chapters, bracketed by this introduction
(Chapter One) and a short conclusion (Chapter Seven). In the main it offers a detailed narrative
and analysis of the meeting of the Heren XIX in Middelburg in the fall of 1645. The even-
numbered chapters follow the meeting closely, moving chronologically from the arrival of news
of the revolt at the end of August (Chapter Two), the selection of a new President and High
Council for Brazil in mid-September (Chapter Four), and finally to the company’s successful
lobbying campaign from the end of October to the end of December (Chapter Six). These
chapters tell the story of how the Heren XIX responded to the crisis in Brazil and how the
company mobilized the States General and other bodies to support a relief fleet to save the
colony. In order to place the proceedings in Middelburg in context, and to provide a deeper
understanding of the board's structure and the issues under discussion in 1645, two chapters
flashback to earlier episodes in the company’s history. Specifically, they explore the negotiations
to create the Heren XIX in the early 1620s (Chapter Three) and the debate over free trade to
Brazil that dominated the late 1630s (Chapter Five). The dissertation thus reaches back to
95 See, for example, Anthony Grafton, Bring Out Your Dead: The Past as Revelation (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001); Anthony Grafton, What Was History?: The Art of History in Early Modern Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Anthony Grafton, Worlds Made by Words: Scholarship and
Community in the Modern West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). Johannes de Laet himself is
discussed in Grafton, Shelford, and Siraisi, New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of
Discovery, 212.
29

formative periods in the company’s history, drawing not only on the minutes from Middelburg,
but also on sets of minutes from 1623-24 and 1638, two other periods for which relatively
complete, detailed sets of minutes for the Heren XIX still remain. 96
Chapter Two introduces the main characters and themes in the dissertation by tracing the
circulation of news and information about the revolt; it is largely narrative, rather than analytic.
The chapter recounts how intelligence was gathered in the colony, transmitted to the United
Provinces, and interpreted and disseminated by the company's directors. The news arrived in
Middelburg ten days before the meeting of the Heren XIX began. Delegations were dispatched
almost immediately to the company's other chambers and to the Prince of Orange and the States
General in The Hague. In parallel with this secret, essentially proprietary network for sharing
information, the news also spread to editors of the two most important newspapers in
Amsterdam. The interplay between private and public spheres, and between The Hague as a
political center and Amsterdam as a center for the exchange of commercial information,
underscores the diversity of channels through which information flowed in the Dutch Republic
and the challenge for the Heren XIX, whose task it became to shape perceptions of what had
taken place in Brazil and to quickly build a coherent case for public support to crush the revolt.
Here the chapter looks specifically at the role played by De Laet. Known for his
sumptuously illustrated geography of the New World, published in several editions and
languages between 1625-1640, and for his debate with Grotius over the origins of the Native
Americans, De Laet has often been treated as a bookish scholar whose main contributions to the
96 These are NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 1, Notulen van de vergadering van de Heren XIX, 24 Juli 1623-24 December
1624 and NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6, no. 10, Notulen van de vergadering van de Staten-Generaal met de Heren
XIX over de vrije handel in Brazilie. Excerpts and incomplete sets of minutes for the Heren XIX can be found
scattered throughout NA 1.05.01.01 and NA 1.01.04, as well as in NA 1.01.05, NA 1.01.07, and NA 1.10.69.
30

WIC were his geographical and historical publications. 97 Building on recent work by Dutch
scholars, and on dozens of sources scattered throughout the archives of the WIC, the City of
Leiden, provincial assemblies, and the States General, the chapter shows De Laet’s deep
involvement in the everyday management of the company and his more specific role shaping the
company’s message in the fall of 1645. The circulation of news from Brazil is thus used to probe
the relationship between knowledge and power within the Dutch Republic.
Chapter Three provides a new explanation for the origins and byzantine structure of the
Heren XIX. Looking back to the company’s formation in the early 1620s, it asks what the board
was designed to do and precisely who was to be represented at its meetings. Most scholars have
assumed that the domestic organization of the WIC mirrored that of the VOC, and that
differences in their respective histories can be attributed primarily to differences in the goods
they traded or the political and economic spheres in which they worked. 98 This assumption is
flawed in several important respects. By examining multiple annotated versions of the WIC’s
charter drafted between 1606 and 1620, along with negotiations within provincial assemblies, the
States General, and the Amsterdam city council, the chapter shows how an initial draft modeled
on the VOC charter was subsequently revised to make the company suitable, in the eyes of its
founders, for Atlantic conquest. In particular, the chapter explores decisions to make the States
General a partial owner of the company and for it to play an active role in company
management—both innovations that diverged sharply from the VOC. While the language in the
final charter closely resembles that of its older sibling, several important clauses served to
97 Joan-Pau Rubiés, “Hugo Grotius’s Dissertation on the Origin of the American Peoples and the Use of
Comparative Methods,” Journal of the History of Ideas 52, no. 2 (June 1991): 221-244; Benjamin Schmidt, “Space,
Time, Travel: Hugo de Groot, Johannes de Laet, and the ‘Advancement’ of Geographic Learning,” LIAS: The
Journal of Early Modern History of Ideas 25 (1998): 177-199; Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s
Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
98 See, for example, Emmer, “The West India Company, 1621-1791: Dutch or Atlantic?”
31

enhance the role of central authority and to encourage aristocratic participation in the new
company.
This finding helps to resuscitate the reputation of Willem Usselincx. Paradoxically,
historians have focused on Usselincx's ideas as the driving force behind the WIC, while
simultaneously assuming that he had little or no influence on its final form. 99 The chapter
highlights his idea for a Raedt van Indie (Council of the Indies), modeled on the Spanish Real y
Supremo Consejo de Indias, and shows how the principle of aristocratic involvement in matters
of war and colonial administration were incorporated into the charter during the final rounds of
negotiation. By examining the first several meetings of the Heren XIX in 1623-1624, the chapter
shows how the company's new board of directors functioned in practice, how it served to
integrate diverse regional interests within the Dutch Republic, and the important symbolic and
political role played by noblemen and magistrates representing the States General.
Chapter Four digs more deeply into the terms of cooperation between noblemen and
merchants. Returning to the meeting in Middelburg in 1645, it offers the first detailed account of
the secretive process for selecting a new President and High Council to govern Dutch Brazil.
Even before news of the revolt arrived in Middelburg this had been the most important item on
the agenda and a source of considerable tension between the company's five chambers. In early
1643 the Heren XIX had decided to recall the colony's highly successful, but rather expensive
Governor General, Johan Maurits, nephew of the Prince of Orange. This led the company to
redesign the colonial administration and opened a process to identify individuals with the
balance of skills necessary to manage the colony. Using rare secret minutes from the negotiations
in Middelburg, along with the diary and memoire of two individuals who were candidates, the
99 Van Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, vol. 2; Den
Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie; Den Heijer, “The Twelve Years’ Truce and the Founding of the Dutch West
India Company,” De Halve Maen 80, no. 4 (2007): 67–70.
32

chapter examines the way that voting was conducted and reveals the rituals employed by the
Heren XIX to ensure loyalty and secrecy. 100 Consistent with recent scholarship on the nobility in
Holland, but contrary to commonly held assumptions among historians working in English, this
episode highlights the central role of noblemen in managing Dutch overseas expansion and
exposes deepening divisions in the 1640s between noblemen and merchants—divisions that
would delay the selection of the new Council at a critical moment for the Dutch colony in Brazil.
Chapter Five offers a new interpretation of the well-known debates over free trade to
Brazil and Angola that erupted during the 1630s and 1640s. These debates have traditionally
been explained as the result of divergent interests between Amsterdam, where merchants saw
greater profits in free trade, and Zeeland, where both merchants and magistrates saw
enforcement of the WIC monopoly as the best means to protect their share in colonial markets,
where Amsterdam would otherwise have enjoyed considerable advantages. 101 More recently,
Weststeijn has argued that the debate was an important source for Enlightenment ideas on free
trade. 102 By reconstructing the course of the negotiations, rather than relying on printed sources,
and by connecting the debate over free trade to Brazil to the subsequent debate over free trade to
Angola, the chapter shows how disputes over free trade were actually motivated by issues of
colonial finance, and in particular, how the Heren XIX and the States General used trade policy
to address the mounting challenges of populating and defending Dutch Brazil.
Crucially, the chapter demonstrates that the decision to re-open the trade to Brazil in
April 1638 was predicated on formally recognizing the WIC’s monopoly on the trade in slaves, a
100 David Baute, Cort Relaas sedert den Jare 1609: de Avonturen van een Zeeuws Koopman in Spanje tijdens de
Tachtigjarige Oorlog (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000); S. P. L’Honoré Naber, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid
van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilie (1645-1654),” Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap
(1925): 126-163.
101 Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek.”
102 Arthur Weststeijn, “Dutch Brazil and the Making of Free Trade Ideology,” 2011. Cited with permission of the
author.
33

trade in which the company had only very recently become involved. 103 The Heren XIX and the
States General were ultimately swayed not by pressure from Amsterdam, but by Johan Maurits'
argument that opening trade to Brazil was the only way to attract free settlers, and by a final
compromise that addressed Zeeland’s concerns over company finance by injecting additional
private capital and ensuring a steady flow of income from the slave trade. In this way Dutch
entry into the trade in slaves was not only a response to labor shortages in Brazil: it was a
deliberate effort to offset the rising costs of New World conquest. The subsequent debate over
free trade to Angola in the early 1640s came increasingly to focus on profits, effectively de-
linking the issue of slavery from concerns about Brazil—a shift that took concrete form when the
revolt halted the trade in slaves to Pernambuco and the company began to explore other markets
in São Tomé and the Caribbean. The chapter thus demonstrates important links between the
debates over free trade and slavery.
Chapter Six returns to the meeting in Middelburg and to the company's campaign to
secure military and financial assistance from the States General in the winter of 1645. It focuses
on two separate efforts to convince officials by establishing the company's value to the state. The
first of these, an internal memorandum drafted in the summer of 1645 by the Amsterdam director
Jacques Specx (1585-1652), drew together the company's diverse streams of income and
expenses from all its conquest areas to provide a calculation of the company's anticipated annual
profits. 104 The second, De Laet’s Historie ofte Iaerlyck Verhael van de Geoctroyeerde
Westindische Compagnie (History or Annual Account of the Chartered West India Company),
103 Ernst van den Boogaart and Pieter C. Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,”
in The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, ed. Henry A. Gemery and
Jan S. Hogendorn (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 353–375; W. S. Unger, “Essay on the History of the Dutch
Slave Trade,” in Dutch Authors on West Indian History: a Historiographical Selection, ed. M. A. P Meilink-
Roelofsz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 42–98; Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From
the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800 (London: Verso, 1997).
104 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fols. 115-120.
34

was published in Leiden in November 1644. 105 In a short section at the end of the book, De Laet
offered almost thirty pages of calculations to establish the total monetary value of the damage the
company had done to the Republic’s greatest rival, the King of Spain. By closely examining
these two documents, and placing them within the context of the company’s lobbying campaign,
the chapter exposes competing theories of value and shows the growing importance of
quantitative analysis in mercantile rhetoric. Against the backdrop of the Tulip Bubble in 1637, it
also shows the interaction between fact and fantasy in arguments over colonial finance. At the
end of December, and thanks in part to De Laet and Specx’s efforts, the States General approved
funding for a relief fleet to sail to Brazil.
A brief conclusion draws these threads together to re-evaluate explanations for the
eventual failure of the company and its most important colony. As an alternative to the theory
that the company was torn apart by the divergent interests of Amsterdam and Zeeland, it suggests
that tensions between merchants and noblemen—already visible in the early 1610s—grew during
the 1640s. Noblemen bridled at the prospect of working “in the service of merchants” and
merchants, especially in Holland, opposed ceding power either to noblemen or to the States
General. Efforts to centralize control over the company and its colonies, coincident with Frederik
Hendrik's efforts to centralize foreign policy more generally, were ultimately unsuccessful. 106
This proved decisive in the period 1644-45, when Brazil lost an able administrator and was left
without senior leadership to prevent or at least stem the Portuguese revolt. Amsterdam's
merchant elite did indeed thwart efforts to save Dutch Brazil, but this only followed a more
fundamental failure to align social and political interests in favor of what was in fact a broadly
popular imperial effort.
105 Johannes de Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael‚ 4 vols. (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931-1937).
106 Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 121-150; Israel, The Dutch Republic, 537-546.
35

5. A Note on Sources
This dissertation draws on a wealth of either new or little-studied archival material in Dutch,
English, and American libraries and archives. It has been indicated already that many sources for
reconstructing the history of the WIC were destroyed in the nineteenth century. 107 The most
important remaining documents are to be found in the company's archive in The Hague, many of
them preserved from the collection of the Zeeland chamber. These include, most significantly,
minutes from the meetings of the Heren XIX (1623-24); an incomplete series of the board’s
ordinary and secret correspondence (1629-57); a nearly complete series of correspondence,
reports, ship registers, and other documents sent from Brazil (1630-54); complete resolutions of
the High Council in Recife (1635-54); a complete set of resolution of the Zeeland chamber of the
company (1626-74); two years of resolutions of the Amsterdam chamber (1635-36); the register
of shares purchased in the Amsterdam chamber (1623-26) and supplementary capital invested in
Zeeland (1636-37); and diverse letters, reports, maps, and other documents relating to the
Caribbean, the Wild Coast, Guinea, Angola, and New Netherland. 108
The primary manuscript on which this study is based is not from the company's archive,
however, but from the archives of the States General. 109 It is an untitled set of ordinary minutes
from the meeting of the Heren XIX in Middelburg, Zeeland from September 9 to October 16,
107 An important new guide to documents in Dutch archives and libraries pertaining to the history of Brazil—and
thus to WIC history more generally—has emerged as part of the "Mauritiana" project jointly funded by the Brazilian
and Dutch governments. See Marianne L. Wiesebron, Brazilie in de Nederlandse Archieven (1624-1654): Inleiding
op de Nederlanden in de Zeventiende Eeuw en de Collecties in Nederlandse Archieven en Bibliotheken, 3 vols.
(Leiden: Research School CNWS, 2004-2008).
108 NA 1.05.01.01, Oude Westindische Compagnie, 1621-1674.
109 Theo Thomassen, “Instrumenten van de Macht: de Staten-Generaal en hun Archieven, 1576-1796” (Academisch
Proefschrift, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2009). Unfortunately this work was brought to my attention too late to
incorporate its findings into this dissertation.
36

Illustration 3. Resolutien van de Vergadering van de Heren XIX te
Middelburg, 9 September-16 Oktober, 1645. Nationaal Archief 1.01.07,
inv.nr. 12564.17, fols. 1-53. The front page of the minutes of the meeting
of the Heren XIX in Middelburg in the fall of 1645, showing the names of
the delegates from each chamber and the States General.
37

1645. 110 The manuscript is found in the loketkas, a series of special dossiers kept by the States
General on negotiations in which they were actively involved. 111 The manuscript is in at least
three hands and almost certainly was copied shortly after the meeting ended from an original set
of minutes kept by one or more company scribes. A note on the top left corner of the first page
indicates that the manuscript was “handed over [to the States General] on 28 October.” The
minutes include a complete list of participants at the meeting, an account of the resolutions
taken, the letters that were read, and dozens of draft calculations, lists, and instructions. It runs to
53 folio pages, front and back, in tight gothic script. Preserved in the same series of the loketkas
are the “Secret minutes of the delegates of the West India Company to the meeting of the Heren
XIX,” a separate document in a single hand, running to 16 folio pages, that was also given over to
the States General on October 28. 112 There are no original signatures or other notations on either
document.
This dissertation draws off a number of other series within the archive of the States
General. The States General maintained bundles, at one time bound with string, of letters and
other documents they received concerning company affairs, along with shorthand drafts of
resolutions or correspondence issued by the States General itself. These are called the liassen and
are organized in rough chronological order, beginning in 1624 and continuing until the end of the
second company in 1791. 113 Though often extremely difficult to decipher, these documents
110 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, no. 20, fols. 1-53. Resolutien van de vergadering van de Heren XIX te Middelburg,
9 September-16 Oktober, 1645.
111 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17. In addition to the ordinary and secret minutes, this dossier includes 24 other
manuscripts, mostly extracts from resolutions in the Heren XIX or the States General, the earliest dated November 7,
1643 and the latest November 8, 1645. All of these relate directly to the company's efforts to select members for the
new High Council to replace Johan Maurits, who was recalled from Brazil in early 1643. Extensive use of these
materials is made in chapter four of this study.
112 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, no. 23, Secrete Resolutien by de Gecommitteerde ter verganderinge der XIX voor.
ho. mo. heren Staten Generael.
113 NA 1.01.04, inv.nrs. 5751-5815, Ingekomen ordinaris brieven en stukken betreffende West-Indische zaken, 1623-
1795.
38

provide the most complete record available of the WIC's history. Among many other documents,
they include invitations and agendas for the meetings of the Heren XIX, copies of all major
documents submitted to the States General either during the course of, or immediately following,
the meetings, and petitions submitted by private individuals, city and provincial officials,
merchants, and foreign diplomats. These sources can be supplemented, or in some cases
corroborated, by resolutions of the committee on WIC affairs at the States General, recorded in
detail in a thick and well-indexed book from the beginning of 1638. 114 If the dissertation is
biased towards the political concerns of the States General, as opposed to those of merchants’ in
the individual chambers, it is partially an artifact of the extensive use that has been made of these
two sources.
In addition, the dissertation draws on manuscript resolutions from the Amsterdam city
council and the States General and printed resolutions from the States of Holland and Zeeland. In
the case of Holland, the formal resolutions can be read against the private notes of Nicholas
Stellingwerf (1592-1667), Pensionaris (Pensionary) of Medemblik, one of the eighteen cities
represented in the States of Holland. For more than forty years, from 1622-1666, Stellingwerf
kept meticulous, nearly verbatim notes on the proceedings, including the names of speakers and
the positions taken by the various representatives. His notes, along with those of a contemporary,
Sijbrant Schot (1592-1658), who served as Pensionaris of Purmerend from 1620-1627, are a
spectacular and largely untapped source for WIC history. They have now been published for the
114 NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, Westindische Zaken 1638 tot 1651.
39

period 1620-1636. 115 For the remaining years one must patiently decipher the cramped script of
Stellingwerf’s original notebooks preserved in the Westfries Archief in Hoorn, North Holland. 116
These resolutions have in turn been supplemented by printed primary sources and by
correspondence, reports, memoranda, calculations, notes, journals, and other documents found in
library special collections and municipal and national archives in Amsterdam, Dordrecht,
Groningen, Haarlem, Hoorn, Leiden, London, Middelburg, New York, Utrecht, and Washington,
DC.
115 N. Stellingwerff and S. Schot, Particuliere Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland, 1620-1640,
ed. J. W. Veenendaal-Barth (’s-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1992).
116 Westfries Archive, 0715, Oud archief stad Medemblik, aantekeningen door gedeputeerden van Medemblik in de
vergaderingen van de Staten van Holland.
40

Chapter Two
News from Brazil: The Political Geography of Information
1. Introduction
Bad news travels fast, as the old English proverb says, and for the WIC the ocean was no
impediment. On August 30, 1645, three Dutch ships—the Walcheren, Roode Hart, and Grote
Gerrit—arrived at the port of Middelburg carrying letters from the Hoge Raad (High Council) in
Recife, capital of Dutch Brazil. 1 That morning the directors of the Zeeland chamber were busily
making plans to outfit a ship to trade for slaves in Guinea and Angola and putting the finishing
touches on the agenda for the meeting of the Heren XIX, scheduled to begin the following week.
In the midst of these activities, a page informed them that ships had arrived from Brazil and
handed over a hefty bundle of letters, reports, inventories, and other documents. 2 These told a
most unfortunate tale: in early June, and under the pretence of a wedding ceremony, a number of
leading Portuguese planters had plotted to murder nearly the entire staff of the Dutch colonial
government. The plot itself had been foiled, but the conspirators had successfully retreated into
the vast scrublands beyond Dutch control. There they joined up with as many as five thousand
black, Indian, and Portuguese soldiers who had marched, undetected, from the Portuguese capital
1 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, entry for August 30, 1645, fol. 106v.
2 The originals of these documents can be found in NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 60, Overgekomen Brieven ende Papieren
uit Brazilie, 1644-1646, fol. 74. My account of the morning's discussion in the Zeeland chamber is drawn from NA
1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, entry for August 30, 1645, fol. 106v.
41

at São Salvador da Bahia de Todos os Santos, further down the coast. Suspicions that the
Portuguese Governor in Bahia was supporting the rebels only added to the potential danger. 3
Bad as this news was, it did not come as a complete surprise. Johan Maurits, who until
May 1644 was Governor General of Dutch Brazil, had warned on his departure that maintaining
civil order would require great care to balance the interests of the colony’s three groups—the
military, the merchants, and the citizens, both Portuguese and Dutch—and ample arrangements
for military defense. 4 He had recommended in the strongest possible terms that the existing
garrisons be paid on time, provisions for religious toleration be maintained, and care taken not to
exert excessive pressure on Portuguese planters who had become deeply indebted to the
company. But with Maurits gone, and funds in short supply, the council and the company had
largely ignored these recommendations: troops were given license to return home, payments fell
behind, and public worship by Catholics was strictly curtailed. By October of 1644 there were
rumors in Brazil of a revolt; by February these rumors were serious enough that the Council
asked the company, as a precaution, to send additional men and munitions. 5
When the news of the revolt reached the United Provinces it created a sensation, not only
in the taverns and coffeehouses where Brazil had for a generation been a staple of public debate,
but also in the halls of government. 6 In Amsterdam, Middelburg, The Hague, and elsewhere,
3 The classic account of the "War of Divine Liberty" is contained in Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 159-
203. See also Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: um Capitulo da Historia Colonial do Seculo XVII,
222-286.
4 On his departure Maurits' left behind a lengthy set of instructions for the remaining members of the Hoge ende
Secrete Raed. This document, often referred to as Maurits' "Political Testament," though he never gave it that label,
was transcribed by Casper Barlaeus in his official history of Maurits' tenure in Brazil, Rervm per Octennivm in
Brasilia, published in 1647. The standard modern edition is L’Honoré Naber, Nederlandsch Brazilië Onder Het
Bewind Van Johan Maurits Grave Van Nassau, 1637-1644 (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1923). There is now
an English translation, Caspar van Baerle, The History of Brazil Under the Governorship of Count Johan Maurits of
Nassau, 1636-1644, trans. Blanche T. Ebeling Koning (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011). On the
balancing the three groups, see Ebeling, 279.
5 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 176.
6 On the popular recneption of news about Dutch Brazil two decades earlier, see Michiel van Groesen's article on
news of the Dutch seizure of São Salvador da Bahia in 1624, “A Week to Remember: Dutch Publishers and the
42

Illustration 4. “Count Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen.” Engraving in Casper
Barlaeus, Rervm per Octennivm in Brasilia (Amsterdam, Joannis Blaev, 1647).
Maurits was Governor General of Dutch Brazil from 1637-1644.
Competition for News from Brazil, 26 August-2 September 1624,” Quarendo 40 (2010): 26-49. On Brazil in
pamphlets and popular culture, see Clazina Dingemanse and Marijke Meijer Drees, “‘Praatjes’ over de WIC en
Brazilië : Literaire Aspecten van Gesprekspamfletten uit 1649,” De Zeeventiende Eeuw 21 (2005): 112–127; Henk
den Heijer, “Het Recht van de Sterkste in de Polder: Politieke en Economische Strijd tussen Amsterdam en Zeeland
over de Kwestie Brazilie, 1630-1654,” in Harmonie in Holland: Het Poldermodel van 1500 tot Nu, ed. Dennis Bos,
Maurits Ebben, and Hank te Velde (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008), 72–92.
43

the revolt pushed the colony’s fate to the top of the political agenda and stimulated an intense
period of negotiations to determine an appropriate response. At the center of these negotiations
was the Heren XIX, the body responsible both for the colony and for the company’s relationship
with the States General. This chapter examines how the Heren XIX collected, interpreted, and
represented information about the revolt. It seeks to understand what happened in Brazil and to
reconstruct how news from the periphery impacted politics at the center, using the circulation of
information to delineate the corridors of power through which that information passed. In this
way the chapter clearly defines the most important issue the Heren XIX had to confront during
their fall meeting in Middelburg. It is largely narrative, rather than analytic, an approach that is
intended to introduce some of the key individuals and institutions involved in colonial politics in
the Dutch Republic.
The Republic’s extensive trade networks and its largely urban, literate population made
for a lively news culture. 7 In assessing this culture, scholars have largely focused on Amsterdam,
“cradle of the modern periodical press.” 8 Although news had long circulated in manuscript form,
and the first printed newssheets appeared in Germany, it was in Amsterdam during the early
years of the Thirty Years’ War that the collection, editing, and printing of weekly newspapers
became professionalized. By 1640, the city boasted ten different newspapers, published not only
in Dutch but also in English and French. 9 These newspapers collected political and commercial
7 See Folke Dahl, “Amsterdam Earliest Newspaper Centre of Western Europe: New Contributions to the History of
the First Dutch and French Corantos,” Het Boek XXV, no. 3 (1939): 161–198; Woodruff D. Smith, “The Function of
Commercial Centers in the Modernization of European Capitalism: Amsterdam as an Information Exchange in the
Seventeenth Century,” The Journal of Economic History 44, no. 4 (December 1984): 985–1005; Frijhoff and Spies,
1650: Hard-Won Unity; Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2000).; Marika Keblusek, Boeken in de Hofstad: Haagse Boekcultuur in de Gouden Eeuw (Hilversum:
Verloren, 1997).
8 Clé Lesger, Handel in Amsterdam ten Tijde van de Opstand: Kooplieden, Commerciële Expansie en Verandering
in de Ruimtelijke Economie van de Nederlanden, ca. 1550-ca. 1630 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001), 223.
9 Folke Dahl, “Amsterdam Earliest Newspaper Centre of Western Europe: New Contributions to the History of the
First Dutch and French Corantos,” 186–195.
44

news from around the world and furnished this news to readers throughout northern Europe.
Amsterdam also was a center for other ephemera, especially pamphlets, and for the publication
of scholarly books, nautical manuals, maps, atlases, accounting guides, and price currents. 10
Even those merchants who did little or no business in Amsterdam were obliged to maintain a
representative there, just to stay on top of the news. As Woodruff Smith and, following him, Clé
Lesger, have argued, Amsterdam's role as an “information exchange” both contributed to and
helped to reinforce the Dutch Republic's hegemonic position in international commerce. News
and economic power were closely intertwined. 11
As this chapter will show, however, news traveled along other roads than just those that
led to Amsterdam. News of the revolt arrived first in Middelburg, an important commercial city
in its own right and the host, at least in 1645, of the meetings the Heren XIX. Like the board of
the VOC, the Heren XIX met on a rotating schedule for six years in Amsterdam and then two in
Middelburg, a system intentionally designed to reduce Amsterdam's dominance within the new
monopoly companies. 12 And once in the company’s hands, the news was sent first to The Hague,
the political center of the Dutch Republic and the seat of both the States of Holland and the
States General, and to the Prince of Orange, Frederik Hendrik, who at this time was encamped in
northern Flanders. 13 Only then was it sent to Amsterdam. Highly sensitive in nature, the news
also was not immediately set into print. Within a matter of days the two most important
10
Smith, “The Function of Commercial Centers in the Modernization of European Capitalism: Amsterdam as an
Information Exchange in the Seventeenth Century”; Burke, A social history of knowledge.
11
Smith, “The Function of Commercial Centers in the Modernization of European Capitalism: Amsterdam as an
Information Exchange in the Seventeenth Century”; Clé Lesger, “The Printing Press and the Rise of the Amsterdam
Information Exchange Around 1600”, n.d. See also Clé Lesger, Handel in Amsterdam ten Tijde van de Opstand:
Kooplieden, Commerciële Expansie en Verandering in de Ruimtelijke Economie van de Nederlanden, ca. 1550-ca.
1630 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2001).
12
Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC; Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie; Gaastra, The Dutch East
India Company.
13
Zeeuwsarchief 2.1, inv.nr. 951, Staten van Zeeland, Ingekomen Stukken, letter from Frederik Hendrik to the States
of Zeeland, September 20, 1645. On Frederk Hendrik, see Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, Prins van Oranje.
45

Amsterdam newspapers did publish stories about the revolt, but their accounts lacked crucial
details and, in at least one case, badly distorted the nature and significance of what had taken
place. By focusing on Amsterdam, and on printed texts, scholars have largely studied the re-
circulation of news, instead of tracing the specific contexts in which news was initially received
and put to use.
The chapter that follows addresses this challenge through three distinct lenses. The first
section joins the directors of the Middelburg chamber in examining the letters from Recife and
places these manuscript sources within a matrix of other sources on the revolt, both printed and
oral. 14 The next section looks at decision-making and planning within the Heren XIX. Through a
close analysis of the board’s deliberations, it demonstrates the ways the company assessed the
news and how its directors tailored multiple messages to suit different audiences within the
Republic. The final section hones in on a single participant in these deliberations, Johannes de
Laet. Building on the work of Jacob Soll, the chapter argues that De Laet played the crucial role
of “information master” within the WIC and that he was instrumental in building a coalition to
relieve the colony in Brazil. 15 As in France and elsewhere in early modern Europe, the collection
of information translated into power and authority, but in the Dutch Republic that authority was
predicated on close cooperation between a company, led by its board, and at least a half-dozen
other institutions and assemblies that together constituted the Dutch state. 16
14 Harold Love, The Culture and Commerce of Texts: Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
15 Jacob Soll, “From Note-Taking to Data Banks: Personal and Institutional Information Management in Early
Modern Europe,” Intellectual History Review 20, no. 3 (2010): 355–375.
16 Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2009); Paul Slack, “Government and Information in Seventeenth-Century England,”
Past & Present 184 (August 2004): 33-68; Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice; Markus Friedrich,
“Government and Infromation-Management in Early Modern Europe: The Case of the Society of Jesus (1540-
1773),” Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008): 539-563; See also Ann Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing
Scholarly Information Before the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
46

2. The Revolt in Brazil and the Circulation of News
News from Brazil reached the United Provinces through many different channels. Although it
was strictly forbidden, sailors, soldiers, and functionaries in the company's employment sent
home private correspondence that described the country, its people, and—most damaging from
the company's perspective—the problems and injustices of colonial administration. 17 In addition,
each year after 1630, when the Dutch seized Recife and Olinda in Pernambuco, several hundred
people traveled back and forth to the colony on both company and private ships. Many of them
came from areas outside the Netherlands—especially the German states, England, and
Scotland—but they normally passed through the coastal cities of Holland and Zeeland on their
way home. 18 There they shared what they had seen and heard, either with family members or in
public spaces such as the taverns and barges that served as the setting for several pamphlets that
discussed recent events in Brazil. 19 Important also would have been the letters seized from
Iberian ships and set into print, the correspondence of private merchants, and letters exchanged
between members of the large Sephardic community in Amsterdam and their contacts in Lisbon
and other Portuguese cities. 20
Nevertheless, the most detailed single source of information on Brazil, at least for those
who were permitted to see it, was the generale missiven (general letters) sent several times each
17 Regulations were contained in the company's Articulbrief beraemt over het scheeps- ende crijgsvolck, ten dienst
van de Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie in Brasyl ende Guinea.
18 Bruno Miranda, “The Military Daily Life in New Holland (1630-1654): The Life’s Conditions of Soldiers of the
West India Company” (Academisch Proefschrift, Universiteit Leiden, 2011).
19 Dingemanse and Drees, “‘Praatjes’ over de WIC en Brazilië : Literaire Aspecten van Gesprekspamfletten uit
1649”; Den Heijer, “Het Recht van de Sterkste in de Polder: Politieke en Economische Strijd tussen Amsterdam en
Zeeland over de Kwestie Brazilie, 1630-1654.”
20 Miriam Bodian, Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation: Conversos and Community in Early Modern Amsterdam
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997); Daniel M. Swetschinski, Reluctant Cosmopolitans: The
Portuguese Jews of Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam (Portland: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2000).
47

year by the Hoge ende Secrete Raad (High and Secret Council) in Recife. 21 The generale
missiven consisted of a single letter over the signatures of all four councilors, with references in
the text to a number of supporting documents that were enclosed and lettered alphabetically.
These supporting documents ranged in substance from reports on diplomatic or military missions
to memoranda on the state of finances and inventories of medical or military supplies; they also
included transcriptions of the daily minutes of the council and copies of important
correspondence. All of these documents were listed in order on a register, as were letters
addressed to the individual chambers of the company or to the Heren XIX by subordinate
councils responsible for finance, justice, and other matters. Separate from these, and given a
register of their own, were documents that listed the names of the dead, soldiers licensed to
return to the Netherlands, slaves delivered to Brazil, and the more prosaic receipts and
inventories that accompanied the loading and unloading of goods from warehouses and ships.
Much like the annual letters of the Jesuits, the generale missiven were organized into a hierarchy
of documents that could easily be sorted and delegated to the appropriate officials at home. 22
There were important ways in which it might be in the council’s interest to misrepresent
information, and on any given topic private correspondence might have offered information of
which the council was unaware, but the generale missiven was still the most complete, synthetic
available portrait of affairs in the colony, and thus served as the basis on which the company's
directors formulated official policy towards Brazil.
21 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654; Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um Capitulo da
Historia Colonial do Seculo XVII. These letters mimicked the format of similar letters sent annually from Batavia by
servants of the VOC. Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company.
22 Friedrich, “Government and Information-Management in Early Modern Europe: The Case of the Society of Jesus
(1540-1773),” 547.
48

The generaal missive that arrived in Middelburg on August 30, 1645 was dated June 27
of the same year. 23 The latest date on the 21 supporting documents was July 2, so we can safely
assume that the Walcheren, Roode Hart, and Grote Gerrit sailed shortly thereafter; the journey
across the Atlantic took almost sixty days. This compares quite favorably with the journey to
Batavia in the East, which could take anywhere between nine and twelve months, but it was still
a considerable length of time. 24 As news, the content of the documents was fresh, but by the time
the directors began reading them they were well aware that the events had taken place months
before, and that whatever measures were agreed in response would take a further two months to
return to Brazil.
We can see the order in which the documents were read from the minutes of the Zeeland
chamber and from annotations made at the top of each document. 25 First read was the cover letter
and the separate secret report and minutes of the council. Whereas the first did little more than
relate basic information on the arrival and departure of ships, the council’s secret letter and
minutes painted an ominous picture of the events that had transpired over the previous months. 26
The letter began by reminding the company's directors that intercepted correspondence from
Bahia contained evidence of preparations for a revolt; although the council had brought this to
the attention of the Heren XIX, little had been done. Now, seeing that no reinforcements had
been sent, and that the colony's defenses were weak, the conspirators had decided to act. From
the south, Henriqué Dias (d. 1662), commander of Portugal's black militia, and Dom António
Felipe Camarão (ca. 1580-1648), a Peiguar Indian and commander of the Indian forces loyal to
23
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 60, Overgekomen Brieven ende Papieren uit Brazilie, 1644-1646. Generale Missiven,
dated June 27, 1645.
24
Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company.
25
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, entries for August 30 and August 31, 1645, fol. 106v and 107; NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr.
60.
26 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 60.
49

the Portuguese, had crossed the Rio São Francisco at the border between Portuguese and Dutch
Brazil and were marching north toward Pernambuco. Their plan was to connect with local
militias organized by João Fernandes Vieira (ca. 1613-1681), a wealthy planter whom the
council conclusively had identified as the author of the revolt. Thanks to an anonymous letter,
the council had been forewarned and begun efforts to round up and question those Portuguese
who had not already fled into the interior. Two Dutch soldiers had been killed in the small
village of Ipojuca, only fifty miles from Recife, and fighting was now underway. Separate
companies of soldiers had been deployed to create a defensive circle around the city and the
senior military officer in the colony had been dispatched to the front in hopes that his presence
might help “to bring the inhabitants to reason.” 27 Without fresh soldiers, the council concluded,
the inhabitants “will be reinforced in their judgment that the company seeks to abandon this
colony” and all efforts to defend it would be in vain. 28
The directors in Middelburg turned from this letter to the council's secret minutes and to
two reports based on interrogations of leading Portuguese planters. 29 The minutes were dated
May 31, 1645, the day after the council had received the anonymous letter that alerted them to
the conspiracy. This letter, a copy of which was enclosed, suggested that “a good number” of
people already were gathered in Paraiba with the intention to overwhelm the garrisons and expel
27 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Letter of the Hoge Raad in Recife, dated June 27, 1645, fol. 139. “waerop wy omme
exempel te Statueren, op dat andere diergelyck niet en attenteren geresolveert hebben de heer Overste Luytenant in
persoon, met eenich gecommandeert volck van hier ende de troupen in Moribecq leggende, in passant mede
nemende een gedeelte vant garnisoen in St. Antonio, recht toe na Poiucan te senden, om, die gerevolteerde tot reden
te brengen.”
28 Ibid, fol. 140. “Eyndelyck om dese te sluyten willen wy uwe Ed. E. noch maels opt alderserieuste recommanderen
de besendinge van Chrysvolck tot versterckinge van onse maght en alle gerequieerde behoeften in conformiteyt van
de Lysten die aende Cameren gesonden worden, daeromme wy continuelyck nu al Jaren langh by uwe Ed. E. hebben
aengehouden sonder die te connen obtineeren, t' welcke vele van de Ingesetenen oorsaeck heeft gegeven om te
gelooven, en den anderen in te beelden, dat uwe Ed. E selve dese conqueste soecken te abandoneren.”
29 The secret minutes are NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Extracts from the secret resolutions of the Hoge Raad, May 31-
June 21, 1645. The interogations are NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 60, Report of the interrogation of Sebastião Caravãlho,
Mauritstaad, signed by Pieter Jansen Bas and Balthasar van de Vorde, June 19, 1645; Report of the interrogation of
George Homen Pinto, signed by Jan van Walbeek, June 25, 1645.
50

the Dutch from Brazil. 30 After some discussion, the council had resolved to provision all the forts
for a period of two months; prepare the company's Indian auxiliaries for battle; send spies to
each of the captaincies under Dutch control; recall any soldiers aboard ship; and, finally, to call
Vieira and other leading planters to Recife for questioning. 31 These plans were immediately set
into motion. Although Vieira had disappeared, several other planters were brought in and
soldiers were paraded around the central square in Recife in a show of force. 32 The council also
received reports that company slaves might join the Portuguese if the opportunity arose, and that
Indians who currently were loyal to the Dutch might easily switch sides. The commander of the
Indian forces, Johan Listry, was therefore ordered to encourage the Indians to send their wives
and children to the Dutch island fortress at Itamaricá, under the pretense that they would be safer
there. 33 Separate documents, based on interrogations of two Portuguese planters, confirmed the
identity of the conspiracy's leadership and provided credible evidence that the Governor of Bahia
had been actively involved in organizing and supporting the revolt. 34
The directors in Middelburg were responsible for ensuring that this information was
promptly shared with the other chambers and with the States General—not least because
Portuguese support to the revolt would signal a breach of the 1641 Treaty that ended hostilities
between Portugal and the Dutch Republic for a period of ten years and recognized their
respective claims in both the East and West Indies, including Brazil. 35 Once the letters had been
30
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Extracts from the secret resolutions of the Hoge Raad, entry for May 31, 1645.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid., entry for July 14, 1645.
33
Ibid., entry for June 16, 1645.
34
NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 60, Report of the interrogation of Sebastião Caravãlho, June 19, 1645; Report of the
interrogation of George Homen Pinto, June 25, 1645
35
The treaty, which was signed in The Hague on June 12, 1641, followed the Portuguese revolution on December 1,
1640 that ended Portugal's the sixty-year union with Spain and brought the Duke of Brangaza to power as Dom João
IV. News of the revolution itself was celebrated in both Dutch Brazil and the United Provinces, where it was seen as
weakening Spain, both the VOC and the WIC opposed the subsequent treaty on the grounds that it would constrain
their attacks on Portuguese positions in Asia and America. While feigning friendship with Portuguese officials in
51

ead aloud, two resolutions were passed: the first ordered the chamber’s commissioner in charge
of supplies to immediately procure powder, musket balls, and fuses to be loaded onto the ship St.
Christoffel, which was preparing to sail for Angola. 36 Shortly thereafter it was determined that
the circuitous route to Brazil via West Africa would be too slow, and the ship was allowed to
depart without any additional cargo. In its place, a second ship, Vlissingen, was prepared to sail
for Brazil and the commissioner for the militia was ordered to send a drummer throughout the
city to recruit new soldiers. 37 The second resolution was to send two delegations to carry the
news: the first, led by Pieter Biscop, was to travel to The Hague to ask that the States General do
everything within its power to assist the colony. The members of this delegation also were
ordered to inform the chambers of the Maas, North Holland, Amsterdam, and Groningen. A
second delegation, led by Abraham van Pere and Simon van Beaumont (1574-1654), the
chamber's lawyer, was requested to travel immediately to the military camp at Eekelo, where the
Prince of Orange was leading a campaign against Spanish soldiers in northern Flanders. 38 Both
delegations departed the following day. In their absence the remaining directors continued to
read the documents and to prepare the ship Vlissingen. 39
The first delegation was admitted into the chambers of the States General on September
2. There they presented an “oral report on the affairs in the conquests in Brazil” and handed over
Recife, Maurits used the time between the ratification of the treaty in Europe and its arrival in Brazil to launch
attacks on São Paulo do Loanda, São Tomé, and Maranhão at the mouth of the Amazon River. A chronology of the
treaty's signing and ratification, evidently prepared to defend Maurits' new conquests, can be found in NA 1.01.07,
inv.nr. 12564.15, no. 46. Beschowing van het vredesverdrag met Portugal, de inhoud, ratificatie, bekendmaking van
het voornoemde verdrag door de vertegenwoordigers van Staten Generael. On the treaty see Evaldo Cabral de
Mello, De Braziliaanse Affaire: Portugal, de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden en Noord-Oost Brazilië, 1641-
1669 (Zutphen: Walburg, 2005); Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 100-109; Cátia Antunes, Globalisation in
the Early Modern Period: The Economic Relationship Between Amsterdam and Lisbon, 1640-1705 (Amsterdam:
Aksant, 2004), 142-145.
36 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, entry for August 30, 1645, fol. 106v.
37 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, entries for August 31 and September 4, 1645, fols. 107 and 107v.
38 Ibid.; Zeeuwsarchief 2.1, inv.nr. 951, letter from Frederik Hendrik to the States of Zeeland, September 20, 1645.
The Prince's campaign in northern Flanders was part of an effort to enhance the Republic's bargaining position in
talks in Münster to end the war with Spain. See Israel, The Dutch Republic, 544.
39 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, entries for August 30, August 31, and September 4, 1645, fols. 106-107v.
52

“various papers concerning that subject.” 40 Documents in the archive of the States General make
clear that these papers included the secret letter from the Hoge Raad and a selection of excerpts
from their secret minutes. 41 Cornelis Musch (ca. 1592-1650), the notoriously corrupt secretary to
the States General, noted on their letter of credentials that these papers were to be handed over to
a committee consisting of Jacob Veth (d. 1667), Coenraad Ruisch (1583-1656), and Wolter
Schonenborch, all of whom previously had been selected to attend the upcoming meetings of the
Heren XIX on behalf of the States General. 42 This committee reviewed the secret documents and
spoke at length with the three directors from Zeeland before reporting back to the States General
as a whole. Evidently, the discussions did not progress very far, for the States General resolved
only that the matter should be referred to the Heren XIX for resolution. 43 While in The Hague the
three directors sent a letter to the Amsterdam chamber informing them of the news and, on their
return, stopped in all three cities that made up the Maas chamber—Delft, Rotterdam, and
Dordrecht. When they returned to Middelburg on September 6, they found the second delegation
already back from Eekelo. This delegation had been “favorably received” by the Prince of
Orange, who promised to write to the States General and the provinces to urge them to pay the
subsidies they owed the company so that military assistance could be organized as quickly as
possible. 44
There is probably no way to know how fast the news spread by word of mouth, or how
many people may have seen either the originals or copies of the documents enclosed in the
generale missiven. But it is possible to trace the spread of the most closely guarded documents.
40
NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for September 2, 1645. “eerste by monde gecognosenteerde deselvere
gelegentheyt van de Saecken der Conquesten in Brasyl, & vervolgens staende vergaderinge aen haer ho: mo:
overgeleeverdt verscheyden pampieren dat subject raeckende.”
41
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758.
42
NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for August 15, 1645. On Musch, see Knevel, Het Haagse Bureau, chapter 5, "Een
Zeventiende-eeuwse Catalina," 123-144.
43
NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for September 4, 1645.
44
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, fol. 108.
53

On Wednesday, the same day the ship arrived at the port of Middelburg, these were shared with
as many of the Zeeland chamber's fourteen directors as were present on that day. By Friday the
documents had reached the Prince of Orange and his military court; by Saturday they reached the
States General in The Hague. They probably reached Amsterdam the same day or early the next
day, Sunday, September 3. The news would have reached Delft, Rotterdam, and Dordrecht no
later than Monday, September 4, and probably considerably earlier. It thus took fewer than six
days for company officials in three of the five chambers, and representatives of all seven
provinces in the Republic, to learn in detail about the events in Brazil, either by letter or directly
from a director of the Zeeland chamber. Given Zeeland’s geographic location, some two days
travel from The Hague and three from Amsterdam, this is remarkable.
More remarkable, though, was the speed with which news of the revolt reached the
Amsterdam press. Since 1618, Jan van Hilten’s Courante uyt Italien en Duytslandt, &c. and
Broer Jansz.’s Tijdinghe uyt verscheyde Quartieren each had appeared once a week on
Saturday. 45 On September 2—just three days after the ships arrived in Middelburg, and the same
day that the directors from Zeeland met with the States General in The Hague—both papers ran
stories about the revolt in Brazil. 46 The stories themselves were in general quite similar, but
45 Folke Dahl, “Amsterdam Earliest Newspaper Centre of Western Europe: New Contributions to the History of the
First Dutch and French Corantos,” 171–185.
46 Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Film C1104, Courante uyt Italien en Duytsch-landt, &c. Printed for Jan van Hilton,
Amsterdam, No. 35, September 2, 1645; Film C1101, Tijdinghe uyt verscheyde quartieren, No. 35 dated 2
September 1645. The text in the Courante reads, “Alle Dorpen in Brasil beginnen [ha]er teghen ons op te setten/
door dien de meeste Singoores van de Ingenios de Ingesetenen tot haer devoti[...] bracht hebben/ waer mede sy
marcheren en[...] soecken aen verscheyde Quartieren te over[...] haer vournemen is dus [..] Jodes ghe[...] derlijk
ontdeckt/ ende hadden voorgh[...] ons op de 24 deserre overvallen/ door middel van seker Bruyloft van een van de
voornaemste portugesen/ ende souden daer op ghenoodight hebben heeren hoogen Raden/ van de Justitie/ het
Collegie ende veel andere/ 't welck sulcks gheschiedt zynde/ souden de selve vermoort/ desselfs cleederen
aenghetrocken/ ende daer op dese Vestinghe aengetast hebben; maer Godt heeft ons daer van bewaert/ ende is den
28 daer over een Dancksegginghe ghedaen: De Burgheren ende Inwoonderen zyn alhier ghemonstert ende 1800
streck bevonden/ gheresolveert voor 't Vaderlandt te vechten. Vele Duytschen komen op het Recijf ghevlucht.” The
text in the Tijdinghe reads, “Drie Schepen in 't last van Juny (te weten de Moor, het Hart, en Groote Gerrit) van
Brasil afgevaren/ zyn in Zeelant wel gearriveert/ brengen tijdinge dat twee van de grootste Schepen/ die al gheladen
waren/ daer noch bleven/ door dien sy het volck daer wilden behouden/ om oorsake datter een Conspiratie van de
54

Illustration 5. Courante uyt Italien ende Duytschlandt, &c., Issue no.
35 dated September 2, 1645. Printed by Jan van Hilten, this was one
of the first Amsterdam weeklies and one of two newspapers that
carried news of the revolt in Dutch Brazil.
Portuguesen in 't Landt woonende/ ondecht was/ maer waren gherepouseert/ en thien of twaelf van de selve door
gebleven/ en maer 2 of 3 van d'onse/ 't schijnt dat se op t' Recif ghemunt hadden. Eenige willen seggen datse op
seecker Bruyloft van een der voormeenste haer verraet meynden int werck te stellen/ en een bedroefde Tragedie aen
te rechten/ daer men de sekerheyt nu haest van hooren sal. Alle Portuguesen zyn ingeroepen om ninnen korten tydt
in haer Engenien te komen.”
55

with subtle differences of fact and emphasis that are suggestive as to their sources and their
interpretation of what had taken place. Both stories appeared near the end of page two, on the
reverse side, in the place customarily reserved for domestic news that preceded last-minute
additions and advertisements. Both papers devoted the bulk of the story to the revolt: Van
Hilten’s Courante began with the statement that “all the towns of Brazil have begun to plan
against us, led by the Senores d'Ingenios [sugar planters] who have brought the inhabitants to
their side and seek to take over various quarters [of the colony].” Broer Jansz.'s Tijdinghe
reported more simply that several ships had been held up from departing Brazil “on account of a
conspiracy of the Portuguese living in that land.” Both papers also reported that the plot involved
“a certain wedding” at which the foremost Dutchmen would be murdered, and that this plot had
been foiled. But their assessment of the outcome was starkly different. Broer Jansz. reported that
twelve of the conspirators had been killed to only two Dutchmen, and suggested that much had
been made of little in Recife. “All the Portuguese,” his story concluded, “were called to swiftly
return to their Ingenios [sugar mills].” Van Hilten, by contrast, ended on a foreboding note: “The
citizens and residents mustered here and found 1,800 strong persons resolved to fight for the
fatherland. [In addition] many Dutchmen fled to Recife.”
As Folke Dahl has pointed out, identifying the sources employed by early Dutch
newspapers has proven elusive. 47 Of the two papers, only one gave any indication of its source:
at the top of the story in Van Hilten’s Courante was written, “Out of Recife of Olinda 28 June.”
This date does not appear on any of the letters included in the generale missiven, but its
proximity to the departure date of the Walcheren, Rode Hart, and Grote Gerrit suggests strongly
that the letter traveled on one of those ships. If this is correct, we can hypothesize that the story
47 Folke Dahl, “Amsterdam Earliest Newspaper Centre of Western Europe: New Contributions to the History of the
First Dutch and French Corantos.”
56

was based upon a private letter that traveled from Middelburg to Amsterdam, arriving in that city
on Friday, September 1, just in time to be incorporated into Saturday's paper. By contrast, Broer
Jansz.’s Tijdinghe offered no dateline, but indicated instead in the opening part of the text that,
“Three ships... that sailed from Brazil in the last of June arrived safely in Zeeland, carrying
news....” This formulation, along with the fact that one of the ships was incorrectly identified as
De Moor, rather than De Walcheren, suggest that Broer Jansz.'s source was oral, and perhaps
even second or third hand. This may help to explain his failure to apprehend the seriousness of
the situation, and incidentally affirms Dahl’s observation that Van Hilten’s Courante tended to
offer more reliable and detailed information. 48
The stories in these two papers would have alerted a broader public to the news from
Brazil, and they serve as an illustration of how information traveled outside the formal channels
controlled by the WIC. Another example, even more tantalizing, is provided by the testimony of
a group that appeared before the four burgemeesteren of Amsterdam on September 7, 1645. 49
48 Ibid, 178.
49 Zeeuwsarchief, 3.1, inv.nr. 2116.2. Copie van een verklaring, September 7, 1645. “Op huiden den 6 september
xvi^c xlv compareerde voor my henderick Schaeff Notaris publique byden hove van hollant geadmitteert t'
amsterdam residerende out ontrent 27 Jaren & Jan willemsz. de keert de koe van hoorn out ontrent 25 jaren schipper
& sturman vant schip de Bontekoe den darden deser int Texel & den vierden daex aen hier voorde stadt gearriveert
althans syne binnen deser stede & hebben by ware woorden in plaetse van Eede ter predictie van de heren
Bewindhebberen, der west Ind. Comp ter camere alhier in Amsterdam getuigen verclaert & geattesteert hoe waer is
dat sy getuigen den 13: July laste den met haer voors. schip & volck gecomen syn aent Eylant Tercera een vande
Vlaemsche Eylanden inde Spaense Zee, alwaer sy met het voorsz. schip beslagen ofte gearresteert wierden den 20
der voorsz. Maent, wt reden dat aldaer twee Caraecken wt OostInd. gearriveert wesende deselve by vertrock van
schepen niet en souden werden ontdeot, soo sy getuigen aldaer verstonden; dat sy aldaer gelegen hebben tot ten 10
Augusty toe & dat ondertusschen den 28 off 29 July voors. aent selve Eylant oock arriveerde een Carvello wt de
Bahia de todos los sanctos in Brasil van de welcke de Officieren & t'volck seyden datse met haer seven advys
Caravellen te gelyck netto Bahia voors. geseilt waeren elck syns weeghs Voorts dat in Brasil de staet paraiba de
Cabo St Augustyn & Rio Grande door de hare, te weten door de Portugesen waren verovert, ende datter mits en
resteerde dan het reciffo t' welck sy seyden dat belegeert was, vorders dat als t'selve Caravel, daer arriveerde, datte
by een Portugees fregatt t'welc mede daer lagh, drie eerschoten werden gedaen & dat een off twee dagen naer t'
selve Carvels arrivement aldaer aent Eylant teeckenen van victori gedaen ende gewert worde met ont allyck veel
vieren & losbrangen vant Canon, doorde voorgemelte twee kraecken & dat aldaer op & aen t Eylant geseit worde
dat het was over de Victorie van de hare in Brasil als voren; Wyders dat op den 4 a 5 Augusty voors. onbegrepen
mede aent selve Eylant aende oost Zyde indeselve bay, daer de Castilianen eertyts quamen te landen, als syt selve
Eylant veroverden arriveerden 2 Caravellen wt Lisbona die aldaer schoonmaecten ende daer nae oock quamen voor:
stadt Angra op de reede, om aldaer soldaten wt het casteelte lichten inte nemen, ende na Brasil over te vaeren, gelyt
57

The group consisted of Henderick Schaeff, a public notary and notary for the WIC, Jan
Willemsz. de Keert, skipper and pilot of the ship Bontekoe, and five men who appeared at De
Keert's request as witnesses. De Keert had arrived at Texel on September 3 and the following
day traveled directly to Amsterdam, where he had given “true words in place of an oath” before
the directors of the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC. Now, before the city's burgemeesteren, De
Keert gave the following testimony: On July 13, his ship arrived at Terceira, one of the “Flemish
Islands in the Spanish Sea [the Azores],” where it remained at port until August 20. On either
July 28 or 29, a caravel arrived from Bahia de Todos os Santos in Portuguese Brazil. According
to the officers and other people aboard the ship, the Portuguese had recaptured Paraiba, Cabo St.
Augustyn, and Rio Grande, three captaincies that previously had been under Dutch control.
Furthermore, the Dutch capital, Recife, was under siege. “Two days after this caravel arrived,”
De Keert continued, “there were signs all over the island of celebrations and the firing of cannon,
which it was said was for the victory in Brazil.” Two days later, two caravels arrived from
Lisbon “and took on soldiers from the fort to carry with them to Brazil.”
This testimony would have confirmed and extended the account found in the newspapers,
and may even have described events in Brazil that took place after the three company ships set
sail for Middelburg at the beginning of July. What was certainly new was the information about
the two caravels from Lisbon that collected soldiers to take to Brazil—a detail that could be
interpreted either as routine or as evidence that the Portuguese King was lending support to the
revolt. Perhaps for this reason the Amsterdam city government forwarded a copy of the
het selve aldaer byde Portugesen onder groot en clein & by yder een openmtlyck werde geseit, & hun getuige
dickwils voorgecomen is, presenterende sy getuigen, t' gunt voors. is, des noot synde naerder by eede te verclaeren,
gedaen t' Amsterdam ter presentie van daniel van der Schelde ende Jan Mastbiergher alhier als getuigen hier toe
versocht hebben noch Adriaen Tiercsen van hansbrouck out ontrent 23 Jaren, sipke pietersz van Molqueren out 25
Jaren, & sievert Pietersz. mede van molcqueren out mede ontrent 25 Jaren met boven gemelte attestant en t' voors.
verclaerde op den 7 september 1645 voorde heren Burgermeesteren der stede Amsterdam met Eede bevesticht.”
58

testimony to the States of Zeeland, and presumably to the States of Holland and the company as
well. Just eight days after the news first arrived, it was beginning to be subsumed within a larger
story, composed from sources that need not even have traveled to Brazil, but which instead
reflected information shared by sailors, merchants, and others along the ocean transit ways that
linked the Americas, Iberia, and northern Europe. As Woodruff Smith noted, the chartered
companies’ proprietary channels for collecting information offered specific elites a level of detail
and speed that was difficult to rival, but their advantage in the marketplace for information was
short-lived. 50 This meant that the WIC needed not only to craft an appropriate practical response
to the news from Brazil; it needed also to gather and corroborate sources, guard those details that
its directors believed could plausibly be kept secret, and work to shape both the private and
public discourses to support an interpretation of the news that best suited their own political
goals. 51 If the responsibility of the Zeeland chamber had been limited to quickly evaluating and
disseminating the information they had received, this broader political responsibility fell to the
Heren XIX. That body's meeting opened in Middelburg on September 9, 1645. 52
3. The Heren XIX and the Politics of Information
As the host chamber, it was Zeeland's responsibility to draft an agenda, set the date, and send
invitations to the other chambers and to the States General to attend the fall meeting of the Heren
50 Smith, “The Function of Commercial Centers in the Modernization of European Capitalism: Amsterdam as an
Information Exchange in the Seventeenth Century,” 995.
51 By September 4, the Portuguese ambassador at The Hague, Francisco Coutinho, had clearly seen the secret
documents delivered by the company to the States General. Later that fall he would support the publication of letters
by disgruntled company servants in an effort to discredit the company in The Hague. Francisco de Sousa Coutinho,
Correspondência Diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho Durante a sua Embaixada em Holanda, ed. Edgar
Prestage and Pedro de Azevedo (Coimbra: Impr. da Universidade, 1920). Coutinho to Conde da Vidiguiera,
September 4, 1645. On Coutinho's publishing strategy, see Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 178.
52 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. 1.
59

XIX. Each chamber selected delegates as it saw fit, with the only stipulation being that
Amsterdam send eight delegates, Zeeland four, and the Maas, North Holland, and Groningen two
each. The States General reserved the right to send as many delegates as it wished, but could
exercise only one of the nineteen votes. 53 Delegates were reimbursed by the company for their
travel and provided with a daily stipend; there were strict guidelines for the format and content of
letters of credential to be presented at the outset of the meeting and stiff penalties for absence or
tardiness—as in other assemblies in the United Provinces, time was monitored by the “turn of the
[hour] glass,” and the fines were given to charity. 54 The meetings ran from nine o'clock until
noon and, following a break, from four until six o'clock in the evening, Monday through Friday,
with a half-day on Saturday. 55 They could last only a week or as long as two months depending
on the nature and gravity of the business at hand.
The letter of invitation to the 1645 fall meeting requested that delegates gather at an inn
in Middelburg on Saturday, September 2, so that the meetings could begin the following
Monday, but delegates evidently arrived late, for the proceedings did not begin in earnest until
the following Saturday. 56 The agenda, which had been distributed to the chambers and the States
General in mid-August, before the arrival of the news from Brazil, included 20 items. 57 Among
these were the usual assessment and outfitting of ships; the delicate issue of selecting a President
and subordinate officers for the Hoge Raad in Recife; the appointment of ministers and school
53 The politics within the chambers to choose delegates to attend the meetings of the Heren XIX, as well as the right
reserved by the States General to send multiple delegates are discussed in Chapter Three.
54 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. See also Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization, 115. “Voorgestelt synde is
goet gevonden ordinaerl. d' ure vande vergaderinge te leggen desmorgens ten negenen ende nae middach ten vieren
op verboute van ses stuyvers die met het omkeeren vant glas niet sullen pres[en]t wesen maer te late comen ende
twaelff stuyvers voor die gene die geheel achter blyven, ende syn de assessors van den cameren zeelandt en
amst[erda]m, gestelt ende geauthoriss[eer]t voorschreven bouten te executteren ten proffyten van den armen.”
55 For hours and rules for the meetings of the Heren XVII, the board of directors of the VOC, see Pieter van Dam,
Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, ed. F. W. Stapel (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1927), 251.
56 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Letter from David Baute and N. van der Merct, Directors of the Zeeland Chamber, to
the States General, August 11, 1645. There is no record of whether anyone was fined for arriving late.
57 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Poincten waerop all de Cameren van de West Indische Comp. beschreven worden,
omme in conformite van den Ocroye [...], August 11, 1645.
60

masters for Brazil; means to improve the slave trade from Angola and the trade in general along
the northern coast of Guinea; a review of outstanding subsidies owed to the company by the
various provincial assemblies; payment to the militia in Brazil; resolution to the management of
New Netherland and Curaçao; a report from the committee charged with examining recent
mineral discoveries; arrangements to sell a large quantity of dye woods from Brazil; and
planning for how to handle the increase in private traders operating illegally within the charter
area. All of these issues ultimately would be addressed at the meeting.
To gather a sense of the affair, it helps to know who attended. While scholars often
mention the WIC’s role in the war with Spain and its responsibility for establishing settlements,
they invariably assume that the company’s directors were sober merchants, for whom matters of
trade and profit were of paramount importance. 58 In fact the picture is more complicated, as a
short review of the biographies of several individuals makes clear. The delegation from the
States General, for example, was made up largely of aristocrats and city magistrates. 59 Its senior
member was supposed to be Hendrick van der Capellen, a nobleman from Gelderland who had
close connections to the Prince of Orange and for several years had served on the committee in
The Hague responsible for affairs related to the WIC. 60 He did not appear in Middelburg,
however, and so was replaced by Johan van der Camer (d. 1657), a member of the Haarlem city
council and, from 1643, a delegate to the Gecommitteerde Raden (Executive Council) for South
Holland. 61 The other members of the delegation, each representing one of the seven provinces,
included Jacob Veth, Pensionaris of the city of Middelburg and Zeeland's permanent deputy at
58 Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek,” 157.
59 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, no. 20, fol. 1.
60 On Van der Capellen, see P.C. Molhuysen, ed., Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek (Leiden: A. W.
Sijthoff’s Uitgevers-Maatschappij, 1911-37), vol. 8, 250.
61 "Johan van der Camer" in Repertorium van ambtsdragers en ambtenaren 1428-1861.
http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/Repertorium/app/personen/3989. Accessed April 12, 2012.
61

Inden naeme den heeren amen Saturn. den 9 September 1645
Sessie genommen als volcht (In the name of the Lord, amen. Saturday,
September 9, 1645. The session proceeded as follows)
De Heeren Gecommitteerde van de
Hooge Mogende Heeren Staten
General der Vereenichde Nederlanden
(Representatives of the High and
Mighty States General of the United
Netherlands)
62
Coenraedt Ruisch
Jan van den Cameren
Mr. Jacob Veth
Gisbert van der Hoolck
Wolther van Schonenburgh
Zeelandt Jan Louys
Amsterdam Joan de Laeth
Amsterdam Joan Raey, Ferdinande Schuylenb.
Zeelandt David Baute
Cornelis Dackers, assessor
Amsterdam Jeronimus Hestersz.
Maze Alewyn Halewyn
Nicholaes ten Hove
Noort Hollandt Floris Huigh
Amsterdam Mr. Jacob Hamel
Zeelandt Adriaen van Hecke
Groeningen niet gecompareert (did not appear)
Amsterdam Johan Lethoor
Adriaen van Eede, assessor
Zeelandt Nicholaes van der Marckt
Amsterdam Isaach van Beeck
Maze Jacob Velthuise
Amsterdam Bonavontura Braen
Noort Hollandt Claes Simonsen Dolphyn
Groeningen Thobias Iddekinge
Amsterdam Johan van Halewyn
Table 1. Delegates to the fall 1645 meeting of the Heren XIX. 62
62 Transcribed from NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, no. 20, fols. 1-53. Resolutien van de vergadering van de Heren
XIX te Middelburg, 9 September-16 Oktober, 1645. See also Illustration 3.

The Hague; Wolter Schonenborch, former burgemeester of Groningen; and Karel Roorda, son of
an influential leader of the Dutch revolt and deputy to the States General from Vriesland. 63 Their
collective accreditation insured that the interests of each province were represented during the
meetings of the Heren XIX. Notably, none of these delegates was actively involved in trade.
By contrast, the delegates who represented the company’s five chambers were
predominantly merchants. Leading the delegation from Zeeland, and present throughout the
proceedings, were Jan Louys and David Baute (1588-1657). 64 Almost nothing is known about
Jan Louys: a resident of Middelburg and member of the city's reformed church, his name appears
in company records for the first time in 1633, when he was appointed as a director. 65 During the
verhoging (literally “augmentation”) organized to raise additional private capital for the
company between 1636-1637, he subscribed for 3,200 guilders. 66 This implied an initial
investment of 9,600 guilders, easily enough to cross the 4,000 guilders threshold required to be
eligible for a directorship. Beyond this the records are silent, save a short entry in the records of
the Middelburg orphanage. 67 When Louys’ wife died in 1635, the influential city magistrate
Pieter van Essen accompanied him to register a new guardian for his remaining children. For this
responsibility he selected Marten Halewyn, a merchant from Amsterdam and brother of a
director in the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC. These scant details suggest that Louys was a
wealthy merchant with many years service to the company and good connections within
63 "Jacob Veth" in Repertorium van ambtsdragers en ambtenaren 1428-1861.
http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/Repertorium/app/personen/6804. Accessed April 12, 2012.
"Carel van Roorda" in Repertorium van ambtsdragers en ambtenaren 1428-1861.
http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/Repertorium/app/personen/4202. Accessed April 12, 2012.
64 Louys and Baute signed the invitations to attend the meeting and chaired the committee within the Zeeland
chamber to draft the agenda. NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26.
65 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5753.
66 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 77, entry for September 9, 1636.
67 Zeeuwsarchief, 10, inv.nr. 155a Weeskamer Middelburg, Journael begghinende met xiiii Feb 1633 Inden xxviii
September 1639, entry for April 4, 1635.
63

Middelburg’s decidedly incestuous elite. 68 He must also have been somewhat advanced in years,
since the leader of the chamber's delegation to the Heren XIX was by custom also its most senior
member. 69
About David Baute far more is known, for shortly before he died he composed a detailed
account of his life to serve as a guide for his children, a copy of which was discovered in the
nineteenth century when the Dutch sold Elmina Castle to Britain. 70 Though a merchant for more
than forty years, Baute's experience was hardly confined to the mundane exchange of goods.
Born in 1588 to a wealthy family of jewelry merchants in the city of Antwerp, his parents sent
him to Middelburg in 1604 to serve as a clerk. Five years later, when the Dutch Republic and
Spain signed the Twelve Years' Truce, Baute moved to Seville to apprentice with a local
merchant; when the Truce expired in 1621 he took over from a merchant from Amsterdam who
was living in Spain and established his own business. 71 This proved to be increasingly difficult
amidst rising anti-Dutch sentiment. In 1624 Baute's name was discovered on a Dutch ship sailing
under the Spanish flag and, despite his denials, he was accused of trading with the enemy and
sentenced to torture. This he described in intimate detail: after being forced to undress, his hands
were tied with rope, the ends of which were attached to a metal bar and successively tightened by
the executioner, “so that they cut to the bone.” 72 This lasted for more than seven hours before
68 On the Middelburg elite, see Frederik Nagtglas, Levensberichten van Zeeuwen, 2 vols. (Middelburg: J. C. & W.
Altorffer, 1890-93).
69 This practice was borrowed from the Heren XVII of the East India Company. Van Dam, Beschryvinge van de
Oostindische Compagnie, 249-250.
70 This text is Baute, Cort Relaas Sedert Den Jare 1609; Frederik Nagtglas, “David Baute, Een Bladzidje uit de
Handelsgeschiedenis der 17de Eeuw,” Tijdschrift Voor Staathuishoudkunde En Statistiek 27 (1869): 374–403; J. H.
Kluiver, “David Baute, Een Zeeuws Koopman-Avonturier uit de Zeventiende Eeuw,” Zeeland Jaargang 1
(December 1991): 6–13.
71 Kluiver, “David Baute, Een Zeeuws Koopman-Avonturier uit de Zeventiende Eeuw.”
72 Baute, Cort Relaas sedert den Jare 1609, 24. “Sijnde nu geheel naakt, alleenelijk aangehouden hebbende mijn
linne onderbroek, wiert ik den scherprechter overgelevert, die mij brocht bij een ijsere traillie, mijnen rugge
daaraanvoegende, wiert ik vast met touwen minder dan een kleijne vinger dik, bloot gebonden. Den beul namp mijn
armen, en leijden se over malcanderen, daaraan leggende den eersten tour, de touwe ofte coorde vast gemaakt sijnde
aan eenen stok gelijk de packers gebruiken, die hij in beyde sijn handen bleeff houdende. Settende sijnevoeten op
64

Baute was released, having—by his own account—revealed nothing to the authorities. It took
nearly ten months for the swelling and scarring to subside and for movement to return to his right
arm. 73 Baute was eventually exonerated, but increasing harassment and extortion led him to flee
the country. In 1627 he exchanged the remainder of his inventory of precious stones for tobacco,
cochineal, and other goods, organized a small Spanish ship manned with thirty soldiers, and
secretly escaped. 74 At sea the ship was boarded and its crew arrested in Portugal; it was mistaken
for a Turkish pirate vessel off the coast of France; and boarded once again by English soldiers
before finally arriving in Antwerp. From there Baute continued to Middelburg, where he married
into the highest levels of the city's elite and, in 1638, became a director of the WIC. 75 His
account is fascinating in its own right, but it also suggests that Baute belongs as much within the
tradition of the sixteenth century merchant-adventurers as he does among the more staid
representatives of the Dutch elite in the second half of the seventeenth century. 76 In the
company's boardroom in Middelburg, where he represented the city’s hooftparticipanten (chief
investors), the physical scars on his wrists would have served as a potent reminder of Spanish
tyranny. Baute’s attitude towards the company’s business, and towards the revolt in Brazil, could
hardly have escaped being colored by this earlier experience.
Amsterdam’s delegation—the largest at the meeting, with eight delegates—was led by
the renowned geographer and historian Johannes de Laet. 77 Born in Antwerp in 1581, De Laet
fled with his family to Amsterdam sometime after 1585 and later established himself in Leiden,
mijne gebonden handen tegens mijnen buijk aan, liet sig op eenen bot so plotselijk ter aarden vallen blijvende soo
continuelijken treckende, invoegen dat de touwen het vlees tot het been doorsneden hadden.”
73 Ibid., 25–27.
74 Ibid., 40.
75 Nagtglas, “David Baute, een Bladzidje uit de Handelsgeschiedenis der 17de Eeuw.”
76 Kluiver, “David Baute, een Zeeuws Koopman-Avonturier uit de Zeventiende Eeuw.” On the Dutch elite, see Peter
Burke, Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Elites (London: Maurice Temple Smith LTD, 1974).
77 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. 1.
65

Illustration 6. Portrait of Johannes de Laet. Engraving by J. G. van
Bronckhorst, 1642. Iconographisch Bureau, Den Haag. De Laet was a
scholar and Director in the Amsterdam chamber of the West India Company.
66

first as a student, and then as a scholar and editor. 78 He is best known today for his historical and
geographical works, including the Nieuwe Wereldt, Ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien (The
New World, or a Description of the West Indies), a comprehensive text that integrated the vast
Iberian, Italian, French and English literature on the Western Hemisphere with the latest findings
of Dutch mariners. 79 He also is known also for a series of “pocket” histories that he helped to
edit for the Leiden publisher Elsevier and an acrimonious debate that he carried on with Grotius
over the origins of the Native Americans. 80 Less well know, but central to his place within the
rich and dynamic intellectual environment of early seventeenth century Leiden, were his editions
of classical authors such as Vitruvius and Pliny and his twenty-year project to compile the first
major dictionary of Anglo-Saxon. 81 De Laet was also an investor, and in 1620 he committed a
sizable sum to the new WIC and became one of its first directors, representing the city of Leiden
in the Amsterdam chamber. His appearance in the Heren XIX in September of 1645 and the
78 The best biographical account remains J. A. F. Bekkers, ed., “Introduction,” in Correspondence of John Morris
with Johannes de Laet (Assen: Van Gorcum and Comp., 1970), XI–XXVII.
79 Johannes de Laet, Nieuwe Wereldt: Ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien (Leiden: Isaac Elzevier, 1625). On De
Laet, see also Jaap Jacobs, “Johannes de Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld,” Jaarboek van het Centraal Bureau voor
Genealogie 50 (1996): 108–130; De Laet, Suiker, Verfhout & Tabak.
80 J. A. Gruys, “De Reeks ‘Republieken’ van de Elzeviers en Joannes de Laet,” in Boekverkopers van Europa: Het
17de-eeuwse Nederlandse Uitgevershuis Elzevier, ed. B. P. M. Dongelmans, P. G. Hoftijzer, and O. S. Lankhorst
(Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000.), 77–106. On Grotius and De Laet, see Herbert F. Wright, “The Controversy of
Hugo Grotius with Johan de Laet on the Origin of the American Aborigines,” Catholic Historical Review 3 (1917):
257–275; Rubiés, “Hugo Grotius’s Dissertation on the Origin of the American Peoples and the Use of Comparative
Methods”; Schmidt, “Space, Time, Travel: Hugo de Groot, Johannes de Laet, and the ‘Advancement’ of Geographic
Learning.”
81 De Laet was a close friend of Salmasius and maintained an active correspondence with Scaliger until the latter's
death. See Rolf H. Bremmer Jr., “The Correspondence of Johannes de Laet as a Mirror on his Life,” LIAS: The
Journal of Early Modern History of Ideas 25, no. 2 (1998): 139-164. On his Anglo-Saxon dictionary, see John
Morris and Joannes de Laet, Correspondence of John Morris with Johannes de Laet (1634-1649), ed. J. A. F.
Bekkers (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp., 1970); Rolf H. Bremmer Jr., “‘Mine is Bigger Than Yours’: The Anglo-
Saxon Collection of Johannes de Laet (1581-1649) and Sir Simonds D’Ewes (1602-50),” Anglo-Saxon Books and
Their Readers, ed. Thomas N. Hall and Donald Scragg (Kalamazoo: 2008).
67

crucial role that he played in its deliberations demonstrate the importance of scholarship, as well
as practical experience in trade, to the management of the WIC. 82
Once the letters of credential for these and the other delegates had been examined and
approved, the company’s charter was read aloud, complete with the various amendments. 83 Only
then did the meeting begin in earnest. The first order of business was to always read the letters
and other documents received since the previous meeting, beginning with the generale
missiven. 84 Whereas the previous week the directors in the Zeeland chamber had turned first to
the secret documents, by this time the information these contained was well-enough known that
the Heren XIX began with the formal cover letter and proceeded swiftly to two separate reports
that had not been shared in advance. All three documents were read aloud—most likely by the
lawyer for the Zeeland chamber, Simon van Beaumont—so that everyone assembled could be
fully apprised of what had taken place. Reading the documents filled the entire afternoon session
with what a contemporary in another context complained sounded like an “endless drone.” 85
The first of the two reports, composed by Gysbert de Witte and Jan van Hoogstraten,
provided a detailed account of their trip to Bahia and their discussions with the Portuguese
governor, António Teles da Silva. 86 Although the trip had taken place in February, this report
offered valuable first-hand information on the state of affairs in Portuguese-controlled Brazil and
provided an opportunity to assess Da Silva’s involvement in the revolt. De Witte and
Hoogstraten indicated that they had been warmly received by the governor and had been
82
De Laet, Suiker, verfhout & tabak; Kees Zandvliet, Mapping for Money: Maps, plans, and topographic paintings
and their role in Dutch overseas expansion during the 16th and 17th centuries (Amsterdam: Batavian Lion
International, 1998).
83
There is no record of a prayer having been delivered, though this would be highly unusual in the Dutch Republic.
Van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization, 152.
84
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol 2.
85
Ibid., fol. Van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization, 157.
86
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 60, Rapport gedaen aende Ed: Heeren van den hoogen en Secreten Raede in Brasil van
[de] Besongnes gevallen over de poincten ons by de gemelte Heeren mede gegeven om inde Bahia met syn
Ex[cellen]tie Antonio Teles da Silva en andersints te verhandelen. Dated April 3, 1645.
68

encouraged to travel freely. This they did, collecting any and all information that might be useful
to the company: there were, according to several people with whom they spoke, 3,000-4,000 men
in arms. In the bay lay only “50 small ships,” though during their visit two larger warships
arrived, with 600 men, led by the renowned admiral Salvador da Sá. 87 Da Silva assured them that
these ships were merely waiting to convoy a fleet from Rio de Janeiro back to Lisbon—an
explanation they accepted at the time, but which now appeared to be untrue. 88
The second report read at the meeting was by Captain Jan Blaer, a soldier in the
company's employ who had recently returned from a mission to find and destroy Palmares, a
large city of runaway slaves in the interior of Pernambuco. 89 After three weeks marching through
the forest, Blaer had found the city deserted and burned it to the ground. To this day Blaer's
report remains one of the most important sources for the study of Brazilian quilombos (escaped
slave communities), but in Middelburg any excitement over the success of the mission must have
been tempered by the ominous possibility that the 1,500 free blacks who had escaped might seek
retribution by joining the rebellion. 90 The minutes of the meeting in Middelburg are silent as to
what, if any, discussion took place before the session adjourned. But it is safe to assume that the
directors—who, atleast by the terms of the company’s charter, were required to be members of
the Dutch Reformed Church—would have attended services together the following morning at
the church just a stone's throw from their offices on the Lange Delft, and that discussions would
have continued into the night at the inn. 91
87 C. R Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686 (London: University of London,
1952).
88 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 60, Rapport gedaen aende Ed: Heeren van den hoogen en Secreten Raede, April 3, 1645.
89 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 60, Journael van de Voyagie die Cap. Johan Blaer gedaen heeft naer de Dolmaris A[nn]o
1645.
90 On Palmares, see Philip Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially 103-107.
91 On the company directors' relationship with the church, see Danny L. Noorlander, “Serving God and Mammon:
The Reformed Church and the Dutch West India Company in the Atlantic World, 1621-1674” (Ph.D. Dissertation,
69

When the meeting resumed on Monday morning, the focus turned squarely to documents
within the generale missiven that provided the most detailed intelligence on the leadership of the
rebellion and the steps taken by the Hoge Raad to deploy soldiers and otherwise reinforce the
company's defenses throughout northeastern Brazil. 92 These documents paint a detailed and
sometimes gruesome portrait of the diverse means employed to gather information. Spies were
deployed, letters opened, and prominent Portuguese planters questioned, sometimes under
torture. Altogether, the company received information from more than sixty unique sources. 93
For a day and a half the meeting had been absorbed with sifting intelligence, and by this
point the picture had become sufficiently clear that the representatives of the States General, led
by Johan van der Camer, interrupted the proceedings to begin planning what was to be done. 94
Van der Camer was not the chair of the meeting—as the senior delegate from the host chamber,
Zeeland, this honor fell to Jan Louys—but with the discussion turning to matters of war and
peace, it was his responsibility to ensure that the wishes and interests of the generality were
protected. Van der Camer’s instructions, drafted by the committee that reviewed the secret
documents delivered to The Hague the previous week, were to determine, in consultation with
the company's directors, “how the conquests in Brazil should be restored to their previous
condition and maintained,” and “to decide how best to approach the provinces so as to quickly
raise the necessary subsidies.” 95 He proposed that a committee be formed without delay: this was
agreed to, and a vote produced six names, one each from the five chambers, plus a second
director from the Amsterdam chamber. These six directors were Adriaen van Hecke of
Georgetown, 2011). The inn where the directors stayed was almost certainly the Herberge de Bijenkorf. See Doeke
Roos, Zeeuwen en de Westindische Compagnie, 1621-1674 (Hulst: Van Geyt Productions, 1992).
92
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. 2.
93
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 60.
94
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 17, fol. 2v.
95
NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for September 4, 1645.
70

Vlissingen; De Laet and Johan Schuilenborch representing Amsterdam; Nicholaes ten Hove of
Delft, Claude Simonsz. Dolphyn of Hoorn, and the lone representative at the meeting from
Groningen, Thobias Ydekkinge. 96 By early afternoon this committee submitted a preliminary
report calling for the first available ship to be dispatched to Brazil with a cargo of provisions,
gunpowder, and muskets. Ten Hove offered the Swaen, which would sail soon after with an
exceptionally brief letter indicating only that the Hoge Raad's correspondence had been received
and that steps were being taken, in concert with the States General, to organize further relief. 97
But this was only a first step, and the committee immediately returned to its work to
produce a comprehensive plan, not only for short-term reinforcement of the Hoge Raad, but to
ensure the colony's long-term viability. The committee performed this work over the following
morning, while the remaining letters from Brazil and Angola were reviewed and discussed by the
larger meeting. In the afternoon, the committee produced its report. This included two important
elements: first, a rhetorical framework that interpreted the events in Brazil and explained their
relationship to the company's efforts and finances, and, second, a budget of 725,925 guilders to
organize a full military expedition to relieve the colony. 98 Whereas the budget would serve as the
substance of discussions with the States General and the individual provinces, the rhetorical
framework was intended to serve as an agreed template to guide those discussions. There was no
question that the revolt in Brazil was a crisis, but exactly who was responsible—both for the
revolt itself and the steps necessary to crush it—was very much open to debate. It was therefore
crucial for the company to preempt criticism that the revolt had resulted from its own negligence,
96 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. 2v. As the only representative of Groningen and the Ommelanden, Yddekinge
nominally served on all the sub-committees named at the meeting. On the Groningen chamber, see P. J. van Winter,
De Westindische Compagnie ter Kamer Stad en Lande (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978).
97 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 9, letter from the Heren XIX to the Hoge Raad dated September 12, 1645.
98 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fols. 3v-4v.
71

and to steer the discussion towards the value of the colony and the state's responsibility to defend
it.
In this sense the report served as a draft remonstrance to the States General. It began by
recalling the “scarcity of money” available to the company, and the enormous sums spent in the
conquests of Brazil and other territories. Like the provinces themselves, the company had hoped
that the 1641 Treat with Portugal would reduce the need for men and munitions, but this now
looked unlikely. Johan Maurits, the report continued, had “not been silent” about the little trust
he put in Portugal, and his suspicions about a possible revolt: “Now it is finally clear that his
suspicions were not without justification.” If support was not forthcoming, “such important
conquests for this state, gained by so much blood and many millions in money” would be lost. 99
It was a desperate plea that only partially disguised the directors’ frustration with the provinces
99 Ibid., fol. 4. “Dat men haer ho: mo: als mede de resp[ectiv]e provintien twelcke staets gewysse nu vergad[er]t
mochten syn door de gedeputt[eerd]e uyt de cameren op het alder spoedich[hei]t behoort te gemelt te voeren hoe dat
in jaeren en dagen geleden op verscheiden occagien en[de] by naer souden op houden aende regeringe desen landen
is vertoont de schaersh[ei]t van de finantien van de west indische comp[agni]e veroorsaeckt soo door de groote
oncosten die de selve nu veel jaeren in de conquesten van brasil en[de] elders heeft gedragen en[de] de cleinne
emmolumenten die uyt deselve hadde getrocken ofte noch syn treckende […] insgelycks dat het hooch noodich was
dat de comp[agni]e voor soo veel doenel. was diende versekert te worden dat by de portugeesen soude henlichl.
onderhouden houden worden den treves tusschen haren coninck en[de] dese provintien gemaeckt op dat de
comp[agni]e sich van der grooten om slach van soldaten en noodige behouften van oorloge inde gewesten van brasil
en[de] andere geannexeerden plaetse wat mochten verlichten ende haer dessigne tegen den conninck van castillen
wesen de een gemeenen vyandt van desen staet ende de croone van portugael tot dienst van desen staet
converteerent is waer dat tot sublimatie van den comp[agni]e lasten ende voordere subsistentie wel eenige goede
ende desen staet seer doenel. ende onbeswaerel. middelen syn voor geslaagen doch geen resolutie, niet
tegenstaen[de] soo veel sollicitatie over gegeven deductien en[de] clachten over den hooch dringen noodt tot noch
toe heeft comen wt gewrocht worden. / Syne ex[elen]tie uyt brasil weder gecomen synde heeft onder andere saecken
aen haer ho: mo: niet verswegen het clein vertrouwen dewelck men van de portugeesen inde conquesten van brasil
woonende hadde te nemen en[de] daer naer heeft men mede vernomen en[de] haer ho: mo: bekent gemaect de
suspicien die daer waaren van eene revolte der ingesettennen portug[ees]e de welcke men billick vermoede by die
van de bahia gemaeckt en[de] gestyft teworden. / tis nu eyndel. gebleken uyt de advyssen van brasilie met des selfs
schepen gecomen die haer ho: mo: syn bekent gemaeckt dat de voorseyde suspitie ende vreese niet sonder reden is
genomen geweest en[de] dat soo importante conqueste voor desen staet en[de] die de goede ingesettenen van dese
geuni[eer]t provintien het welck veel bloets en[de] soo veel milloennen gelt heeft gecost aen eensyden raet heeft
gehangen en[de] veel licht noch is hangende ten sy daer op het spoedichste in wert voorsien en[de] by haer ho: mo:
de hant werden geboden aende comp. ende een eynde gemaeckt van de deliberatien de welcke hare ho: mo: heeft
gelieft voor te nemen tot herstelling van de selve comp. oft in dien deselve conclussie tegens des comp. hope en[de]
vermoede noch niet soo haest en conde genomen worden dat haer ho: mo: ten minste gelieft den te versorgen datter
prompte middelen de comp. mochten werden verschaft door de welcke de vermoede conquesten mochten werden
bevryt van den ondergang met de welcke sy nu worden gedreyght.”
72

for their continual failure to contribute to the war effort. The personal resources of the directors
were now exhausted, the report continued, and the company’s access to credit nearly gone.
While the company was well managed and could expect great profits in the future—not only in
Brazil, but in Guinea and Angola—at present the coffers were empty. It was now time for the
States General to step in provide what, in time of war, the company on its own could not: money
enough to outfit a fleet of twelve warships and to recruit and equip 1,500 fresh soldiers to join an
existing force of 2,700 soldiers in Brazil for a period of six months. 100 If this support was not
forthcoming, the report warned, “We cannot be responsible for telling our children that we let
these beautiful colonies slip away.” 101
The next step, once this rhetorical framework and its associated budget had been
approved, was to approach the two wealthiest and most powerful provincial assemblies in the
Republic, the States of Holland and the States of Zeeland. Delegations were selected for each. In
the meantime, the representatives of the States General were “requested to use their good offices
and all means at their disposal to reinforce these intentions of the company, both in their public
and their private capacities.” 102 Since round-trip travel to The Hague would require at least four
days, during which time the meeting would continue, delegates to address the States of Holland
100 By the terms of the charter, in the case of military conflict the States General was to provide 16 ships to assist the
company. The States General also agreed that, "if it should happen that the country should be greatly eased of its
burdens and that this Company should be put to the heavy charge of war, we have further promised, and do promise,
to increase the aforesaid subsidy [of 1 million guilders] in such manner as the situation of this country will permit
and the affairs of the Company shall require." Articles 40 and 41. Rensselaer, Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts,
109-111. The translation is by Alan H. Strong.
101 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. 4v. “In alle gevallen en is niemmandt onbekent & is mede by verscheyde
gelegentheden gededoceert over groote nutticheyt die den handel dewelke gedreven wordt in de limiten van het
westindsiche octroy dese geuneerde provintien ys toebrengende soo dattet ons bedruckers een misslach soude wesen
niet verantwordelen voor de naecomelingen dat mensulcken schoone conqueste soo soude laete verlooven gaen. /
Siende dan dat het gevaer dicwils nu daer is & veel licht grooter als wy noch apprehendeeren soo duncht de
commissaerissen dat men op t spoodicht behoort te sollicitteren by haer ho: mo: & de respective provintien die nu
vergadert syn dat haer gelieven op t spoodichst tot comste ter minste te voorsien met seven tonnes gouts om sich
daer mede in desen hooch dringende noot te behelpen.”
102 Ibid., fol. 5. “oock de aenwesende heeren gecommitt[eerd]e van hare ho: mo: versocht met alle goed officien de
Intentie van de comp. te seconderen het welcke by hare Ed: aengenomen ys te does met alle middeln redennen ende
motiven al omme soo int publicq als in het particulier.”
73

were chosen from among the ranks of company directors who were not attending the meeting.
Most important among them were Pieter Bischop, the Zeeland director who had carried the news
to the States General a week earlier, and Jacques Specx, a director in the Amsterdam chamber
who several months before had represented the company in negotiations in the States of Holland
over a possible fusion of the VOC and the WIC. 103 They were joined by four other directors from
the Amsterdam chamber. This group, accompanied by the Amsterdam chamber's lawyer,
Gysbert Rudolphij, arrived in The Hague on September 19 and proceeded first to the States
General, where they delivered the company’s position, both verbally and in writing, and
submitted a separate letter signed by Van der Camer, Vett, and Schonenborch, the
representatives of the States General present at the meeting in Middelburg. 104 In this fashion the
company’s position was represented on multiple levels: while the delegation's report provided
the views of the Heren XIX as a whole, the separate letter from the States General’s own
representatives confirmed their advice and lent credibility to the associated military plans.
In the States of Holland, which the delegation addressed two days later, the directors
largely followed the script that had been agreed to in Middelburg, but to give the information
additional salience they emphasized Portugal’s likely role in supporting the revolt, contrary to
the terms of the 1641 Treaty. They reported on the conspiracy to murder Dutch officials at the
wedding ceremony and “God’s grace in making this treachery known,” and formally requested
700,000 guilders to relieve the colony. 105 This request was debated over the following several
days, during which time the States General recommended taking the needed 1,500 men from the
5,000 soldiers on their way back from Denmark, where they had fought alongside Sweden in the
103 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 26, fol. See also Henk den Heijer, “Plannen voor Samenvoeging van de VOC en WIC,”
Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis 2 (Jaargang 1994): 115-130.
104 NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for September 19, 1645.
105 Staten van Holland and Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties, entry for September 21, 1645.
74

Thorsteinson War, and called on the States of Holland to pay the balance of the subsidies they
owed to the company. 106 Similar messages came from other sources: Jacob Cats (1577-1660), the
poet and Raad Pensionaris, who served in the powerful position as chair in the States of Holland,
delivered a letter from the company requesting financial assistance and on September 26 the
States received a letter from the Prince of Orange lamenting the situation in Brazil and
requesting prompt assistance to lift “the heavy burden hanging over the heads” of the company's
directors and the colony. 107 The collective weight of these messages had some effect: according
to Nicholas Stellingwerf, the delegate to the States of Holland from Medenblik, there was
general agreement to provide the company with additional funds as quickly as possible. Only
Amsterdam objected: although the city wielded but one of nineteen votes, its financial and
political influence was such that no resolution could be reached without its support. 108 Cautious
about irritating Portugal, Amsterdam repeatedly asked for additional time to consider the matter
and effectively succeeded in blocking any support from the States of Holland.
The delegation to the States of Zeeland was more successful. Led by Louys and De Laet,
and joined by the other members of the sub-committee from Middelburg, along with the Zeeland
chamber's lawyer, this delegation was given an audience on September 16. 109 Present were
representatives of each of Zeeland’s seven cities, as well as Johan de Knuyt (1587-1654),
representative of the Eerste Edele (First Nobleman), the Prince of Orange. 110 Again, the
delegation closely followed their script, but rather than dwelling on Portugal's treachery, they
106 Ibid., entry for September 23, 1645. During the Thorsteinson War (1643-45) the Dutch entered an alliance with
Sweden to force Christian IV, King of Denmark-Norway, to abandon protectionist policies in the Baltic. A peace
agreement was signed on August 13, 1645, freeing personnel for possible service in Brazil. See Israel, The Dutch
Republic, 543–544.
107 Staten van Holland and Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties, September 23 and September 26, 1645.
108 Westfries Archief, Medemblik 0715, inv. 131, entry for September 27, 1645.
109 Resoluties van de Staten van Zeeland, entry for September 16, 1645.
110 On De Knuyt, see J. H. Kluiver, De Souvereine en Independente Staat Zeeland (Middelburg: De Zwarte Arend,
1998), 116–118.
75

emphasized the considerable sums invested in the company and the potential repercussions for
ordinary shareholders if the colony were to be lost. This was a message tailored to the cities of
Zeeland, where anti-Iberian sentiment required little encouragement, and where public
institutions and small shareholders may have made up a larger share of total investment. 111 The
delegation warned that the company was in danger of going under completely: “We whole-
heartedly cry out, ‘Help us,’” they apparently said, “‘or we shall perish.’” If no action was taken,
all that would be left would be “the tears of widows, orphans, and other miserable, dejected
persons” who had placed their faith in the company. 112 Immediately after the delegation
departed, the States of Zeeland resolved—over initial opposition from the smaller, inland cities
of Goes and Zierkzee—to fulfill their obligations for 1635, with monies collected by the 500 th
penny. 113 A few days later, after receiving another delegation from the company and a letter from
the Prince of Orange, the cities began negotiations to pay their respective portion of the subsidies
for 1636 and 1637. 114 If the sum itself was small, it nevertheless represented an important vote of
confidence.
Scholars have long noted that Amsterdam was skeptical of the enormous costs of
expanding and defending Dutch Brazil, and they have equally pointed to Zeeland’s continuing
support for the company and its colony. 115 The analysis here, based on the circulation of
information about the revolt, suggests that Amsterdam was in fact isolated in initially opposing
111
Ibid., 181-182.
112
Resoluties van de Staten van Zeeland, entry for September 16, 1645. “Dogh over het geene voorby is,
genoegsaem tot Onse descharge gebleken zynde, dat Wy allenthalven, met solicitatien, de gedreygende [threatened]
swarigheden hebben voor d'oogen gestelt, zulcx, dat nu staende allenlyck te sien op 't gene voor de handt is,
genootdruckt werden volmondigh uyt te roepen, helpt Ons, of Wy vergaen, ende dadelyck te bethoonen tot die
perplexiteyt gebraght te zyn, dat, in plaetse van woorden, vreesen, voortaen niet zullen hebben uyt te storten, dan
tranen van Weduwen, Weesen, ende andere miserable bedruckte Persoonen, Geinteresseerde in de Compagnie, en U
Ed. Mog. Onderdanen.”
113
Ibid.
114
Ibid., entry for September 22, 1645.
115
Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654; Van Hoboken, “The Dutch West India Company: the Political
Background of Its Rise and Decline”; Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek”;
Kluiver, De Souvereine en Independente Staat Zeeland.
76

elief to Brazil. The company drew support not only from Zeeland, but also from the Prince of
Orange, Gelderland, Groningen, Overijssel, Utrecht, and even the majority of cities in
Holland. 116 The Amsterdam city council remained opposed to putting new money into the
company, but even in Amsterdam the picture is not so clear. On September 14, Abraham Erude,
Joseph Acosta, and Jeronimo Nunes, Portuguese Jewish merchants living in Amsterdam,
travelled to Middelburg to present the Heren XIX with a formal remonstrance asking the
directors to ensure that their sugar was exported from Recife without delay and to “protect the
company's territories” in Brazil. 117 They were given assurances and asked to make their concerns
known to the “government of this land,” and especially the city of Amsterdam. Two weeks later
they did just that, presenting a formal remonstrance to both the States General and the City of
Amsterdam, the latter including a petition with 93 signatures of Amsterdam merchants trading to
Brazil. 118 Despite this pressure to defend the colony, Amsterdam continued to withhold its
approval. Changing the city's position would require additional pressure.
116 NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for October 28, 1645.
117 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. 5. “met aen wyssinge van de middelen de welcke soude mogen worden
aengewent ende soo haest mogel. wesende sonder tyt versuymen int wreck gestelt, om de suykeren van daer over te
bringen ende het Landt te bewaaren tot voorcomminge van een totale ruyne voor de negotianten ende groote schade
voor de comp.” Born in Florence in 1620, Jeronimo Nunes moved to Amsterdam in 1642 and was appointed Agent
of the Portuguese Crown in May 1645, beginning a long career furthering Portuguese interests in the Dutch
Republic. His presence in this delegation is indicative of the overlapping and potentially conflicting loyalties of
Amsterdam’s Portuguese Jews. At least at this early stage in the revolt, it appears that a number of Jewish merchants
saw their interests best protected by a continuation of Dutch rule in Pernambuco. On Nunes see Jonathan Israel,
“The Diplomatic Career of Jeronimo Nunes Da Costa: An Episode in Dutch-Portuguese Relations of the
Seventeenth Century,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 98, no. a/1 (1983):
167–190.
118 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Letter from Merchants of Amsterdam Trading to Brazil, received by the States General
on October 2, 1645.
77

4. Johannes de Laet as “Information Master”
Arguably no individual figure was more involved in the company’s lobbying campaign, and in
the translation of information into decision-making, than Johannes de Laet. That September he
was the senior delegate from the Amsterdam chamber in the Heren XIX, a participant on the
committee that crafted the company’s message to the provincial assemblies, and one of the
delegates who delivered this message to the States of Zeeland. While scholars have noted De
Laet’s roles as an investor and director, their evaluation of his contribution to the company has
focused overwhelmingly on his work as a scholar, compiler, and writer. 119 In addition to his
Nieuwe Wereldt De Laet composed a detailed account of Brazil’s geography and anthropology
for Johan Maurits before the latter’s departure to Brazil at the end of 1636 and a comprehensive
historical work, the Iaerlyck Verhael. 120 These texts, all of which flowed directly from De Laet’s
association with the company and drew heavily on its archive in Amsterdam, reveal an
impressive ability to identify, evaluate, organize, and synthesize information. 121
But this is hardly the whole story, and it is difficult to agree with Benjamin Schmidt’s
characterization that, in comparison to Grotius, De Laet “opted for the life of a scholarly
scholar.” 122 Seeing De Laet’s role in the company's response to the revolt in Brazil, and the way
that he marshaled information to influence policy, we gain a much fuller picture; one that better
119
Bekkers, “Introduction”; P. G. Hoftijzer, “The Library of Johannes de Laet,” LIAS: The Journal of Early Modern
History of Ideas 25, no. 2 (1998): 201–216; Bremmer Jr., “The Correspondence of Johannes De Laet as a Mirror on
His Life”; Rubiés, “Hugo Grotius’s Dissertation on the Origin of the American Peoples and the Use of Comparative
Methods”; Schmidt, “Space, Time, Travel: Hugo de Groot, Johannes de Laet, and the ‘Advancement’ of Geographic
Learning.”
120
De Laet, Nieuwe Wereldt: Ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien; De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen
der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie; De Laet, Suiker, Verfhout & Tabak. See also, Jacobs, “Johannes de
Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld.”; Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640.
121
See Ben Teensma's introduction in Suiker, Verfhout & Tabak, where he describes De Laet's style as "didactic,
systematic, detailed, and productive." Ibid., 14.
122
Schmidt, “Space, Time, Travel: Hugo de Groot, Johannes de Laet, and the ‘Advancement’ of Geographic
Learning,” 193.
78

integrates his scholarly output with his role as an expert, manager, strategist, and publicist. 123
This section steps back from the narrative to examine De Laet’s responsibilities as a company
director. Following Jacob Soll, it argues that De Laet played a very similar role in the WIC that
Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) played in the French State; that is, he was an “information
master,” for whom information was a tool of politics. 124 This perspective helps complete
important parts of his biography, but it also allows us to probe the relationship between
information and power in the Dutch Republic.
As Jaap Jacobs and others have shown, De Laet's influence within the WIC stemmed
initially from his financial stake. 125 His personal investment of 54,000 guilders made him the
company’s third largest single investor and ensured him a coveted directorship in the Amsterdam
chamber, a position he retained for all but three years between 1621 and his death in 1649. 126 In
addition, De Laet was one of a handful of investors in the agricultural and trading colony of New
Netherland. 127 As his own correspondence attests, De Laet was torn between his managerial and
his scholarly commitments: after briefly stepping down as director in 1639, he wrote to the
English ambassador at The Hague, William Boswell (d. 1650), that it “was a most convenient
thing for me, for I will be more free to be with my family and to conduct my studies; and I will
not so often be an exile from my home.” 128 Four years later, when he had resumed his position,
he complained to his close friend, the Leiden scholar Claude Saumaise (1588-1653), that,
“Sometimes I greatly regret that I have shouldered this burden [...] for it is hardly possible to
123 Eric H. Ash, ed., Expertise: Practical Knowledge and the Early Modern State (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2010).
124 Soll, The information master.
125 Jacobs, “Johannes de Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld.”
126 Regionaal Archief Leiden 501A, inv.nr. 6701; NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 18*; Bekkers, “Introduction,” xvi; Jacobs,
“Johannes de Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld.”
127 Jacobs, “Johannes de Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld”; Rink, Holland on the Hudson; Venema, Kiliaen van
Rensselaer (1586-1643): designing a new world.
128 British Library Add Ms 6395, Johannes de Laet to William Boswell, August 10, 1639. John Kuhner kindly
assisted translating from the original Latin.
79

devote myself to my books.” 129 A second letter, sent to Saumaise later the same year, explained
the burden of his travel on the company’s behalf:
I have been busy for the last 14 days with the affairs of the [company], and although I hope to be
soon finished, there will soon be another meeting at The Hague, after which I will come back
here again. Consequently I am going back and forth the whole summer, and can't promise myself
any rest before the winter. 130
Quite aside from composing books and other materials for the company’s use, the frequent travel
back and forth to The Hague, Amsterdam, and Middelburg required of a company director
represented a considerable investment of time and energy. As De Laet grew older, and other
senior directors from the founding generation of the company either resigned their positions or
passed away, his responsibilities would have become proportionately greater. De Laet’s
complaints suggest that the burden of this responsibility was not always welcome, but they also
betray a long and deep commitment to actively promoting the company’s business. The nature
and significance of this commitment become clearer when we reconstruct his activities at all
three levels of the company's organization: the city (Leiden), chamber (Amsterdam), and board
of directors (Heren XIX).
De Laet came to Leiden as a student in 1597 and quickly established himself amongst the
city’s intellectual elite. 131 He lodged with the Counter-Remonstrant theologian Franciscus
Gomarus (1563-1641) and studied with the humanist scholar Joseph Scaliger (1540-1609),
joining a small circle of talented students that included the young Grotius. 132 After brief periods
of time in England, he returned to Leiden and became involved in city politics, most notably
129 Universiteitsbibliotheek Leiden PAP 7, Johannes de Laet to Claudius Salmasius, March 11, 1643. Chris
Heesakkers generously assisted translating from the original Latin.
130 Ibid., August 3, 1643.
131 Bremmer Jr., “The Correspondence of Johannes de Laet as a Mirror on his Life.”
132 On Joseph Scaliger, see Anthony Grafton, Joseph Scaliger: a Study in the History of Classical Scholarship, 2
vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
80

epresenting Leiden at the Synod of Dordrecht, where he earned other delegates’ respect for his
learning and his principled positions on key aspects of the negotiations. 133 When the city
magistrates came together to discuss Leiden's position in the newly formed WIC three years
later, De Laet again played a leading role. In addition to his own sizable investment, he was
responsible for an organizing committee that literally went door-to-door to inform citizens of the
company's plans and to solicit their financial contributions. 134 This effort was so successful that
the city raised 269,000 guilders, more than any city in the Republic save Amsterdam,
Middelburg, and Groningen. Just days after the charter was signed, De Laet was selected to
represent Leiden at The Hague and, on his return, was selected as one of the city's two directors.
By the terms of the charter, any city that raised at least 100,000 guilders earned a directorship in
one of the company’s chambers. At first Leiden considered splitting its investment between the
chambers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, “in order to keep an eye in two places at once,” but this
was rejected in favor of two seats in the Amsterdam chamber. 135
De Laet not only represented Leiden’s investors, he also served as a bridge between the
company and the city more broadly, including its University. In the most mundane sense, we can
see that De Laet used his office to direct patronage, recommending, for instance, that the
company purchase oxen for Brazil from a local farmer and promoting Leiden citizens for
positions in the company’s employment. 136 More substantively, De Laet maintained a regular
correspondence with the Amsterdam chamber and ensured that Leiden's financial and political
133 Henk Florijn, “Johannes de Laet and the Synod of Dort, 1618-1619,” LIAS: The Journal of Early Modern History
of Ideas 25, no. 2 (1998): 172.
134 Regionaal Archief Leiden 501A inv.nr. 6701; Jacobs, “Johannes de Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld”; Israel, The
Dutch Republic, 158.
135 Regionaal Archief Leiden 501A inv.nr. 6700, fol. 1. “[…] dat dienstich soude syn onse Capitael te verdelen in 2
sommen, en[de] diene vand hier te brengen in die Camer van Amsterdam aelent dien mesten te enal van andere
Capitaelen, en[de] oock de meestie administratie, mitsgaders voer die eerste ses jaeren de generale vergaderinge van
[de] negenthyene vallen sullen en[de] d'andere somme in eer vant camers van [de] Maze daermen de meeste
voordelen sal comen bedingen, om alsoo op twee plaetsen ter ooge int zeyl hebbende.”
136 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 14, entries for August 20 and October 10, 1635.
81

interests were adequately represented. Although there is little direct evidence, it is likely that De
Laet also facilitated correspondence and the exchange of information between the company and
the university. As Anthony Grafton has argued, Leiden was an urban campus, where university
and society as a whole “were locked together in a symbiosis that enriched both parties.” 137 The
concentration of books and manuscripts available in Leiden, along with the wide reading and
critical approach to sources that De Laet would have learned from Scaliger and others, were
crucial to his Neiuwe Wereldt. And the presence of a publisher like Elsevier, located only a few
doors down from De Laet’s house on the Rapenburg, helped transform both this book and the
Iaerlyck Verhael into prestigious, luxury editions for consumption by the Dutch elite. 138
Conversely, De Laet used his position in the company to furnish friends at the university with
natural and cultural specimens from all over the Western Hemisphere, a project that culminated
in the publication of Willem Piso (1611-1678) and Georg Markgraf’s (1610-c.1643)
sumptuously illustrated book on the flora and fauna of Brazil. 139 De Laet's status as an expert on
the New World was the collective product of his scholarly life in Leiden and his concrete
responsibilities as the city’s representative within the company, and each reinforced the other.
Our knowledge of De Laet's work within the Amsterdam chamber is limited by the
remaining sources, which include only a single volume (covering two years) of the chamber’s
minutes during the period that De Laet served as a director. 140 Nevertheless, these are sufficient
to paint a very persuasive picture of his activities. The chamber met every Monday and
Thursday, though occasionally meetings would be held on other days as well. In 1635 De Laet
137 Grafton, Bring Out Your Dead, 128.
138 The latter apparently was known as "one of the most prestigious books published by the firm Elsevier." Cited in
Bremmer Jr., “The Correspondence of Johannes De Laet as a Mirror on His Life,” 151.
139 Willem Piso, Georg Markgraf, and Johannes de Laet, Historia Natvralis Brasiliae [...]: in qua non tantum plantæ
et animalia, sed et indigenarum morbi, ingenia et mores describuntur et iconibus supra quingentas illustrantur
(Leiden: Franciscus Hackius, 1648).
140 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 14, Resoluties van de Camer Amsterdam, 1635-36.
82

was present at twenty-seven of these meetings and in 1636 he was present at thirty-three. 141
Given that Leiden was half a day's journey from Amsterdam, this is an impressive record of
involvement. Equally important, by the mid-1630s, De Laet was in his mid-fifties, making him
one of the more senior directors in the chamber. The significance of this is borne out by his
selection to serve on the committee of rekenmeesters (accountants), one of eleven standing
committees that were modeled on similar committees in the VOC. 142 Each committee had a
specialized area of responsibility, such as handling trade goods, outfitting ships, procuring “dry”
and “wet” provisions and medicines, recruiting soldiers, and overseeing the colonies of Curaçao
and New Netherland, which together were administered by the Amsterdam chamber on behalf of
the company as a whole. 143 The committee of rekenmeesters was responsible for keeping track of
all the chamber's finances, including invested capital, obligations, operating expenses, and
profits. This was challenging in its own right, and would have required both trust and
considerable skills in mathematics and accounting. 144 But it also required diplomatic skills, since
in order for the company to calculate profit and loss in general, the individual chambers needed
to reconcile all their accounts with one another at the end of each year. The status associated with
these activities is confirmed by two pieces of evidence: first, all five members of the committee
of rekenmeesters were senior directors in the chamber. Second, the committee formed to manage
the difficult problem of populating Brazil included all of its members, plus Albert Coenraeds
Burgh, later burgemeester of Amsterdam and, together with De Laet, probably the most powerful
person in the chamber.
141
Ibid. De Laet's attendance does not include days on which he attended meetings of the Heren XIX on the
chamber's behalf. He also wrote many letters to the chamber while he was in Leiden.
142
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 14, entry for June 30, 1636. Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie.
143
Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC; Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland; Venema, Kiliaen van
Rensselaer (1586-1643): Designing a New World.
144
See Donna Merwick, “A Genre of Their Own: Kiliaen van Rensselaer as Guide to the Reading and Writing
Practices of Early Modern Businessmen,” The William and Mary Quarterly 65, no. 4, Third Series (October 2008):
669–712.
83

De Laet's substantive work in the Amsterdam chamber did not end there. Once again, the
surviving sources provide only a very narrow window, but in the years 1635 and 1636 De Laet
twice served on subcommittees charged with drafting the agenda for the meetings of the Heren
XIX and was selected to represent Amsterdam three times, in March and September 1635 and
then again in June 1636. 145 He also traveled regularly to The Hague to meet with representatives
of the States of Holland and the States General. One example from 1636 is particularly notable:
throughout the early part of the year, discussions had been ongoing to identify an individual (or
individuals) to travel to Brazil to strengthen the company's colonial government. As late as
August 4, the directors were instructed, “to consider capable people to serve on the secret council
in Brazil.” 146 The following day, De Laet reported back from the meetings of the Heren XIX in
The Hague that Johan Maurits had been asked to serve as “Governor, Admiral, and Captain
General of the Conquests in Brazil,” and that he was likely to accept. 147 There is no evidence that
De Laet himself identified Maurits for the position, and he was only one of five directors in the
chamber that subsequently were tasked with identifying councilors to serve together with
Maurits in Recife. But De Laet’s role in conveying this highly sensitive piece of information, as
well as his subsequent work helping to draft the formal instructions and terms of Maurits’
contract, make clear that he was very close to the center of decision-making within the
Amsterdam chamber. 148 As Ben Teensma has shown, De Laet also was responsible for drafting a
lengthy manuscript roteiro (geographical and ethnological guidebook) for Maurits’ personal use
145 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 14, entries for March 16 and September 13, 1635 and May 31, 1636.
146 Ibid., entry for August 4, 1636. “De heeren werden vermaent te dencken op capable personen tot secrete raeden
in Brasil.”
147 Ibid., entry for August 5, 1636.
148 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.20, no. 120. Benoemingsbrief van Johan Maurits, graaf van Nassau, tot Gouverneur
Generaal en Admiraal van Brazilie, met ambtsbevoegdheden van graaf van Nassau als GG van Brazilie, en
Voorwaarden aangeboden door de Heren XIX aan de graaf van Nassau.
84

once he arrived in Brazil. 149 De Laet’s involvement in the negotiations to select and confirm the
new governor suggest, once again, that his written work grew out of and supplemented, rather
than expressed, the most important elements of his contribution to the company’s business.
And the same was true for the meetings of the Heren XIX. Of the ten meetings of the
company’s board for which records remain, De Laet was present at five. 150 Based on extracts,
letters, and other documents it is clear that he attended at least ten more, so that we can say with
some certainty that he attended a minimum of fifteen meetings of the Heren XIX between 1622
and 1649, and possibly more. 151 This means that De Laet’s would have been one of the most
familiar faces on the company’s board, including not only the directors of the various chambers
but also the noblemen who served on the committees on WIC affairs at The Hague and returned
year and after year to represent the States General in the Heren XIX. 152 This familiarity ensured a
modicum of continuity and memory in an institution that otherwise had no permanent
membership. Since De Laet was often the most senior delegate from Amsterdam, which hosted
the meetings six of every eight years, he also would have had plenty of experience as chair.
Except in a very few cases, it is impossible to extract from the remaining sources the
views or competencies of any specific individual within the Heren XIX. Resolutions by their very
nature hide the discussion that preceded them, and even the lists that show the membership of the
sub-committees that did much of the board’s work cannot tell us who took which position, or
wielded authority on a specific matter. Nevertheless, the list of committees on which De Laet
served provides almost a microcosm of the company’s history as a whole, reinforcing the view
149 De Laet, Suiker, verfhout & tabak.
150 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 1; NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6 and 12564.17; NA 1.10.69, inv.nr. 542. These include
meetings in the fall of 1623, spring 1624, spring 1634, spring 1638, and fall 1645.
151 NA 1.01.04, inv.nrs. 5753-5758; NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.15; NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 20; NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 9.
These include meetings in the spring of 1626, fall 1629, spring 1630, winter and summer of 1631, Spring 1633, fall
1635, summer 1636, summer 1643, fall 1644, and fall 1646.
152 See Chapters Three and Four of this dissertation.
85

that, even at the beginning, De Laet rarely was far away from the deliberations on the most
difficult questions the company faced. In May 1623, he participated in the delicate negotiations
to amend the charter to provide a greater management role for the hoofdparticipanten, or chief
investors in the company, a milestone in the formal recognition of investor rights. 153 In April
1624, as the Heren XIX planned the Groote Dessyn (Grand Design) to simultaneously attack
Bahia, Elmina, and Loanda, De Laet was summoned for the explicit purpose of sharing his
knowledge of geography. 154 That same year he served on the committee charged with drafting
the rights and exemptions for investors who hoped to establish colonies in New Netherland. 155 In
1629 he participated in deliberations at The Hague to ensure the company's interests in peace
negotiations with Spain that began that year. 156 In December 1636 he was one of several
directors who represented Amsterdam at the States General to protest the closure of free trade to
Brazil; he then served in the Heren XIX in February 1638 when the trade was re-opened to
private merchants and a new monopoly created on the trade in slaves. 157 Later that year he
lobbied the States General to send additional troops to support Maurits' campaigns in Brazil. 158
In July 1643, he helped the company craft a reply to Portugal's quite legitimate complaints that
the Dutch had seized Maranhão, Angola, and the island of São Tomé after peace negotiations
had been completed and a non-aggression treaty signed. 159 And, in 1645, De Laet began what
153
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5752. On investor rights, see Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie; William N.
Goetzmann and K. Geert Rouwenhorst, eds., The Origins of Value: The Financial Innovations that Created Modern
Capital Markets (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
154
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 1, entry for October 31, 1623.
155
Ibid., entry for March 28, 1624.
156
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5752.
157
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, entry for January 21, 1637; NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6.
158
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754.
159
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.18, entries for July 3 and August 7, 1643.
86

would become a two-year campaign lobbying the States General to provide military support to
end the Portuguese revolt in Brazil. 160
This work touched on a number of aspects of the company's business, but especially on
issues relating to investors, the company’s colonies, and relations with Portugal and Spain. The
first of these areas of engagement was probably no more than a reflection of De Laet’s
considerable personal stake in the company, but the other two recognized and put to practical use
his geographical and historical knowledge and his impressive linguistic abilities. 161 This range
and depth of involvement made De Laet an excellent diplomat for the company, not only at
home, but also abroad. In June 1641, shortly after the Spanish had destroyed the Providence
Island Company's Caribbean colony, De Laet was approached by Sir Thomas Roe, Robert Rich,
and other wealthy Englishmen to provide Parliament with advice on establishing an English
West India Company on the Dutch model. 162 The onset of England’s Civil War prevented De
Laet from formally addressing Parliament, and such a company never got off the ground, but De
Laet’s correspondence from London makes clear that he did not think this group of English
aristocrats were up to the task, being “not sufficiently aware of the things which are required for
the proper establishment of a company of this sort, nor do they understand exactly how much
money is needed.” 163 For potential allies as well colleagues within the Dutch Republic, De Laet’s
intimate knowledge of the company’s history and structure made him the ideal person to
represent its interests at the highest levels of government.
160 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17.
161 Bremmer Jr., “The Correspondence of Johannes de Laet as a Mirror on His Life”; Bremmer Jr., “‘Mine is Bigger
than Yours’: The Anglo-Saxon Collection of Johannes de Laet and Sir Simonds D’Ewes.”
162 British Library Add Ms 6395, fol. 120, Johannes de Laet to William Boswell, June 18, 1641. See also Bekkers,
“Introduction”; Bremmer Jr., “‘Mine is Bigger than Yours’: The Anglo-Saxon Collection of Johannes de Laet
(1581-1649) and Sir Simonds D’Ewes (1602-50)”; Appleby, “An Association for the West Indies? English Plans for
a West India Company 1621-29”; Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630-1641, 343.
163 British Library Add Ms 6395, fol. 120, Johannes de Laet to William Boswell, June 18, 1641. The translation is
by John Kuhner.
87

De Laet’s presence at the meetings of the Heren XIX in Middelburg in September 1645
represented a continuation along this trajectory. He spent much of 1643 and the first several
months of 1644 composing the Iaerlyck Verhael, a book whose dry detail and chronological
organization reflect what must have been many hours among the ships journals, memoranda, and
other documents stored in the Amsterdam chamber’s archives. When this book was published, in
November 1644, De Laet was back in Amsterdam attending the fall meetings of the Heren XIX
helping to draft a new set of regulations for private trade within the areas covered by the
company’s charter. 164 As we have seen, De Laet was again selected to represent Amsterdam for
the meetings in Middelburg, where he was on the committee tasked with developing a response
to the news of the revolt in Brazil. As part of this effort, he began another project: to collect,
synthesize, and prepare for the States General evidence that the King of Portugal had provided
assistance to the rebels, in defiance of the terms of the 1641 Treaty.
By September 18, 1645 Francisco De Sousa Coutinho (1597-1660), the Portuguese
ambassador at The Hague, already was warning that the rumors had shifted from speaking of an
uprising to speculation that the Portuguese governor in Bahia was responsible for supporting the
rebels. 165 This information came first from Paris, where it was reported that the King of Portugal
claimed to be “master of Pernambuco” once again, and had requested that France intercede with
the Dutch Republic on Portugal's behalf. According to Jan Louys, who wrote the States General
from Middelburg, the news was consistent with the contents of “many private letters” from
Portugal itself. 166 This information was crucial, both for the bleak picture it painted of events in
Brazil since the end of June, the date of the last generale missiven, and because it strongly
164 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5757, entry for September 19, 1644.
165 Coutinho, Correspondência Diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho Durante a sua Embaixada em
Holanda, 310. Sousa Coutinho to Conde da Vidigueira, September 18, 1645.
166 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Extract uyt een brief van Louys dato 23 September 1645; NA 3.01.04.01, inv.nr. 77,
Resolutions of the States of Holland, October 3, 1645.
88

implied that the King of Portugal intended to reclaim the portions of Brazil that had been under
Dutch control and to integrate them back into Portugal’s overseas empire. Coutinho followed
these developments closely, reporting that “every day the rumors are different,” but that there
had been no new ships from Brazil, and thus the company “goes around with one foot on top of
the other,” almost literally tripping over itself to convince the States General to provide financial
and military assistance before it was too late. 167
The swirl of contrasting accounts of events in Brazil made it difficult for the company to
obtain the support it believed was necessary. In response, the Heren XIX composed and
submitted to the States General a memorandum that detailed, in eighteen separate points, all the
evidence it had collected concerning Portuguese involvement in the events in Brazil. This
document bears all the hallmarks of De Laet’s work:
Evidence drawn from diverse letters and other papers, as well as private communications and oral
reports, received by the directors of the West India Company concerning the recently transpired
events in Brazil [...] whereby it is shown that this treachery cannot have been carried out without
the knowledge of the Portuguese governor in Bahia, and indeed of Portugal itself. 168
In fact the memorandum conveyed little information that wasn’t known already: it recounted, for
example, the story of the plot to assassinate members of the Hoge Raad and other principle
officers at the wedding ceremony in Recife, and distilled portions of both Bernardo Caravalho's
167 Coutinho, Correspondência Diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho Durante a sua Embaixada em
Holanda. Sousa Coutinho to Conde da Vidigueira, September 25, 1645. I am grateful to Diana Brown for translating
this passage.
168 NA 1.01.04 inv.nr. 5758, Memorie vant geene uyt verscheyden missiven..., dated September 28, 1645. A note on
the reverse of the cover page indicates that the document accompanied Louys' letter of September 23, but also that it
was delivered by Gysbert Rudolphij, lawyer for the Amsterdam chamber. The form and content of the letter, as well
as the fact that it came from Amsterdam, strongly suggest De Laet's authorship. “Memorie vant geene uyt
verscheyden missiven, ende andere pampieren, als particuliere advysen ende mondelinge rapporten, byde
Bewinthebberen van de Westindische Comp. wegen het jonste gepaseerde in Brazil verstaen is, waer uyt by provisie
(: ende tot dat naarder verclaeringe sullen becomen syn :) genoucksaem bespeurt ende affgemeten can werden, dat
de revolte ende verradische voornemen, van de Portugysen (: op den staat ende conquesten vande voors. Comp. :)
aldaer niet sonder kennisse vande Portuguysen Gouverueur inde Bahia, als die van Poortugael selver, syn
gepractiseert ende int werck gestelt.”
89

confessions under interrogation and the council's assessments of the movement of Indian and
black troops from Bahia. Based on the letters from “private persons in Portugal,” it reported
intelligence that several “extraordinary ships, troops, and weapons of war” were being prepared
to sail to Bahia, and supported this by citing the Dutch skipper's testimony from Terceira. If the
information was hardly new, and the evidence connecting the revolt to the King himself
painfully thin, the memorandum's condensed presentation nonetheless laid it all out and made a
plausible argument for how the information should be interpreted: the Portuguese inhabitants, it
concluded, “could not have acted alone, but must have relied on the help of others.” 169 In concert
with pressure from other actors in the States of Holland and the States General, this information
was sufficient to convince Amsterdam to support the relief fleet.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has shown, among other things, a case of how humanism and politics were
interwoven in the Dutch Republic. This was hardly unusual either in the Republic or early
modern Europe, but its central place within a joint-stock company points to the unusual role that
the WIC played within the Dutch political system. 170 Many scholars have explored the
importance of the collection and management of information to the centralization the state. In
Venice, Paolo Sarpi consulted the massive collection of diplomatic dispatches housed in the
Venetian archives, while in Spain King Philip II tried to keep up with the thousands of pages of
169 Ibid.
170 An excellent example is Justus Lipsius’ analysis of Polybius to inform Prince Maurits' military strategy in the
1590s. See Momigliano Arnaldo, Polybius Between the English and the Turks, J. L. Myers Memorial Lecture
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
90

eports from America and elsewhere that literally covered his desk. 171 In France, Colbert
assembled and meticulously organized a library of documents relating to population, geography,
trade, noble titles, and French law, and used this information to plan state policy, impose Royal
authority, and advance France's diplomatic interests. 172 In Rome, the Jesuits employed an
elaborate system of letters and questionnaires to centrally administer a vast network of missions.
In England, where gentlemen preparing for the Grand Tour were educated to gather intelligence
for the use of the Crown, the story is similar: early modern state craft demanded the effective
accumulation, organization, and use of information. 173
During the first half of the seventeenth century the States General had devised new
methods for collecting and storing information, as well, and its offices in The Hague filled with
papers and a professional staff of functionaries who managed them. 174 But the States General no
more could claim a monopoly on information than it could a monopoly on power itself.
In the absence of a single figure or central institution to which information flowed and
from which decisions emanated—the King in Spain, England, or France; the Council in Venice
and the Jesuit Curia in Rome—in the Dutch Republic the central nodes for information were the
companies themselves. 175 In the case of the VOC, information from abroad flowed back to an
army of clerks at home who organized correspondence and other records in a manner that would,
in time, permit predictions concerning the movement of prices. 176 In the case of the WIC and
171
Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice; Friedrich, “Government and Information-Management in Early
Modern Europe: The Case of the Society of Jesus (1540-1773).”
172
Soll, The information master; See also Erik Thomson, “Commerce, Law, and Erudite Culture: The Mechanics of
Theodore Godefroy’s Service to Cardinal Richelieu,” Journal of the History of Ideas 68, no. 3 (July 2007): 407–428.
173
Nicholas Popper, “Cultivating Experience in Elizabethan England: Expertise in Travel Observation, Exploration
and Political Authority,” 2009. Unpublished paper, cited with permission of the author.
174
Knevel, Het Haagse bureau.
175
Siegfried Huigen, Jan L. de Jong, and Elmer Kolfin, eds., The Dutch Trading Companies as Knowledge Networks
(Leiden: Brill, 2011).
176
Smith, “The Function of Commercial Centers in the Modernization of European Capitalism: Amsterdam as an
Information Exchange in the Seventeenth Century,” 999–1003.
91

Brazil this meant the Heren XIX, which from its temporary position in Middelburg shared
information about the revolt with the company's chambers, the States General, the Prince of
Orange, and provincial assemblies. Its control over information from Africa and the New World
gave it important powers to influence the course of the Republic’s foreign policy. In this context
De Laet's contribution to the company was less that of mercator sapiens, the wise merchant
celebrated by Casper Barlaeus for his learning and humanity, than of the deliberate use of
scholarship to advance political, military, and colonial aims. 177 This, in turn, required careful
coordination with the States General.
How did the Heren XIX develop this unique place in the politics of the Dutch Republic?
And how were the terms of cooperation with the States General laid down? To answer these
questions, we need to re-examine of the process that created the company in the first two decades
of the seventeenth century and the routines established during the first meetings of the Heren
XIX between 1622 and 1624.
177 Caspar van Baerle, Mercator Sapiens: Oratie gehouden bij de Inwijding van de Illustre School te Amsterdam op
9 Januari 1632, ed. S. van der Woude (Amsterdam: Universiteitsbibliotheek, 1967).
92

1. Introduction
Chapter Three
A Council of the Indies for the Dutch Republic?
The Origins of a Company Board
The WIC was granted a 24-year charter by the States General on June 3, 1621. 1 Although many
people were involved in its formation, historians have long pointed to the tireless agitation of a
single figure, Willem Usselincx. 2 Born in Antwerp in 1567, Usselincx was one of the most
innovative economic theorists of his generation. When Antwerp was sacked by Spanish troops in
1585, he traveled to Spain, Portugal, and the Azores, where he gained first-hand experience of
the wealth of the New World and the manner in which it was extracted by the Iberian powers.
Sometime around 1591 he migrated north and settled in Amsterdam, where he was quickly
absorbed into the city's merchant and intellectual elite. By his own account, Usselincx began
advocating for a WIC during the last years of the sixteenth century. 3 In a 1608 pamphlet, he
argued that the Dutch could exploit the riches of the New World by planting settler colonies in
1 Den Heijer, “The Twelve Years’ Truce and the Founding of the Dutch West India Company.”
2 J. Franklin Jameson, Willem Usselinx: Founder of the Dutch and Swedish West India Companies (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1887); Catharina Ligtenberg, Willem Usselinx (Utrecht: A. Oosthoek, 1914); Otto van Rees,
Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, vol. 2 (Utrecht: Kemink en
Zoon, 1868). A more recent discussion can be found in Benjamin Schmidt, Innocence Abroad: The Dutch
Imagination and the New World, 1570-1670 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 176-184.
3 A. C. Meijer, Liefhebbers des Vaderlands ende Beminders van de Commercie: de Plannen tot Oprichting van een
Generale Westindische Compagnie gedurende de Jaren 1606-1609 (Middelburg: Zeeuwsch Genootschap, 1986).
93

Illustration 7. Portrait of Willem Usselincx, 1637. Schilderijencollectie
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. Born in Antwerp, Usselinx was a pamphleteer
and advocate for a Dutch West India Company.
94

the area north of the Amazon River. 4 “The general belief,” he wrote, “is that the greatest riches
from the Indies are derived from Gold and Silver,” but in fact,
This is a great misunderstanding: because the greatest riches lie in the diverse fruits that can be
found there, such as Sugar, Ginger, Indigo, Cochineal, Sasparilla, and dry goods such as diverse
sorts of Wood, Skins, Pearls, and Stones: and then again in the diverse Manufactures, Wares, and
Trade Goods that the Spanish send there, whereby the Merchants, Officials, Sailors, Inhabitants,
and all the others live. 5
Settlement and trade, in other words, were the twin foundations for success in the New World.
Usselincx advocated peaceful relations with the Indians and opposed slavery, not only because it
was contrary to Christian morals, but because it would prohibit the development of a free
population with the means necessary to consume Dutch manufactures. 6 Over the next two
decades Usselincx repeated these themes in literally dozens of pamphlets and proposals meant to
persuade the States General, city councils, and provincial assemblies of the benefits of erecting a
West India Company. 7
But the company’s birth did not come about as Usselincx envisioned. During the final set
of negotiations, his carefully conceived draft for the company's new charter was set aside in
favor of a rival draft generated by a committee within the States of Holland, and by the time the
charter was approved Usselinx found himself marginalized. In place of his plans to promote
4 Willem Usselincx, Vertoogh, hoe Nootwendich, Nut ende Profytelick het sy voor de Vereenighde Nederlanden te
Behouden de Vryheyt van te Handelen op Westindien, 1608. Knuttel 1442.
5 Cited in Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, 90. “Het
ghemeen ghevoelen hiervan is, dat den meesten Rijckfom van dyen handel soude ghelegen zijn inde rijcke Goudt
ende Silvere Mijnen die Indien heeft. Dan t’selve is een groot misverstant: want den meesten Rijckdom bestaet inde
verscheyden vruchten ende ghewassen die in die Landen van Indien vallen, als daer zijn Suycker, Gember, Indigo,
Cochenille, Salsaperille, ende ander Drogheryen: als mede diversche soorten van Houdt, Huyden, Peerlen ende
gesteenten: ende wederom inde verscheyden manufacturen, Waren ende Coopmanschappen, die van Spaengien
derwaerts ghevoert werden, waer by den Coopman, Ambachtsman, Schippers, Landtlieden, ende meest alle de
ghemeenten leven.”
6 Ernst van den Boogaart and Pieter C. Emmer, “Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” in The
Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, ed. Henry A. Gemery and Jan S.
Hogendorn (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 355.
7 Ligtenberg, Willem Usselinx.
95

peaceful settlement along the fringes of Spain’s New World empire, the new company’s
directors began planning for direct attacks on Spanish and Portuguese positions in Bahia,
Elmina, and Loanda. Usselincx was stunned and bitterly disappointed. As Henk den Heijer
describes it, his ideas, especially for the company's charter, ultimately “amounted to nothing.” 8
This chapter revises this now well-established interpretation. By examining five separate
drafts of the charter—along with the annotations of various participants in the negotiations—it
suggests that Usselincx's proposals were more influential than previously thought. In particular,
the chapter looks at Usselincx’s idea for a Raedt van Indien (Council of the Indies) that would
strengthen central authority over the company by giving noblemen and the States General an
important say in the company’s affairs. This was one of the most controversial elements of
Usselincx’s draft, and it was firmly rejected by the States of Holland. A closer look, however,
reveals that important elements of such a council were in fact included in the final language of
the charter during the last phase of the negotiations. A careful reconstruction of these
negotiations helps us to better understand the mechanisms for coordinating between the company
and the States General, and the ways that the Heren XIX evolved from a clone of the VOC’s
board of directors to a body tailored to the specific needs of Atlantic conquest. It also permits
fresh examination of the first few meetings of the Heren XIX, when the formal terms of the
charter were put into practice and a working balance was struck between the diverse interests
involved in the new company.
Despite its central role, the Heren XIX has received almost no attention from either
economic or colonial historians. 9 This is due in part to the fact that the WIC has for centuries
lived under the shadow of the VOC, and in part to the scarcity of sources. This applies not only
8 Henk den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie: de VOC en de WIC als Voorlopers van de Naamloze
Vennootschap (Amsterdam: Stichting tot Bevordering der Notariële Wetenschap, 2005), 50.
9 An important exception is Den Heijer in Ibid., 121-128.
96

to meeting minutes, but also to the record left by contemporary chroniclers. Johannes de Laet’s
history of the WIC was studiously silent on the company's internal management, almost certainly
to avoid discussion of the acrimonious disputes that dogged the company’s board. 10 There is thus
no equivalent to the analysis of the Heren XVII found in Pieter van Dam’s exhaustive account of
the “constitution, government, and trade” of the VOC, composed between 1693-1701. 11 While
the Heren XVII have been lionized within Dutch historiography, the Heren XIX have been
largely forgotten. To see the contrast one need only examine the chapter headings in J. G. van
Dillen’s magnum opus on the Dutch economy, Van Rijkdom en Regenten (Of Regents and
Riches). The section on the VOC is entitled, “Het Bedrijf van de Heren XVII” (The work of the
Gentlemen XVII); that on the WIC more prosaically, “Afrika en Amerika.” 12 For the VOC we are
presented with an agent, for the WIC, only a geographic region. We still know precious little
about the way the Heren XIX functioned, the individuals that staffed its meetings, and the polices
it developed to address the combined challenges of war, commerce, and colonial administration.
Answering these questions requires suspending contemporary assumptions about the role and
composition of a modern corporate board and carefully reconstructing the way the Heren XIX
functioned in practice.
The chapter is divided into three sections, each of which draws on a slightly different set
of sources. The first examines drafts for the WIC's charter composed between 1606 and 1620. 13
10 Johannes de Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, ed.
L’Honoré Naber, 4 vols., Linschoten Vereeniging (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931).
11 Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, ed. F. W. Stapel (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1927). Born in Amersfoort in 1621, Van Dam became the company's legal advisor in 1649 and then, in
1652, its lawyer, a position he retained until his death in 1706. His Description of the East India Company was so
important that it was kept under lock and key in a chest in the Amsterdam chamber of the VOC. See Vree, Meetings,
Manners, and Civilization, 175.
12 J. G. van Dillen, Van Rijkdom en Regenten: Handboek tot de Economische en Sociale Geschiedenis van
Nederland tijdens de Republiek (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
13 These drafts were assembled from the Secrete Loketkas, Oude Westindische Compagnie in the archive of the
States General (NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1) and the papers of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt in the archive of the States
97

By analyzing the successive changes made over this period—and especially between 1618-
1621—it shows how and why the Heren XIX assumed its unique institutional structure, and the
ways that Usselincx's idea for a Raedt van Indien informed important modifications to the
charter. The second section examines minutes of the meetings of the Heren XIX between 1622-
1624 and asks the deceptively simple question, “How many is XIX?” By reconstructing the
negotiations over who was permitted to attend the council’s meetings, the section demonstrates
the multiple and overlapping lines of accountability built into the Heren XIX’s structure. The
third section looks at the ambiguous position of representatives of the States General within the
company's board and shows the specific operational and symbolic roles they played. The chapter
thus recounts the origins of an early modern company board and deepens our understanding of
politics within the Heren XIX in the 1640s.
2. Competing Drafts for the WIC Charter
Discussions to create a WIC began during the first decade of the seventeenth century. The initial
impetus was overwhelmingly military: in addition to protecting Dutch trading interests, the
company was intended to serve as an instrument to weaken Spain by opening a third front in the
Atlantic and, as much as possible, driving the war from Dutch soil. 14 This aim had become
especially important after the United Provinces’ closest allies, France and England, signed
treaties with Spain in 1598 and 1603, respectively. Formal discussions began in February 1606,
when the States of Holland established a commission to look into the practical steps that would
of Holland (NA 3.01.14 inv.nr. 3164). The 1606 draft is appendix III in Meijer, Liefhebbers des Vaderlands ende
Beminders van de Commercie. I have dated the crucial drafts from January and March 1620 by comparison with
copies in the archive of the States of Zeeland (Zeeuwsarchief 2.1 inv.nr. 2086.1).
14 Ibid.; Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC.
98

e required to create a monopoly company for the West Indies. This commission was led by
Francois Francken, Pensionaris of Gouda. Another member was Jan Huygen van Linschoten
(1563-1611), whose voyage to the East Indies in 1586-1587 laid the groundwork for Dutch
overseas expansion in Asia. 15 By the beginning of September 1606, the committee had produced
a lengthy report; by October this report had been transformed into a detailed concept-octroy
(draft charter) that was sent by the States General to the various provinces for their
consideration. 16
This document was modeled on the charter of the VOC, approved four years earlier, in
1602. Like the VOC, the WIC was to be granted a monopoly on trade in its respective territory
and rights to exercise force, plant settlements, and appoint colonial governors in the name of the
States General. At home, the company would be composed of four chambers—Amsterdam,
Zeeland, North Holland, and the Maas—each managed by a fixed number of directors chosen
from among the chief investors. Each chamber would be responsible for raising its own capital
and would be operationally independent. As often as needs required, however, representatives
from the four chambers would convene in a general council to “handle and determine all of the
company’s business.” 17 This business was described as consisting primarily in “resolving when
ships shall be equipped, how many ships shall be sent by each chamber, and all the other daily
affairs of the company in general.” 18 For the first six years the company’s general meeting would
15 Meijer, Liefhebbers des Vaderlands ende Beminders van de Commercie; Van Rees, Geschiedenis der
Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, 2:77; The narrative of Linschoten’s journey is
Jan Huygen van Linschoten, The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies: The First Book,
Containing His Description of the East. (Elibron Classics, 2005); See also Roelof van Gelder, Jan Parmentier, and
Vibeke Roeper, Souffrir pour Parvenir: de Wereld van Jan Huygen van Linschoten (Haarlem: Uitgeverij Arcadia,
1998).
16 Meijer, Liefhebbers des Vaderlands ende Beminders van de Commercie, 32-34.
17 Article 23, “alle saecken deze compaignie aangaende verhandelt ende beslooten sullen worden.”
18 Article 24, “‘t Voorseyd Collegie van Seventhien bescreven sijnd, sal tesamen commen om te resolveren wanneer
men sal equipperen, hoeveele schepen men op elck quartier sal seynden ende op alle andere diergelijcke saecken de
compaignie in 't gemeen betreffende.”
99

convene in Amsterdam; the following two it would convene in Middelburg. Any issues on which
the general meeting could not reach a decision would be referred to the States General. 19 Nearly
identical language can be found in the charter of the VOC.
At the same time, however, there were important differences between the two charters.
First, as a corrective to perceived problems in the VOC, provisions were included in the draft
WIC charter to give the chief investors more power in company management and more access to
the company’s financial accounts. 20 Second, to offset the perceived risk of confronting Spain in
the New World, the draft WIC charter included considerable public support: the States General
would provide direct military assistance in the form of sixteen warships, a one-time subsidy of
one million guilders to be paid over five years, and an annual subsidy thereafter of an additional
200,000 guilders. As Albert Meijer has pointed out, this arrangement represented the culmination
of negotiations in which the States General’s contribution to the company rose steadily—a fact
that provides strong evidence both for the importance that that body attached to the new
company and the initial opposition it faced persuading merchants and other potential investors to
participate. 21
Almost as soon as the these terms had been agreed upon, however, the entire enterprise
was shelved in accordance with the terms of a peace agreement with Spain, negotiations for
which began the following year, in 1607. This meant that a number of important issues in the
1606 draft were never resolved. One of these concerned the thorny question of whether the chief
investors or city magistrates would select the company's directors. Even more significant for our
purposes, however, was the question of who would serve as the seventeenth delegate at the
19 Articles 23, 24, 25, 27 in Ibid., 56-57.
20 Meijer, Liefhebbers des Vaderlands ende Beminders van de Commercie, 33.
21 Meijer indicates that the States General's contribution rose from an initially vague promise of "support," to the
sum of 600,000 guilders and then, finally, to 16 warships plus 1,000,000 guilders. Ibid., 54.
100

company's general meeting. Article 23 of the draft charter indicated that Amsterdam would
contribute eight persons, Zeeland four, and the Maas and North Holland each two. In the case of
the VOC, the seventeenth delegate was always selected by one of the non-Amsterdam chambers
in a system of rotation designed to ensure that Amsterdam could never control an absolute
majority. But in the 1606 draft, this formula was not adopted. After the words “understanding
that the seventeenth person…” the anonymous scribe left only a blank line. 22 From this we can
infer that the commission recognized the need to check Amsterdam’s power, but could reach no
agreement on who should cast the deciding vote.
This question was resolved several years later, in 1614, when negotiations resumed at the
behest of merchants in Holland. 23 The decisive language can be traced directly to Johan van
Oldenbarnevelt, the Landsadvocaat (Executive Administrator in the States of Holland) and the
most important political figure in the United Provinces. Although Van Oldenbarnevelt opposed
any steps that would offend Spain and re-ignite the war, he faced considerable pressure to protect
Dutch merchants from Iberian aggression, especially in Guinea. Perhaps knowing that these
terms would prove unacceptable, or perhaps to ensure his own influence if the negotiations
succeeded, he amended the draft to provide a more prominent role for the States General. On a
copy of the 1606 draft to be found amongst his papers at the National Archive in The Hague,
Van Oldenbarnevelt filled in the blank line in Article 23 with the words “shall be appointed by
us,” referring to the States General. 24
22 Ibid., 56. “Welverstaende dat de seventhien personen…”
23 Heijer, “The Twelve Years’ Truce and the Founding of the Dutch West India Company”; Rees, Geschiedenis der
Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, 2:99.
24 “By ons werden gedeputeerd.” States of Holland, Collection of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, NA 3.01.04 inv.nr.
3164, Article XVII. In this document van Oldenbarnevelt also resolved the question of who would select directors
from amongst the candidates presented by the hooftparticipanten, writing “by the magistrates” in the margin of
Article 13. In her study of Willem Usselincx, C. Lichtenburg argues that van Oldenbarnavelt was keen for the 1614
draft to be rejected. His work in connection with the WIC during this period warrants closer attention. See
Ligtenberg, Willem Usselincx.
101

This formulation, which must previously have been discussed and rejected, broke
decisively with the structure of the VOC. That company was accountable to the States General
and met with its representatives at least once a year at the so-called Haags Besoigne
(Consultations in The Hague), but its management was in the exclusive hands of merchants
based in the maritime cities of Holland and Zeeland. 25 By placing one of its representatives on
the WIC's board of directors, the States General relinquished this more passive, consultative role
and sought instead to assume an active role in shaping company policy. Once again, the
negotiations faltered, but an important shift nevertheless had been registered in the relationship
between company and state.
For Willem Usselincx, who began drafting an alternative charter shortly thereafter, this
formulation was totally unacceptable: including a delegate appointed by the States General on
the WIC’s board, he believed, would only confuse the roles of merchant and statesman, without
adequately providing the company with the political support it would need. Usselincx’s draft
proposed instead that the WIC be governed by a Raedt van Indien, an institution transparently
modeled on contemporary Iberian practice. Founded in 1524, Spain's el Real y Supremo Consejo
de Indias (Supreme Council for the Indies) was the central organ by which the King
administered his American possessions. A sprawling bureaucracy, it was responsible for all
matters relating to war, trade, and the administration of justice. And at its summit sat a group of
eight well-connected noblemen and lawyers who reported directly to the King. 26
Usselincx was under no illusions that such an institution could be precisely replicated in
the United Provinces, which was after all a Republic rather than a monarchy. Instead, he
proposed a bi-cameral structure. Article 39 of his draft proposed a smaller, nine-person version
25 F. S. Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003).
26 Stafford Poole, Juan de Ovando: Governing the Spanish Empire in the Reign of Phillip II (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2004).
102

of the Heren XVII to manage the company's shipping and trade. 27 This body would be elected
from among the chief shareholders in each of the chambers. But weightier decisions relating to
war, colonization, and justice Usselincx reserved for the Raedt van Indien. He described the
council's purpose in Article 36:
And so that the Company may be provided with the necessary and appropriate authority, and the
directors saved from considerable trouble and expense from soliciting our assistance and support,
and so that they may be able to attend to their trade and the outfitting of ships, as little as possible
bothered with problems of state, so should there be elected [after the directors and representatives
of the chief participants] a certain number of qualified persons, from among the noblemen as well
as others, to form a Council of the Indies, whom we will recognize with appropriate authority and
instructions, in our name to provide assistance and support to the company, raise armies, appoint
governors, make laws, administer justice, and consult with the directors concerning the means
necessary for the preservation of the company. 28
This Raedt van Indien would consist of approximately eight to ten members. Anyone investing
more than 800,000 guilders in the company would automatically receive one seat; the remaining
seats would be filled by election from amongst the chief investors. The Prince of Orange would
serve as the council's chair and the meetings would take place in The Hague, rather than in
27 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fol. 123. A transcription of Usselincx's draft is also available as Appendix II in the
second volume of Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw,
2:384-408.
28 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fol. 121. “Ende op dat deze Comp. soude mogen worden versien van noodige,
behoorlycke, ende wettige autoriteyt ende ansien, ende de Bewindhebbers ontlast van veel moeyten, ende oncosten,
die by haer souden moghen gedaen worden int soliciteren om noodige hulpe ende bystandt, ende andere saecken, die
sy met ons souden mogen te behandelen ende voor te dragen habben, ende op dat sy haer te beter souden mogen
besigh houden met de saecken, haeren Coophandel ende vuytrustinge betreffende, ende oock om haer met de
saecken van Staet, die hier aen nootwendelyck zyn hangende, soo weynich te bemoyen als het doenlyck is, Soo
sullen wy nae t’ verkiesen vande Bewindhebbers ende deelgenoten, verkiesen seecker getal van gequalificeerde
persoonen, soo van adel als andere, tot eenen Raedt van Indien, die wy sullen verkiesen met behoorlycke
Authoriteyt ende Instructie, om vuyt onsen twegen achtinge te nemen op het verleenen van hulpe ende bystandt,
aenneminge van krygsvolck, stellen van Gouverneurs, t’ maecken van wetten, keuren ende ordonnantien tot
onderhoudinge van t’ recht ende alle borgerlycke eendracht, met de Bewinderhebbers te beraedtslagen over de
middelen tot haerder bescherminge noodich, ende waer men die met de minste beswaringe, soo van t’ landt als
vande compaignie sal becomen ende te wege brengen, als oock om alle verschillen, die onder de deelgenoten van
dese Comp. souden mogen risen, vuyt eenige oorsaecken deselve Compagnie betreffende, de plano sonder eenige
forme van proces te mogen afdoen.”
103

Amsterdam or Middelburg. 29 In this way Usselincx imagined a partially aristocratic, partially
elected structure, with pride of place reserved for Maurits of Nassau and the possibility open for
foreign princes—the group best able to invest the requisite sum—to purchase an important office
and thereby contribute to the Protestant cause and the war against Spain. 30
Usselincx spelled out the logic for his proposal in a number of subsequent letters to the
States General, composed after it had become clear that his idea faced considerable opposition. 31
In his view, the responsibility for trade and that for war and colonial administration should never
be vested in the same institution; nor should social groups be asked to perform functions for
which they were not qualified. His draft proposed that the company’s directors be selected by the
chief investors, rather than city or provincial magistrates, as Van Oldenbarnavelt had advocated,
since no one could know a merchant's business better than other merchants. 32 To permit
magistrates to interfere in trade on a daily business would undermine the company’s profitability
and discourage investors. Likewise, merchants should be relieved from responsibility for tasks
that fell outside their sphere of competence. It was both inappropriate and dangerous to involve
merchants—whom he characterized as “tak[ing] profit as their North Star and desire as their
29 The Prince of Orange's role in the Raedt van Indien is only implicit in Usselincx draft charter, but is stated clearly
in his subsequent clarifications between 1619-1622. See, for example, NA 1.01.05 inv.nr. 9409, Corte aenwysinge
van de voor meeste verschillen tusschen t' Concept van Octroy op Westindien dat by de ho: mo: heeren, Myn heeren
de Staten Generael inde Maent van februario anno 1619 aende respective provincien is gesonden, ende tgene
daerna by de Gecommitteerde wt de groote zee steden van hollandt ende Westvrieslandt is beraemt..., April 13,
1620.
30 The resolutions of the States General reveal a number of inquiries that were transmitted via Dutch diplomats
serving in Geneva, Heidelberg, and Paris. See for example Brederode's letters in the Resolutien der Staten Generael,
April 30, 1620 and September 28, 1621. The most important foreign investor in the Amsterdam chamber of the
company was the Prince of Anhalt, who subscribed 36,000 guilders via his agent, Adolf van Borstel (NA 1.05.01.01
inv.nr. 18). See also the British National Archives in Kew, SP 84/104, fol. 217. Cort Verhael van de Redenen ende
oorsaecken waerom dat over den Handel van de Westindien benevens de Cameren can de Bewindhebberen eenen
Raedt van Indien behoort te wesen, Waerom dat aen naburighe vorsten ende Republicquen die hier met groote
sommen incomen, moet toe gelaten worden eenen Raetheer te moghen stellen.
31 NA 1.01.05 inv.nr. 9409.
32 Ibid. Corte aenwysinge van de voor meeste verschillen tusschen t' Concept van Octroy op Westindien dat by de
ho: mo: heeren, Myn heeren de Staten Generael inde Maent van februario anno 1619 aende respectiv provincien is
gesonden, ende tgene daerna by de Gecommitteerde wt de groote zee steden van hollandt ende Westvrieslandt is
beraemt, April 13, 1620.
104

compass”—in the organization of war, the formulation of laws, and the administration of
justice. 33 These pursuits required individuals with a very different outlook and social standing;
qualities without which they could neither hope to exercise appropriate judgment nor instill
confidence in their subordinates. That merchants could be responsible for making war was to
Usselincx manifestly absurd: “I have heard regular soldiers say,” he wrote, “that they would
rather be hanged than travel to the Indies in the service of merchants.” 34 Likewise, only a smaller
group could be trusted to handle the secrets of military plans, especially since “America is only a
short distance in comparison to the East Indies.” 35
Usselincx thus drew a clear distinction between trade, on the one hand, and war and
colonial administration, on the other. He repeatedly referenced Spanish practices and emphasized
what he saw to be important differences between orders in society and their proper roles in the
new company, differences that were emphasized in other contemporary pamphlets as well. 36
Compared to the 1606 draft, Van Oldenbarnevelt’s amended version increased the power of the
States General in important ways, but it left merchants to manage the bulk of the company’s
affairs. By contrast, Usselincx’s draft represented a wholesale revision that would have
centralized authority over colonial affairs in the States General and the Raedt van Indien, and
dramatically enhanced the position of Prince of Orange. These two competing visions would
need to be reconciled—or one rejected—before the charter could be approved.
In 1617 the States General had formed a committee to once again begin the work of
creating a West India Company. This committee consisted of, among others, Jonas Witsen
33 Ibid. “Cooplieden […] die de winste tot Noortsterre ende de begeerlicht voor compas hebben.”
34 Ibid. “Ende het is soo verre van daer dat lieden van grooten aensien onder t' gebiet van de Cooplieden souden
willen wesen, dat Ick selve gemeyne Soldaten hebbe hooren seggen, dat sy haer liever wilden laten hangen als onder
t' gebiet vande Cooplieden na Indien te gaen.”
35 British National Archives, Kew. SP 84/104, fol. 218v.
36 Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, 2:118.
105

(1566-1626), later burgemeester of Amsterdam, Albert Magnus, Zeeland’s influential deputy to
the States General, and Johan van Goch, a nobleman from Gelderland and intimate member of
The Hague’s elite. 37 Usselincx’s ideas found a warm reception among this group, as well as with
the Prince of Orange and his court. However, all progress was blocked by the States of Holland,
which remained firmly committed to Van Oldenbarnevelt’s policy of peace with Spain. The
stalemate was not broken until August 1618, when a growing tide of religious and political
upheaval led to Van Oldenbarnevelt's arrest and execution, and set the stage for Amsterdam's
city council to be reconstituted in favor of the Calvinist, pro-war faction led by Reynier Pauw. 38
At Pauw’s instigation, the States of Holland created their own committee, consisting of
representatives from the major trading cities in that province—Dordrecht, Delft, Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen. 39 This committee was tasked with reviewing Usselincx’s
draft together with the draft from 1606 and distilling the two into a single document. By mid-
December 1619 the committee had completed this task and their new draft was approved for
submission to the States General.
Usselincx quickly discovered that the new document represented an amplification of the
1606 draft and ignored his recommendations almost entirely. When he submitted a letter of
protest, the States of Holland informed their members that Usselincx's draft was not “fit” to be
discussed further; individual members were free to consult it, but this should not hold up
approval of the new draft. 40 On January 3, 1620, the delegates of the States of Holland presented
their document to the States General. This draft would serve as the basis of discussion for the
37
Ibid., June 24, 1617. On Johan van Goch, see Knevel, Het Haagse bureau, 57.
38
Johan E. Elias, Geschiedenis van het Amsterdamsche Regentenpatriciaat (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff,
1923), 78.
39
Resolutions of the States of Holland, February 27, 1619.
40
Ibid., December 17, 1619. “Het Vertoog en Concept van Willem Usseling, aangaande de Westindische
Compagnie, is niet geraaden gevonden in de Vergaderinge te examineeren; maar de Leeden die sulks begeeren
sullen, in handen te stellen om te examineren, ten eynde geen retardement te geeven in de besoigne op het
overgesonden Octroy.”
106

emaining ten months before the language of the charter was finalized. 41 For the time being, it
appeared that Usselincx’s ideas had been decisively shelved. However, the debate was not
over—an important fact overlooked by Otto van Rees, whose transcriptions of the charter drafts
remain the main source consulted by historians. In the appendices to his monumental
Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde, published between 1865-1868, Van Rees chose not to
transcribe the two penultimate drafts alongside Usselincx’s draft because they were “too similar
to the final charter” to warrant publication. 42 That Holland's draft approximated the final charter
is indisputable; but the changes that were made during the final ten months were in fact critical
to the form taken by the WIC’s board of directors.
Foremost among these changes was the inclusion of language to spell out more clearly
the role to be played by the representative of the States General. The 1606 and 1614 drafts
provided no insight into this question; the draft submitted by the States of Holland's did: Article
17 stated unequivocally that the seventeenth person would be chosen by the States General “in
order to preside in the fore mentioned meeting.” 43 This was extremely significant, for it
augmented the States General's role of casting the deciding vote by giving them de jure
chairmanship, with all the powers this implied to convene meetings, draw up the agenda, and
control the terms and order of debate. In addition, the following article, which spelled out the
responsibilities of the board, was amplified to include a clause providing the States General with
effective veto power over any decisions relating to war. 44 A marginal note on Usselincx’s draft,
41 The States General approved the WIC's charter by unanimous vote on October 13, 1620. Holland's January 1620
draft is NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fols. 89-102.
42 Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, 2:384.
43 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fol. 94. “[…] om in de voors. Vergaderinge te presideren.”
44 Ibid., fol. 94. “[...] Welverstaende dat in saecken van oorloge op de genomen resolutie versocht sal worden onse
approbatie.” The emphasis is mine.
107

placed next to his description of the Raedt van Indien, makes clear how this clause came to be
added:
In place of this Council [the Raedt van Indien], which will be removed, in Article 18 it shall be
stated that in matters of war the approbation of their High and Mightiness [the States General]
shall be sought. 45
This is conclusive evidence that Usselincx’s idea continued to find supporters. But the January 3,
1620 draft went through another round of revisions. When a new draft was circulated to the
provinces three months later, in late March, the powers allocated to the States General had been
reduced. 46 In place of “to preside in the fore mentioned meeting,” we find the more modest
responsibility, “to best help direct the affairs of the company.” 47 At the same time, new language
was added that gave the States General the power to delegate more than one individual to attend
the meetings of the company's board. The new draft thus read, “understanding that the nineteenth
person, or so many as we shall find suitable, shall be chosen by us, in order in the fore mentioned
meeting to best help direct the affairs of the company.” 48
The March 1620 draft contained two other important changes, as well. After a sustained
campaign, the provinces of Groningen and Friesland were granted a chamber of their own, a
modification that brought the final number of delegates in the WIC's board of directors to
nineteen. 49 Finally, Article 39, which spelled out the States General’s financial contribution to
the company, was revised. In the January 1620 draft, the total amount of one million guilders
45 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.1. “In Staete van desen Raet & datter expendeert wort int' 18 artyckel gesyt dat in
saeken van oorlogs op de genoomen resolutie vorsocht sal worden haer ho: mo: approbatye.”
46 The revised draft was approved by the States General on March 31, 1620. It is NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fols.
27-48. A copy in the collections of the Staten van Zeeland is marked as having been received on April 5, 1620.
Zeeuwsarchief 2.1 inv.nr. 2086.
47 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fol. 36b.
48 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fol. 36b. “welverstaende dat den negenthienden persoon, offe soo veel meer als wy
telckens sullen goetvinden, by ons sal worden gedeputeert, omme in de voors. vergaderinge de saecken van de
Comp. ten besten te helpen dirigeren.”
49 Ibid., fol. 36. See also the draft language in fols. 1-4.
108

was described as a subsidy, to be paid in five annual installments of 200,000 guilders each. 50 In
the March draft, however, the language was changed so that half of this amount came in return
for company stock, with the States General “enjoying and sustaining profit and risk in the same
manner as all other participants in the company.” 51 Here, and for the first time, the States
General appeared in the charter as an owner.
The resolutions of the Amsterdam city council make clear that Amsterdam's merchants
opposed all three of these changes. Most upset were the merchants trading to Guinea, who had
long argued that the charter should be restricted to America alone, and were justifiably
concerned that their profitable trade would suffer as a result of inclusion within the monopoly
company. 52 On April 10, 1620 the city agreed to the new draft with the important qualifications
that the new chamber given to Groningen and Friesland must not serve as a precedent for
discussions about the VOC, and that:
Concerning the ten-hundred thousand [i.e., one million] guilders to be furnished as a subsidy to
the West India Company, it is understood that, while we consent to the foresaid sum, the
Generality must not be a participant with part of the company, or in any case not further than with
three-hundred thousand guilders, leaving seven-hundred thousand guilders as a subsidy; and that
the Generality does not appear in the meetings of the foresaid company with more than one
person, who may appear as president, though without any responsibility to direct the company's
affairs. 53
50 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fol. 98b.
51 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.1, fol. 40. “Welverstaende dat wy mette helft vande voorschreve thien hondert duysent
guldens, sullen ghenieten ende dragen winste ende risico gelijck alle andere Participanten in dese Compagnie
genieten ende dragen sullen.”
52 See Van Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, 2:80.
53 Stadsarchief Amsterdam 5025 inv.nr. 11, entry for April 10, 1620. “Voorts wat belangt de Tienhondert Duysent
gul. by de Generaliteyt tot subsidie van de voors. Westindische Compagnie te furneren, Is verstaen, dewyle de
voors. Somme tot subsidie geconsenteert is, dat de Generaliteyt nyet en behoort met eenich gedeelte van dien In de
zelve Compagnie te participeren, Immers In allen gevalle nyet verder volgende voorgaende Instellinge als met
Driehondert Duysent guldens, blyvende de Sevenhondert Duysent guldens suyvers tot subsidie, Dat mede de
Generaliteyt nyet meer als een persoon, In de vergaderinge van de voors. Compagnie en behoort te hebben, die wel
neffens den president zoude sitten sonder nochtans eenige directie te hebben.”
109

That these two provisions remained in the final charter, despite Amsterdam’s explicit protests, is
remarkable. It strongly suggests that others saw them as extremely important, and demonstrates
that the States General and its allies were in a position to push back against Amsterdam’s
interests at this crucial stage in the negotiations.
Van Rees pointed out long ago that from 1619 Usselincx encountered increasing hostility
from delegates at the States of Holland, but that he remained a welcome guest at the States
General, which continued to entertain his periodic requests for financial support. 54 The crucial
issue here was not—or at least not only—that the States of Holland opposed Usselincx's
proposals for peaceful colonization, but rather that they did not want the company's coveted new
directorships to be subordinated to a quasi-aristocratic council of noblemen with strong ties to
the Prince of Orange and the States General. 55 Once Usselincx’s draft had been decisively
rejected by the States of Holland, and the 1606 draft resuscitated as the basis for discussion, the
representatives of the States General and the court sought changes that would grant them
additional powers, especially over war and government. They were unsuccessful in their bid to
preside over the meetings of the company’s board, but by giving themselves veto power over
decisions about war and the right to send multiple delegates, they reserved the right to establish
an informal Raedt van Indien within their own ranks; a body that could meet regularly and
become intimately familiar with the problems of colonial administration, just as Usselincx had
advised. The modification that gave the States General a substantial ownership share in the new
54 Van Rees, Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland tot het Einde der Achttiende Eeuw, 2:109.
55 For the Amsterdam elite's interest in the directorships, see Elias, Geschiedenis van het Amsterdamsche
Regentenpatriciaat, 78-79.
110

company ensured that this informal council’s interests, exercised on behalf of the States General,
could not be ignored. 56
The last changes to the draft were made in October 1620 and the charter was approved by
unanimous vote in the States General on June 3, 1621. In the end, the WIC’s board of directors
was to be composed of nineteen members, eighteen of them delegated by the company’s five
chambers. But the States General's powers were much enhanced and the door was left open for
this body, along with the Prince of Orange, to delegate their own representatives to attend the
board’s meetings. As the subsequent minutes of the Heren XIX make clear, this is exactly what
they did. 57
3. How many is XIX? The Politics of Representation
The WIC’s charter was of course only a piece of paper. The difficult tasks of raising capital,
electing directors, and organizing the chambers remained to be done. The contrast with the VOC
is striking: whereas that company required only the coordination of functioning partnerships,
with established directors, the WIC was designed to reach out to new groups of investors. The
inclusion of Groningen and provisions within the charter that afforded directorships to any city in
which investors subscribed at least 100,000 guilders meant that the company would draw from a
broader geographical area. This had important implications, since the chambers were designed to
serve as administrative hubs for regions that overlapped with, but were not identical to, the eight
56 Even after these changes, the Raedt van Indien remained on the table. In July 1620, Prince Maurits of Nassau
appeared before the States General to ask whether such a council would be included in the charter; in mid-August,
only weeks before the charter was finalized, it appeared again, as one of the last three issues still requiring
resolution. The other two issues were a chamber for Groningen and clarification of the rules concerning foreign
investors. See the Resolutien der Staten Generaal, July 26, 1620 and Resolutions of the States of Holland, August
14, 1620.
57 See, for example, NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 1 and NA 1.01.05 inv.nr. 9410-9411.
111

provinces. The creation of the WIC thus brought into being an entirely new layer of political
organization, distinct from the provincial assemblies, and left to the primary maritime cities the
responsibility to resolve amongst themselves their respective rights and obligations within the
new chambers. This problem was then compounded by the requirement that the chambers be
represented in fixed proportions at the meetings of the Heren XIX. Quite apart from the well-
known dispute over whether the salt trade would be included in the WIC's monopoly, the matter
of greatest concern to those involved in establishing the company was political: how would the
chambers be constituted and who would represent them in the Heren XIX?
The problem can be conceived of as one of numbers: in theory the council was to consist
of nineteen members, but in practice almost three years of negotiation was required to determine
precisely who would attend. This section of the chapter examines several episodes in the
negotiations to resolve representational issues in the chambers of North Holland, Zeeland, and
the Maas. Each of these episodes reflected a specific political compromise that contributed to the
final dimensions and character of the Heren XIX. How many was nineteen? Addressing this
question requires a careful look at the minutes of the first four meetings of the Heren XIX.
The board’s first meeting took place in December 1622. 58 Before this the States General
had on at least three occasions invited delegates to convene in The Hague to discuss practical
concerns relating to the company’s management and to hash out their differences. The invitation
to one such meeting, held in August 1621, specifically requested the cities to delegate individuals
knowledgeable about matters of trade so that they could form a “standing college” on WIC
58 NA 1.01.02 inv.nr. 4941. Report by Johan van der Meer to the States General, December 30, 1622. This meeting
predates the first one found in NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 1, which is often assumed to have been the first meeting of the
Heren XIX.
112

affairs. 59 By October of the next year, the States General expected to receive lists of the new
directors from the chambers. These directors were then invited to assemble in The Hague, where
in late November they were loaned the States General's archive of documents relating to the
company and the Amsterdam chamber was asked to call the first meeting of the Heren XIX. 60 In
a sign of the company’s emerging independence, a request from the States General for this first
session to be held in The Hague, rather than Amsterdam, was rejected. 61 The proceedings began
in Amsterdam on December 17, 1622.
The foremost problem at this first meeting, as the State's General's senior representative,
Nicholas van der Meer, reported back to The Hague, concerned the delegation from North
Holland. For almost two years the cities of Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Alkmaar, Edam, Medemblik,
Monnickendam, and Purmerend had failed to reach agreement on the allocation of directorships
and the division of responsibilities for the construction and provisioning of ships. The nature of
the impasse is clear from a long session devoted to the problem held in the States of Holland in
March of 1621, recorded in detail by Nicholas Stellingwerf. Mediators from Amsterdam, Delft,
and Dordrecht proposed what they expected to be a workable solution: Hoorn and Enkhuizen
would together receive 4/10 of the so-called timmeragie (ship building) while 6/10 would be
divided among the smaller cities. Alkmaar and Purmerend agreed to this proposal, but Hoorn
demanded 6/10 for itself and Enkhuizen, Edam, Medemblik, and Monikendam each demanded
1/4. A similar situation pertained to the allocation of directorships, and repeated efforts by the
States of Holland to find a resolution all ended in failure. 62
59 Resolutions of the States General, August 6, 1621. “Deze [bekwaamste en best geaggectionnerde direceuren]
zullen zo nodig bijeenkomen en een voorlopig college vormen, dat besluiten kan nemen in alle voorvallende zaken.”
60 Ibid., November 29, 1621.
61 Ibid., December 5, 1621.
62 Stellingwerff and Schot, Particuliere Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland, 1620-1640, entry for
March 18, 1621.
113

The result was that the delegates from Hoorn and Enkhuizen arrived at the first meeting
of the Heren XIX carrying letters of credential signed by their respective cities, rather than by the
chamber of North Holland, since no such chamber yet existed. The delegates were asked to leave
the room, whereupon the remaining members of the Heren XIX agreed in their absence that this
represented a violation of the charter. The delegates from Hoorn and Enkhuizen were promptly
asked to return home and consult the magistrates of their respective cities. 63 Van der Meer made
little effort to conceal his frustration. When he visited the States of Holland the following week
he implored that body to resolve the problem: without proper chambers to be represented, the
work of the company's board could not proceed. 64
The complete absence of the delegation from Zeeland presented an even greater
problem. 65 As in North Holland, the discussion in Zeeland stretched back to well before the
approval of the charter, and in particular to a heated disagreement between Middelburg and
Vlissingen over the location of the chamber’s office, the division of timmeragie, and allocation
of directorships. Middelburg, by far the larger and richer of the two cities, wanted to resolve
these questions once subscriptions had been made, in proportion to the capital subscribed.
Vlissingen took the contrary position that the WIC’s monopoly was too broad to begin with, and
would overly restrict the freedom of the city’s merchants. If Vlissingen was to agree to support
the charter, it would only do so based on preferential terms that had to be spelled out in
advance. 66 Despite overwhelming pressure from the other cities of Zeeland, as well as the Prince
of Orange, Vlissingen didn’t budge from this position, and was still voicing its dissent the week
63
NA 1.01.02 inv.nr. 4941, entry for December 17, 1622.
64
Stellingwerff and Schot, Particuliere Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland, 1620-1640, entry for
March 7, 1623.
65
NA 1.01.02 inv.nr. 4941, entries for December 17 and 20, 1622.
66
Resolutions of the Staten van Zeeland, September 13, 1619.
114

efore the charter was printed. 67 It was a classic case of particularism, in which a single city
delayed progress on an issue of broad importance for almost six months. Indeed, no resolution
was found for another two years; in the meantime the States of Zeeland continued to delegate
merchants from Middelburg, Vlissingen, and Veere to discuss the company's affairs at the ad hoc
meetings convened by the States General, but the province went unrepresented at the first two
meetings of the Heren XIX. 68
The problem in Zeeland was not satisfactorily resolved until after agreement had been
reached and the charter amended to address a separate, but equally vexing matter: the
relationship between directors and chief investors. This agreement, negotiated in the Spring of
1623 and finalized in June, gave the WIC’s chief investors greater access to the financial records
of the company, limited borrowing by the directors, and reserved directorships within the
chambers of Amsterdam, Zeeland, and the Maas for a new category of investor-director, the
hoofdparticipant bewindhebber (chief investor director). 69 These individuals were to be
nominated by the chief investors from amongst their own ranks and selected by the sitting
directors from a slate of three. For our purposes, the most significant aspect of the agreement
followed from this item: henceforth, two of these hoofdparticipant bewindhebbers—one from
Amsterdam and the other from Zeeland—were to be included in their respective chambers'
delegations to the meetings of the Heren XIX. In addition, each could bring with him a non-
voting assessor (assistant) to help monitor the company's finances. This important modification
67 Resolutions of the States General, June 7, 1621.
68 Ibid., June 8, 1623.
69 Accoordt tusschen de Bewinthebberen ende Hooft-Participanten van de West-Indische Compagnie, met
approbatie van de Ho: Mog: Heeren Staten Generael ghemaeckt. In date den 21 Junij 1623. The hoofdparticipanten
of Amsterdam and Zeeland also held separate meetings, the minutes of which can be found in NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr.
17 (Amsterdam) and inv.nr. 34-48 (Zeeland).
115

to the original charter gave the chief investors a direct say in company management and
effectively expanded the ranks of the Heren XIX to twenty-one members.
It also provided a new landscape on which the negotiations in Zeeland could advance.
This can be seen in the compromise finally reached by the cities of Middelburg, Vlissingen, and
Veere in August 1623 and a pair of formal agreements signed at the beginning of the following
year. 70 These agreements, negotiated with assistance from the Amsterdam directors Samuel
Blommaert (1583-1651), Jan van de Merct, and Albert Wifferinck, spelled out how the chamber
would be organized and who would be represented at the meetings of the Heren XIX. 71 The first
agreement—between Middelburg on the one side, and Vlissingen and Veere on the other—made
Middelburg the chamber’s headquarters and divided the timmeragie and equipagie (provisioning
of ships) into thirds. Middelburg received 2/3 and Vlissingen and Veere together, 1/3. The
second agreement—between Vlissingen and Veere—broke this final third into thirds again, so
that Vlissingen received 2/3 and Veere, 1/3. The division of directorships proceeded along
roughly similar lines: of the sixteen positions, Middelburg received ten and Vlissingen and Veere
together, six.
The formula for selecting delegates to attend the meetings of the Heren XIX was
considerably more complex:
All the deputies to the meeting of the XIX shall be chosen as follows, namely that two Directors
shall be chosen by Middelburg, and one by Vlissingen or Veere, and the Investor-Director shall
for two years be from Middelburg, with the Assessor for two years from either Vlissingen or
70 A provisional version of this agreement is cited by the Zeeland delegation to the Heren XIX on October 10, 1623.
See NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 1. The final agreements are in NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 19 and NA 1.01.04 inv.nr. 5751A.
See also the draft dated November 12, 1622 in the papers of J. Boreel, Secretary of the city of Middelburg.
Zeeuwsarchief 2.1 inv.nr. 3184.
71 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 19. NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 39, entry for January 17, 1624. The first two named were from
the Amsterdam Chamber. Wifferink was a councilman from the new chamber in Groningen.
116

Veere, and that in the third year the Investor-Director shall be from Vlissingen or Veere [...] and
the Assessor from Middelburg. 72
To complicate matters further, the agreement between Vlissingen and Veere added the
following:
That in the first year, Vlissingen shall appoint a director and Veere the Assessor, and in the
second the reverse. Concerning the Investor-Director in the third year, the first two turns shall be
taken by Vlissingen, the last by Veere. 73
The results of the two agreements together can be seen in the table below:
Year Director 1 Director 2 Director 3 Investor-Director Assessor
1 M M VL M VE
2 M M VE M VL
3 M M VL VL M
4 M M VE M VL
5 M M VL M VE
6 M M VE VL M
7 M M VL M VE
8 M M VE M VL
9 M M VL VE M
Table 2. "M" represents Middelburg, "VL" Vlissingen, and "VE" Veere. 74
Although neither Vlissingen nor Veere could have been fully satisfied with this outcome, the
formula ensured a constant rotation of three of the five Zeeland seats at the Heren XIX, with each
of the three cities present for all but one year (listed as year 3 above) in the nine-year rotation. It
72 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 19. “Alle deputaten ter vergaderinge van de XIX sullen geschieden als volcht, namentlyck
twee Bewinthebbers van Middelburch, ende een van Vlissingen oft Vere, ende den hooftparticipant Bewindhebber
sal gaen twee jaren van Middelburgh ende daer negens den Assessor twee jaren van Vlissingen oft Vere, ende het
derde jaer den hooftparticipant bewinthebber van Vlissingen ofte Vere ofte by gebreke van selve een ander
Bewinthebber in syne plaetse. Ende daeriegens van Middelburch den Assessor.”
73 Ibid.
74 All tables in this chapter are original. I would like to thank Nealin Parker for her assistance with formatting and
design.
117

thus shows the political—as opposed to financial or administrative—significance of the addition
of the assessor. This individual might not have voting rights, but he would be able to keep an eye
on the proceedings and perhaps even catch the ear of a fellow delegate.
When the delegation from Zeeland arrived at their first meeting of the Heren XIX, in
August 1623, they brought no fewer than eight people. 75 By March 1624, after the two new
agreements had been finalized, the formula was followed to the letter: Simon Schotte, Pieter
Beurdt, and Jeremy Waelens represented Middelburg; Rogier Cobbert, Vlissingen, and the
assessor, from Veere, was Adrian Velters. 76
The difficulties in the chamber of the Maas were much less complicated, but they were
equally disruptive and, critically, proved a more serious test of the ability of the Heren XIX to
resolve disputes among its own members. 77 As Van Dillen and others have noted, the most
dramatic difference between the subscription lists to the WIC and VOC was the relative share
invested by the merchants of the Maas. 78 This resulted in large part from the fact that
Dordrecht—which in 1602 had chosen to invest in the Amsterdam chamber of the VOC—now
joined Rotterdam and Delft. While the three cities together raised more than a million guilders,
and were jointly responsible for the chamber’s management, they were entitled to only two seats
at the meetings of the Heren XIX. This created a natural conflict. Unlike North Holland or
Zeeland, however, the merchants of the Maas cooperated to form a chamber and then pushed for
a modification to the way the chamber would be represented. At the October 1623 meeting of the
Heren XIX, the Maas delegation arrived with three people, rather than two. Jacob de Witte
75 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 1, entry for August 3, 1623.
76 Ibid., entry for March 16, 1624.
77 Ibid., entries for March 16-March 30, 1624. See also Cornelis Christiaan Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean
and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971), 99-100.
78 J. G. van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek,” Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 74
(1961): 150; Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie, 61.
118

(1591-1631), a director from Dordrecht, submitted a formal request that all three be permitted to
attend, even though they would collectively be entitled to only two votes. 79 This request was
rejected by the other assembled delegates on the grounds that it violated the terms of the charter,
but all three Maas delegates were permitted to remain at the meeting.
The same was not true at the next meeting, held in March of 1624, and the conflict
became increasingly acrimonious thereafter. The representatives of the States General—
Hendrick Feyt, Johan van der Meer, and Nicholas Schaffer—had already consulted on the matter
the previous week and concluded that the Maas could only appear with two delegates, but the
disruption the dispute caused to the meeting’s progress became so severe that they shifted
strategies again and again to try to find a resolution. 80 Their methods included putting the
question to a majority vote, asking a subcommittee to make a recommendation, and requesting
the delegates to consult with their principals. Finally, when the Maas delegates refused to attend
unless all three were admitted, the representatives of the States General resorted to sending the
chamber keeper to the delegates’ private accommodations to execute a formal summons. 81
None of these methods worked, as De Witte and his colleagues held stubbornly to the
position that the charter spoke only of votes, not delegates, and that their principals would not
permit them to negotiate on this point. 82 Failing to gain approval, they were instructed to leave
the meeting—a prospect that contained within it the thinly veiled threat that the chamber would
withdraw its capital from the company altogether. Separately, De Witte made a proposal on
behalf of his own city, Dordrecht, to deliver an investment of 500,000 guilders in exchange for
79 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 1, entry for October 10, 1623.
80 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 39, entry for March 13, 1624.
81 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 1, entries for March 16-March 25, 1624.
82 Ibid., entry for March 22, 1624.
119

1/10 of the equipagie and two directors in the Heren XIX. 83 This was obviously unacceptable to
the other delegates, and the matter was finally turned over to the States General. De Witte and
Philips Doubleth, the company's new Ontvanger Generaal (Receiver General) and later
Ontvanger Generaal for the United Provinces as a whole, represented the chamber of the Maas;
Albert Coenraeds Burgh and Jeremy Waelens represented Amsterdam and Zeeland,
respectively. 84 No resolution was reached in that body either, but by September the States
General had become so tired of the issue that they acquiesced to the Maas’ request. Henceforth
the Maas was permitted to send three delegates to each meeting of the Heren XIX. 85
There were similar problems within the other two chambers not discussed here:
Groningen was only partially successful in its efforts to incorporate Friesland, with whom it
nominally shared a chamber, and Amsterdam was bombarded by letters from newly-elected
directors in Leiden, Haarlem, Utrecht, and Deventer, each of whom desired a seat in the Heren
XIX. But the main point should be clear enough: the Heren XIX was neither simple nor simply
assembled. It had to be constructed, delegate-by-delegate, from amongst diverse and often
competing constituencies in more than two-dozen Dutch cities. This process—begun in 1622, but
not complete until the end of 1624—expanded the board's membership beyond the proposed
nineteen members and created an entirely new forum in which merchants, investors, and the
representatives of the States General would meet to craft policy for the new company.
83 Ibid., entry for March 27, 1624.
84 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 39, entry for May 3, 1624. On Philips Doubleth, see "Philips Doubleth" in Molhuysen,
Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, vol. 7, 378-379.
85 See the cover pages to the minutes of the Heren XIX for 1633-34 (NA 1.10.69 inv.nr. 542), 1642 (NA 1.01.05
inv.nr. 9411), and 1645 (NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17).
120

4. The Role of the States General
The precise role of the States General in the company's board has never been clearly explained.
Cornelis Goslinga’s assertion that the Heren XIX “operated under a mandate from and were
directly responsible to their sovereign the States General” is both too crude and, on a crucial
point, manifestly incorrect. 86 The delegates from the States General certainly were accountable to
that body, and the Heren XIX as a whole were bound by the charter to consult with the States
General on matters of war and peace. But the company's board of directors had many masters, as
should be evident from the discussion in this chapter. Regular delegates were accountable to
their respective chambers, not the States General, and investor-directors had to answer to the
specific pool of investors that had sent them, which in most cases meant participants from one
city, rather than the entire chamber. In practice both groups were largely independent of the
States General, except in the abstract sense that their legitimacy derived in the first instance from
the company’s charter. All of this left the States General’s representatives at the Heren XIX in a
highly ambiguous position. Though inspired by the Raedt van Indien, they had none of the
formal role envisioned by Usselincx. On the one hand they represented the States General as a
quasi-sovereign body responsible for the company as a whole, while on the other they acted in a
concrete way as a concerned shareholder, with one of nineteen votes. Navigating these uncertain
waters was an important problem for the representatives of the States General as they assumed
their role within the newly created board.
Johan van der Meer’s report from the first meeting of the Heren XIX provides a nice
illustration. By the end of the meeting the delegation from Zeeland had still not appeared, so a
committee was tasked with drafting a letter to the States of Zeeland to apprise them of what had
86 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 93.
121

taken place. Once the draft letter had been read aloud and approved, a lengthy discussion ensued
as to who should sign it. At stake, of course, was which delegates among the nineteen were
vested with the authority to represent the body as a whole. In his report, Van der Meer indicated
somewhat cautiously that he had agreed to sign in the capacity of “President,” along with Jonas
Witsen, Burgemeester of Amsterdam and a director of the company, whom he referred to as
“Vice President.” 87 This language is nowhere to be found in the charter, but it evidently served as
the best available compromise. The effect was to elevate Van der Meer, and thereby the States
General, to a procedural position senior to that of the formal chair, a role unambiguously
assigned to either Amsterdam or Zeeland (on a rotating basis).
Johan van Goch, who served as the senior delegate of the States General at the following
two meetings of the Heren XIX, exercised a much firmer hand, with important implications for
the manner in which the board functioned. On the first day of the meeting—August 3, 1623—the
minutes indicate that Van Goch collected the letters of credential from the various delegates and
read a short document (sadly no longer extant) outlining the manner in which the meetings’
business would be conducted. He then requested that each of the delegates take his seat,
following a predetermined order: first to be seated were himself and Van der Meer, followed by
the senior delegate from Amsterdam, the senior delegate from Zeeland, and then a descending
order of delegates from the remaining chambers, in a manner which clearly established the
hierarchy within the company. Such a hierarchy was a fundamental element of the order of
87 NA 1.01.02 inv.nr. 4941, entry for December 21, 1622. “Is voorts gelesen een concept van een brief aen die van
Zeelant te senden […] ende naer lange disputen aldaer voorgevallen wie d’selve brieven soude tekenen, mitsdien
alsnoch geen Secrets en was aengenomen. Is eyntel. goetgevonden dat d’selve by my als Preses & by Jonas Witters.
als Vice Preses soude worden get.” It is interesting to note that van Goch was paid 212 guilders for his expenses at
this meeting, a substantial sum. See the Resolutien der Staten Generaal, entry for March 22, 1623.
122

Seat Chamber
1 Amsterdam
2 Zeeland
3 Amsterdam
4 Zeeland
5 Amsterdam
6 Zeeland
7 Delft
8 Amsterdam
9 Zeeland
10 Amsterdam
11 Rotterdam
12 Amsterdam
13 Hoorn
14 Amsterdam
15 Enkhuizen
16 Amsterdam
17 ~ Rotated ~
Table 3. Seating order in the
Heren XVII of the VOC. 88
123
Table 4. Seating order in the
Heren XIX of the WIC. 89
88 This is adapted from van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, 250.
89 Adapted from NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 1, entry for March 16, 1624. This is identical to all the other participant lists
for meetings of the Heren XIX of which I am aware.
Seat Chamber
1 States General
States General
2 Amsterdam
3 Zeeland
4 Amsterdam
5 Zeeland
6 Amsterdam
7 Maas
8 North Holland
9 Amsterdam
10 Zeeland
11 Groningen
12 Amsterdam
13 Zeeland
Zeeland (assessor)
14 Amsterdam
15 Maas
16 Amsterdam
17 North Holland
18 Groningen
19 Amsterdam
Amsterdam (assessor)

Table 5. Seating for the delegations at the States General. 90
Table 6. Possible seating at the Heren XIX. 91
90 Adapted from Van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization, 150. Note that the chair rotated on a weekly basis
among the seven provinces. Gelderland always spoke first, followed by Holland and Zeeland.
91 There are no remaining images of the Heren XIX, so this diagram must be considered conjectural. The seating
order in Table 4 implies that members of the same chamber were not seated together, but this would be highly
unusual, since members of the same delegation sat together in both the States of Holland and the States General.
This is also consistent with the fact that statements from multiple delegates from the same chamber rarely appear in
the board’s minutes. Nevertheless, since voting was conducted by delegate, rather than by delegation, it is possible
that seating was organized as in Table 4 and thus that delegations did not sit together. It is impossible to say whether
the two assessors and the lawyer (who did not vote but likely recorded the minutes) would have been seated at the
table. Note that only two seats are allocated to representatives of the States General, though quite often the number
was higher, and only two seats to the chamber of the Maas, which in practice sent three delegates, consistent with
the argument presented above.
124

seating at the meetings of the States General, and mimicked that in the board of directors of the
VOC, clearly shown by Pieter Van Dam in his account of the company's management. 92 Once
everyone was seated, Van Goch confirmed that all present were familiar with the terms of the
charter. He then administered a “solemn oath” to each delegate, one at a time, to affirm their
commitment to abide by its terms, uphold the secrecy of the proceedings, and confine discussion
to the points outlined in the agenda. 93 Though by no means uncommon in official settings in the
Dutch Republic, this set of rituals established the formal character of the board and the
generative authority of the senior representative of the States General within it. 94
Throughout the remainder of the meeting, Van Goch pressed this role, guiding the
discussion, setting deadlines for the work of subcommittees, and responding to official
delegations from the church, Admiralty, and other institutions that called upon the Heren XIX to
address specific grievances. In addition, he undertook to relay the results of the delegates’
deliberations back to the States General, especially on issues that concerned them directly. These
issues included the continuing failure of the authorities in Zeeland and North Holland to publicly
display the terms of the charter; logistical and financial issues concerning the status of Fort
Nassau in Guinea; issues relating to the sale and authenticity of shares in the company; and, most
importantly, payment of the promised subsidy and allocation of ships and soldiers for the first
92 Van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, 250. For seating at the States General, see Van Vree,
Meetings, Manners, and Civilization, 150. That seating mattered to the delegates is evident from the fact that Killaen
van Rensellaer, a wealthy and influential investor, protested at being given the nineteenth place at the table when he
appeared as the representative of the hooftparticipanten of the Amsterdam chamber at the meeting of the Heren XIX
that began on March 16, 1624. NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 1. "Behalve dat de heer Kiliaen van Renselaer verhaelde eer
hy gingen sitten, dat hy tegens de XIXde plaetse inde voorgaende vergaderinge voor hem ende synen assessor hadde
geprotesteert, ende acte van onprejuditie vercregen, de welcke hy ende synen assessor, noch in haer geheel waren
behoudende, terwyl haerluyden daer over noch geen contentement gedaen en was."
93 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 1, entry for August 3, 1623.
94 See S. J. Fockema Andreae, De Nederlandse Staat onder de Republiek (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche, 1969),
106-107.
125

phase of the company’s Groot Dessyn (Grand Design). 95 On each of these issues the Heren XIX
were dependent upon the States General, so that progress required frequent dispatch of delegates
to The Hague to clarify or argue in favor of a specific policy. But on many other issues the board
made its own resolutions and acted with self-conscious independence. The chamber of the Maas
was not silenced by Van Goch’s rejection of their request to send three delegates; a subsequent
request by the States General that the company explore terms for integrating with companies in
England and France was rejected outright. Thus there emerged a system wherein the States
General exercised an important procedural power, along with a lead role in coordinating the
company's military preparations, while its authority to achieve specific outcomes was
circumscribed.
This system required that the States General assign a number of people to handle the
business the WIC, not only in the meetings of the Heren XIX, but also in The Hague. This
process was already well underway by 1619, when ordinary deputies from the States of Holland
and Zeeland helped to push through agreement on the WIC charter. Key figures included Hugo
Muys, Albert Joachimi (1560-1654), Albert Bruynings, Schaffer, Magnus, and Feyt, along with
Van der Meer and Van Goch, all of whom drafted reports and briefed the full meetings of the
States General in advance of visits by delegations from the individual chambers or the Heren
XIX. 96 This group never exercised the executive authority over the company that Usselincx had
imagined, but in many cases specific individuals remained involved with its affairs over a fairly
long period of time and played a critical role in determining which policies would receive the
sanction and support of the States General. Among them Van Goch was clearly a leading figure
in the early days of the company, and his influence no doubt would have grown had he not been
95 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 39, entry for August 12, 1623.
96 Resolutien der Staten Generaal, multiple entries, 1617-1624.
126

selected for the powerful position of griffier (clerk) to the States General in October 1623. 97 In
his absence, Feyt and Schaffer joined Van der Meer at the meetings of the Heren XIX, but none
of these men succeeded in establishing themselves as a consistent, senior presence. Only in the
1630s was such a presence established by Gerard van Arnhem, and in the 1640s by Hendrick van
der Capellen, each of whom attended more than a half dozen meetings of the Heren XIX. 98
5. Conclusion
This chapter has advanced three central arguments. First, it suggests that Usselincx's arguments
for central control over colonial affairs, and in particular his proposal for a council of noblemen
to oversee matters of war, law, and settlement, powerfully influenced the creation of the Heren
XIX. There is no question that Usselincx himself was deeply distressed by the final agreement,
but in missing this compromise altogether historians have underestimated his political legacy.
More important, and quite separate from his personal success or failure, the inclusion in the final
charter of language empowering the States General and its representatives demonstrates a strong
desire among some drafters for stronger central authority and a corresponding anxiety about
turning over the management of military and colonial affairs to merchants. That a similar anxiety
was largely absent from the negotiations to establish the VOC indicates that contemporaries
viewed the regions as distinct and different. As Usselincx himself argued,
In the East Indies there are great and powerful Kingdoms, in which since olden times a great trade
has been driven, which the VOC encountered on its arrival; so that the whole work consists of
trade and maritime warfare. But in America the trade must be built [from scratch]. And therein is
97 Knevel, Het Haagse Bureau, 59.
98 For Gerard van Arnhem, see NA 1.10.69 inv.nr. 542, along with the WIC liassen, NA 1.01.04. For Van der
Capellen, see NA 1.01.05, inv.nr. 9411 and NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17.
127

to be understood the sending over of people, the building of colonies and new Republics, the
building of Cities, Conquests, and Lands, their distribution [among citizens], war on land as well
as at sea, the digging of Mines, the appointment of Governors, Officials, and courts of Justice
[…]. 99
Infiltrating Spanish America was not the same as establishing trade in Asia. It required different
tools and different orders of society to manage them. Of course, the States of Holland's
opposition to a Raedt van Indien and their efforts to reduce the influence of noblemen, while
simultaneously pushing for a policy of conquest, makes clear that this view was not universally
shared. But the company’s history, and the role within it of the Heren XIX, cannot be understood
without recognizing this basic conflict.
Second, the chapter has argued that the company’s board of directors was a highly
political, rather than a strictly commercial body, and that to function at all it needed to resolve,
however tentatively, underlying regional and inter-urban tensions. As with the States General
itself, the Heren XIX had an integrative role to play. This may help to resolve a paradox pointed
out by the economist and economic historian Eli Heckscher in the early 1930s. In his estimation,
The Dutch trading companies were, besides the English, the most famous undertakings of the
mercantilist period. It is curious that the influence of the state upon their form was even more
pronounced than was the case with the English companies, in spite of the fact that England was,
politically, infinitely more unified. 100
99 NA. 1.01.05, inv.nr. 9409, Corte aenwysinge van de voor meeste verschillen tusschen t' Concept van Octroy op
Westindien dat by de ho: mo: heeren, Myn heeren de Staten Generael inde Maent van februario anno 1619... "Maer
in America moet den handel noch gemaect worden ende t'sal daer meest bestaen in t' becomen ende overvoeren van
de meenicht van volck, d'oprechten van Colonias ende nieuwe Republycquen, t'bouwen van Steden, Conquesten van
Landen, ende ytdeelinge derselver, in d'oorloge soo te water als te Lande, de lantbouwinge t'Arbeyden inde Mynen,
t'stellen van Gouverneurs, Amptlieden ende hoven van Justitie [...]"
100 Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, ed. E. F. Soderlund, trans. Mendel Shapiro, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin,
1955), 356.
128

The preceding analysis suggests that state involvement in the WIC was so great precisely
because the state itself was so decentralized. The company was both a product of, and a vehicle
for, the centralization of commercial and imperial policy.
Finally, the chapter has argued that representatives of the States General played a vital
role in the in the Heren XIX. Van der Meer and Van Goch's efforts to impose order and unity
were only a beginning, though, and the significance of the States General’s representatives and
the board itself would grow substantially during the 1630s and early 1640s, when the territory
under the company's direct administrative and military control rapidly expanded. In order to
handle the greater volume of correspondence and the challenges of financial accounting, the
Heren XIX hired additional scribes, clerks, and accountants, and in 1642 they established a
General Rekencamer (Central Accounting Office) responsible for coordinating the work of the
chambers' individual accountants and reconciling the company’s books. 101 The Heren XIX also
retained a staff of lawyers to handle suits from foreign merchants and governments who believed
that they had been wronged by the company’s actions overseas. 102 The challenge of staffing
regional directorates in the conquests grew, as well. By 1642 there were already separate
administrative structures in Brazil, Guinea, Angola, New Netherland, and Curacao, each
requiring a steady stream of personnel, instructions, and provisions. 103 As a result, the meetings
of the Heren XIX lasted longer and longer, so that the board began to take on the character of a
standing colonial administration, with its own staff and supervisory authority over subordinate
councils overseas.
101 NA 1.01.05 inv.nr. 9411.
102 These included Simon van Beaumont, secretary to the city of Middelburg and a director of the company, and,
later, the Amsterdam lawyer Gysbert Rudolphij.
103 For the separation of Loanda from Brazil, see NA 1.01.05 inv.nr. 9411. For the division of Guinea into a northern
and southern, districts see Van den Boogaart and Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade,
1596-1650,” 358.
129

But by far the most important transformation was brought about by the heavy financial
burden of military conquest and territorial defense—problems that forced a wedge between the
Heren XIX and the States General. With the company’s coffers empty, the company's directors
were increasingly convinced that the States General was not living up to its military and financial
commitments, and thus took measures to reign in costs. The States General, meanwhile, became
increasingly distrustful of the Heren XIX's ability to effectively govern its overseas territories.
This wedge is nowhere clearer than in the company’s efforts to find a replacement for Johan
Maurits as Governor General of Dutch Brazil in the summer and fall of 1645.
130

1. Introduction
Chapter Four
“In the Service of Merchants”
The Selection of a New Government for Dutch Brazil
On May 6, 1644, the elite of Recife—formerly the port for the city of Olinda, the center of
Portuguese sugar cultivation, but by this time the capital of Dutch Brazil—assembled in the the
council chamber in Mauritstad for a meeting that would permanently transform the colony's
political structure. 1 Present were the diverse components of the colonial government: three
members of the Hoge ende Secrete Raad (High and Secret Council), members of the Councils of
Justice and Finance, the bailiff, aldermen, commissioners, the orphanage masters, reformed
ministers, the church council, military and naval officers, WIC servants, and prominent members
of the city’s Jewish population. The occasion was a somber one: Johan Maurits van Nassau-
Siegen had been recalled to the United Provinces after more than seven years service as
Governor General of Dutch Brazil (1637-1644). The ceremony had been organized according to
precise instructions from the Heren XIX to mark the occasion of his departure and to make
visible the delicate transfer of power this entailed.
1 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 70, Minuten van de Hoge en Secrete Raed in Brazilie, entry for May 6, 1644.
131

Illustration 8. Map of Mauritstad and Recife, c. 1645. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag,
(4 VEL), H 619-74. Formerly the port for Olinda, capital of the Portuguese captaincy of
Pernambuco, the Dutch transformed Recife into an administrative and political center.
132

Maurits began by announcing what everyone must have known already: he was preparing
to return home. He thanked the members of the Hoge ende Secrete Raad for their service,
obedience, and trustworthiness and informed them that from henceforth they would assume all
the responsibilities and authority that previously had been invested in him. He addressed each
member individually and administered to each an oath of loyalty to the States General, the Prince
of Orange, and the Heren XIX. 2 Once this had been done, he and the three councilors retreated
into a separate, smaller chamber, where Maurits presented them with a lengthy memorandum he
had composed to advise the council on the best means to govern the colony and to maintain order
amongst its subjects. 3 The counselors thanked Maurits and wished him a swift return journey.
Ten days later he left Recife along roads thronged by supporters and onlookers amidst a carnival
atmosphere famously memorialized by his official chronicler, Casper Barlaeus. 4
It was a ritual display of political power and a reminder—should one be necessary—that
the Dutch commercial world of the mid-seventeenth century was both more colorful and more
complicated than the impression left to us by the rows of portraits of Marcusian one-dimensional
men, clothed in black, counting coins and scribbling notes in their Amsterdam canal houses. 5
Maurits was a nobleman, a decorated military commander, and a patron of the arts and sciences:
a “Humanist Prince” in the New World, as one scholarly collection put it. 6 He has been variously
credited with expanding the territory under Dutch control, promoting religious toleration for
Jews as well as Catholics, and with supporting a coterie of painters, naturalists, astronomers, and
2 The text reads "zijn hoocheyt," which would have referred to Frederik Hendrik, the Prince of Orange.
3 Caspar van Baerle, The History of Brazil under the Governorship of Count Johan Maurits of Nassau, 1636-1644,
trans. Blanche T. Ebeling Koning (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011).
4 Ibid., pp. 395-398.
5 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991).
6 E. van den Boogaart, Hendrik Richard Hoetink, and Peter James Palmer Whitehead, eds., Johan Maurits van
Nassau-Siegen, 1604-1679: a Humanist Prince in Europe and Brazil. Essays on the Occasion of the Tercentenary of
His Death (The Hague: Johan Maurits van Nassau Stichting, 1979).
133

geographers whose works remain a treasure trove for the study of colonial Brazil. 7 As historians
have long recognized, however, Maurits' reputation among the directors of the WIC, for whom
he nominally worked, was altogether different. During his tenure in Brazil Maurits rarely
corresponded directly with the Heren XIX, preferring instead to address his letters to the States
General, who then forwarded copies. He was arrogant and difficult to control. But, most
important of all, he was expensive, and the company, which by 1643 was nearly bankrupt,
decided—against the objections of the States General and the Prince of Orange—that he must be
replaced. 8
This chapter looks closely at how this was done. Replacing Maurits and designing a new
council to govern Dutch Brazil dominated discussions within the Heren XIX in Amsterdam in
1644 and was still unresolved by the beginning of the fall meeting in Middelburg in September
of 1645. There the matter appeared as the second item on the agenda, to be resolved “without
further delay,” but this was considerably more difficult than it might at first appear. 9 Charles
Boxer noted the troubles the WIC faced in agreeing upon a suitable candidate and argued that
this episode brought into sharp relief the limitations of the Dutch political system for
administering colonies overseas. 10 Without a strong central authority, it was, according to Boxer,
nearly impossible to reach collective agreement quickly or to take decisive action in the face of
mounting problems abroad. 11 This judgment is certainly correct, but it overlooks a more subtle
conflict that emerges at several important places in the records of the negotiations themselves,
7 The most famous text to come from this group is Piso, Markgraf, and Laet, Historia Natvralis Brasiliae [...] : In
Qua Non Tantum Plantæ Et Animalia, Sed Et Indigenarum Morbi, Ingenia Et Mores Describuntur Et Iconibus
Supra Quingentas Illustrantur.
8 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654.
9 NA 1.01.04 inv.nr. 5758. Poincten waerop alle de Cameren van de West Indische Comp. beschreven worden,
omme in conformite van den Octroye tegens den tweeden vande aenstaende maent September 1645, etc. August 12,
1645.
10 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 173–175.
11 Ibid., 175.
134

and especially in the secret minutes recorded by representatives of the States General, a source
which Boxer did not consult. Echoing the debate over the Raedt van Indien in the period 1618-
1621, this concerned the thorny question of which groups within society—merchants,
magistrates, or noblemen—were best suited to represent the company’s interests, and which
skills were most appropriate to the task of colonial government. It was, in a deeper sense, a
conflict over the company's aims in Brazil and between the various orders of Dutch society for
the authority to implement them.
Among these orders, the figure of the Dutch merchant is perhaps the most familiar, both
to contemporaries in early modern Europe and from the classic studies of capitalism from Max
Weber and Werner Sombart to the present day. 12 Less familiar is the figure of the Dutch
nobleman, whose place in Dutch history has been all but forgotten, Peter Burke’s comparative
study of elites in Venice and Amsterdam may be taken as emblematic of the problem. After
briefly mentioning the Dutch nobility and the important role they played at the Stadholder’s
court at The Hague, Burke devotes his study entirely to Amsterdam’s merchant oligarchy.
Whereas Venice was governed by a closed group of noblemen, and thus could be characterized
as an “estate society,” Burke argues, Amsterdam developed Europe's first “class society,” with
political and economic power centralized in the hands of a few merchant families. 13 As a
description of Amsterdam this is largely correct, but Amsterdam was only one city in the
province of Holland, and Holland only one of eight provinces. As Henk van Nierop's recent
study of the Dutch nobility makes clear, even in Holland noble families continued to serve
12 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 1992);
Werner Sombart, Economic Life in the Modern Age, ed. Nico Stehr and Reiner Grundmann (New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 2001).
13 Peter Burke, Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Elites (London: Temple Smith, 1974), 27.
135

important military, administrative, and legal functions at almost all levels of Dutch society. 14
Their prominence and influence may have declined relative to urban merchant oligarchs, but
those noblemen who chose to remain active in politics could exercise considerable political
influence. To take but one of Van Nierop's many examples, the number of noblemen who
attended the meetings of Ridderschap (the council of nobleman in the States of Holland)
declined markedly over the course of the sixteenth century, but those noblemen who attended did
so more frequently. 15 And since the Ridderschap represented the smaller towns within the States
of Holland, chaired its meetings, voted first, and had a formal role in resolving disputes, its
power was far greater than its single vote might suggest. 16 The important place of noblemen in
the United Provinces in the seventeenth century is now widely recognized among Dutch
historians, partly as a result of Van Nierop's work, but it is still frequently overlooked by
scholars working only in English.
What role, if any, did the nobility play in Dutch overseas expansion? In Spain noblemen
filled the ranks of the Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias and served as council president, at least
until Philip II selected Juan de Ovando for this office in 1571. 17 Noblemen also played a critical
role in expeditions of military conquest and as colonial viceroys in the New World. 18 In England,
as Theodore Rabb has shown for the period 1575-1630, the gentry were disproportionately
represented as investors and directors in overseas commercial enterprises—especially those
14
H. F. K. van Nierop, Van Ridders tot Regenten: De Hollandse Adel in de Zestiende en de eerste helft van de
Zeventiende Eeuw (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1990).
15
Ibid., 151.
16
Ibid., 147.
17
Stafford Poole, Juan de Ovando: Governing the Spanish Empire in the Reign of Philip II (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2004).
18
John Lynch, “The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish America,” Journal of Latin American Studies 24
(1992): 69–81.
136

involved in privateering or which aimed to discover new sea routes or establish settler colonies. 19
Indeed, Rabb argues that gentry investors differed in important ways from their merchant
counterparts: whereas merchants were, in general, more consistent and diligent in applying
themselves to the business at hand, and more focused on profits, members of the gentry appeared
more willing to sustain losses for the sake of enterprises that might enhance national (and thus
also their personal) power and prestige. 20 Their significant contributions up to 1630 were critical,
Rabb concludes, to pushing past the difficult and risky early phases of colonization and thus
helped lay the groundwork for England's subsequent imperial expansion. 21 The involvement of
the gentry, and the leading role played by the royal family itself, in colonial ventures after the
Restoration is well known, and suggests that the basic contours of Rabb's analysis carry well into
the seventeenth century.
Although scholars have identified similarly important contributions by noblemen in
Portugal, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, and elsewhere, the United Provinces always appear as
an exception. As Fritz Redlich put it in a special issue of Explorations in Entrepreneurial History
dedicated to this subject a half-century ago, “there was no European country which did not
experience at one time or another the phenomenon of aristocratic business leadership, except
Holland and Switzerland, countries in which feudal institutions had never found fertile
ground.” 22 In light of Van Nierop's study of the Dutch nobility this conclusion needs to be re-
examined. The previous chapter examined the role of the nobility in discussions over the
composition of the WIC's board of directors. This chapter considers the conspicuous role that
19
Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise and Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575-
1630 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).
20
Ibid., 38-41.
21
Ibid., 69.
22
Fritz Redlich, “European Aristocracy and Economic Development,” Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 6,
no. 2 (December 1953): 78-91. The quotation is taken from page 78.
137

noblemen played in overseas administration—not only in the person of Johan Maurits, but in the
original list of candidates that was drawn up to replace him. In taking this approach my purpose
is not to substitute one lop-sided position with another: the Dutch Republic was dominated by
merchant interests, and merchants made up the bulk of WIC investors and directors. But no
understanding of company politics in the mid-1640s is possible if one ignores the small group of
noblemen who stood at the center of the company's negotiations over how to govern Dutch
Brazil.
The negotiations themselves are but one instance in the long history of opaque, highly-
secretive processes employed by governments and other institutions to select and anoint new
political leadership. Our knowledge of this particular episode is made possible by an unusually
rich collection of documents, both secret and ordinary, kept by the States General, whose
delegates were deeply involved. An important complement to these are two contemporary
documents—a diary and a formal memoire—composed by two of the candidates for office in
Brazil: respectively, the Amsterdam merchant Hendrik Haecxs and the nobleman Alexander van
der Capellen (ca. 1590-1656). 23 Based on a close reading of these and other sources, this chapter
attempts to excavate the process by which the new colonial government for Brazil was chosen.
By following the negotiations from beginning to end, it exposes and explores the rituals
employed by the WIC to display authority, maintain secrecy, reach consensus, and bind the
political allegiance of company servants abroad. The chapter thus provides both a new analysis
23 The secret minutes of the negotiations, along with a number of memoranda prepared by representatives of the
States General to the meetings of the Heren XIX, can be found in NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17. Alexander van der
Capellen's memoires were published in the eighteenth century as the Gedenkschriften van Jonkeer Alexander van
der Capellen (Utrecht: J. van Schoonhoven, 1777). Hendrik Haecxs' diary was edited and published in the early
twentieth century: L’Honoré Naber, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië
(1645-1654),” Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap (1925): 126-163.
138

of a pivotal moment in the history of Dutch Brazil and offers insight into the more general
challenges the Dutch Republic faced in its efforts to govern a land colony.
The chapter begins by reviewing the company's powers to appoint colonial officials and
by examining the various proposals to reform the structure of the Hoge ende Secrete Raad. The
next section establishes the list of candidates for the office of President and explores some of the
reasons that each refused to serve, focusing especially on the figure of Alexander van der
Capellen. The following section examines the selection of the four subordinate councilors, and in
particular the company directors' efforts to ensure greater participation by individuals with
practical experience in trade. The last section reconstructs the career of Wolter van
Schonenborch, the individual who was ultimately chosen to serve as President, and explores
some of the rituals associated with his selection. A conclusion examines the limitations of this
compromise for the colony's future and offers a re-assessment of the role of the nobility in Dutch
expansion overseas.
2. Institutional Reform and the New Council
As with all matters concerning senior personnel in the WIC's employment, the process to replace
Johan Maurits was the responsibility of the Heren XIX, rather than of any of the company's
individual chambers or the States General. Article 2 of the WIC charter entrusted the company
with responsibility for governing the conquests and settlements it established overseas. It was
given the power
in our [the States General's] name and authority, within the limits herein set forth [...] to make
contracts, leagues and alliances with the princes and natives of the countries therein comprised, to
build any fortresses and strongholds there, and to appoint, transfer, discharge, and replace
governors, troops, and officers of justice, for the preservation of the places, the maintenance of
139

good order, police and justice, and in general for the furtherance of trade, according to the
circumstances as they see fit. 24
This language gave the company a great deal of leeway, both to design the institutions of
colonial administration in each territory and to select the individuals who would lead these
institutions. At the same time, however, the States General reserved the right to approve or reject
candidates for Governor General and Vice Governor, along with a host of lesser, but still
powerful, offices. 25 Once candidates for office had been approved, they were “obliged to take the
oath of allegiance to us [the States General] and also to the Company.” 26 As Jaap Jacobs has
pointed out, the charter did not endow the WIC with sovereign authority over its territories;
rather, the company was given the more limited authority to exercise sovereignty on behalf of the
States General. 27 Decisions regarding colonial appointments were made by the Heren XIX and
shared with the States General either by their own representatives to this body or by delegations
of company directors who travelled to The Hague explicitly for this purpose. In the case of
disagreement in the Heren XIX the matter would be referred to the States General for resolution.
By the time that Maurits returned to The Hague from Brazil in the end of June 1644,
discussions about how to replace him were well under way. 28 It was not until December,
however, that the Heren XIX reached agreement on reforms to the structure of the colonial
government, and not until April that it had composed a secret list of candidates for the newly-
24
Charter of the West India Company (1621), Article 2. The translation has been modified very slightly from that in
A. J. F. van Laer (ed.), Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, 87-115.
25
Ibid., Article 3.
26
Ibid.
27
Jaap Jacobs, “Dutch Proprietary Manors in America: The Patroonships in New Netherland,” in Constructing Early
Modern Empires: Proprietary Ventures in the Atlantic World, 1500-1750, ed. L. H. Roper and B. van Ruymbeke
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 301–326. On government and law within the WIC territory more generally, see Jacob A.
Schiltkamp, “Legislation, Government, Jurisprudence, and Law in the Dutch West Indian Colonies: The Order of
Government of 1629,” Pro Memorie 5, no. 2 (2003): 320–334.
28
Lieuwe van Aitzema, Historie of Verhael van Saken van Staet en Oorloch in ende ontrent de Vereenigde
Nederlanden, vol. 5 (’s-Gravenhage: Johan Veely, 1660), 712.
140

created offices of president and councilor. 29 The reforms were subtle but important: Maurits
simultaneously had held the titles of Governor-, Captain-, and Admiral-General, which meant
that he was the senior representative of the company in the colony and commander of all land
and sea forces. Maurits nominally shared this authority with three subordinate councilors, but a
provision that gave him a double vote in case of a tie ensured that he could pass any resolution
supported by at least one other member of the council. 30 The proposals circulated towards the
end of 1643 were intended to curb this power, while at the same time institutionalizing important
elements of the colonial government. One proposal, circulated by the Groningen chamber,
recommended eliminating the existing structure entirely, and replacing it with a new council
consisting of five members—each member nominated by, and responsible to, one of the
company's five chambers. 31 This proposal would have ensured that the smaller chambers,
Groningen included, would have an equal representation in the government of Brazil. The
proposal clearly received little favor, however, and the reforms that ultimately were agreed to in
Amsterdam on December 14, 1644 were considerably more modest. The position of Governor
General was eliminated, but in its place the Heren XIX created the office of President, supported
by four councilors and a secretary. Decisions were to be made by majority, with each of the five
members of the council exercising only a single vote. At the same time, the Heren XIX
strengthened the existing Councils of Justice and Finance. 32 Together these changes increased
29
NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract wt die secrete notulen der vergaderinge der Negentien t’ Amsterdam
gehouden zedert de 22 April 1645.
30
Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC, 43-44. Maurits' original instructions can be found in the archives of the
States General: 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.20.
31
NA 1.10.78 inv.nr. 8, Verzameling stukken, afkomstig van Salomon Sweers (levensjaren 1611-1674), Jeremias
van Vliet (levensjaren ca. 1602-1674), Jacques Specx en François Mannis, Project betreffende de regeering in
Brazilie, ingeleverd door de kamer Groningen, fol. 160-167.
32
NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract wt het register der resolutien van [de] Gecommitteerden wegen de Generael
Geoctroyeerde Westind. Comp. ter vergaderinge van de XIX. Mercury den 14 Decemb. 1644. See also, Extract wt
het Rapport van het gebesongeerde ende vergaderinge der negentien van de Westindische Compagnie t'Amsterdam
141

the council's size and authority, decreased the powers of its senior member, and more clearly
delineated responsibility for administering justice, tracking money, and corresponding with the
company at home. All these measures were implicitly intended to correct what the company's
directors perceived to be the failures of the colonial government in Brazil under Maurits'
direction.
This was in fact only the latest stage in a longer history of Dutch efforts to govern the
colony. The 1621 charter originally had envisaged a Governor General who would administer
not only Brazil, but all of the company's territories and forts within the Western Hemisphere. It
was no coincidence that this mirrored the administrative structure of the VOC, which had
appointed Pieter Both (1568-1615) in 1610 to serve as Governor General at Batavia with
responsibility for all of the East Indies. 33 A document drafted after the short-lived seizure of
Bahia in 1624, however, sought to institute a significantly less centralized model. According to
this document, Bahia would be governed by a council of nine members and a rotating presidency
that followed the detailed representative formula and hierarchy of the Heren XIX itself. 34 The
plan was never implemented, as the colony was lost to a joint Portuguese-Spanish fleet the
following year, but it showed the degree to which at least some of the company's directors had
been unwilling to establish a strong and independent central authority in Brazil. 35 Later, when the
company captured Recife and Olinda in 1630, the Heren XIX experimented with a whole range
gedaen inde vergaderinge van haer hooch Mogh. By de Heeren van der Capellen toe Ryssel, Vierssen, en van
Santen de 27 Decemb: 1644.
33 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 62; Schiltkamp, “Legislation, Government, Jurisprudence, and Law in
the Dutch West Indian Colonies: The Order of Government of 1629,” 326.
34 Concept van Regieringe. soo in politie als justitie in de Bahia de todos los Sanctos, ende andere plaetsen noch te
veroveren in Brasil. This document was drafted by Albert Coenraads Burgh, Simon van Beaumont, Philips Doubleth
and Diderich Scherff in mid-September 1624. NA 1.01.04 inv.nr. 5751A. For the discussions within the Heren XIX,
see NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 1, entry for 13 September 1624.
35 See Stuart B. Schwartz, “The Voyage of the Vassals: Royal Power, Noble Obligations, and Merchant Capital
Before the Portuguese Restoration of Independence, 1624-1640,” The American Historical Review 96, no. 3 (June
1991): 735–762.
142

of different councils, including one led by two company directors who were dispatched from the
Netherlands for this purpose. Only with Maurits' selection in 1636—with the full title of
Governor General—did the company concede the need for stronger leadership to protect and
expand the colony. 36 The proposal to create the office of President in 1644 thus represented an
effort to rein in the colony's leadership, without returning to the somewhat chaotic situation that
had existed before Maurits took office, which had been characterized by frequent changes of
personnel and nearly constant bickering between military and civilian authorities.
The remaining sources do not indicate whether the adoption of this proposal was
particularly contentious. 37 The task of identifying potential candidates for the new offices was far
more difficult. Each of the company's chambers naturally sought to advance its own candidates
and to take advantage of the patronage opportunities that the offices offered. 38 But staffing the
new government also exposed a set of deep ideological divides over what sorts of people were
most qualified to serve. Maurits had been selected in 1636 in large part because he was a
nobleman, with the military experience and status necessary to place the Brazil colony on a
firmer footing. 39 As we will see, at least some actors within the States General and the circle
around the Prince of Orange believed that only an individual of noble birth could adequately
replace him. By contrast, a number of merchants within the Heren XIX were most concerned to
ensure that the new council would have adequate representation by individuals with greater
practical experience in trade and commerce. The intensity of this divide was perhaps exacerbated
by the pressure under which decisions needed to be taken: by April, Maurits had been gone for
nearly a year and the colony had been left in the hands of a relatively junior group of company
36 Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC, 43–44.
37 With the exception of a handful of brief extracts, no minutes remain for the December meetings of the Heren XIX.
38 For the Groningen Chamber's efforts in this regard, see Winter, De Westindische Compagnie ter Kamer Stad en
Lande, 124–125.
39 Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC, 43.
143

servants. These individuals may not have been inexperienced, as Boxer pointed out, but they
were hardly in a position to overawe, either. 40 A new council needed to be identified and
deployed quickly.
The nomination of candidates—indeed the entire process for selecting the new High
Council—was kept strictly secret. The Dutch Republic was at the time notorious throughout
Europe for the ease with which official secrets could be purchased or otherwise discovered, but
this did not mean that specific matters could not be hidden. 41 Most of the discussion at meetings
of the Heren XIX was recorded in an official set of ordinary minutes for distribution to the five
chambers and the States General, and copies occasionally appear in private collections. Company
affairs were also discussed in the individual chambers, provincial assemblies, and the States
General, so that information about the company circulated in the form of resolutions or
resolution extracts from these bodies. The proceedings for selection of the new High Council for
Brazil, however, were recorded in only two places: a separate, secret set of minutes from the
meeting of the Heren XIX, and the secret reports delivered to the States General by its own
representatives. The business of selecting the new council appears nowhere in official records of
the provinces or the States General until the new President was announced on November 18,
1645. 42 From this we might draw two conclusions: first, that the company believed it was
critically important to restrict discussion about personnel and to keep disagreements about
colonial leadership from spilling into public view; and, second, that the decisions themselves
were taken by a small group of individuals behind closed doors.
40 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 164. The remaining councilors were Hendrik Hamel, a merchant from
Amsterdam, Pieter Bas, formerly a goldsmith in Haarlem, and Adriaan Bullestrate, formerly a master carpenter in
Middelburg.
41 For a sophisticated discussion of secrecy and politics in the Dutch Republic, see De Bruin, Geheimhouding en
Verraad: De Geheimhouding van Staatszaken ten tijde van de Republiek (1600-1750).
42 NA 1.01.03 inv.nr. 4845, entry for November 18, 1645.
144

Extracts from the secret minutes of these meetings provide an exceptionally rich portrait
of the negotiations. On April 14, the Heren XIX resolved to begin the nomination procedure.
Each director was requested to bring forward the name of one individual, subject to three
important stipulations: the individual was to have already shown exemplary service; his name
and all subsequent discussions were to be kept strictly secret; and the final selection was to be
made freely and in good conscience, based exclusively upon the merits of the respective
candidates—directors were instructed explicitly that their vote should not be constrained by any
obligation to their respective chambers. 43 Once this had been done, Hendrik van der Capellen,
the senior representative of the States General and a nobleman from Gelderland, administered an
oath of secrecy and collected the names from each director, so that a secretary could assemble
them into a single list. This list was read aloud and all present were requested to apprise
themselves of the qualities of the individuals named therein. The election itself took place eight
days later, on April 22, 1645, after a brief recess for Easter. It produced a new list, in which five
candidates for the office of President were ranked by the number of votes they had received. The
first of these individuals would be approached directly, and, in the case he excused himself from
consideration, the second would be approached, and so forth. A second election was then held to
generate a rank-ordered list of twelve candidates to fill the remaining four positions of
councilor. 44
43 The text of the minutes reads as follows: “Is goetgevonden en geresolveert, dat alsnu de naemen vande persoonen
tot de hoge regeringe sullen werden opgegeven, ende by den yder van [de] vergaderinge, hooft voor hooft verclaert
op den eet aende comp. respectivel: gedaen, dat deselve sullen werden secreet gehouden, alsmede de discoersen die
daer over mogen vallen, ende dat [...] dat niemant is geobligeert aen eenige last aen syn camer om op seeckere
persoonen te gaen, maer indifferent wt alle die voorgestelt worden de selve verkiesen sal vry sonder passien offe
affectatie, ende naer een yders beste kennissein goede conscientie hem int eligeren sal gedragen, op sulcke
persoonen de welcke capabelle achten, omme den meesten dienst vant Lant het beste vande Comp: te bevorderen.”
See NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract wt die secrete notulen der vergaderinge der Negentien t' Amsterdam
gehouden zeder de 22 April 1645.
44 Ibid.
145

At this point the election was complete. It was agreed that two company directors would
begin, in the most discrete manner possible, to approach the first candidate on the list for the
office of President. Chosen for this delicate task were two of the company's most senior figures:
Albert Coenraeds Burgh and David Baute. Baute, a director in the Zeeland chamber who for
many years traded in Spain, has already been introduced. Burgh was one of the original directors
of the Amsterdam chamber, a regular representative at the meetings of the Heren XIX, an
investor in the New Netherland colony, and in the previous year Burgemeester of Amsterdam. 45
3. The Failed Search for a New President
The names on the list for the office of President are no longer well known, but at the time they
were of considerable political stature. The first candidate, Jacques Specx, had served for many
years as a senior official in the Dutch East Indies, first as opperkoopman (senior merchant) in
Japan from 1609-1621 and then as Governor General of the VOC at its headquarters in Batavia
(modern day Jakarta) from 1629-32. 46 In many ways he must have seemed the perfect candidate:
his service in Asia would have prepared him for the political, military, and communication
challenges of governing the Dutch colony in Brazil, as well as for navigating the company's
complicated relationships with Portuguese merchants and officials in Bahia, which remained in
Portuguese hands. His connections within the Netherlands were extensive. After returning from
Asia, Specx married Magdalena Doubleth, sister to Philips Doubleth, Ontvanger Generael
45 Johan E. Elias, De Vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795 (Amsterdam: N. Israel, 1963), 327. For Burgh's
activities as an investor in New Netherland, see Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland; Jacobs, “Johannes de Laet
en de Nieuwe Wereld.”
46 Boxer mistakenly assumed that Alexander van der Capellen was the company's first choice for President; in fact
he was fifth. Compare Boxer, 173-174 to NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract wt die secrete notulen der
vergaderinge der Negentien t' Amsterdam gehouden zedert de 22 April 1645.
146

Illustration 9. Portrait of Jacques Specx, Stichting Iconographisch
Bureau, Den Haag. Specx was a Director in the Amsterdam chamber
of the West India Company and, in 1645, a candidate for President
of the High Council in Dutch Brazil.
147

(Receiver General) of the United Provinces. Doubleth was in turn married to Geertruyd
Huygens, sister of Constantijn Huygens, Secretaris to Frederik Hendrik, the Prince of Orange.
This marriage therefore placed Specx firmly within the inner circles of the Dutch aristocracy.
Finally, in 1642 Specx became a director of the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC and, two years
later, served as the company's chief spokesman during crucial negotiations at the States of
Holland over renewal of the company's charter. He thus had ties to three key constituencies:
Amsterdam merchants, the financial, cultural, and political elite at The Hague, and the company
itself. 47
Burgh and Baute approached Specx on April 25, but with little success: Specx indicated
that he was eager to be of service to the company, and offered to conduct a review of the
company's various overseas possessions, but he refused the office of President in Brazil. 48 The
Heren XIX were not satisfied with this response and resolved to approach Specx again. Specx
held his ground, though, and on May 2 Burch and Baute were authorized to approach the second
candidate on the list, Bernard Julsinck, then Burgemeester of Groningen. Like Specx, Julsinck
was a shareholder in the company, and from 1631, a director of the Groningen chamber. In the
fall of 1641 and 1644 he represented Groningen at meetings of the Heren XIX. Unlike Specx,
however, Julsink's experience was squarely in city government, rather than colonial affairs. He
was Secretaris to the provincial Hoofdmanskamer (High Council) from 1618-1620, a
representative to the Generaliteitsrekenkamer (General Accounting Office) from 1622-1624,
curator of the city's academy in 1627, and either Hoofdman or Burgemeester almost every year
47 See Den Heijer, “Plannen voor Samenvoeging van VOC en WIC.” On Specx connections to the Huygens family,
see Kees Zandvliet, ed., De 250 Rijksten van de Gouden Eeuw: Kapitaal, Macht, Familie en Levensstijl (Nieuw
Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum, 2006), 46.
48 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract van de vergadering van de Heren XIX, 2 May 1645 en 17 Juny 1645. It
appears that Specx fulfilled this promise: see his review of WIC finances in each of the conquest areas in NA
1.10.78 inv.nr. 8, fols. 115-120, treated in detail in Chapter Six of this dissertation.
148

thereafter. 49 His appeal presumably stemmed from this service, and perhaps also from
Groningen's relatively neutral status in the long-running feud between the Amsterdam and
Zeeland chambers of the company.
Whatever the Company saw in him, however, was not reciprocated. Julsinck refused the
position outright, on the rather flimsy grounds that he was bound by oath to serve out the
remainder of his term as Burgemeester of Groningen. 50 By this time it was already late June and
the company's directors, along with the States General, were getting anxious. The selection
process had taken far too long, and little more had been achieved in the intervening months; with
winter approaching, it would soon be too late to dispatch the new council to Brazil. In April the
directors had raised the President's salary from 1,000 to 1,250 guilders per month—a
considerable sum, against which the directors of the North Holland chamber vigorously
protested—in the hope of attracting qualified candidates. 51 Their first two choices had refused
even this. No records remain for the discussions with candidates three and four: Albert Ruyl,
Stadspensionaris (Pensionary) of the city of Haarlem, and Nanning de Keyser, Secretaris of the
city of Hoorn. 52 But presumably they refused also, perhaps privately, for Hendrick van der
Capellen reported to the States General in late July that no candidate had yet agreed to the
position and that the matter would have to await resolution at the next meeting of the Heren XIX,
scheduled to take place in Middelburg in September. 53
49
Groninger Archief 1700 inv.nr. 16, Lijst van Gezagdragers vermeld in het Regeringsboek afkomstig uit het
Gemeente-Archief Groningen, 1594-ca. 1811, 81.
50
NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract van de vergadering van de Heren XIX, 27 Juny 1645.
51
Ibid., Extract wt die secrete notulen der vergaderinge der Negentien t' Amsterdam gehouden zeder de 22 April
1645. Boxer states that Maurits' salary had been 1500 guilders per month, plus expenses, though proposals drafted in
1636 list the astonishing sum of 50,000 guilders per year. See NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.20; Boxer, The Dutch in
Brazil, 1624-1654, 69.
52
Ibid.
53
NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Rapport Sommierlyck gedaen by die Heeren vander Cappelen toe-Ryssel, Herbers,
en Nykerck van di principaelste Poincten inde besoignes van die vergaderinge der Negentien t'Amsterdam
voorgevallen zeder Martio 1645.
149

Why did these candidates all refuse what would appear to have been a quite prestigious
and lucrative position? We catch a glimpse on an answer from the case of Alexander van der
Capellen, Hendrick van der Capellen's younger brother and the fifth name on the list. Alexander
was born into a noble family from Zutphen along the United Provinces' eastern border with
Germany sometime between 1590 and 1600. He studied law, history, and Arabic at Leiden and
spent several years abroad, primarily in France. When he returned to the United Provinces in the
early 1620s he was selected to join the city council of Zutphen; shortly thereafter he was
appointed deputy from Gelderland to the Generaliteitsrekenkamer (Generality Accounting
Officer), the Raad van Staat (Council of State), and finally the States General. Around 1635 he
moved into the circle around the Prince of Orange, Frederik Hendrik, whom he served as a
trusted advisor under the latter's death in 1647. 54 Like other Dutch nobleman of the period who
chose to remain active in state service, he maintained his estate in Gelderland but spent the
majority of his time at the court and in the daily conduct of public affairs at The Hague. 55
According to one of his descendants—a partial, though not therefore necessarily inaccurate,
source—Alexander was a pious but un-dogmatic public servant, who “understood fundamentally
the limitations of our system of government, and likewise the difficulties involved in reforming
it.” 56
54
Alexander van der Capellen, Gedenkschriften van Jonkheer Alexander van der Capellen, Heere van Aartsbergen,
Boedelhoff, en Mervelt, ed. Robert Jasper van der Capellen (Utrecht: J. v. Schoonhoven en Comp., 1777), xxxiii;
Molhuysen, Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, 569–570. Vol. 1.
55
Van Nierop, Van Ridders tot Regenten: De Hollandse Adel in de Zestiende en de Eerste Helft van de Zeventiende
Eeuw, 151.
56
Van der Capellen, Gedenkschriften van Jonkheer Alexander van der Capellen, Heere van Aartsbergen,
Boedelhoff, en Mervelt, xlii. “De gebreken van ons Staatsbestuur kende hij grondig; doch hij wist te gelijk, hoe
moeielijk het zij, dezelven te verbeteren.”
150

Illustration 10. Portrait of Alexander van der Capellen. From the
Gedenkschriften van Jonkheer Alexander van der Capellen (Utrecht:
J .v. Schoonhoven, 1777). He was an advisor to Frederik Hendrik,
Prince of Orange, and, in 1645, a candidate for President of the High
Council in Dutch Brazil.
151

Alexander's name was almost certainly put forward by his older brother over the course
of the difficult meetings of the Heren XIX that Hendrik chaired in late 1644 and early 1645. But
the former's qualifications were obvious: his father and brother both were investors in the WIC,
he had a close relationship with the Prince of Orange, and his knowledge of politics and law
would be indispensible to the company's efforts to organize the new government in Brazil. Once
again, however, the difficulty was to convince such a man that the position was worthy of his
status and efforts. Alexander's response to the proposal—detailed in a series of reflections he
composed from the early 1620s to the early 1650s, and which was published as a memoir in the
late eighteenth century—reveals his serious reservations about both the company's prospects in
general and, perhaps more important, the specific expectations the directors had of the new
President and council.
In Alexander's estimation, the company was in dire straights: poor management by the
directors and the malfeasance of company servants were partly to blame, but the largest troubles
resulted from the spiraling costs of defending the company's scattered conquests. At first these
had added to the WIC's wealth and prestige, but now they threatened to ruin the investors and
drag the company into bankruptcy. For a nobleman Van der Capellen's metrics were perhaps
surprisingly businesslike: “stock in the company, which recently was trading above [the face
value of] 100 guilders, now lies so low that a capital of 100,000 guilders can be purchased for
30,000 [guilders], the promised distributions or rents have ceased, and all the company's income
is absorbed in the heavy costs of war.” There were still good returns to be expected from Brazil,
New Netherland, and the coast of Africa, he observed, but these returns now fell into the hands
of private traders, “who are favored by the directors of the company.” 57 As a result, the company
57 Ibid., vol. 2, 111. “Synde d'Actien, die over de hondert plechten te gelden , nu so laegh geloopen, dat een Capitael
van hondert dusent gulden gekost konde worden voor dertigh dusent guldens, ende komende de beloofde
152

was flirting with complete collapse. This dim view, incidentally, was not the result of a long-
standing prejudice against the WIC or its directors: as late as December 1644 Alexander asked
his brother to buy an additional 6,000 guilders worth of stock on the open market for 55 guilders
a share. 58 At that point—only six months before he penned the lines above—he either believed
that this figure represented a bargain or he was committed to investing for reasons of pride and
prestige. 59 In either case, he presumably believed that the company's fortunes stood a reasonable
chance of improving.
Now Alexander worried that the company would have trouble finding anyone fit to
assume the office of President. The directors desired someone with a lower profile than Maurits,
whom they could more easily control. But who would accept such a position? Alexander's
comments concerning his own candidacy, which apparently came as a complete surprise, were
unequivocal:
I have always said, and had written to my brother, that I had no reason to go so far over the sea in
the service of merchants, and that it would still not appeal to me if the contract, now grown to
1,800 guilders per month, was made still greater. 60
uytdeilongen of renten te cesseren, ende alle het inkomen van de Compagnie geabsorbeert te worden in de swaere
lasten van oorlogh, ende onderhoudinghe van Forten ende Comtooren. Daer quamen wel goede retouren van Brasil
ende Nieuw Nederlandt, als oock van de kust van Africa; maer d'openstellinge van de handel in Brasil dede alle, ofte
de beste retouren komen in handen van particuliere reeders, die by de Bewinthebberen wierden gefavoriseert. Alle
die uyt Brasil wederomme t'huys quamen, waren verryckt.”
58 See Alexander van der Capellen's rekenboeck in the Gelders Archief, 0467, inv.nr. 134, fol. 49.
59 Evidence for the latter motivation might be read in his reference to "a capital of 100,000 guilders," the investment
threshold required for a city to merit a director in the Amsterdam chamber.
60 Van der Capellen, Gedenkschriften van Jonkheer Alexander van der Capellen, Heere van Aartsbergen,
Boedelhoff, en Mervelt, vol. 2, 111. “De titul ende macht van President, versien met goede instructie, wierde
geordeelt de meeste ende aengenaemste diensten te kunnen doen, maer men wiste niet, waer men de persoon daertoe
bequaemst soude kunnen vinden, tot dat by de vergaderinghe geresolveert wiert, daertoe vyf voorgestelde ende de
Cameren aengenaeme persoonen te fondeeren, daeronder ick Alexander van der Capellen een was, ende gestelt
wierde voor aen, hoewel butn myn kennisse, toedoen ofte versoeck. Als nu myn broeder my dese sake bekent
gemaeckt hadde, ende ick die by my overleyt, hebbe ick altydt geseyt, ende myn Broeder geschreven gehadt, dat ick
geen reden hadde, om soo wydt over See te gaen in dienst van coopluden, konde oock daertoe geen treck krygen,
alwaer 't dat het tractement, nu begrootet op 1800. gulden ter maendt, noch grooter gemaeckt mochte worden.”
153

None of the remaining records indicate that such a sum was on offer, though given the
company's desperation it is certainly not inconceivable. But Alexander went further still, offering
a bit of advice from classical history on what he believed was needed to get the company back on
its feet:
In order to restore all the affairs of the company, for the good of the generality and the
satisfaction of the participants, it would be necessary not only to know the various needs of the
company in Brazil, but also to have the power and authority here in the general meetings of the
XIX, and in the respective chambers of Holland, Zeeland, and Groningen. The Romans, finding
themselves in such a position of weakness, where the well-being of the Republic was in jeopardy,
sought remedy in the installment of a Dictator, and therein found relief. 61
Here Alexander was no longer talking about the company's military conquests abroad or its
finances at home: the key trouble, in his view, was political. Competition and the endless
bickering between chambers was undermining the company's effectiveness. No individual could
be successful in Brazil without unified authority and support—least of all a political lightweight
selected explicitly for his pliability in the hands of the company's directors. Such a post could
hardly be appealing to a nobleman, especially with memories of Maurits' involuntary recall still
fresh. 62
This same antipathy to the company's directors can be found in the diary of Willem
Frederik (1613-1664), a nephew of Frederik Hendrik and the Stadholder of Friesland, where he
maintained a separate court. In an entry from August 1643, Frederik noted that Maurits always
had been mistreated by the company's directors, from whom he could expect nothing “but
61 Ibid., 112-113. “Tot herstellinghe van alle dese saken in sulken staet, dat de gewenschte vruchten daer uyt
mochten resulteeren, tot dienst van 't landt in 't gemeen ende genoegen van de participanten, was niet alleene
wysheyt van nooden, om alles wel dirigeeren in Brasil, maer oock macht en autoriteyt, om goede voorslagen te doen
hebben effect hier te lande onder de generale vergaderinghe van XIX, ende in de respective Cameren in Hollant,
Zeelant ende Groningen. De Romeynen, komende te vervallen in groote swarigheyden, daer by de welstandt van
haer Republique pericliteerde, sochten haer remedien in 't aenstellen van een Dictateur, ende hebben sich daer wel
by bevonden.”
62 It may be worth noting that, even in the age of the joint-stock company, classical scholarship still provided
important guidance for practical affairs.
154

quarrels and affronts.” As merchants they were jealous of his status and incapable of showing
him the deference he deserved. 63 It was in many ways a replay of the sentiments expressed when
the WIC was founded in the early 1620s. As we saw in the Chapter 2, whereas the States General
and the Prince of Orange preferred a more prominent role for the nobility in governing the
company's affairs, and a more centralized system for administering the colonies, merchants and
city magistrates were loath to allow their business interests to be subordinated to the militaristic
and lavish tastes of the court. Now, two decades later, this same conflict was plaguing the effort
to find a President for Brazil. Alexander wished the Company well, but noted that:
Little should be expected, even if the wisest man in the land were sent. I see no hope for there to
be a dictator, and also know no man in the state who would be fit for that post. And I am
therefore resolved to leave this advantage to someone else, who seeks it, and the honor of the
Presidency to he who shall merit it and be chosen lawfully. 64
4. Magistrates, Merchants, and the Politics of Administration
Naturally, at least some of the company's directors saw the problem differently than did
Alexander van der Capellen: although worried about filling the office of President, they also
were concerned that the new council contain adequate representation from the merchant
community. Such representation was, they believed, the only way to ensure that the colony
63 Willem Frederik, Gloria Parendi: Dagboeken Van Willem Frederik, Stadhouder Van Friesland, Groningen, En
Drenthe. 1643-1649, 1651-1654 (Den Haag: Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, 1995), entry for August 9, 1643.
“Dat de [Westindische] Compagnie noch op hem pretendeert, daerom Kijn hem geraeden heeft sooveul te sijn [zien]
te bekomen als hij kan, wanneer hij vandaer gaet, want van de coopluyden heeft hij niet te verwachten als querelen,
questien, affronten, want de coopluyden mit luyden van fatsoen niet om kunnen gaen.”
64 Van der Capellen, Gedenkschriften van Jonkheer Alexander van der Capellen, Heere van Aartsbergen,
Boedelhoff, en Mervelt, vol. 2, 113. “Men magh die wat levende houden, maer groot voordeel verwachte ick daervan
niet, al is 't, dat de wyste man van 't lant gesonden wort. Ick sie geen hoope, om tot een Dictateur ten kunnen komen,
ende kenne oock niemant in den Staet, die daertoe bequaem soude wesen. Ende bin daeromme geresolveert het
voordeel te laeten aen die geene, die het soeken, ende d'eere van President te gunnen aen dien geene, die het sal
meriteeren, ende dien geene, die daertoe wettelick gekooren sal worden, te wenschen wysheyt om soodanigh amt
wel uyttevoeren, ende macht om te kunnen doen, 't geene ten besten van de Compagnie sal strecken.”
155

would be profitable and that their own investment in the company, and traders' interests more
generally, would be protected. These concerns are most apparent in the process to select the four
councilors that would serve with the President in Brazil. The process to select these individuals
began concurrently with the selection of the President, but made headway far more quickly. On
June 27, Charles Loten, the Amsterdam director who evidently had been charged with
approaching candidates, reported to the Heren XIX that three individuals had already excused
themselves. These included Pieter Dircksz. Ben, formerly Burgemeester of Hoorn and a director
in the North Holland chamber of the company, Jacob Schagen Hoochland, Burgemeester of
Alkmaar, and Anthony de Hout, a merchant from Dordrecht. Loten also reported, however, that
two individuals had agreed to accept the position: Michiel van Goch, Stadspensionaris of
Vlissingen, and Simon van Beaumont, one of the company's two lawyers and Secretaris of the
city of Dordrecht. 65
This was welcome news, but it raised an unanticipated problem. A discussion
immediately ensued in which it was observed that both Van Goch and Van Beaumont “were
persons with more experience in government and politics than in trade, and that the others who
had more knowledge of trade already had excused themselves.” 66 A proposal was therefore put
forward to address this deficit by supplementing the existing list. This proposal was approved
just two days later—a minor miracle given the often-glacial pace of decision-making—since it
was concluded that, “one or two persons who understand trade must be in the High Council.” 67
The fact that agreement on this point could be reached so swiftly, and that the elaborate process
65
NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract van de vergadering van de Heren XIX, 27 Juny 1645. On Van Goch, see
Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 266–267.
66
NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Extract van de vergadering van de Heren XIX, entry for June 27, 1645. “syn
persoonen meer ervaren in t stuck van regeringe en polityc, als wel in de coopmanschap, ende dat d'andere die van t
voorz. stuck van de coopmanschap meer kenisse hadden sich hebben geexcuseert.”
67
Ibid., entry for June 29, 1645. “ende noch ongesondeert persoonen soude wenden afgegaen ende een of twe
persoonen haer de coopmanschap verstaende onder de raden van de Hoge regeringe behooren te wesen is by
provisie vast te stellen dat der een coopman onder sal wesen.”
156

used to nominate and rank-order the candidates only a few weeks earlier could be suspended
without serious objection, indicates how important the company's directors considered the
matter. As a result of the proposal, three new names were put forward: Abraham Trouwers, a
director from the Amsterdam chamber and the company's Rekenmeester; Nicholas
Koeckebacker, Schepen (Alderman) from Delft; and Hendrik Haecxs, a merchant living in
Amsterdam. It was hoped that these additions would help to solve the problem and help balance
the council. But would any of these three individuals accept?
Hendrik Haecxs' story is well known among Dutch scholars thanks to a lengthy diary he
began at this time. 68 Although almost nothing is known of his life, it is clear that Haecxs had
lived and worked as a merchant in Brazil during the early 1640s. He appears in the minutes of
the Hoge ende Secrete Raad as early as 1641, when he signed a petition complaining about the
preferential treatment afforded to Jewish merchants in the colony, and again in April 1644, when
he received payment of 475 guilders in return for goods specified to be “for the service of his
Excellency,” meaning Maurits. 69 It seems likely that this service brought Haecxs to the attention
of the company's directors. Haecxs recorded in his diary that he was informed of the company's
interest in his service by a friend while he was attending a wedding on June 29, 1645. A week
later, three directors, including Loten, visited his house to communicate directly the wishes of
the Heren XIX:
After ripe deliberation, they had unanimously voted my name, in order (if it pleased me) that I
should take a place in the Hoge ende Secrete Raad, not doubting whether this would be an honor
to God, an improvement of the desolate state of the company, as well as the many widows and
orphans supported thereby, and my own reputation. 70
68 Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654).”
69 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 56, Overgekomen brieven en papieren van Brazilie, packet for 1641 and NA 1.05.01.01
inv.nr. 70, Minuten van de Hoge en Secrete Raed in Brazilie, entry for April 30, 1644. I must thank Lucia Xavier for
finding and calling my attention to these sources.
70 Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654),” entry for July
5, 1645, 150. “na veel rijpe deliberatie mijne persoon eenparichlijck hadden gestemt, om (soo Ick wilde) mij plaetse
157

Haecxs thanked them for the honor they had offered him and requested time to think it over.
Loten made clear that he would have to make a quick decision: the meeting of the Heren XIX
was scheduled to close in two days time and a resolution would be needed before then. 71 Haecxs
thus was given only until the following morning to give his reply; the directors furnished him
with copies of the two resolutions detailing the structure of the new Council and then departed
with the following words:
Considering what fine members, indeed the best in our land, that hope for and work to gain this
position, and that we on the contrary come bearing the request to you, like a servant approaching
his master, we hope that the prospect of spreading God's honor and the many attractions of the
position shall animate you to accept, and that this visit shall not be a waste of our efforts.
Certainly it would bring you honor and reputation, along with great profit, the adoration of all the
world, and undying renown. 72
Haecxs agonized over the decision, weighing the duty he felt to assist the company against the
risks and hardships of leaving his family, friends, and business for so long. But when Loten
returned the following morning Haecxs answered in the affirmative: he would go to Brazil.
Loten and the other two directors congratulated him and shared their sentiment that this would be
most welcome news to bring back to the Heren XIX. 73
Three days earlier Abraham Trouwers also had accepted the company's offer, which
meant that the council was now complete, save the office of President. Whereas Haecxs' case
van Ho. en Secrete Raet aldaer t’ offereren en op te dragen, niet twijffelende of Ick soude sulcx tot Gods eere, tot
wederoprechtinge van den desolaten Staet der Comp. en veeler weduwen en weesen geinteresseerde en reputatie van
min eijgen persoon gewillichlijck op mij nemen.”
71 The historian L'Honoré Naber, who edited Haecxs' diary, believed that Haecxs was approached because of fears
concerning a possible revolt in Brazil. This is true in the most general sense, but the proximate cause was the need to
place more merchants on the High Council. See Ibid., 133.
72 Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654),” entry for July
5, 1645, 151. “Considereert eens, wat fraije liedens, Jae de Beste van ons landt, dat selfs na dese Charge hoopen en
veele vrunden utmaecken, daer wij u ter contrarij, ghelijc een serviteur sijn Matresse carresseert, coomen
versoecken; soo dat wij hoopen, dat het voortplanten van Gods eere het veelvoudich suchten veeler geinteresseerden
u sal animeren en wij geen verlooren moeijte en mogen doen. Sekerlijc, de eere en reputatie, als mede het groot
profijt, en voorts van alle Werelt geadoreert te worden en sich daerdoor een onsterffelijcke renommee te maecken,
en behoorde een lange utstel te begeren.”
73 Ibid., entry for July 6, 1645, 152.
158

provides an intimate look at the rhetoric used to encourage potential candidates, and, along with
Alexander van der Capellen’s memoires, some of the factors candidates may have considered,
Trouwers’ case gives a sense of what the company was hoping to achieve. Trouwers left behind
no diary and records of his life are scarce, but a document in the collection of the States General
from this period shows exactly the skills the company thought he might bring to bear in Brazil. 74
In 1642, after a separate, and equally long, set of deliberations, the WIC had created a
Generaal Rekenkamer (General Accounting Office) to coordinate the activities of the chambers'
individual accountants and to advise the company on matters of finance and trade. 75 This office
had, among other responsibilities, the difficult task of reconciling the company's books at the end
of each year. According to the WIC charter, the chambers were to participate in the company in a
set proportion—Amsterdam 4/9, Zeeland 2/9, and the other three chambers each 1/9—but every
chamber remained responsible for provisioning its own ships and auctioning the goods that
returned from abroad. In the abstract this meant that the company would operate like a modern
cartel consisting of five independent companies, with the important exception that at the end of
each period the total expenses and profits were to be redistributed consistent with the proportions
laid out in the charter. 76 This required a Herculean effort in bookkeeping and coordination
between the company's ever-suspicious chambers. The new Generaal Rekenkamer was designed
to simplify this process, both practically and politically, by centralizing the company's financial
work in one office. Its first director was Abraham Trouwers.
74 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Consideratien van de generale Reeckencamer aende Ed. vergaderinge der xix van t'
gene alhier te Lande mitsgaders in Brasil ende andere conquesten van die Comp. souden kennen Jaerlyx
gemenageert worden, overgegeven den 22 Juny 1645.
75 NA 1.01.05 inv.nr. 9410.
76 See Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, trans. Mendel Shapiro (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955), vol. 1, 364.
For a review of the history of financial institutions in the Netherlands, see Jacobus Thomas de Smidt, Van Tresorier
tot Thesaurier-Generaal: zes Eeuwen Financieel Beleid in Handen van een Hoge Nederlandse Ambtsdrager
(Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 1996).
159

On June 22, 1645—just a week before the Heren XIX decided to supplement its list of
candidates for the council in Brazil—Trouwers and a colleague, Gerrit Janssen de Vry, submitted
a set of considerations on how the WIC could save money in Brazil and its other conquests. The
twelve points in this document shed some light on both Trouwer's approach to the company's
finances and on the specific problems the company confronted as it tried to manage and integrate
the flow of commodities between the disparate parts of its empire. The first three
recommendations all related to cutting costs associated with personnel and physical
infrastructure in Brazil: according to the Rekenkamer's calculations, by reducing the number of
support staff in the army, requiring soldiers to cover additional aspects of their own upkeep, and
reducing the number of warehouses in Brazil, the company could save 350,000 guilders a year.
Two other recommendations addressed the trade to West Africa: 55,000 guilders could be saved
by better coordinating shipping to Arguin, Senegal, and Cape Verde, and by using ships bound
for Guinea to provision the recently-captured island of São Tomé. Then followed
recommendations for trimming the company's expenses at home: taken together, Trouwers and
De Vry believed that 250,000 guilders could be saved by making procurement more efficient,
selling off unnecessary armaments and the ship-building yard in Amsterdam, and restricting the
meetings of the Heren XIX to twice yearly. 77
But by far the most significant savings could be made by reducing the number of ships
the company owned and leasing ships instead. Straightforward in itself, this recommendation led
Trouwers and De Vry to calculate the number of ships that were needed to carry supplies and
trade goods within each of the conquests on an annual basis. The result provides a stark, if
77 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Consideratien van de generale Reeckencamer aende Ed. vergaderinge der xix van t'
gene alhier te Lande mitsgaders in Brasil ende andere conquesten van die Comp. souden kennen Jaerlyx
gemenageert worden, overgegeven den 22 Juny 1645.
160

idealized representation of the relative priority that the company gave to each of the areas under
its control:
The ships which are needed yearly in the conquests of the company are:
in Guinea 4
in Argyn, Cabo Verde, Gambia, and Sierra Leone 4
in São Tomé 2
in Loanda 12
in New Netherland and Curaçao 2
in Brazil 24
48
Subtracting the eighteen ships that the company owned yielded thirty ships to be leased, each of
which would save the company 1,200 guilders per month, for a total of 432,000 guilders per
year. The exact manner in which leasing offered a savings over ownership was not made explicit,
but the importance placed on Brazil and Angola—which together were expected to employ three
quarters of the company's 48 ships—is unmistakable. Equally important is the sense the
document conveys of its authors' groping efforts to identify a workable system to integrate the
flow of people and goods. Although Portugal had pioneered the Triangular Trade a half-century
earlier, the WIC had only entered the slave trade in the mid-1630s, and had yet to develop a
workable formula. 78 Trouwers’ eye for saving money and his familiarity with these complicated
geo-commercial issues made him a perfect candidate to oversee the company's trading interests
as a member of the council in Brazil, the colony at the center of the WIC's Atlantic system.
78 Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery (London: Verso, 1997). See also Ernst van den Boogaart and
Pieter Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650.” The company's role in the slave
trade will be discussed in the next chapter.
161

5. Wolter Schonenborch and the Rituals of Office
With four councilors—Van Goch, Van Beaumont, Haecxs, and Trouwers—in place, the most
important item on the agenda for the fall meeting of the Heren XIX in Middelburg was to select a
President, and quickly. The first three days of the meeting were consumed with news of the
Portuguese revolt in Brazil, which had arrived by ship the previous week. 79 But once all the
available intelligence had been sifted and preliminary measures taken to address the crisis, the
delegates turned to the issue of staffing the new council. Discussion began on September 13, but
was delayed by a complaint lodged by the representative from Groningen that Daniel Alberti, a
servant of that province and a former advisor to Maurits in Brazil, had been passed over for the
post of councilor. 80 This complaint was acknowledged, but not addressed, and the meeting
proceeded to name a committee to handle the matter of selecting a new President. The committee
was chaired by Jan van der Cameren, the senior delegate from the States General; its most
important members were David Baute and Johannes de Laet. 81 The committee took two
immediate actions: it dispatched letters inviting the accepted councilors to appear before the
meeting and it sought—and received from the larger meeting—authority to approach a fresh set
of candidates for the office of President.
The candidate nominated by the committee was Wolter Schonenborch, former
Burgemeester of Groningen and the province's deputy to the States General. 82 The reasons for
79 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Secrete notulen van de afgevaardigden van de WIC aan de vergadering van deer
Heren XIX, entries for September 11-13, 1645. See also the Notulen van de Kamer Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr.
26, entry for August 30, 1645. The reception and circulation of this news is discussed in Chapter Three of the
dissertation.
80 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17 no. 23, entry for September 13, 1645. See also discussion of the complaint in the
chamber Zeeland, NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 26, fol. 108, entry for September 9, 1645.
81 See Chapter Two.
82 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Secrete Resolutien gehouden byde Gecommiteerde van generael Westindische
Comp. ter vergaderinge der XIXe binnen Middelburch in Zeelandt, entry for September 19, 1645.
162

this selection have never been explored and, given the available sources, must remain a matter of
conjecture. However, there are several clues as to the merits of his candidacy. Schonenborch's
father, Hendrik, was an important political figure in Groningen, serving as Secretaris and then
Hoofdman and Burgemeester for much of the 1620s and 1630s. When he died in 1638, Wolter
served out the remainder of his term and remained in high office from then on, including serving
as Burgemeester in 1639, 1640, 1643, and 1644. 83 In October of 1644 he was selected by the
provincial council to represent the province's interests at a series of meetings in The Hague that
had been convened to determine whether the WIC and VOC might be merged into a single
company. 84 This plan had arisen in the context of discussions over the terms for extending both
companies' charters, and was intended to serve as a means to re-capitalize the ailing WIC at the
expense of the wealthier VOC, rather than the States General. Although the plan faced stiff
opposition from directors and investors in the VOC, it was broadly popular within the WIC and
especially in Groningen, which—quite separate from the contributions of individuals—had
invested more than 200,000 guilders of public money in the company. 85 Schonenborch was
instructed to “use all means to promote the combination” and thus spent more than two months at
The Hague that winter arguing the company's case. 86 During this time he almost certainly would
have come into close contact with Jacques Specx, Johannes de Laet, and other influential
company directors.
When Schonenborch was chosen to serve as Groningen's deputy to the States General in
1645 it meant that he would remain in The Hague for an additional year. His previous experience
83
Groninger Archief 1700 inv.nr. 16, Lijst van Gezagdragers vermeld in het Regeringsboek afkomstig uit het
Gemeente-Archief Groningen, 1594-ca. 1811, 135. See also Winter (1978), 124-125.
84
Groninger Archief 1 inv.nr. 10, Staats Resolutien, entry for October 15, 1644. On the merger of the two
companies, see Den Heijer (1994).
85
Groniger Archief 1 inv.nr. 2677; Winter, De Westindische Compagnie ter Kamer Stad en Lande, 225.
86
Groninger Archief 1 inv.nr. 10, Staats Resolutien, entry for January 17, 1645.
163

with the WIC presumably did not go unrecognized; when in early September the States General
assembled a delegation to attend the upcoming meeting of the Heren XIX in Middelburg,
Schonenborch was one of the five individuals they chose. 87 In fact, Schonenborch did not attend
the opening session of the meeting, held on September 9, because he had been detained at the
military camp near Eekelo, where Frederik Hendrik was personally leading the campaign against
Spanish troops in Flanders. 88 But this may actually have enhanced the legitimacy of
Schonenborch's candidacy to serve as President in Brazil, especially given the tenor of the news
that had just arrived from the colony and the growing recognition—both within the company and
at the States General—that the chief responsibility of the new council would be to crush the
Portuguese rebellion. It might also be noted that Schonenborch's candidacy would have helped to
assuage Groningen's ongoing protest about Daniel Alberti, the province's overlooked candidate
for the position of councilor, and served as the replacement for Bernard Julsinck, who had
refused. Taken together, and under the circumstances, these factors must have proven quite
compelling to the delegates assembled in Middelburg.
On September 19, after only three days of formal deliberation, the committee of the
Heren XIX reported that they had communicated their offer to Schonenborch and given him
several days to consider and discuss it with his family. 89 Eight days later the same committee
reported that he was already on his way from Eekelo, eager to see the instructions and to learn
more about the conditions of the offer. At this point the committee was thanked for its efforts and
its work was suspended. Van der Cameren proposed, and the full meeting of the Heren XIX
approved, the immediate dispatch of De Laet and Jan Louys to meet Schonenborch and to
87 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Secrete notulen van de afgevaardigden van de WIC aan de vergadering van deer
Heren XIX, entry for September 9, 1645.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., entry for September 19, 1645.
164

personally escort him to the meeting. The three men arrived shortly thereafter and Schonenborch
was seated, tellingly, in the place usually assigned to the lead delegate from the States General.
To the great joy and relief of the meeting, Van der Cameren announced that Schonenborch had
accepted the company's offer to serve as President of the High Council in Brazil. The directors
offered their congratulations and the meeting was adjourned, both to celebrate the news and to
allow time for Schonenborch and the representatives of the States General to hold a separate
meeting with the Prince of Orange. 90
Over the following several weeks the committee returned to its work drafting and
revising the instructions for the President and High Council, in consultation with Haecxs, Van
Beaumont, and the other councilors, who arrived in late September. 91 By October 9 these were
complete: the terms of the contracts dictated that Schonenborch would receive 1,250 guilders per
month, four servants, eight company slaves, and an additional 3,000 guilders to cover his
expenses. Each of the councilors was to receive just more than half these amounts: 750 guilders
per month, two servants, four slaves, and 1,800 guilders for expenses. The contracts would be
valid for three years and the slaves were to be returned to the company upon termination of the
individuals' service in Brazil. Finally, the spoils from war or piracy on land and at sea—2% of
which were reserved for the Governor General in Maurits' time—were to be distributed equally
amongst the President and councilors, with each receiving 1%. The new council was upon arrival
in Brazil to replace the existing government and to be guided by the new instructions, and by the
various instructions and resolutions of the Hoge ende Secrete Raed since 1636. 92
90 Ibid., entry for September 27, 1645; NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Minuten van de Vergadering van de Heren XIX
in Middelburgh, 9 September 1645-16 October 1645, entry for September 27, 1645.
91 Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654),” entry for
September 19, 1645. Haecxs indicates that he arrived in Middelburg on September 22, 1645.
92 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, Secrete notulen van de afgevaardigden van de WIC aan de vergadering van deer
Heren XIX, entry for October 13, 1645.
165

Haecx recorded in his diary that on October 13 he and the other councilors were asked to
appear before the Heren XIX, where Van der Cameren read aloud an oath that had been
specially-prepared for them; they “stood, President and Councilors alike,” and accepted the oath
“with hands out-stretched and fingers extended.” 93 Four days later Haecxs departed Middelburg
and returned home briefly, before being summoned by Jan Louys to The Hague for meetings
with representatives of the States General. He traveled to The Hague a second time at the
beginning of November and remained there until November 18, when he was introduced to the
full meeting of the States General by De Laet and two other company directors, Alewijn
Halewyn and Nicholaes ten Hove. He recorded finding “everyone standing, approximately thirty
men”:
Thereupon the Secretary, Cornelis Musch, began to read the formula of the oath [to the States
General] and, having done that, we were asked by Mr. Jacob Veth, who was presiding at this
time, whether we, all five standing before the table, were ready to accept. Yes, we answered,
confirming this by raising our hands in the same manner that we had done in Zeeland. Thereupon
Mr. Veth extended his hand to us and wished us much luck; he took his leave of us and we
returned into the anti-chamber. 94
The High Council for Brazil was now complete. In this sense the Heren XIX had achieved their
primary objective for the fall meeting. But there were still serious problems to come.
93 Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654),” entry for
October 13, 1645. “Is ons door d’Hr. van der Cameren den Eedt voorgelesen, die wij opstaende, gesamentlijck soo
President als Raden met utgesteken handen en utgerecte vingeren hebben gepresteert.”
94 Ibid., entry for November 18, 1645. “Hebben ons d’Hrn. De Laet, Alewijn van Leijden, en Ten Hove in de
vergaderinge van d’Hrn. Staten Generaal geintroduceert. Vonden Hare Ho. Mo. allemael staende, ontrent 30 Heeren;
daerop begon de Griffier Meusch het formulier van den Eedt te lessen en, gedaen hebbende, vraechden ons de Hr.
Jacob Veth, doenmaels president sijnde, en wij met ons vijven voor de taeffel staende, of wij bereijt waren, om dien
te praesteren; Jae, antwoordden. Hebben denselven ghelijck in Zeelandt met opgeheven handen geconfirmeert.
Daerop ons d’Hr. Veth de hant toestekende veel ghelucks menschte; namen also onsen afsheijt en gingen wederom
in de antechamber.” In Spain the ritual was no more elaborate, even if its content differed: after taking the oath, a
new official would kiss the royal order and put it on his head as a sign of acceptance. See Poole, Juan de Ovando,
159.
166

6. Conclusion
The scale of these problems became clear only a few days after Haecxs and the other councilors
had taken the oath in the chambers of the States General. On November 27, a bundle of letters
from Brazil dated September 17, 1645 arrived carrying exceedingly bad news: soldiers loyal to
the WIC had abandoned the Brazilian countryside and two of the most important coastal forts
had fallen into the hands of the Portuguese rebels. 95 The news, itself already two months old,
caused a great commotion throughout the United Provinces. 96 It also caused a stir amongst the
members of the new High Council. As early as December 4 the company's directors, then
gathered in The Hague, caught wind that Schonenborch might be having reservations about
traveling to Brazil and immediately dispatched two directors to speak with him. 97 The next week
Haecxs was summoned to appear before the Heren XIX in person. 98 Claes Simonsz. Dolphyn, a
director from Enkhuizen, berated Haecxs for a letter he had sent to Van Beaumont in which he
apparently suggested, “That the company would be better served by sending soldiers instead of
regents [to Brazil].” 99 The discussion the following day was even more heated. Haecxs was
directed to sit between the chair of the meeting and Amsterdam's lawyer, Gysbert Rudolphij. He
was then asked whether he remained committed to his earlier resolution to travel to Brazil and
whether he was prepared to depart as soon as the first relief ship was ready. Haecxs evidently
95
These can be found in NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 59, Overgekomen brieven en papieren van Brazilie, bundle for 1644-
1645. Copies can also be found in the archive of the States General, NA 1.01.04 inv.nr. 5758. See Chapter Two for
an analysis of these documents.
96
Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654).”, entry for
November 27, 1645.
97
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 2*, entries for December 4 and 6, 1645.
98
This was most likely the so-called Haags Besoigne, an annual set of meetings at The Hague during the winter that
usually involved ten, rather than the full complement of nineteen, company directors. See Den Heijer, De
Geoctrooieerde Compagnie, 129.
99
Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654),” entry for
December 13, 1645. “seijde, Jae, en datter een brief van mijn aen d’Hr. Beaumont was geschreven, daerin Ick mijne
onlusten genoech deede blijcken, en waren dit de woorden aan Bemont geschreven, dat de Comp. nu eer soldaten
als regenten derwarts diende te senden. Dit hadden die Seignoor heel qualijc genomen.”
167

wavered, for De Laet, who was many years his senior and could be quite severe when he wanted
to be, immediately demanded to know whether Haecxs planned to stay, or to go. 100 “That is
sharp,” Haecxs apparently replied, before indicating that if the company would not even discuss
the implications of the new situation in Brazil it was at liberty to offer his place on the council to
someone else. 101 This unexpected response must have greatly worried the company's directors,
for they asked Haecxs to step out of the council chamber and, after an hour's discussion,
approached him with what Haecxs described as a far more conciliatory tone. He promised not to
waste the company's time, but requested a few days to consider his position. After consulting his
friends and associates in Amsterdam, “all of whom gave the same answer,” he returned to The
Hague on December 21 and reconfirmed his commitment to serve on the High Council. 102
The company's problems with Schonenborch turned out to be even more serious. On
December 18 he sent a letter to the States General noting the “changed circumstances” in Brazil
and informing them that he planned to ask the Heren XIX to release him from his obligation to
serve as President of the High Council. 103 This request was denied, and after repeated
consultations with senior company directors, including Louys and De Laet, Schonenborch finally
agreed to abide by his oath. 104 He and Haecxs ultimately both departed the United Provinces for
100 See, for example, the tone of De Laet's letter to Kiliaen van Rensselaer dated February 8, 1641 in Van Laer, Van
Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, 539-542.
101 Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-1654),” entry for
December 14, 1645. “Hierop soo begon De Laet te seggen, dat Ick sonder eenige conditien soude willen verclaren,
of Ick wilde gaen of dat Ick wilde blijven, daerop Ick antwoorde: Dat is scherp.”
102 Ibid., entry for December 15, 1645. See also NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 2*, entry for December 21, 1645.
103 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, fol. 207, letter from Wolter Schonenborch to the States General. “Want gelijck u. ho.
mo. kennelijck is, hoe de zaken aldaer tot enen openbaren oorlog uitgevallen zijnde, niet allene de conquesten van
de Comp. ten platten lande, maer oock enige importante forten, so doer correspondentie metten vijant, als met
gewelt van wapenen sijn t’ondergebracht: De voornaemste hoofden van de militie, neffens een groot getaal soldaten
verslagen, gevangen ende door den vijant gedebauchert; het Recijff genouschsam gebloqueert met apparent pericul
van meerder swarijcheijt, indien daer een prompt ende vigourens secours, deselve niet werde voorgekomen. Dese en
meer consideratien, is ten regard van den staet in t’gemeen, als vor mijn in t’particulier hijruit resulterende, hebben
mij doen resolveren, om de heren Gedeputeerd Bewinthebberen, alhijr sijnde vergadert wegen de entfangene eere te
bedancken ende mijne entslaginge te versoucken.”
104 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 2*, entries for December 12, 13, and 21, 1645.
168

Recife in early May of 1646. It was an inauspicious beginning for a government that would
hobble along for almost eight years, until the colony was definitively relinquished to Portugal.
The council that had taken more than two years to build, and another six months to cajole and
deploy, arrived late and was incapable of restoring order. When Schonenborch, Haecxs, Van
Goch, and Van Beaumont returned to the Republic with the last remaining Dutch soldiers in
January of 1654 they faced both public scorn and the threat of legal prosecution. 105
Many scholars have linked the failure of a Dutch empire in the Atlantic to the Republic's
problems finding sufficient colonists to settle in the Americas. 106 The same might be said of its
problems recruiting colonial administrators. The problem—at least in 1645—was not only that
the company had become overstretched by its various colonial responsibilities, but that the Dutch
elite could not reach agreement on the individuals appropriate to govern an extensive land
colony. Senior members of the magistracy were simply not interested in the post of President in
Brazil, preferring instead to avoid the risks associated with life and military service in the
colonies and to remain closer to the centers of power at home. 107 Members of the Dutch
nobility—at least some of whom believed themselves to be uniquely qualified to serve as
colonial officials—refused to work “in the service of merchants.” In Alexander van der
Capellen's view, the solution lay in greater centralization of colonial affairs and the
subordination of merchant interests to those of the States General. But neither he nor the other
noblemen around the Prince of Orange and the States General were powerful enough to enforce
this view. The company's directors, meanwhile, were eager to more carefully hem-in the
activities of colonial officials and, above all, to save money. Those merchants who traded
105
Trouwers died shortly after arriving in Brazil. See Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 266.
106
See, for example, Pieter C. Emmer and Wim Klooster, “The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800: Expansion Without
Empire,” Itinerario 23 (1999): 48-69.
107
Jaap Jacobs, “Incompetente Autocraten? Bestuurlijke Verhouding in de Zeventiende-eeuwse Nederlandse
Atlantische Wereld,” De Zeventiende Eeuw 21, no. 1 (2005): 64–78.
169

privately to Brazil, legally or illegally, were shut out of the deliberations altogether, and thus
limited their activities to openly opposing the company's efforts to exert any authority
whatsoever. Amidst this cacophony of perspectives and interests, the administration of Brazil
languished, creating the opportunity for a revolt.
If the story itself is remarkable, its core elements are actually quite familiar. Spanish
colonial institutions were riven by conflicts between representatives of the Old Nobility and the
letrados (educated commoners) who increasingly filled the ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. In
the 1570s Juan de Ovando, President of the Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias, attempted to
replace the retiring Viceroy of Peru with a letrado candidate, in part to save money. His proposal
drew the ire of senior noblemen who believed such positions should be reserved for members of
the military aristocracy, and ultimately his proposal was rejected by the King. 108 In England, the
alliance between gentry and merchant investors in commercial companies occasionally broke
down, as in the late 1610s, when gentry “factions” ousted merchants from senior positions in
both the Virginia and Bermuda Companies. Their effort to effect a similar coup in the more
solidly merchant East India Company failed; the company's minutes reflect that certain
“gentlemen” were scolded for attempting to takeover the company's management, which was
described as a “business proper only for merchants.” 109 The language of these disputes, and the
worldviews they represented, is almost precisely the same. Noblemen in the United Provinces
never had the power that they did in either Spain or England, but their role was quite significant.
As this chapter has shown, Dutch noblemen played many different roles in the
management of the WIC, both at home and abroad. These include what Fritz Redlich somewhat
imprecisely referred to as “mercantile public administration,” as well as their more obvious role
108 Poole, Juan de Ovando, 159–160.
109 Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise & Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575-
1630 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 49.
170

as colonial governors and military commanders. 110 The first of these is apparent in the figure of
Hendrick van der Capellen, who chaired the meetings of the Heren XIX, administered the oath of
secrecy during the selection of candidates, and more generally advocated the company's interests
with the Prince of Orange and at the States General. His brother, Alexander van der Capellen,
played no formal role beyond that of investor, but his nomination as a candidate for the office of
President shows the directors' continuing interest in finding a senior nobleman to serve in the
company's most important colonial post. In this sense, the towering figure of Maurits, whose
tenure in Brazil had been so successful, still exercised considerable influence over questions of
how to govern the colony, even after his fateful recall.
If conflicts over government were bad, those over trade were even worse.
110 Fritz Redlich, “European Aristocracy and Economic Development,” 86.
171

1. Introduction
Chapter Five
Free Trade and African Slavery:
The Politics of Monopoly
On July 12, 1645, Hendrick van der Capellen, the States General's senior delegate to the spring
meeting of the Heren XIX, submitted an unusually blunt assessment of discussions within the
WIC's board. 1 He reported to the States General that there had been some progress towards
assembling a new government for Brazil, though up to this time no President had yet been
selected, and that relative calm prevailed in the conquests—save New Netherland, where an
Indian revolt had broken out, killing several colonists. 2 But the issue that had produced the most
acrimony was a discussion of the company's monopoly over trade to Angola. Echoing a similar
proposal from 1643, a group of directors and hoofdparticipanten (chief investors) in the
Amsterdam chamber recommended that this trade be opened to private merchants. 3 Lifting the
monopoly, they argued, would increase the number of slaves sent each year to Brazil and reduce
the administrative and logistical burden on the company. This proposal was vehemently rejected
1 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, no. 7, Report Sommierlyck gedaen by die Heeren van der Capellen toe-Ryssel,
Herbers, en Nykerck van di principaelste Poincten inde besoignes van di vergaderinge der Negentien 'tAmsterdam
voorgevallen zeder Martio 1645.
2 Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 217–221; Jacobs, Petrus Stuyvesant, 60–61; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 217–221.
3 NA 1.01.05, inv.nr. 9411, Rapport Sommier van de Gecommittierden van haer ho: mo: Hendrick van der Capelle
toe Ryssel, Andries Bicker, D.V. Hogendorp van't gene in die vergaderinge der Westindische Comp. t'Amsterdam is
gedaen in September en Octob: 1643, submitted November 7, 1642. See also Unger, “Essay on the History of the
Dutch Slave Trade,” 53.
172

y all four of the other chambers. Van der Capellen reported that the discussion had caused
tempers to flare and sewn dangerous disunity. In his view, the trades to Angola and Guinea were
“the soul of the company.” 4 Opening either region to private merchants would undermine a
critical source of revenue, with potentially catastrophic implications. But Amsterdam persisted,
and when the Heren XIX gathered in Middelburg in September of 1645 item seven on the agenda
asked, “How more blacks could be purchased at St. Paulo do Loanda” and “in what manner the
trade in blacks shall be improved.” 5
Chapters Three and Four have examined politics within the Heren XIX from the
perspective of competing visions for colonial administration, first at home and then abroad. This
chapter looks instead at competing visions for the administration of trade. In particular, it
explores how trade policy was used to balance the competing priorities of ensuring a smooth
flow of goods, populating Brazil, and distributing the heavy financial burden of defending the
WIC's conquests. In practice this manifested in a series of debates over whether trade within the
territory defined by the company's charter should be open to all citizens of the United Provinces
or reserved exclusively as a company monopoly. The Dutch Republic was probably more
responsive to merchant interests than any government in Europe, but in practice this meant
applying a wide range of different policies to different sectors and social groups: while, for
instance, fishing and textiles were heavily regulated, finance and many branches of trade were
4 Ibid. “Watter voor is geweest by eenige Bewinthebberen en hooftparticipanten van de Camer van Amsterdam om
den handel op Angola wederom open te stellen voor yder een, hoe kostich sich die andere Cameren daertegens
hebben gedeclareert. Wat oneenicheyt daeraf te verwachten stondt tuschen die camer van Amsterdam ende andere
Cameren tot verachteringe en Discredyt van Westind. Companye, en soo sulx met goede reden is voorgekomen hoe
de Negoty, prinsipalyck op Guinea en Angola is de Ziele der Compagnie, en hoe met aftrockinge ofte verminderinge
van de selve de ruine der Compagnye wort veroorsaekt.”
5 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758, Poincten waerop all de Cameren van de West Indische Comp. beschreven worden ...
Dated August 11, 1645. “wt de schriftelycke ende mondelinge advisen de comp. bekent synde dat Jaerlycx ongelyck
meerder swaarten in St. paulo de loanda connen werden gehandelt als tot noch toe is geschiet, wanneer met
behoorlyck cargasoen de cust sal werden versien, ende dat midts dien het proffyt, t' welcke in die conqueste streeckt
voor de comp. daerwt niet wordt getrocken, is ter vergaderinge van XIX op den 30 Junio 1645 goetgevonden dat een
poinct sal gemaect worden, hoe, ende op wat manniere den handel ende de negros best sullen werden gebeneficeert
derhalven de Cameren verdracht willen syn derselver gecommitt. hierop insgelycx te lasten.”
173

left relatively open. 6 Where monopolies were imposed—including trade to the East and West
Indies—they became the subject of intense criticism. Rather than promoting trade as a whole,
monopolies by their very nature promoted the interests of some merchants and social groups
above those of others; their intent, as Oscar Gelderblom has encouraged us to see, was political
rather than strictly commercial. 7 This was already an important issue during the protracted
negotiations to establish the WIC in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, but it
erupted with particular force in the mid-1630s, when a heated debate broke out over the
company's monopoly over trade to Brazil.
Although the WIC charter strictly forbade private trade, a series of agreements negotiated
during the late 1620s and early 1630s offered important exemptions. In 1628 both New
Netherland and parts of the “Wild Coast” along the northern tip of South America were opened
to private entrepreneurs who wished to establish settlements. 8 Then, in 1630, when the company
seized Recife and Olinda in northeastern Brazil, treaties negotiated with representatives of the
Portuguese community promised that private merchants would enjoy the same freedoms to trade
on their own account that they had enjoyed under the King of Portugal. 9 These treaties were
reinforced by regulations approved by the States General in 1630 that permitted private trade in
all goods but dyewoods, foodstuffs, and ammunition, so long as private merchants registered
their goods, transported them in company ships, and paid a percentage to the company in
recognition and freight fees. 10 In 1634 these regulations were further relaxed and a brisk private
6
D.C. Coleman, "Introduction" to his own edited collection, D. C. Coleman, ed., Revisions in Mercantilism
(London: Methuen & Co., 1969), 12; De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy.
7
Oscar Gelderblom, ed., The political economy of the Dutch Republic (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009).
8
Rink, Holland on the Hudson; Jacobs, The colony of New Netherland; Venema, Kiliaen van Rensselaer (1586-
1643): Designing a New World.
9
Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 75–76.
10
Articulum ... over het Open ende Vry Stellen van den Handel en Negotie op de Stadt Olinda de Pernambuco, ende
Custen van Brasil (Amsterdam, 1630).
174

trade developed in the colony's most important commodity, sugar. 11 This resulted in a boom
atmosphere in the Dutch colony, but it left most of the profits in private hands at precisely the
moment that costs for the colony's military defense were becoming unsustainable.
In December of 1636 the States General passed a resolution reinstating the company's full
monopoly and forbidding any further private trade to Brazil. This generated a swift and angry
reaction, especially from merchants in Amsterdam, where a number of pamphlets appeared
arguing that the trade should be left open. One of these pamphlets likened the company's grip on
Brazil to the tyranny of the Duke of Alva; not only was the company incapable of conducting the
trade to Brazil on an adequate scale, but the monopoly would enrage Portuguese merchants and
discourage potential settlers who would only wish to travel to Brazil if their rights and liberties
were guaranteed. 12 Defenders of the monopoly, based primarily in Zeeland, replied in kind,
arguing that it was unjust for private merchants to reap all the benefits while the company's
investors were saddled only with debts. Moreover, they reasoned that private merchants, “intent
on their own profit,” were unlikely to cultivate the land to benefit of the colony, and thus the
United Provinces, as a whole. 13 Ultimately, the arguments in favor of free trade carried the day
and the States General re-opened the trade to Brazil in April of 1638.
The debate has fascinated generations of historians and features prominently in nearly
every account of the WIC's history. 14 These accounts have emphasized the acrimony between
Amsterdam and Zeeland and their divergent interests: whereas Amsterdam's powerful merchant
11 Narder Ordre Ende Reglement ... over Het Open Ende Vry Stellen Van Den Handel Ende Negotie Op De Stadt
Olinda De Pernambuco Ende Custen Van Brasil, 1634; Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 76.
12 Vertooch by een Liefhebber der Vaderlants vertoont tegen het Ongefondeerde ende Schadelijck Sluyten der Vryen
Handel in Brasil, 1637.
13 Examen over het Vertoogh, teghen het Onghefondeerde ende Schadelijck Sluyten der Vryen Handel in Brasil.
Door een Ondersoecker der Waerheydt, 1637.
14 Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um capitulo da historia colonial do seculo XVII; Boxer, The
Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654; Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek”; Den Heijer,
“Het Recht van de Sterkste in de Polder: Politieke en Economische Strijd tussen Amsterdam en Zeeland over de
Kwestie Brazilie, 1630-1654.”
175

community saw greater profits in private trade, merchants and magistrates in Zeeland supported
the company's monopoly as a means to protect their share in colonial markets where Amsterdam
would otherwise enjoy considerable advantages. 15 These accounts interpret the debate primarily
in terms of the ways that it exposed inter-regional conflicts within the Dutch Republic. In a
forthcoming article, Arthur Weststeijn argues that its significance was far greater. By tracing a
"crooked historical route" from pamphlets written in the 1630s to Pieter de la Court and the abbé
Raynal, he suggests that the debate “played an important role in the development of free trade
ideology throughout the Enlightenment.” 16
Weststeijn's route begins with an examination of De la Court's critique of monopolies in
the 1660s as being antithetical to commercial liberty. In the specific case of the WIC, according
to De la Court, the company's emphasis on “Princely wars” and “Monarchical conquests,” rather
than free trade, was largely responsible for the loss of Dutch Brazil. 17 Had the trade been open,
he argued, the colony might have thrived:
By an open trade, and consequently well-founded colonies, not only the mighty Lands of Brazil,
Guinea, Angola, São Tomé, &c, could have easily been defended with small expenses against all
foreign aggression, but, which is very considerable, we would have been able to carry on an immense
trade with our own Nation, without fear that a foreign Potentate would seize our ships, goods, or
debts. 18
The dissemination of De la Court's writings throughout Europe, and especially in England and
France, brought this assessment to the attention of, among others, both Raynal and Adam Smith,
who blamed the WIC monopoly for the “slow and languid” progress of Dutch colonial
15 Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek.”
16 Weststeijn, “Dutch Brazil and the Making of Free Trade Ideology,” 1–2. This text will appear in the forthcoming
collection The Legacy of Dutch Brazil, edited by Michiel van Groesen. Cited with permission of the author.
17 Ibid., 7.
18 Cited in ibid. The translation is Weststeijn’s.
176

settlements in the Americas. 19 The argument for commercial freedom, Weststeijn contends, “was
perhaps the most important ideological legacy of the rise, decline and fall of Dutch Brazil.” 20
This chapter will suggest a very different legacy of the debate over free trade, namely the
WIC's decision to enter the trade in slaves. Although scholars have long recognized that the
company's first forays into the slave trade were in 1636—the same year that the States General
re-imposed a monopoly on trade to Brazil—and that slaves were listed as one of only three items
excluded from free trade in the States General's resolution that lifted the monopoly in 1638, there
has been no effort to explain what relationship, if any, there was between these two highly
significant, essentially contemporary developments. 21 By looking closely at the negotiations
themselves, rather than the rhetorical arguments found in printed pamphlets, the chapter tries to
tease out this relationship and to show its importance for our understanding of both company
politics and the longer-term evolution of Dutch participation in the slave trade. This requires
methodically re-examining the debate over free trade to Brazil and connecting it to the debate
over free trade to Angola that began only four years later. It also requires focusing more
carefully on the mediators, rather than the antagonists, and on the give and take and compromise
of practical politics. In particular, it requires being sensitive to the ways that seemingly discrete
and un-related issues can suddenly become contingent during the course of negotiations.
The chapter argues that the debates over free trade—to both Brazil and Angola—were
primarily debates over colonial politics, rather than trade, and that successive decisions to open
19
Ibid., 11. Smith's quotation is taken from vol. 2, book IV, chapter 7. See Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 117.
20
Weststeijn, “Dutch Brazil and the Making of Free Trade Ideology,” 12.
21
Boxer treats these two issues sequentially, but does not analytically connect them. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil,
1624-1654, 75–84. Richard Tuck remarks on the coincidence of the two issues in Grotius' De Jure Belli et Pacis,
published in 1625: “It is significant that the first major public expression of a strong rights theory to be read in
Protestant Europe should have contained both a defence of slavery and absolutism and a defence of resistance and
common property in extremis.” Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 80. Cited
in Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 194.
177

and close trade to private merchants were driven by the States General's interests in populating
and defending Brazil at the least possible public expense. Slavery was part of both
considerations. The first section of the chapter shows that the company's plans to raise additional
private capital in 1636 stalled in the face of shareholder frustration with the policy of free trade
to Brazil, and that the States General's decision to reinstate the monopoly that December was
motivated by its desire to avoid assuming the financial burden for the war. The next section
explores the States General's concerns about disorder in Brazil itself on the even of Johan
Maurits’ arrival. By reconstructing the relevant committees, it establishes the active role played
by noblemen and other officials in The Hague who supported monopoly, military expansion, and
slavery as the best means to secure the colony. The following section examines the decision
within the Heren XIX to reopen the trade in 1638 and in particular at a compromise proposal
presented by the States of Holland. Though a victory for Amsterdam, the chapter shows that this
proposal was in fact accepted on Maurits' recommendation, and that it contained important
provisions to appease Zeeland by attracting additional private capital and formally recognizing
the company's monopoly on the trade in slaves. The last section analyzes the way that the Heren
XIX planned for and organized the slave trade during the period 1637-1645. The conclusion
suggests a framework for thinking about how this trade evolved from a solution to problems in
Dutch Brazil to a source of commercial profit in its own right.
2. Monopoly and Private Capital
The States General's decision to re-impose the company's monopoly in December of 1636 dates
back to the beginning of 1635 and was intimately linked to plans for a verhoging (augmentation
178

or supplemental investment) to help recapitalize the WIC. The latter episode has received almost
no notice from historians. 22 Reporting on the spring 1635 meetings of the Heren XIX, where they
had represented the States General, Gerard van Arnhem and Frans Herberts wrote that, “Through
God's grace the conquests in Brazil have been brought so far that the trade is now on a good
foot.” 23 However, there had been a discussion of “whether it would be best to leave the trade
open or to reserve it for the company and investors.” Van Arnhem and Herberts reported that,
“the majority were of the opinion that it should remain open,” but that the directors of the
Zeeland chamber, as well as hoofdparticipanten from both Zeeland and Amsterdam, disagreed.
They protested that private trade contravened the company's charter and that profits were flowing
disproportionately to the free traders, rather than to the investors who had assumed the
considerable risks of seizing and defending the colony. The matter was left unresolved, but Van
Arnhem and Herberts evidently sensed that a serious conflict was brewing: at the end of their
report they indicated that “your Excellencies [the States General] should consider whether it
might not be advisable to establish a permanent college” at The Hague to attend to this and other
important matters confronting the company in Brazil. 24
From the perspective of the States General, the problem was not simply that investors
were not receiving the profits they believed they deserved, but that the company was having
22 The verhoging features briefly in two accounts devoted to the history of individual chambers or cities. See J.
Acquoy, Deventer’s Participatie in de West-Indische Compagnie (Deventer: Oud-Archief van Deventer, 1922);
Winter, De Westindische Compagnie ter Kamer Stad en Lande.
23 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 59. Rapport van de Heeren Arnhem ende Herberts van eenige poincten
voorgevallen op de vergadering van de XIX... in Mario ende Aprilis 1635 binnen Amsterdam geholden, exhibited in
the States General on May 14, 1635. “By occasie dat door Godes Genaedigen seegen, de conquesten in Brasil soo
verre syn gebracht dat de trafycq ende handel aldaer schynt een goeden voet te sullen neemen, en is in deliberatie
gelegt off deselve trafycq aen een ieder op sekere conditien daer toe te beramen diende open gestelt dan off die aen
de Comp. offe participanten alleen diende gehouden te werden. De meeste leaden van de vergadering waeren van
opinie dat den handel voor een ieder behorde open te syn.”
24 Ibid. "U. Hog Mog in bedencken off niet diende gebesoineert om een vast en. permanent collegie van
Westindische Comp. te hebben, waer doorcan vasten en. ordre soude werden gehouden in de saechen van de voors.
Comp."
179

trouble paying its bills, especially for the defense of Brazil. 25 Financial problems plagued the
WIC throughout its early history. Although the company was able to raise more than seven
million guilders in private capital between 1622-1626, attacks on Salvador da Bahia, Loanda,
and Elmina in 1625 badly depleted the company's coffers. Were it not for Piet Heyn's celebrated
capture of a Spanish silver fleet off Matanzas in 1628—which brought home booty worth a
staggering 11.5 million guilders—the company might have quietly fallen into obscurity. Rather
than being used to replenish the capital stock, however, these funds were distributed amongst the
Prince of Orange (in his capacity as Admiral General), sailors and soldiers who participated in
the mission, and the company's directors and shareholders, all of whom clamored for part of the
spoils. Investors received dividends of 25% in 1628 and a further 50% in 1629. 26 The remaining
funds were devoted to preparations for the assault on Pernambuco. The mission was successful,
but expenditures on men and provisions dramatically exceeded the income from looted sugar and
other goods. To compound the problem, beginning in 1633 several provinces, including Holland,
fell into arrears on promised subsidies. Delegations sent to lobby them and the States General for
the most part came home empty-handed, leaving the company on the verge of bankruptcy once
more, at precisely the moment that its most promising colony was beginning to bear fruit. 27 This
was especially problematic in 1636, when plans were being made to appoint a new colonial
government and to dispatch additional soldiers in Brazil. 28
Without access to either adequate income or reliable public subsidies, the company's
directors determined that their best option for maintaining a steady supply of provisions and men
to the colony was to raise additional private capital. This idea was floated in April of 1636 and
25
Cornelis Goslinga attributed the debate over free trade to the “sheer private greed and cupidity” of the company's
directors. See Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 292.
26
Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC.
27
Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie, 58-63.
28
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 199. Beschrijving Poincten [...], May 22, 1622.
180

approved by a resolution of the States General two months later, on June 15. 29 Planning began
immediately thereafter for a verhoging in which each shareholder would be asked to subscribe
new money equal to 1/3 of his original investment, payable in three installments. Organizing
committees were established in each chamber to reach out to existing shareholders, oversee the
subscription campaign, and prepare printed announcements to be displayed in public. 30 The
company also appealed directly to the States General to supplement its own initial investment. 31
To ensure that investors would be receptive to the plan, the company offered an annual return of
8% on both newly invested and existing capital—a step that effectively transformed the
company's shares into interest paying, convertible bonds. 32
From the very beginning the verhoging was presented as a way to pay for expenditures
in northeastern Brazil, and thus became linked to the thorny problem of whether trade to the
colony would be left open or reserved exclusively for the company. The link can be seen clearly
in an anonymous memorandum submitted to the States General in 1636. 33 Composed in
conversational style, the memorandum employed a format of alternating questions and answers
to address the central problem stated unambiguously in its title: “How the [West India] Company
can be stabilized, to the advantage of the investors, without incurring costs to the government.”
Whether the memorandum was submitted by someone in the Zeeland chamber or by an advisor
in The Hague is impossible to discern. What is clear, however, is that it aimed to find alternatives
29
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 195. Versoeck van de Gecommitteed Bewindhebbers van de WIC, NA 1.01.04,
inv.nr. 5754, exhibited on April 29, 1636; NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 77, fol. 1. See also Acquoy, Deventer’s
Participatie in de West-Indische Compagnie, 19; Winter, De Westindische Compagnie ter Kamer Stad en Lande, 19.
30
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 22. Resoluties van de Bewindhebbers van de Camer Zeeland, entry for August 21, 1636.
31
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 195. Versoeck van de Gecommitteed Bewindhebbers van de WIC, exhibited on
April 29, 1636.
32
Ibid. On the use of bonds see Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst, The Origins of Value.
33
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.5. Discourse ondervrage en antwoort hoe die Westind. Comp. sal comen gestabiliseert
en gebeneficeert worden buyten costen vant lant, tot merckel. voordeel van die participanten.
181

means to capitalize the company without recourse to further public subsidies, a route that had
little support at the States General.
The memorandum began with a simple question: why had the WIC not thrived in the
same fashion as the VOC? This was slightly disingenuous, as the author must have known, for
during its first two decades the VOC also had struggled, requiring public support and failing to
pay dividends in all but two years. By the mid-1630s, however, the VOC had consolidated its
position at Batavia and emerged as a profitable enterprise. In 1636 its shares traded at more than
double their face value and investors received a handsome dividend of 37.5%. By contrast, WIC
shares continued to trade at, or just above par, and there had been no dividend since 1629. 34
What could account for this difference? The answer, at least according to the author of the
memorandum, was that the WIC lacked sufficient money and credit. This, in turn, was seen as a
consequence of the decision to open the trade to Brazil. Whereas the VOC had vigorously
protected its monopoly over trade to all parts of its territory, the WIC had opened the door to
private merchants and allowed them to undermine its main source of revenue.
The memorandum thus advised that the only way for the company to restore its finances
was to close the trade once again. If this could be done, its author asked, would the company
have sufficient means at its disposal, and a sufficient appetite for risk, to provide the colony with
the supplies it required? In other words, did the company have the capacity to transform itself
from an organization devoted primarily to piracy and conquest into one that conducted normal
trade on a greatly enlarged scale? The author answered in the affirmative, and offered the
outlines of a financial strategy to smooth the transition. The company would need to raise
approximately 2.5 million guilders in additional private capital, of which 1.5 million guilders
should be reserved to cover the costs of war. The remaining 1 million guilders should be used as
34 Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie, 249–250; Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company, 26–29.
182

collateral to borrow an additional 2 million guilders to finance the company's trade to Brazil. 35
This was a risky strategy, but the author believed that profits from the Brazil trade would more
than repay the new investment.
Most of the chambers opposed reinstating the company's monopoly, as we have seen
already, but the idea of raising additional private capital enjoyed broad support. Actually raising
new money proved more difficult than anticipated. In Zeeland, the chamber for which the best
records remain, new subscription books opened to investors simultaneously in the three cities of
Middelburg, Vlissingen, and Veere on August 26, 1636. 36 Abraham Bischop and Pieter Alleman,
who had helped negotiate the terms of the verhoging with delegates from Amsterdam and the
other chambers, served as the commissioners. 37 During the first month less than 70,000 guilders
were raised in Middelburg, and although investors included influential directors such as Jan van
der Merct, Jan Louys, and Pieter van Essen, many others stayed away. 38 On September 27, the
matter came to a head: the chamber's hoofdparticipanten insisted that they would invest further
funds only if they could be assured that these funds would go straight to Brazil, and if the
chamber's directors were forbidden from participating in the private trade. 39 On October 6 the
hoofdparticipanten were assured that these conditions would be met, and the chamber's directors
collectively “took a solemn oath not to trade [to Brazil] on their private accounts.” 40 Cornelis
Lampsins of Vlissingen (1600-1664), who indicated that he would rather lose his seat as a
35 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.5. Discourse ondervrage en antwoort hoe die Westind. Comp. sal comen gestabiliseert
en gebeneficeert worden buyten costen vant lant, tot merckel. voordeel van die participanten.
36 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nrs. 77, 78, and 79.
37 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 22, entry for August 21, 1636.
38 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 77. Note that the sums listed in the manuscript are in Flemish pounds. By September 27,
investors in Middelburg has subscribed 11,235 Flemish pounds, equal to 67,410 guilders.
39 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 22, entry for September 27, 1636.
40 Ibid., entry for October 5, 1636. “Alle de Bewindhebberen van de vergaderinge gedaen hebbende den eedt,
achtervolgens de resolutie van de negentiene van op brasyl in haer particuliere nyet te handelen, als alleen d’heer
Lampsins.”
183

director than his trade to Brazil, refused to take the oath and stepped down several weeks later. 41
In effect, the Zeeland directors had reached an agreement independent of both the other
chambers and the States General not to compete with one another in the trade to Brazil. Having
forfeited the right to profit personally, outside the framework of the company's monopoly, it is
not surprising that they would become so frustrated with Amsterdam, where directors'
involvement in private trade to Brazil was believed to be widespread. 42
In any case, the agreement succeeded in stimulating new subscriptions, but hardly
enough to encourage confidence. By the end of November Middelburg's books still registered
only 150,000 guilders, a sizeable sum but well short of the 290,000 guilders that would be
expected based on the city's initial investment of 879,475 guilders. 43 In Vlissingen and Veere the
situation was much the same, and the problem extended to other regions, as well. In September
Johannes de Laet reported to the Amsterdam chamber that shareholders in Leiden were hesitant
to subscribe new money. 44 Several weeks later a committee in Amsterdam met to discuss similar
problems in Vriesland, Arnhem, and Zutphen. 45
In Amsterdam itself, where investment could help procure a coveted seat as one of the
chamber's directors—and thus access to secret information that would be invaluable to private
merchants trading to Brazil—there was considerably more enthusiasm for the verhoging. Even in
Amsterdam, though, there was disagreement. While a majority of the chamber's directors were
committed to a policy of free trade, the hoofdparticipanten were concerned that private traders
were reaping all of the benefits of trade. In a remonstrance to the States General, submitted in
41
Ibid. and entry for December 3, 1636.
42
Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek”; Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean
and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 292.
43
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 77. Roos, Zeeuwen en de Westindische Compagnie (1621-1674), 21.
44
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 14, entry for September 11, 1636.
45 Ibid., entry for December 25, 1636.
184

July of 1635, they had recommended that the trade to Brazil remain open, but that investors in
the company who traded on their own account be given preferential terms, including lowering
the recognition fees due the company to 5% from the normal rate of 10%. 46 This proposal was
not adopted and the Amsterdam hoofdparticipanten eventually resolved to support keeping the
trade open. But their position can only have further undermined confidence among the other
chambers and cities, which increasingly voiced concern about the cozy relationship between
Amsterdam's directors and the private merchants trading to Brazil.
These concerns took concrete form in yet another way. The WIC's charter called for
each chamber of the company to manage its own capital stock and lists of shareholders, even
though profits and losses were reconciled annually and distributed amongst the five chambers
based on a set proportional formula. Evidently the founders of the company did not foresee, or at
least did not take steps to prevent, the possibility that shares issued by different chambers would
begin to trade at different prices. But once Brazil was opened to private merchants, this is exactly
what happened. In their report in May of 1635, Van Arnhem and Herberts noted that the value of
shares in the company had “begun to diverge widely.” 47 In Amsterdam shares were selling for
119-120 guilders, while in Groningen they had sunk to 94-95 guilders, below par. Zeeland
pointed out that VOC shares had never diverged in this fashion, and, at the next meeting of the
Heren XIX in July of the same year, protested that failing to protect the company's monopoly
indirectly permitted “the majority [of the trade] to fall to Amsterdam, to the prejudice of the
other chambers and cities.” 48
46 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fols. 107-114. Remonstratie van de Hooftparticipanten van de Camer Amsterdam.
47 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 59. Rapport van de Heeren Arnhem ende Herberts. “Die actien die nu soo
verschieden van prys zijn in der respective cameren.”
48 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 137. Rapport van de heeren Arnhem ende Pauw Gecommitteerden van wegen hare
hooch mo. op de Jongste vergaderinge van de Negentiene van de Westindische Compagnie binnen Amsterdam die
beschieden is geweest den ii July 1635 ende geendicht den eerste ten Augusti daer aen volgende.
185

With the verhoging stalled, and animosity towards Amsterdam's directors building,
Zeeland seized the opportunity to press its case for the trade to be closed. On the chamber's copy
of the draft agenda for the fall meeting of the Heren XIX, scheduled to begin in Amsterdam on
December 8, 1636, they recorded a unanimous decision that further discussion of the verhoging
was to be contingent upon resolution of the question of closing the trade to Brazil, and a
delegation was appointed to carry this message directly to the representatives of the States
General at The Hague. 49 By this time the chambers of the Maas, Groningen, and North Holland
all had reached the same conclusion: the only means to refinance the company, and thereby to
adequately provide for the colony, was to re-impose the company's monopoly. It was colonial
policy, not “cupidity” or greed, that motivated Zeeland and its allies.
3. Decision-Making at The States General
The States General's decision to close the trade to Brazil on December 27, 1636 was not just
about money: it was also based on advice coming from the Hoge Raad in Brazil and on a vision
for the colony based on unified authority, military expansion, and slavery. Identifying the
ultimate locus of decision-making within the complex political structure of the United Provinces
is no easier for the modern historian than it was for contemporaries who shuttled back and forth
between city governments, provincial states, the States General, and other bodies looking for
definitive resolution to disagreements over matters of law and policy. 50 As we saw in Chapter
Three, in the case of the WIC the difficulty is compounded by the overlapping responsibilities of
49 NA 1.05.01.01 inv.nr. 22, entry for December 1, 1636. “Te consenteren tot verhooginge van de Capitalen, mits dat
de handeling aende Comp. blyve, volgens hey viii poinct. Synde dit geresolveert met eenparige stemmen.”
50 Fruin, Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek; Frijhoff and Spies, 1650:
Hard-Won Unity, 220–226; Goldgar, Tulipmania; Van Vree, Meetings, Manners, and Civilization.
186

the five chambers, their constituent cities, and the company's board. With no direct records of
discussions in the Heren XIX, the States of Holland, or the States General, any explanation for
the decision must be based on a certain amount of inference and conjecture. Henk den Heijer has
pointed to the States General's representative within the Heren XIX, arguing that Amsterdam
may have lost the support not only of North Holland, but also of this crucial nineteenth vote,
which in the past had helped to guarantee Amsterdam's majority. 51 What little evidence remains
supports this view, suggesting that the States General and its functionaries played something
more than a passive role in adjudicating the question of free trade. 52 Robert Fruin famously
argued that the States General was “more a congress of ambassadors than a genuine legislature,”
in the sense that delegates from the various provinces arrived with and represented strict
instructions, rather than collectively and autonomously generating new policies or laws. 53 In the
debate over free trade, however, it appears that the committee charged with overseeing WIC
affairs held and may have acted upon views of its own.
As Herman Wätjen showed, there were growing concerns that free trade was
undermining the company's fragile efforts to consolidate its authority in Brazil. 54 A string of
military successes in 1634-1635 had rapidly expanded the territory under Dutch control to
include the captaincies of Itamaracá, Paraiba, and Rio Grande, as well as Pernambuco, but the
revenue from looted sugar and other goods had not been adequate to offset the company's
expenditures. As Willem Usselincx had warned a decade and a half earlier, Brazil was “no cat to
51 Den Heijer, “Het Recht van de Sterkste in de Polder: Politieke en Economische Strijd tussen Amsterdam en
Zeeland over de Kwestie Brazilie, 1630-1654,” 81.
52 Knevel, Het Haagse Bureau.
53 Fruin, Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek, 179. “De afstand van hunne
committenten maakte hen [de leden der Staten Generaal] in kleinigheden wel eenigszins onafhankelijk, maar zij
stemden dan daar toch alleen in toe onder voorbehoud van de goedkeuring der committenten. Het [de Staten
Generaal] was dus meer een congres van gezanten dan een wetgevende vergadering.”
54 Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um capitulo da historia colonial do seculo XVII, 450–452.
187

e handled without gloves.” 55 In his view, local Indians, Jewish settlers, and African slaves were
unlikely to welcome the Dutch and, even if they did, the company would soon find that
everything of value in the colony had been destroyed. Just as the Dutch had burned crops and
flooded lands in advance of Spanish troops in the early years of the Revolt, in Brazil the
Portuguese would burn the sugar mills in order to deprive the company of any stable source of
revenue. 56 In this, as in many other matters, Usselincx was largely correct. By 1635 little or no
new sugar had been planted, the colony's finances were in disarray, and much needed supplies
were not arriving fast enough to replenish depleted stocks.
During the course of the following year company officials and others in Brazil
increasingly became convinced that private merchants were to blame for this state of affairs.
Initially the Politique Raad—the civilian political council charged with overseeing the colony's
affairs—had supported opening the trade to private merchants. With control over the vast
majority of the sugar trade, and with the trade in provisions, munitions, and Brazilwood reserved
for the company, the council did not expect that private trade would pose a serious threat. 57 But
their view quickly changed. By the summer of 1636, members of the council were calling on the
States General to take action to exclude private traders and to close the trade. Their arguments
were devoted in part to commercial issues, but far more important was their concern that free
trade was sewing disunity, undermining the company's authority, and threatening its ability to
consolidate colonial rule.
“We recommend to your excellencies that the trade [to Brazil] be closed,” stated the
council's letter of June 11, 1636, signed by Jacob Stachower, Elias Herckmans, Willem Schot,
55 NA 1.01.05, inv.nr. 9409. Brief van Willem Usselincx, exhibited in the States General on April 13, 1620. “Wat
Bresillien belangt dat en is geen cat om sonder hantscoenen aen te tasten, te meer als den Conninck van
Spaignendaer twee offe drie duysent oude soldaten na toeschicte.”
56 Ibid.
57 Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um capitulo da historia colonial do seculo XVII, 449.
188

and Philips Serooskerken. 58 The recognition fees that the company collected on goods shipped
by private traders were welcome, the letter argued, but they were tiny in comparison to the
profits of the trade itself. The only way to secure a greater portion of these profits would be to
close the trade. In his separate letter, Serooskerken, a Zeelander, expressed the frustration and
indignation aroused by the activities of the private traders. While the company was obliged to
maintain the army and its own servants—as well the forts, warehouses, and living quarters—the
private traders were making a fortune on the trade in sugar and provisions. Not only did this give
them an unfair advantage, Serooskerken reasoned, but it led to price inflation, since the private
traders simply added to the price of the goods they sold the recognition fees they paid to the
company, plus 100-200% in profits. In Recife the price for houses, many of which were still
dilapidated as a result of the war, had increased as much as sevenfold. As a result, many in the
colony—and especially the company's soldiers and menial servants—had fallen deeply in debt.
The private trade, Serooskerken concluded, was “eating the company like a worm.” 59
Jan Robberts, another company official, qualified his remarks as based solely on “my
personal sentiments,” but the recommendations he offered were almost exactly the same. 60 The
private traders, he wrote, were “no friends of the company,” but rather men who in every
instance placed their own particular interests above those of either company or fatherland. 61 He
echoed Serooskerken's reports on the poor state of the company's warehouses and the rapid rise
in prices, which he blamed for the “thousands” of company soldiers that could be found
58 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.5. Extracts from the letter of the Politique Raad, June 11, 1636.
59 Ibid. Extracts from a letter from Philips Serooskerken, June 11, 1636. “Den handel van particulieren compt hierin
zoodanigen consideratie, dat noch militaire noch maritime, noch politycque, noch Ecclesiastique haer met genouch
daerover verwonderen en commen, Oordelen geen beter middel gevonden te commen worden, om de Comp te
gronde te helpen, ende de particuliere in corten tyt schatryck te maecken, dan dat den oorloch ende de oncosten daer
aen dependerende de Comp. als een verterende Worm behoude”
60 Ibid. Extracts from a letter from Jan Robberts, August 12, 1636. “Doch ick schrijve met myn particulier gevoelen,
u E. sullen misschien beter tot voordeel van. Comp. onderrecht syn, Dat ick van haerten wensche.”
61 Ibid.
189

“walking the land half-naked” for want of clothes and food. 62 If the company sent additional
provisions and paid the soldiers in cash, he suggested, it would “receive with one hand what it
paid with the other,” and thus make an additional profit. He recommended four measures: the
trade should be reserved to the company; fresh soldiers and supplies should be sent out at once;
soldiers should be made responsible for their own upkeep; and a general should be appointed to
restore order and oversee the full range of the colony's military and civilian affairs. Separate
letters by Hendrik Schilt and Willem Schot offered many of the same recommendations. 63
Christoffel Artichewski, the Polish colonel who led company forces in Brazil during the
early and mid-1630s, would later explain to Johan Maurits, that these letters contained numerous
mistakes and misinterpretations. But their impact in the United Provinces was dramatic. 64 The
first set of letters arrived in Zeeland on August 18, 1636, barely two weeks after Johan Maurits
had been selected to serve as Governor General of Dutch Brazil, with broad powers to reorganize
and expand the colony. Appointing a nobleman of such high status represented a major
investment for the company: with Johan Maurits already preparing to depart at the head of 3,000
new troops, news of the poor state of the army and provisions must have been particularly
disturbing. But the letters also played directly into Zeeland's hand. After reading them, the
chamber's directors resolved that closing the trade to Brazil was now urgent. 65
The States General was similarly moved. In October, after the second batch of letters
had arrived from Brazil, they formally requested advice from each of the company's five
62 Ibid. Extracts from a letter from Jan Robberts, July 24, 1636.
63 Ibid. Extracts from a letter from Hendrik Schilt, September 4, 1636; Extracts from a letter from Willem Schot to
the Heren XIX, July 25, 1636.
64 Christoffel Artichewski, “Missive van den Kolonnel Artichofsky aan Graaf Maurits en de Hoogen Raad in
Brazilië, 24 Juli 1637,” Kronijk van het Historisch Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht 25, no. 5 (1869): 231. J. C. M.
Warsinck, “Christoffel Artichewsky,” in Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctryeerde West-Indische
Compagnie, ed. L’Honoré Naber, vol. 4 (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1937), xxv–lxxii; Xavier, “Het Gebruik
van Egodocumenten en Nederlands Brazilië: De Memorie van Kolonel Christoffel Arciszewski.”
65 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 22, entry for August 18, 1636.
190

chambers. Notably, this request came not from Van Arnhem, but from Hendrick Willemsz.
Nobel, a deputy to the States General from Rotterdam, an early investor in the WIC, and a
director in the chamber of the Maas. 66 Since the Maas had by this point concluded that the trade
should be closed, Nobel's involvement likely ensured that Zeeland's advice would at the
minimum receive a favorable hearing. On November 6 two directors in the Zeeland chamber
began assembling excerpts from the letters sent by the Politique Raad and others. 67 To these
excerpts they attached a lengthy memorandum arguing for the trade to Brazil to be closed. The
arguments themselves were by now familiar—if the trade was left open the colony would be
ruined, since shareholders would not devote additional resources while private trade brought
richer returns—but for the first time Zeeland also made the case that they believed a majority
could be won on the issue in the Heren XIX. 68
The States General's decision took the form of a resolution, signed by Cornelis Musch
on December 27, 1636. A letter to the Heren XIX announcing the resolution cited both the news
from Brazil and the company's enduring financial difficulties:
We have examined the documents submitted to us and note with great sadness the terrible effects
wrought by opening the trade to Brazil, including the emptying of the company's warehouses and
its inability to resupply them, which together have caused many heavy troubles. Whether this is
the result of the sinister activities of a few, or has been caused by other means, we wish not to
examine further at this time, but instead we have decided that for the best of the Company the
currently approved free trade shall be abolished, and all goods or ships that have been outfitted by
private traders shall immediately be confiscated. 69
66
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 14, entry for October 17, 1636. "Hendrick Willemsz. Nobel," Molhuysen, Nieuw
Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, 1384. Ambtsdragers en Ambtenaren, 1428-1861.
http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/Repertorium/app/personen/11402. Accessed on April 4, 2011.
67
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 22, entry for December 6, 1636.
68
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.5, Cort sommier uyt dese voorgestelden 11 extracten... gedateert van den 11 Juny aff
tot den 10 September 1636 toe.
69
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 39, fol. 58v. “Wy hebben Geexamineert de bygevoechde stucken ende daerinne met
droefheyt ende met Groot leerwesen bespeurt de quade Effecten ende het open stellen van den vrien handel op
Brasil heeft gebaert ten regarde van het onblooten vanden magasynen van de Comp. ende de negligentie van de
selve meder te versien ende remplaceeren, t’ welck veele swaricheeden heft veroorsaect, tsy dan off sulcx is Geschut
door mis practiquen offe by ander […] tselve en willen wy voor t mael met verder ondersoecken Maer hebben
goetgedracht ten besten van de Comp. aff te schaffen, gelyck wy ook aff schaeffen mits desen den tegenwoordigen
191

While the resolution as a whole shows that Zeeland's arguments had been decisive, the final
clause suggests that the decision was made rather hastily, likely without consultation with
representatives of the company. 70 As the directors, who were still assembled at the meeting of
the Heren XIX in Amsterdam, immediately recognized, it was hardly just to seize ships and
cargos that had been prepared for shipment to Brazil before December 27, when private trade to
Brazil was still legal. On January 3 Van Arnhem reported to the States General that the
directors—who had for months been feuding amongst themselves—were unanimous in their
view that the resolution should be revised to allow these ships to depart unmolested. 71 The States
General at first refused; it then passed a second resolution calling on the company to take control
of the confiscated ships and their cargoes in return for a “fair market price.” This turned out to be
equally unacceptable, because the company did not have nearly the resources that would have
been necessary to compensate so many merchants simultaneously. 72 Finally, after intervention by
the delegate from Holland, the States General backed down, and allowed a limited number of
ships to sail. Part of the rationale for their decision may have been the fact that several of the
ships were carrying military and other supplies for Maurits and members of his extensive
entourage. 73
It is unknown whether a vote on the question of free trade ever took place within the
Heren XIX. Under normal circumstances the directors sought consensus, but on particularly
contentious issues decisions were made by a simple majority, with the senior representative of
Geconsenteerden handel verclaerende dien volgende verbeurt ende Geconfisqeert alle de schepen ende goederen die
derwaers near dare deses uyt dese Landen.”
70 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 78.
71 NA 1.01.04, inv. 5754, fol. 274. The report is dated January 3, 1636.
72 NA 1.05.01.01 inv. 39, fols. 59-60v. Extracts of the Resolutions of the States General dated January 3, January 5,
and January 7, 1636.
73 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 39, fol. 60.
192

the States General casting the nineteenth—and thus tie-breaking—vote. If even this failed to
resolve the impasse, the charter authorized the States General to move debate to its own
chambers and resolve the matter as it saw fit. 74 With the Amsterdam chamber in favor of free
trade, and Zeeland, the Maas, and Groningen against, in a strict sense such an impasse could only
have occurred if both North Holland and the representative of the States General abstained. 75
Whatever took place, it seems certain that the States General acted quickly to assume
responsibility for the decision, and thus to imprint its own vision on the company and its colony.
The impetus likely did not come from Gerard van Arnhem. Born in 1598, Van Arnhem
was a member of the Veluwesch Ridderschap (council of noblemen for the Veluwe, a portion of
Gelderland along the United Provinces' eastern border). 76 In 1634 he married Theodora van
Wassenaer Vuer, daughter of Johan van Wassenaer, Heer van Duvenvoorde, a member of
Holland's Ridderschap and, from 1617 until his death in 1645, its representative to the
Gecommitteerde Raden (Delegated Councilors). In 1617 he accompanied Hugo Grotius on a
mission to Dordrecht and Zeeland to try to stop the Synod of Dordrecht, which began the next
year. Theodora's brother, Arend van Wassenaer Veur, served as a sergeant major in the cavalry
and, following his father's death, entered both Holland's Ridderschap and the Gecommitteerde
Raden. Van Arnhem's marriage, in other words, both reflected and reproduced his status within
the military and administrative nobility, and possibly also within the remnants of the
Remonstrant party. From at least as early as 1630, he regularly served as the States General's
senior representative at the meetings of the Heren XIX. According to Artichewski, he was—
74 Charter of the Dutch West India Company, Article 23.
75 Since any other alignment would have yielded a (albeit small) majority. Amsterdam had eight votes, Zeeland four,
the Maas two, Groningen two, North Holland two, and the States General one.
76 The short biography here draws substantially on the entry for Van Arnhem's father in law. See “Johan van
Wassenaer” in Molhuysen, Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, vol. 2, 1530.
193

along with the two powerful Amsterdam directors Johannes de Laet and Albert Coenraeds
Burgh—a well-informed and reliable supporter of free trade to Brazil. 77
The inclinations of the deputies at the States General in The Hague were rather different.
Once the resolution to close the trade had been finalized, both Zeeland and Amsterdam sent large
delegations to express their views. Zeeland, of course, congratulated the States General on its
decision, while some fifteen directors and hoofdparticipanten from Amsterdam complained
bitterly that the decision jeopardized both the company and the colony. 78 Their respective letters
were placed in the hands of a committee that was asked to submit a report, in consultation with
Van Arnhem and Jan Gijsbertsz. Pauw, a deputy from Alkmaar and the States General's junior
representative to the meetings of the Heren XIX. 79 This committee was disproportionately staffed
with noblemen who were either hostile to Spain or represented provinces whose chambers in the
company opposed free trade to Brazil. The matter was not simply that Amsterdam's numerical
strength was weaker in the States General—where, together with all the other cities in Holland, it
exercised only one vote of seven, as opposed to the eight votes it controlled in the Heren XIX—
but that it faced almost unanimous opposition on both ideological and political grounds.
The deputy from Zeeland, for example, was Johan de Knuyt, Heer van Oud en Nieuw
Vosmaera, later a fierce critic of peace with Spain and a close confidant of the Prince of
Orange. 80 While there is no record that Frederik Hendrik ever explicitly supported Zeeland's
position, he had written to the States General the previous year to ask that their case be heard,
77 From 1639 until his death in 1644, Van Arnhem served as one of two Commissarissen-Deciseurs appointed by the
States General to oversee appointments, law, and administration in the Maastricht, the Limburg city captured by
Frederik Hendrik in 1632. He first appears in the records of the WIC as a representative of the States General in
March 1630. See NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5752. His identification as an advocate of free trade is taken from Artichewski,
“Missive van den Kolonnel Artichofsky aan Graaf Maurits en de Hoogen Raad in Brazilië, 24 Juli 1637,” 231.
78 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fols. 288 and 301.
79 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 39, marginal note in the Credentiebrief van de Camer Amsterdam aen de Staten Generael,
dated January 27, 1637.
80 See Chapter Two.
194

and later suggested that the monopoly be maintained for at least a year to see if the company was
capable of delivering sufficient provisions to Brazil. 81 Willem Ripperda tot Boxbergen, another
nobleman, represented Overijsel, where the verhoging had run into opposition from investors
who resented Amsterdam merchants' domination of the private trade. 82 Hendrik Schonenborch,
the deputy from Groningen (and Wolter Schonenborch's father), was an investor himself and
presumably would have been sympathetic to his province's chamber in the company, which
supported closing the trade. The same was true for the deputy from Holland, Hendrick Willemsz.
Nobel, who, as we have seen, came from Rotterdam, one of the three cities that participated in
the chamber of the Maas.
Perhaps most important of all, however, was Hendrik van der Capellen, Alexander van
der Capellen's older brother and a considerable figure in his own right. 83 Born around 1580, he
had inherited the title of Heer van Rijsselt from his father; later a cousin ceded him title to Esselt
as well. In 1620 he served as Burgemeester of Zutphen and thereafter was admitted to the
Ridderschappen (Council of Noblemen) of both Zutphen and Cleves. By the mid-1630s, he had
established himself as a prominent member of the Gelderland nobility and served as a
representative of the generality lands to the States General. His contribution to the discussion on
free trade would inaugurate a long period of steady involvement with the WIC and its affairs.
After 1640 Van der Capellen effectively replaced Van Arnhem as the States General's senior
representative to the meetings of the Heren XIX, and later he would become a financier, with
81 Frederik Hendrik's request to the States General can be found in NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 131, entry for
September 29, 1635. His call for the monopoly to be left in place is recorded in Nicholaes Stellingwerf's personal
notes of the meetings of the States of Holland. Stellingwerff and Schot, Particuliere Notulen van de Vergaderingen
der Staten van Holland, 1620-1640. Entry for April 8, 1637.
82 On Ripperda, see the entry in Ambtsdragers en Ambtenaren, 1428-1861.
http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/Repertorium/app/personen/7636. Accessed on April 4, 2011.
Overijsel's complaint can be found in NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 14, entry for November 14, 1636.
83 "Hendrik van der Capellen" in Molhuysen, Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, vol. 8, 250–251.
195

Cornelis Melijn, of a patroonschap on Staten Island. 84 In between he developed a solid working
knowledge of the company's business and a keen interest in matters of war, law, and colonial
government. His brother's subsequent comments about the free traders and their pernicious effect
on the company suggests that Hendrik may already have viewed them with suspicion in 1636. 85
This committee's report, submitted by Van der Capellen in late February, shows its
authors’ attitude towards the company and their vision for ensuring the success of the Brazil
colony. 86 The report began by reviewing the central points of the submissions provided by
Amsterdam and Zeeland. Amsterdam maintained, in effect, that the company didn't have the
resources or credit to drive the trade to Brazil, and that the important goal of settling the colony
was possible only if traders could conduct their business freely. In addition, they argued that the
company and the States General were obligated to uphold their agreements with Portuguese
planters; only by treating them with respect, as the King of Portugal had done, could the
company hope to bring them over to its side. Finally, Amsterdam calculated that the income
from recognition fees, which in 1635 and 1636 had been worth between 500,000-600,000
guilders, could be expected to rise to 2.5 million guilders if the trade was left open. 87
Zeeland, by contrast, argued that closing the trade was consistent with the WIC's charter,
whereas Amsterdam's position was not, and that only the company could ensure that the public
interest was protected. This included ensuring that Brazil was adequately populated and
cultivated, aims that private traders had no incentive to share. And Zeeland attacked
Amsterdam's financial calculations by pointing out that the company had spent nearly 6 million
84
Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 73.
85
See Chapter Four.
86
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fols. 379-383. Rapport van den heere Vander Capellen toe Ryssel en andere haer
hoochmog Gecommitteerde over die Communicatie gehouden met die Gedeputierde der Negentien van die
respective Westindische Cameren van Amsterdam, Zeelant, Mase, Norderquartier, Stat Groningen en omlanden.
Exhibitum 25 February 1637.
87
Ibid., fol. 379.
196

guilders to expand and defend the colony. If the WIC were to command the trade, which
Amsterdam itself calculated to be worth more than 5 million guilders, it would be able to offset
these costs. Notably, they argued that the difference could be made up by the new trade in slaves,
which the company also should be permitted to keep to itself. 88
The committee supplemented these two positions with information they had received
from conversations with company directors and others who visited The Hague over the
preceding week. To their frustration, Kiliaen van Rensselaer, one of the most influential
Amsterdam hoofdparticipanten, refused to say almost anything at all. 89 When asked his view on
the question of free trade, he stated only that the magistrates of the city of Amsterdam were
currently debating the issue, and that he would prefer not to speak on the matter without their
permission. When Van der Capellen offered to release him from this obligation, so he could
share his thoughts freely, Rensselaer again refused. As a patroon with private interests of his
own in New Netherland, and as signatory to Amsterdam's letter of complaint, Rensselaer almost
certainly supported free trade. 90 But after nearly a decade of wrangling with both the company
and the States General to get his own fledgling colony up and running, he may have thought it
prudent to stay silent rather than to engage in a contentious discussion with a committee that only
recently had taken the opposite view.
Sebastian Franck, a director from Dordrecht, was more forthcoming. 91 He explained that
the chamber of the Maas had become so weak as a result of the war effort, with no prospect for
making profit from trade, that the only solution was to reserve the trade to the company; without
88 Ibid., fol. 380.
89 On Van Rensselaer, see Venema, Kiliaen van Rensselaer (1586-1643): Designing a New World; Merwick, “A
Genre of Their Own”; Rensselaer, Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts.
90 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr 5754, fol. 288. Van Rensselaer was delegated as one of 17 representatives of the Amsterdam
chamber that requested permission to visit the States General on January 21, 1637.
91 On Dordrecht's position, see also Den Heijer, “Het Recht van de Sterkste in de Polder: Politieke en Economische
Strijd tussen Amsterdam en Zeeland over de Kwestie Brazilie, 1630-1654,” 81.
197

this measure, he said, “no one in Dordrecht was willing to provide new capital.” 92 Those who
had invested had done so not in order to wage war and collect recognition fees, but to conclude
the war as swiftly as possible and engage in trade. Under the current system, however, the
private merchants were supplying the company and the enemy alike, which only prolonged the
war and its associated costs. 93 When asked if the private traders were taking any interest in
sending settlers and cultivating the land, Franck indicated that they were not, but that the
company was making efforts to do so. The last person with whom the committee spoke, a
lieutenant named Beyma, was also pressed on the question of how best to populate Brazil. His
response, like that previously offered by Zeeland, emphasized a combination of African slaves
and soldiers whose terms had expired. If the company could ensure a regular flow of both, the
colony would thrive. 94
Beyma's argument echoed that in the anonymous memorandum in conversational style
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 95 There the author had asked, “who would want to go
to live in the colony, if they could not trade freely there?” As in the East Indies, the
memorandum's author argued, it was not people of means who would go to Brazil, but the poor
and landless. Spain, he wrote, “peopled its empire at first with bandits and delinquents.” Only
with time did these individuals amass wealth sufficient to support a thriving society. With proper
incentives, soldiers in the company's employment could be expected to remain in Brazil once
their contracts had expired and to cultivate the land. And their labor would be significantly
augmented by slaves from Africa, who would increase the colony's productivity at little cost to
92 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 381.
93 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 78.
94 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 382.
95 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.5. Discourse ondervrage en antwoort hoe die Westind. Comp. sal comen gestabiliseert
en gebeneficeert worden buyten costen vant lant, tot merckel. voordeel van die participanten.
198

either the company or the provinces. 96 A pamphlet from early 1637 expressed these themes in
more philosophical terms, suggesting that, while it was difficult to attract free colonists to Brazil,
this was not the only way to populate a colony:
In a Machiavellian form the Prince [by the Free Traders] is advised that he must seek to throw out
the natural inhabitants of a conquered land and people it with his own; on the contrary, however,
one shall not find it unusual in history, both modern and ancient, that all praiseworthy conquerors
have not depopulated their colonies. 97
Instead, the pamphlet argued, colonies could become rich and prosperous by careful management
of existing populations. In Brazil, this meant Dutch, Portuguese, Indian, and African peoples
under a stable government. 98
The States General's decision to close the trade to Brazil was not based solely on the
narrow economic interests of the Zeeland chamber. It reflected a more general aim to ensure that
the company had access to sufficient financial resources to maintain order in the new colony. At
this stage, at least, Amsterdam had been unable to convince the States General either that the
company could persist on recognition fees alone, or that free trade would attract settlers who
planned to stay. Instead, sources in Brazil and at home suggested the free traders were
undermining order. Merchant interests were not neglected—indeed the representative from
Dordrecht's argument was devoted explicitly to long-term commercial gain—but in the short
term these interests were subordinated to what were perceived to be the interests of the United
Provinces as a whole. And these interests lay, the States General evidently concluded, in
96 Ibid. "Sonder onsen costen."
97 Examen over het Vertooch tegen het ongefondeerde ende schaelick sluyten der vryen handel in Brasil. Door een
onder soecker der waerheyt. 1637. Knuttel 4515. This was a response to Vertooch by een liefhebber der vaderlants
vertoont tegen het ongefondeerde ende schaelick sluyten der vryen handel in Brasil. 1637. Knuttel 4514. “Also sik
bevindet: oft moste deselve in eene Machievellische forme zyn gegoten lerende den Prince dat hy die naturallen van
een geconquesteert Lant moet soecken uyt te roeyen ende dselve met den zynen weder peupleren: Ter Contrarie sal
de gene so in die historien niet vreemt en is / notoirlijcken soo wel inde nieuwe also oude bekent worden: dat alle
loflycke conqueranten die landen van hare naturellen niet en hebben gedepeupleert.”
98 Ibid.
199

maintaining the company's solvency, expanding the colony by military means, and supplying
Brazil with labor, either free or un-free. Several of these conclusions would be seriously
challenged during the intense period of lobbying in the months that followed.
4. Compromise within the Heren XIX
When Colonel Artichewski returned home in early 1637 from several years commanding Dutch
forces in northeastern Brazil, he found a state of “perilous quarreling” among the WIC's five
chambers. 99 In a letter to Johan Maurits, who had just arrived in Brazil, Artichewski indicated
that he had read the “hundreds of pages” composed on the question of free trade, but had not
become involved personally. He had friends on each side and, though from his service he knew
far more than anyone else about the actual conditions in the colony, he didn't want to offend
them. Moreover, once delegates from Zeeland suspected that he might not support their side—
that, in other words, he supported free trade—they instructed him not to speak. 100 Artichewski
hoped that the States General or the Prince of Orange might seek his counsel, but even here he
had been foiled, as the chambers sent minders to ensure his silence. “This matter,” Artichewski
wrote, “which has become so bitter here, cannot be resolved in any way better than for your
Excellency to write from Brazil yourself.” 101
And this is precisely what Maurits did, borrowing liberally from arguments that
Artichewski provided. In Artichewski's view, the company's directors, who had never visited the
99 Artichewski, “Missive van den Kolonnel Artichofsky aan Graaf Maurits en de Hoogen Raad in Brazilië, 24 Juli
1637,” 222. “Int Vaderlant gearriveert sijnde, vant ick den staet vande West-Indische Comp. door inwendige twisten
heel pericleus onstelt.”
100 Ibid., 224.
101 Ibid., 225. “Altoos, dese saecken, die hier soo qualijck wtgevallen sijn, connen niet beter op nieu vervat worden,
als door V Extie. ende E. entremise wt Brasil selffs.”
200

Illustration 11. Portrait of Christoffel Artichewsky. From Johannes de Laet,
Historie ofte Iaerlyck Verhael, edited by L’Honoré Naber and J. C. M.
Warsinck, vol. 4 (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1937). A Polish Colonel, Artichewsky
led Dutch land forces in Brazil from 1634-36.
201

colony, overestimated the number of ingenhos (sugar mills) and the value of the sugar that could
be exported each year. They believed, erroneously, that the colony was now in good shape and
ready to yield profits. Artichewski wrote instead that Brazil “had never been poorer.” 102 Those
who understood this, including Van Arnhem, De Laet, and Coenraeds Burgh, excused
themselves from the discussions rather than be subjected to the vitriol—bordering on
blasphemy—of the two sides. 103 The real issue, as everyone knew, was to attract settlers to
establish new ingenhos and defend the colony, and on this Artichewski agreed squarely with the
arguments of the free traders. The only people who would come to Brazil under the company's
monopoly were those who had nothing to lose in the first place. 104 It was also crucially important
to honor the company's promises to the Portuguese: some had proven to be untrustworthy, but
this only increased the company's responsibility to be fair to those who were not. Artichewski
looked to recent history to prove his point: with free trade Recife had grown dramatically, but
there was no better example than the United Provinces themselves:
What power, what means would the Netherlanders have derived from the land and public capital
alone […] without the multitude of private traders? What above all else made the city of
Amsterdam so great? That not only Netherlanders, but all nations of the world walk freely in the
city and trade as they wish. 105
Private trade makes wealth and attracts people, Artichewski concluded. “There is more to find,
more to buy, and more to sell where more people live, work, and spend, than where there are
102 Ibid., 226. “maer ick can het niet sien. Den staet van Brasil is noyt soo arm geweest als hij tegenwoordich is.”
103 Ibid., 225. “Noch is hier dese pest mede ingecropen, dat de Camaren dese questie alhier tegen malcander met soo
groote hevicheyt ende bitterheyt drijven, dates malcander daerover blasfemeren.”
104 Ibid., 233.
105 Ibid., 237. “Maer hoe can men noch een beter exempel voorstellen als dese Nederlanden selffs? Wat cracht, wat
middelen souden de Nederlanden hebben uyt het lant alleen ende uytte publijcque capitalen alleen, tot soo
merckelijcke en miraculeuse grote oncosten die se doen, wanneer niet was de meenichte van particulieren? Wat heft
onder veele andere de stadt Amsterdam soo splendissant gemaeckt? Is het niet de meenichte van particulieren, ended
at niet alleen Nederlanders, maer oock alle natien van der wereldt vrij in der stadt wandelen ende handelen connen
nae haer believen?”
202

fewer men.” Brazil was simply too big for the WIC—or for that matter, even for the King of
Spain—to populate on its own. Better to make the colony open to all classes of people, from any
nation, and to keep the trade free. 106
Maurits letter was dated January 16, 1638. He began by saying that “even those who
want to keep the trade for the company alone know well that to populate the colony is the highest
priority, and that free trade would best achieve this.” 107 The company deceived itself if it
believed it could simply appropriate the trade of the private merchants. Like Sir William Temple
thirty years later, Maurits argued that trade could not simply be conquered or seized: it was
governed by its own laws and had to be carefully nurtured. 108 In the early years of the colony the
price of sugar was low because Portuguese planters feared it would be plundered, and so sold it
cheaply, but now it was in short supply and the prices had risen accordingly. The company
would need deep pockets and the flexibility to sell goods on credit; it was better to leave this to
private merchants, who had more resources and experience. 109 Only free trade would attract
settlers and encourage industry, including among the Portuguese:
The inhabitants [of Brazil]... say that they would rather let their farms go wild, and let their ingenhos
stand idle, than to work for others under the closed trade and thus to be slaves of the company, like
their blacks who work on the sugar mills. 110
106 Ibid., 239. “dat alree boven genough bewesen is, dat daer meer te vinden, meer te copen en meer te vercopen valt,
waer veele menschen woonen, arbeyden, spenderen, als daer waer der menschen weynich is.”
107 Johan Maurits, “Memorie van Prins Maurits van Nassau van 16 Jan. 1638, waarbij deze op Vrijen Handel
aandringt en het Monopolie der West-Indische Compagnie Bestrijdt,” Kronijk van het Historisch Genootschap
gevestigd te Utrecht 11, no. 3:1 (1855): 63. “Ick sie dat die geene, die den handel voor de Compagnie alleen willen
behouden, wel erkennen, dat het populeeren van Brasil ten hoochsten noodich sij, ende sullen oock apparentelijck
toestaen, dat door vrye negotie die populatie betern voortganck soude neemen, maer dat den tegenwoordigen stant
van de Compagnie sulckx niet toe en laat ende daer na niet en kan wachten.”
108 Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces of The Netherlands, 121; Hont, Jealousy of Trade. On the
problems of restoring economic activity in contemporary war zones, see Jeff Peterson and Mark Crow,
“Expeditionary Economics: Towards a Doctrine for Enabling Stabilization and Growth,” 2010. Cited with
permission of the authors.
109 Maurits, “Memorie van Prins Maurits van Nassau van 16 Jan. 1638, waarbij deze op Vrijen Handel aandringt en
het Monopolie der West-Indische Compagnie Bestrijdt,” 65.
110 Ibid., 68. “[…] het sluiten van den handel sal d’inwoonderen, die gereets sijn, verjagen, want sij maecken veele
ende sware clachten, gelijck uyt bijgaende copie aen de xix te sien is, seggende lieuer alle haer planten te laten
203

And Maurits offered another argument for free trade—one tailored to a major concern within the
States General: imposing monopoly would make the Portuguese bitter and eager to fight for their
old freedoms. If they were more disposed to the Dutch, instead of its enemies, the colony would
require fewer soldiers for its defense. Within a general framework of free trade, however,
Maurits recommended that the company reserve for itself certain goods, “which are the most
marketable,” in order also to prosper from the trade. 111
Maurits' letter arrived on March 17 and was read the same day in both the States of
Holland and the States General. Its effect was immediate and powerful—less perhaps for the
arguments it contained than for the fact that Maurits, rather than anyone else, had made them. At
this point discussions within the Heren XIX had been deadlocked for almost a month, despite
having relocated to The Hague, at the States General's insistence, “so that there in the presence of
the government it is possible to unravel [the question of free trade to Brazil] and bring an end to
the dispute.” 112 Not surprisingly, Zeeland, which was scheduled to host the meeting, objected, on
the grounds that meeting in The Hague was inconsistent with the company's charter. But the
States General held firm: since the charter derived its power from them they had the authority to
temporarily suspend its terms. 113
blijuen ende verwilderen, haer ingenios stil laeten staen, als onder den gesloten handel alleen hare arbeyt voor
anderen te doen ende in gelijcker slavernie voor die Compagnie te arbeyden als hare negros voor haer in molens
arbeyden.”
111 Ibid., 69. “dat die Compagnie eenige specie van coopmanschappen, die de courantste sijn, aen haer behouden
ende soo het nodich ware, bij de voor desen aen de Compagnie verbleuene noch eenige andere bijuoegende, soo dat
de cracht van negotie den particulieren niet gans benomen werde, want soo soude men beyde de intensien mogen
erlangen, de Compagnie soude bij de negotie connen prospereeren.”
112 Stellingwerff and Schot, Particuliere Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland, 1620-1640. Entry
for February 19, 1638. “[…] omme aldaer in presentie van de regeringe dezelve questie te desmeleren ende een
eynde van te maecken is ‘t doenlijcken.”
113 Ibid.
204

The meeting began on February 17, 1638. 114 Representing the States General were,
among others, Rutger Huygens, Willem Ripperda, and Wolter Schonenborch. Hendrick Nobel,
who represented Rotterdam in the States General in December of 1636, now appeared as a
delegate for the chamber of the Maas. Huygens, Heer van Klarenbeek, was a magistrate from
Arnhem and for many years Gelderland's representative to the States General. 115 Consistent with
the charter, if not the location, the chair of the meeting was Bouderwyn Schot, the senior
delegate from Zeeland. The senior delegate from Amsterdam was Albert Coenraeds Burgh, who
in 1638 was also one of the city's four burgemeesters. Johannes de Laet and Bernard Julsinck
were also present. After examining the letters of credential and reading the charter, Huygens
opened the meeting by imploring the delegates to resolve the issue of free trade to Brazil once
and for all. Schot immediately protested, saying that this already had been decided; that all that
remained was to determine how to deal with the ships of private traders; and that the Zeeland
delegation was not authorized to discuss the matter any further. Burgh responded by indicating
that the delegates from Amsterdam were prepared to continue with all points on the agenda,
beginning with the first, as was normal. 116
It was not an encouraging start. Indeed, the meeting was adjourned on three separate
occasions before there was any tangible progress. The Amsterdam chamber, now joined by
North Holland, remained firmly in favor of opening the trade to Brazil; the Zeeland chamber and
the Maas, along with Groningen, remained firmly against it. Had Maurits' letter not arrived the
situation might well have stayed this way; instead, his letter broke the impasse. Nicholas
114
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6. Minutes of the meeting of the Heren XIX in The Hague, February 26 - May 1, 1638.
115
Personal communication with Jaap Jacobs, April 10, 2012. Huygens is discussed in Jacobs’ forthcoming
biography of Pieter Stuyvesant.
116
NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6. Minutes of the meeting of the Heren XIX, entry for February 26, 1638.
205

Stellingwerf, who sat in the States of Holland the day the letter was read there, and who kept his
usual meticulous notes, recorded that Maurits
clarified in good conscience, and fulfilling his duty to advise, that if men persisted by the contrary
resolution [to close the trade] there was no question that the Company would be ruined. He was
therefore of the advice that the trade must be opened, except for a few items that should be kept
for the Company. 117
There was no further discussion that day, but six days later, on March 23, Stellingwerf recorded
that Maurits' letter was discussed again and that, “the Gentlemen from Dordrecht, Delft, and
Rotterdam, who had instructions contrary to this advice, asked to have a copy [of the letter] in
order to communicate the same with their principals.” 118 Having only recently dispatched to
Brazil such an eminent figure as Maurits, to ignore his advice on this important question must
have seemed inconsistent with the long-term goal of stabilizing the colony and increasing trade.
On March 26, a committee within the States of Holland reported that they had met with the
Heren XIX, with the result that,
We find that a majority now stands in favor of open and free trade, that only Zeeland is against
and that those from Groningen and the Maas are inclined to hear a proposal for an
accommodation, which also has been [drafted], laying out that the trade would be opened, but that
reserved for the Company would be the trade in Brazilwood, ammunition, and blacks, and also a
few [delegates] urged that linen and some other small items [also be reserved for the
Company]. 119
117 Stellingwerff and Schot, Particuliere Notulen van de Vergaderingen der Staten van Holland, 1620-1640. Entry
for March 17, 1638. “Is geleesen zeecker missive van den 16en januarii geschreeven bij graeff Maurits ende eenige
raeden uyt Brasijl op ‘t subject van den handel ende negotie aldaer te stabiliseren, wat best weesen soude […]
Verclaeren in goeden gemoede te ghaen ende haer advijs te sullen diennen tot haer descharge in cas men bij
contrarie resolutie persisterende de Compagnie daerdeur so sij nyet en twijffelen moght werden geruineert. Zijn
daerom van advijs dat men den handel behoort open to stellen behalven alleen van eenige weynigh spetien die men
aen de Compagnie soude houden.”
118 Ibid. Entry for March 23, 1638. “[…] verclaerden de heeren van Dordrecht, Delfft, Rotterdam voor deesen
contrarie dit advijs gelast geweest te zijn ende daerom alvoren copye daeruyt te moeten hebben om ‘tzelve met haer
principalen te communiceren ende naerder last in te brenghen.”
119 Ibid. Entry for March 26, 1638. “[…] bevinden dattet meerendeel tot openen ende vrijstellen van den handel
verstaen, doch dat Zelant met allen ijver daertegens is ende dat die van Groningen ende van de Mase geneegen sijn
om voorslaegen van accommodatie te hooren, welcke voorslaegen oock gedaen zijn ende daerop loopen dat men den
handel wel soude opstellen, maer dat men aen de Compagnie geslooten souden houden den handel van ‘t
206

Following a brief discussion it was agreed to refer the proposal to the Prince of Orange and to
request that he meet with officials in Zeeland to “make the proposal palatable” to them. 120 At the
same time, and consistent with the charter, the States of Holland determined that the proposal
should be forwarded to the Heren XIX to be resolved by majority vote. Zeeland held out another
day, requesting on March 27 that discussions be postponed until after Easter, but this was
rejected, with delegates in the States of Holland remarking that Zeeland now “wanted only to
delay the process” and was negotiating in bad faith. 121 It took another three weeks for a vote to
be held, with the Prince of Orange lobbying repeatedly for Zeeland to consent. Finally, on April
23, the States General reported that,
Concerning the issue of opening the trade to Brazil, the XIX of the West India Company, coming
together in friendship and by unanimous vote, had agreed to the following articles, for which they
request the approval of the States General; that is, that the company shall keep the trade in blacks,
ammunition, and Brazilwood; that for all other goods the trade shall be open, not for everyone but
for participants [in the company] or those who shall obtain shares against the same sum [as the
value of those shares]; that the same freedom shall be granted to all natives and inhabitants of
Brazil for the same sum as they shall send goods into this land; [and] that directors [of the
company] may not trade directly or indirectly [to Brazil]. 122
Further stipulated were that private goods would need to be registered, with a 10% recognition
fee paid to the company on exports to Brazil and a 20% fee on goods imported to the United
brasilienhout, van ammunitie van oorloge, van de negros ende se eenige oock urgeren van lijnwaeten ende eenige
andere cleynicheeden meer.”
120 Ibid. "[…] doch veele met die van Amsterdam daer toe incilinerende dat me de voorige ghedeputeerden soude
authoriseren om de voorslaegen met Zijn Hoogheyt te communiceren ende is 't doenlijcken met inductie dezelve
partijen smaeckelijk te maecken.”
121 Ibid. Entry for March 27, 1645. “Doch als men ‘t geheele werck insiet dat claerlijcken blijckt dat Zelandt nyet
anders voorheefft dan al d’andere te bedryeghen ende nyet ter goeder trouwen ghaen.”
122 Ibid. Entry for April 23, 1638. “Den heer van Noordwijck rapporteert uytte Generaliteyt dat die van de XIX van
de Westindische Compagnie op ‘t stuck van ‘t oopenstellen van de handel op Brasijl onderlinge met malcanderen in
vrundschap ende met eenparighe stemmen verdraegen ende geaccordeert zijn op zeeckere articulen hiernae
volghende, daervan zij versoecken approbatie van de heeren Staten, te weeten dat alleen aen de Compagnie blijven
zal de handel van de negros, ammunitie van oorloge ende Brasilienhout; dat belanghende alle andere waeren den
handel open werdt gestelt, nyet voor een yeder maer voor de participanten alleen offte die haer actie sullen
verkreegen hebben tegens sulcken somme als zij in deselve sullen participeren offte actie toe verkregen hebben; dat
dezelve vrijheyt sullen hebben alle ingebooren ende inwoonderen van Brasyl voor sulcken somme als zij aen waeren
in deese landen sullen senden; datte bewinthebberen nyet en sullen mogen handelen directelijcken noch
indirectelijcken […]”
207

Provinces, plus smaller fees of 3% on transferring money and 2% for freight. With this “the
delegates [in the States of Holland] were happy that such a difficult and important question had
finally been resolved.” 123 On April 29, 1638 the States General issued a formal resolution re-
opening the trade to Brazil. 124
It is significant that Maurits, rather than Amsterdam, ultimately convinced the Maas to
switch sides, but the terms of the final agreement itself are equally revealing. Remarkable, first
of all, are the lengths to which the States of Holland, the States General, and the Prince of
Orange were willing to go to try to secure a unanimous decision, and to push for a vote within
the Heren XIX, even after they knew that a majority had come around to support free trade. This
was not ultimately successful: Stellingwerf recorded that the proposal had passed by unanimous
vote in the States of Holland, but it does not appear that unanimity was ever reached in the Heren
XIX itself. All the chambers except Zeeland signed the final minutes of the meeting of the Heren
XIX and on May 12 the States General received an angry letter from the States of Zeeland
protesting “that such an important decision, affecting the charter itself, could have been taken
without agreement of all the provinces.” 125
Despite Zeeland's continuing opposition, however, the proposal that was finally adopted
contains a number of important “sweeteners” evidently included in the resolution in an effort to
sway them and their allies. The most obvious of these were the stipulations that directors could
not be involved in private trade and that private merchants could only trade to Brazil if they
owned shares in the company, and only in proportion to the value of those shares. The latter still
meant that the trade was “open,” in the sense that private merchants could trade whatever goods
123 Ibid. “Hierop gedelibereet sijnde, is de leeden aengenaem geweest dat deese moeyelijke questie in so grooten
zaecke met gemoede was affgemaeckt ende is daeromme ‘tzelve accoort bij de leeden eenparich geaccordeert ende
verstaen dat ter Generaliteyt zal worden innegebracht om aldaer meedegeapprobeert ende gearresteert te worden.”
124 Reglement byde West-Indische Compagnie ... over het Open-Stellen vanden Handel op Brasil, 1638.
125 NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for May 6, 1645.
208

they liked (save the three goods explicitly excluded) at anytime and any price they chose;
although these goods would be transported on company ships they neither belonged to the
company nor were subject to its discretion. At the same time, however, by forcing private
merchants to purchase shares, the compromise ensured that these merchants would have a stake
in the company's survival. This would better distribute the risk involved in the company's
activities in Brazil and, crucially, it would force up the value of the company's shares. From a
value of 98 in 1637, shares rose to 117 in 1638 and 134 in 1639, before beginning a long
decline. 126 This was hardly unfettered free trade in the sense used by Adam Smith, but it worked
as the solution to a complex political and economic problem.
But there was another remarkable element of the final agreement: three goods were
identified as reserved for the company. Two of these—Brazilwood, used to make dyes for the
cloth industry, and ammunition, which the company did not want falling into the hands of the
Portuguese—also had been exempted when the trade to Brazil was first opened to private
merchants in 1630. 127 The third “good,” which up to this point had never appeared in any formal
regulation or resolution by the States General, was slaves. Without fail historians always mention
that the slave trade was one of three exemptions, but the tendency has been to treat this as a
continuation of a pre-existing state of affairs. Van Dillen, for example, sums up the agreement by
saying that, “the trade in slaves, dyewoods, and ammunition remained a company monopoly.” 128
In a strict sense this is true, since the slave trade, in which the company had become involved
two years earlier, was never open to private merchants. But in a broader sense, the decision to
126
Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie, 250; Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en
de Politiek,” 159.
127
Articulum ... over het Open ende Vry Stellen van den Handel en Negotie op de Stadt Olinda de Pernambuco, ende
Custen van Brasil.
128
Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek,” 160. “Echter bleef de handel in
slaven, verfhout en ammunitie het monopolie der Compagnie.” The italics are mine.
209

exclude private merchants from the trade in slaves represented a deliberate choice to retain for
the company an important source of revenue to compensate for the income Zeeland, its allies,
and the States General initially hoped would come from monopoly control over the trade to
Brazil. Slavery, in other words, was a bargaining chip that helped to resolve the debate in favor
of free trade. On April 22, the day before the States General announced that a deal had been
struck, a proposal “to trade blacks in Brazil and on the Coast of Africa” was reviewed in the
Heren XIX, “so that once the regulations for free trade have been approved by their High and
Mightiness [the States General] this can be executed.” 129 Once agreement had been reached, the
delegates at the Heren XIX devoted the next several days to planning for the slave trade.
5. Planning for the Slave Trade
Before 1636 the WIC had played almost no part in the Atlantic slave trade. There is evidence
that Dutch skippers participated in Portuguese slaving missions in the 1590s and that they
profited from seizing and then selling the cargo from slaving ships, including a well known case
in which 20 slaves were delivered to Virginia in 1619. 130 This accelerated under the WIC:
between 1623-1636, De Laet calculated that the company captured 2,356 slaves aboard
Portuguese ships and sold them on to America at a hefty profit. Nevertheless, these were the
proceeds of piracy, and the company did not become involved in purchasing slaves on the
129 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6, entry for April 22, 1638. “Is gelesen het project om op Brasil ende de Cust van
Africa negers to handelen soo wanneer het reglement vanden openhandel, by haer ho: mo: soude syn geapprobeert,
ende versocht dat Commissarisen t'selve wilden voltrecken.”
130 Van den Boogaart and Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” 354–355.
210

African coast for the explicit purpose of trade until the mid-1630s, almost two centuries after
Portugal, and 80 years after Sir Richard Hawkins’ journeys in the mid-sixteenth century. 131
Scholars have disputed whether this reflected a moral aversion to the slave trade or was
simply the result of economic considerations. Cornelis Goslinga, for example, pointed to
evidence of popular opposition to slavery. In 1596, when Dutch privateers seized a Portuguese
ship carrying 130 slaves and tried to sell them in Middelburg, the city’s mayor refused the ship
entry on the grounds that Africans “could not be kept by anyone as slaves and sold as such, but
had to be put in their natural freedom without anyone pretending [to have] rights to them as his
property.” 132 Later, in 1623, the question of slavery was referred to a committee in the Heren
XIX that included, among others, Killaen van Rensselaer. This committee advised that, “it
appears this trade ought not to be practiced by Christians.” 133 At almost precisely the same time,
however, the directors of the VOC reached agreement on a code to regulate the treatment of
slaves in Asia and Hugo Grotius published his famous defense of slavery in De Juri Belli et
Pacis. 134 Having assessed the available evidence, Ernst van den Boogaart and Pieter Emmer
conclude that doubts over the morality of the Atlantic slave trade persisted, but that they were
hardly universal and that economic considerations—especially the lack at this time of a viable
market for slaves in the New World—played at least an equal, if not a more important, role. 135
This began to change when the territory under the company's control expanded and
officials in Brazil, Guyana, the Antilles, and the newly captured island of Curaçao began
131 Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery; Harry Kelsey, Sir John Hawkins: Queen Elizabeth’s Slave Trader
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
132 Cited in Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 341. See also Unger, “Essay
on the History of the Dutch Slave Trade,” 48.
133 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 1, entry for July 24, 1623. See also Cited in Van den Boogaart and Emmer, “The Dutch
Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” 356.
134 Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 190, 194.
135 Van den Boogaart and Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” 355–357.
211

clamoring for slaves. 136 The problem was especially acute in Brazil, where many slaves had fled
with their masters at the time of the Dutch conquest and the trade in slaves had come to a
standstill. The conquest and relative pacification of Pernambuco, Paraiba, and Itamaricá led to
increasing demand for slaves to work the sugar mills. As Maurits, who initially considered using
free white labor, would put it in 1638, “it is not possible to effect anything in Brazil without
slaves... and they cannot be dispensed with upon any consideration whatsoever: if anyone feels
that this is wrong, it is a futile scruple.” 137 Back home this message was heard loud and clear.
The agenda for the fall 1635 meeting of the Heren XIX noted, “urgent requests for blacks from
Brazil,” and this message was reinforced by the Zeeland directors Pieter Duvelaer and Pieter van
de Velde when they visited the Amsterdam chamber on October 30. Daniel Liebergen and
Edward Man, who were delegated to prepare Amsterdam's response, presented a “concept for the
trade in blacks” on December 11. 138 A year later hoofdparticipanten in the Zeeland chamber
resolved to “urge the XIX with insistence to get the trade in blacks underway.” 139 While Van den
Boogaart and Emmer cite the dispatch of ships from Zeeland and Amsterdam to Guinea to
purchase slaves in the spring of 1635, W.S. Unger writes that the first ship outfitted “for the
purpose of trading in blacks” departed Veere in the autumn of 1637. 140 That January a Dutch
factor and a Portuguese assistant were sent to Angola to organize the slave trade there and in
August of the same year a Dutch fleet that sailed from Brazil succeeded in capturing São Jorge
da Mina (Elmina), the oldest Portuguese fortress on the Gold Coast and an important potential
source of slaves. By the time that agreement had been reached in The Hague to open the trade to
136
Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 341–342.
137
Cited in Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 83.
138
NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fol. 149; NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 14, entries for October 30 and December 11, 1635.
Cited in Unger, “Essay on the History of the Dutch Slave Trade,” 50–51.
139
Ibid., 51.
140
Van den Boogaart and Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” 358; Unger,
“Essay on the History of the Dutch Slave Trade,” 51.
212

Brazil at least a half dozen company ships had participated in the slave trade, carrying
approximately 1,100 slaves to Dutch Brazil. 141
This represented a remarkable—and remarkably rapid—entry into a completely new
trade, with its own dynamics, infrastructure, and technologies. 142 The company's directors were
well aware of the profits that Portuguese merchants made in the slave trade and the company had
at least limited experience transporting and selling slaves captured aboard Portuguese ships. The
company also had considerable experience trading in West Africa: since the early 1590s,
merchants from Holland and Zeeland had established a dominant place in the coastal trade,
steadily eroding the Portuguese monopoly by offering higher quality cloth and manufactured
goods at lower prices. 143 In 1611 the States General had assisted a consortium of merchants
trading on the Gold Coast by building a small fort at Mouree, a few miles east of Elmina. The
company assumed responsibility for this fort in 1623 and two years later tried to seize Elmina
itself, but the Portuguese, who were in a better position to exploit alliances with local authorities,
organized an ambush that killed 441 Dutch soldiers even before they were able to reach the
fort. 144 In 1635, Pompeius de la Sale, Director General at Mouree, sent a report to the Heren XIX
arguing that the Portuguese position had become weaker and encouraging a fresh attack. 145
Maurits organized the expedition from Brazil in June 1637, sending a fleet of 16 ships and 1,200
men, among whom were counted an unknown number of Brazilian Indians. News of the
141
This figure was compiled from records for Dutch-registered ships listed in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
Database: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/index.faces. Accessed December 5, 2011.
142
Marcus Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human History (New York: Viking, 2007); Blackburn, The Making of New
World Slavery.
143
For a contemporary account, see Pieter de Marees, Description and Historical Account of the Gold Kingdom of
Guinea (1602), ed. Albert van Dantzig and Adam Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); De Jonge, De
Oorsprong van Neerland’s Bezittingen op de Kust van Guinea; John Vogt, Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast,
1469-1682 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979); Den Heijer, Goud, Ivoor en Slaven.
144
Jan Dircksz Lam, Expeditie naar de Goudkust: het journaal van Jan Dircksz Lam over de Nederlandse aanval op
Elmina, 1624-1626, ed. Henk den Heijer (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2006).
145
Klaas Ratelband, ed., Vijf Dagregisters van het Kasteel São Jorge da Mina aan de Goudkust, Linschoten
Vereeniging (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953), LXVIII.
213

expedition's success, along with detailed maps of the fort, reached the United Provinces that fall.
The Dutch now possessed the oldest and most important strategic position in all of West
Africa. 146
The remainder of the meeting of the Heren XIX in the spring of 1638 was devoted to
consolidating this new position and preparing the company to aggressively enter the trade in
slaves. The directors began with basic organizational matters: it was agreed, for example, that the
trade should be shared proportionally among the chambers, following the standard formula of
ninths, with ships outfitted for 18 months and provisioned to each carry between 350 and 400
slaves. 147 Every ship also was to carry a smaller vessel to travel up river in search of new traders.
Next the directors reviewed a “formula for the cargo appropriate for the slave trade at Ardra and
Rio Calabria,” referring to what are now Benin and eastern Nigeria, then known as the Slave
Coast. 148 African consumers' tastes were notoriously fickle, especially for cloth, and the
company
needed to determine what goods were in fashion. 149 No similar lists were discussed for the Gold
Coast, where the company had more experience. Ships were to stop first at Elmina, where the
Director General had already taken up residence, and from there to proceed eastwards to trade
for slaves. 150 Following this discussion, the directors conducted a thorough review of all the
146 On Elmina, see J. Bato’ora Ballong-Wen-Mewuda, São Jorge da Mina, 1482-1637, 2 vols. (Paris: Commission
Nationale pour les Commemorations des Decouvertes Portugaises, 1993); Christopher R. DeCorse, An Archaeology
of Elmina: Africans and Europeans on the Gold Coast, 1400-1900 (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press,
2001).
147 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6, entry for April 23, 1638. Formulier van een Cargasoen dienstich tot de Slaeffsche
Negotie voor Ardra ende in Rio Calbario naer gissinge voor ontrent een Jaer.
148 A similar list can be found in Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 349; See
also Adam Jones, ed., West Africa in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: An Anonymous Dutch Manuscript (Atlanta:
African Studies Association Press, 1994).
149 Jones, West Africa in the Mid-Seventeenth Century.
150 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.6, entry for April 23, 1638.
214

Illustration 12. The Attack on Elmina in October 1625. Drawing by Hans Propheet, 1629. Nationaal
Archief, Den Haag, (4 VEL), 771. Built by the Portuguese in 1482, Elmina was
the most important fortress on the Gold Coast. The attack in 1625 failed, but the Dutch eventually
seized Elmina in August of 1637.
215

trading locations on the Gold Coast, making plans to counter English trade at Cormantyn, build a
new lodge at Accra, and oust the Portuguese from their remaining forts at Axim and Shama. 151
But the company's new foothold on the Gold Coast soon proved unsatisfactory as a
source of slaves. Exports to Brazil from 1637-1640 averaged only 1,500 slaves per year, only a
third the number the Portuguese had brought to Pernambuco before the Dutch conquest. In the
months before the Peace Treaty with Portugal took effect, Maurits therefore recommended that
the Heren XIX authorize him to organize a mission to expel the Portuguese from São Paulo do
Loanda, which controlled access to greater numbers of slaves and was geographically closer to
Pernambuco. In June 1641 a fleet led by Cornelis “Peg Leg” Jol seized not only São Paulo do
Loanda, but also the island of São Tomé and the Portuguese fort at Axim. 152 Plans were drawn
up by Pieter Mortamer, the first Dutch Director General in Loanda, for the construction of
“transit barracks” and for making Dutch ships more suitable for the trade. The strategy worked:
in 1642 the company brought 2,312 slaves to Brazil, followed by 3,948 in 1643 and 5,565 in
1644. 153 By 1645 the WIC had bought and sold more than 30,000 slaves. 154
The profits from the slave trade quickly attracted the attention of private merchants. As
early as October 1639, directors in the Zeeland chamber recorded that, “it is being contemplated
to partially open up the slave trade.” 155 In 1643 two directors in the Amsterdam chamber—
Johannes de Laet and Abraham Willmerdonck—made a formal proposal to lift the company's
monopoly and permit private merchants to trade to Africa. 156 This proposal was rejected by the
Hoofdparticipanten in the Zeeland chamber, who argued that, “the Company is better suited to
151
Ibid. See also Van Albert van Dantzig, Forts and Castles of Ghana (Accra: Sedco Limited, 1980).
152
Klaas Ratelband, De expeditie van Jol naar Angola en São Thomé, 30 Mei 1641-31 Oct. 1641 (’s-Gravenhage:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1943).
153
De Mello, O Brasil Holandês, 1630-1654, 487.
154
Den Heijer, Goud, Ivoor en Slaven, 21.
155
Quoted in Unger, “Essay on the History of the Dutch Slave Trade,” 53.
156
NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 35, fol. 33-34. Entry for February 24, 1643.
216

handle [the trade] than private merchants.” An anonymous pamphlet on the question of free trade
to “the Coast of Africa, namely St. Thome, Guinea, Angola, St. Paulo de Loanda,” addressed to
“all the company's chief investors,” appeared shortly thereafter. 157 The pamphlet argued that
opening the trade to Brazil had been a disaster for the company's finances, but that now some
within the company were eager to do the same in Africa. The folly of this plan was
clear enough from the common observation that competition from the English was already
driving down profits in the Africa trade; the same would be true if the trade was opened. But,
more important, the company's monopoly over the slave trade ensured that slaves went to Brazil,
rather than to Spanish America, where the “King of Spain [now receives] no slaves to work in
his Gold and Silver mines.” 158 Free traders could not be trusted in this way. There were problems
with the company's management, the pamphlet's author concluded, but to open the trade was “a
cure worse than the disease.” 159
Perhaps not coincidentally, the arguments in favor of free trade with Africa coincided
with the emergence of Curaçao as a new destination for slaves to be traded onwards to Spanish
America and colonies in the Caribbean. This was first proposed by the island's Director General,
Johannes van Walbeek, in 1639 and gained steam under his successors in the early 1640s,
including Pieter Stuyvesant, who served from 1642-1644. 160 When he returned to the United
Provinces, Stuyvesant presented the Heren XIX with plans for Curaçao to be administered
157 V. W. C., Trou-hertighe onderrichtinge, aen alle hooft participanten, en lief-hebbers vande geoctroyeerde West-
Indische Compagnie. Nopende het open stellen vanden handel op de cust van Africa, namentlijck, St. Thomé,
Guinea, Angola, St. Paulo de Loando, mitsgaders de Marignian, Nieu Nederlant ende West-Indien. (Amsterdam,
1643).
158 In 1640, Maurits argued that stopping the flow of slaves from Loanda would strike a key blow against Spain for
exactly this reason. Koninklijk Huisarchief A4, inv.nr. 1454, fol. 196. “Le Roy de Castille ne tyrant de Negros
d’Angola, la ruine des indes est inevitable.”
159 V. W. C., Trou-hertighe onderrichtinge, aen alle hooft participanten, en lief-hebbers vande geoctroyeerde West-
Indische Compagnie. Nopende het open stellen vanden handel op de cust van Africa, namentlijck, St. Thomé,
Guinea, Angola, St. Paulo de Loando, mitsgaders de Marignian, Nieu Nederlant ende West-Indien., B3.
160 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680.
217

directly from New Netherland, and shortly thereafter he was appointed Director General for both
colonies, a position he would keep until surrendering to English forces in 1664. 161 Since New
Netherland had for several years already been controlled by the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC,
this arrangement would place Curaçao under Amsterdam’s control as well. It must have been
easy enough for Amsterdam merchants to see what profits might be gained from a free and open
trade not only to Brazil, but to new markets in the Caribbean and Spanish America as well.
6. Conclusion
In many ways the debate over free trade to Angola mirrored the earlier debate over free trade to
Brazil. In both cases merchants in Amsterdam were the prime instigators for lifting the
company’s monopoly, while merchants and city officials in Zeeland were their most ardent and
vocal opponents. In both cases the free traders argued for the advantages of commercial liberty
and portrayed themselves as possessing greater competence in matters of trade: in the context of
Brazil this meant the ability to carry more sugar; in Angola more slaves. Defenders of the
company’s monopoly, meanwhile, argued that the company should be able to enjoy some of the
profits that flowed from its military and administrative undertakings and associated risks, and
that the company’s ability to control prices and maintain order were crucial to the proper
management of the colonies.
But these similarities hide an important underlying shift. This chapter has argued that
the States General’s decision to re-impose the company's monopoly on trade to Brazil in
December 1636 was stimulated by investors’ refusal to commit additional private capital to the
WIC without assurance that the company would have access to steady income from Brazil, and
161 Jacobs, Petrus Stuyvesant, 45–48.
218

from the States General’s aversion to assuming public responsibility for the costs of the war.
Their decision also was informed by reports of disorder in the colony and concerns that private
trade, despite the rhetoric, was not in fact attracting settlers. Although the company's chambers in
Zeeland, the Maas, and Groningen, along with representatives of the States General itself, all
lined up behind this position, Maurits' well-timed letter forced them to reconsider. The
agreement reached within the States of Holland in March and April 1638 that opened the trade to
Brazil was based on a compromise to address Zeeland and its allies’ concerns by forcing private
merchants to own or purchase shares, and by formally ensuring that the company would have a
steady stream of income from a monopoly over the trade in slaves. Maurits’ letter was the
catalyst, but this compromise was the essence of the decision. In this sense the near perfect
overlap in timing between the debate over free trade and the company's decision to enter the
trade in slaves was more than coincidental.
Both decisions were answers to the larger question of how to build a prosperous colony;
a question that hinged on increasing the population, and the new problem—shared by the English
colony on Providence Island—of spreading risk and profit while absorbing the costs of military
defense. 162 It is extremely difficult to identify precisely who held which views, and it is
important not to jump too quickly to assumptions about the coherence and stability of the various
sides in these debates. Nevertheless, it is clear that slavery played a more prominent role in the
vision for the colony elaborated by Zeeland and individuals like Van der Capellen at the States
General than it did for the free traders, both as a source of income to sustain the company and as
a means to populate Dutch Brazil. Van der Capellen imagined an expanding colony populated by
soldiers and slaves that was governed by a strong central authority: the company's monopoly
162 Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630-1641; Frederic C. Lane, “Oceanic Expansion: Force and Enterprise in the
Creation of Oceanic Commerce,” The Journal of Economic History 10, Supplement: The Tasks of Economic
History (1950): 19–31.
219

over trade was simply the projection of greater central authority over colonial affairs in the
United Provinces itself. The free traders offered no critique of slavery, and many, including De
Laet, evidently supported the company's participation in the slave trade. But the whole thrust of
their campaign was predicated on the idea of attracting free settlers, and the conviction that these
settlers—rather than soldiers or slaves—would form the productive bedrock of a colony in which
central authority was relatively weak, both in the colony and at home.
After 1638, when the States General re-opened the trade to Brazil, the free traders
shifted their attention to Africa. While their initial arguments addressed the need to deliver more
slaves to Brazil than the company had been able to do, and thus formed part of a potential answer
to the general question of how to build the colony, they came to focus with increasing
transparency on profit itself; it was not for nothing that De Laet wrote of the “lucrative trade in
blacks” in his Iaerlyck Verhael, published in November 1644. 163 This focus took concrete form
when the revolt in Pernambuco in 1645 halted the slave trade to Brazil, and merchants looked to
São Tomé and Curaçao for access to new markets. The company’s entry into the slave trade, in
other words, was stimulated by an imperial vision for Dutch Brazil, backed by the States
General. But with no market to meet the supply, Dutch participation in the trade largely became
detached from imperial considerations and oriented towards market demand.
The difference between the earlier and later debates can be seen in the respective
positions taken by Johan Maurits. In 1638 he supported both free trade and the slave trade, as
twin elements for stabilizing Dutch Brazil and the sugar industry. In fact, the two were intimately
connected, since only free colonists with access to capital would be able to purchase the slaves
163 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie; Unger, “Essay on
the History of the Dutch Slave Trade,” 53.
220

needed to sustain the colony’s economy. 164 But Maurits opposed opening the trade to Angola, on
the grounds that only the company could be trusted to ensure a steady supply of slaves. 165 His
position may well have been influenced by his strong desire to personally assume control over
the administration of Loanda. In a 1641 proposal, he argued that “the trade in blacks, which is
the foremost and the only trade of Angola, can be no better regulated than by us in Brazil, to
which the slaves are brought [and where they are] sold and consumed.” 166 Maurits suggested
many other advantages of this proposal, including the fact that Brazil was closer and company
servants were already acclimatized and could speak Portuguese. To do otherwise, he concluded,
was “to put two heads on one body.” Despite these arguments, the Heren XIX decided to separate
the company's administration in Africa into two parts—northern (based at Elmina) and southern
(based in Loanda)—and to control both directly from the United Provinces. 167 In this case the
political incentives in the center and the periphery did not align: Maurits wanted to assume
control over the slave trade, as a means to enhance and expand his authority in Brazil, while the
Heren XIX wanted to ensure Angola's dependence on themselves and the income promised by
the slave trade. For Maurits political factors counseled free trade in one case, monopoly in the
other.
The arguments of the free traders failed and the trade in slaves from Angola remained a
company monopoly, only growing in importance over time. Indeed, the slave trade was probably
164 Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 197.
165 V. W. C., Trou-hertighe onderrichtinge, aen alle hooft participanten, en lief-hebbers vande geoctroyeerde West-
Indische Compagnie. Nopende het open stellen vanden handel op de cust van Africa, namentlijck, St. Thomé,
Guinea, Angola, St. Paulo de Loando, mitsgaders de Marignian, Nieu Nederlant ende West-Indien., C.
166 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5756. Redenen; ende correctie, waeromme de Negotie der Swaerten, De Stadt St. Paulo de
Loanda, ende Regieringe van den Coninkrycke van Angola behoort te dependeren van den Gouverneur en Hoge
Raeden in Brasil, ofte met de regieringe Aldaer werden gecombineert. Signed by Maurice Conte de Nassau and
received by the States General on January 19, 1642. “Eerstelyck, om dat de Negotie der Swarten, welck de
voornaemste jae de eenichste handelinge van Angola is, door niemant bequamer als door de selve can werden
gereguleert ane dien die nergens als in Brasil overgebracht, vercocht en geconsumeert werden.”
167 Van den Boogaart and Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” 358.
221

the area in which the company was best able to make the transition from piracy and conquest to
trade. It may be interesting in this context to revisit Arthur Weststeijn’s argument and in
particular a quotation he takes from the abbé Raynal, who wrote that the Dutch had to
part with a conquest [northeastern Brazil] that might have become the richest of all the European
colonies, and would have given the republic a degree of importance it could never acquire from
its own territory. But, in order to keep it, the government ought to have undertaken the
administration and defense of it; and to make it prosper, it should have enjoyed full liberty. With
these precautions, Brazil would have been preserved, and would have enriched the nation, instead
of ruining the company. Unfortunately, it was not yet known that the only way to make lands
useful in America was to clear them, and that this could not be done with success, unless a free
trade were opened to all the inhabitants under the protection of government. 168
Weststeijn uses this quotation to establish Raynal’s debt to Pieter de la Court and his belief that
Dutch Brazil failed because it had never enjoyed “full liberty.” But emphasis might be put on
another portion of the quotation, in which Raynal argued that the Dutch state should have taken
full responsibility for the colony’s defense and administration. The debate over free trade was in
part about commercial liberty, but it was also about how to fund colonial expansion precisely in
the absence of direct public support. With the onset of the Portuguese revolt over the summer of
1645 and the company’s finances in disarray, this became the dominant question in discussions
between the WIC and the States General: would the States General commit money and men to
save Dutch Brazil?
168 Cited in Weststeijn, “Dutch Brazil and the Making of Free Trade Ideology,” 1.
222

Chapter Six
Imaginary Economies: Lobbying and the Rhetoric of Numbers
1. Introduction
The fall meeting of the Heren XIX came to a close on October 16, 1645. After agreeing to an
extraordinary payment to the scribe and signing the official minutes, the delegates returned to
their homes and prepared to debrief their respective chambers. 1 A great deal had been
accomplished over the preceding five weeks: the board had dispatched initial relief to Brazil and
set into motion negotiations within the States General and provincial assemblies to support a
more robust military response to the revolt. They had selected Wolter Schonenborch to serve as
President of the High Council in Recife, a decision that (it was hoped) would bring greater
authority and coherence to the colony's management. And they had resolved to keep the slave
trade a company monopoly and approved Pieter Stuyvesant’s plans to jointly administer New
Netherland and Curaçao. 2 But their work was hardly done. Schonenborch and his colleagues
were still in the Netherlands and discussions within the States General over money and men for
Brazil were stalled. 3 Equally troubling, the WIC’s charter, which had expired earlier in the year,
1 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, fol. 53. The representatives of the States General—Johan van der Camer, Jacob
Veth, and Wolter Schonenborch—reported back to the committee on the WIC in the States General on October 28.
NA.1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for October 28, 1645.
2 See Jacobs, Petrus Stuyvesant, 43–48.
3 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758; NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 2*. Notulen van de Beoignes in den Hage van Prima December
1645 tot 4 May 1646; Haecxs, “Het Dagboek van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid van den Hoogen Raad van Brazilië (1645-
1654).”
223

had not yet been renewed. 4 As the delegates departed Middelburg the company faced very real
existential threats both abroad and at home. These threats could only be addressed by the States
General, in what would amount to a substantial public bail out.
The situation only worsened over the following weeks. On October 25, the company
submitted separate memoranda to the States General and the States of Holland, indicating
frustration that consensus had not yet been reached on the subsidy of 700,000 guilders the
company had requested in mid-September. 5 Although the Amsterdam chamber had already
rented and begun to outfit four ships to send to Brazil, it was unable to meet even the basic
expenses to cover sailors’ wages. The directors accused the States of Holland of abandoning
them and “hazard[ing] us to the enemy, despite the courage with which you and the other
provinces helped to build the company, at such expense in money and blood.” 6 Even this
produced no firm commitment, though, and when several directors appeared in person in the
States of Holland a month later, on November 25, the news they bore was even more grim.
Johannes de Laet, who addressed the assembly, reported that Fort St. Augustyn had been lost and
Dutch settlers had been forced to abandon their lands in the interior of Pernambuco for the safety
of the coast. 7 The company could hold on to the colony for perhaps a few more months, but not
longer. Without immediate assistance to Brazil, De Laet warned, the Dutch Republic stood to
lose more than 30 million guilders—a staggering figure that must have included not only the
company’s investment, but also the investments of private traders, Amsterdam sugar refiners,
and others involved in financing and supplying the colony. 8
4 Den Heijer, “Plannen voor Samenvoeging van VOC en WIC.”
5 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5758. Remonstrantie from the Delegated Directors of the West India Company to the States
General, exhibited in the States General on October 25, 1645.
6 Ibid. “
7 Staten van Holland and Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties, entry for November 25, 1645.
8 Ibid. I have not been able to corroborate this figure in any other source. De Laet had every reason to inflate
potential losses, but he also was known and respected for the accuracy of his claims. Whether he believed this figure
224

For the remainder of 1645, De Laet and his fellow director in the Amsterdam chamber,
Jacques Specx, would be deeply involved in the company’s lobbying campaign for money to
crush the revolt and save the colony, a campaign that would ultimately spill into and beyond the
peace talks at Münster and the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the 80 Years’ War. 9 Although the
acuteness of the situation focused minds in The Hague that winter, the outlines of the company’s
message were largely unchanged from the preceding year. Although it possessed a potentially
lucrative empire in Africa and the New World, the company was out of money and could raise
no more additional private capital. The survival of Dutch Brazil, the company itself, would
require substantial financial support. The case for this support was built on unstable ground: the
company needed to prove its worth, despite its empty coffers, and it needed to convince
magistrates, the merchant community, and a public exhausted by war that an organization
devoted during most of its history to piracy and conquest could profitably secure and administer
its new possessions, to the benefit of the Republic, in a time of peace. Advancing these
arguments required more than lofty rhetoric; it required concrete evidence of the company’s
value to the state.
But how could this be measured? What was the New World really worth—or, more
prosaically, what was it worth to the Dutch Republic, and by what metric could the question even
be assessed? This chapter looks at two very different efforts to answer these difficult questions,
both from the period just before the outbreak of the revolt. It argues that the decision to send
relief to Brazil in the spring of 1646 was based on a determination that the colony was valuable
was accurate or merely credible, the fact that he presented in the States of Holland and that it was included in the
formal minutes suggests that it should be taken seriously. The problem of determining the value of the Republic's
investment in Brazil is the topic of this chapter. On the Amsterdam sugar industry, see Arjan Poelwijk, “In Dienste
vant Suyckerbacken”: De Amsterdamse Suikernijverheid en haar Ondernemers, 1580-1630 (Hilversum: Verloren,
2003).
9 Kluiver, De Souvereine en Independente Staat Zeeland.
225

to the Dutch state, and that this determination was inspired by the company’s work to
convincingly articulate that value. The first effort, an internal memorandum drafted by Specx in
the summer of 1645, carried the simple title, “State of the Income and Expenses of the Chartered
West India Company.” 10 In ten folio pages of calculations, Specx defined value in the familiar
language of pure monetary gain: by estimating the company's sources of income and expenditure
in each of its five most important conquests, he arrived at a single, positive sum for the
company's projected annual profits. Doing so required him to distill revenues from dozens of
trades that had rarely if ever been considered as part of a single economic system, many of
which—as the term “conquest” implies—had only quite recently fallen into Dutch hands. The
second effort was by De Laet. Published in November 1644, his Iaerlyck Verhael (History of the
Chartered West India Company) chronicled the company's first thirteen years and, as a coda,
provided detailed calculations demonstrating the total monetary value of the damage the
company had inflicted on Iberian America. 11 Using history, rather than accountancy, De Laet
offered the company’s accumulated achievements as a proxy for the economic and political
value of continued investment in the New World.
Although their approaches—and their conclusions—were quite different, Specx and De
Laet both assembled and analyzed vast amounts of company statistics. In the absence of all but a
few financial records, their work is nearly all that remains for contemporary scholars interested
10 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, Collectie Sweers, fols 115-120. Staat van het Incomen, ende de Lasten van de
Geoctoyeerde Westindsiche Comp. soo als deselve in haer Hant heeft, ’t een en ’t andere, na haer Believen te
Stellen, 1645.
11 Johannes de Laet, Historie Ofte Iaerlijck Verhael van de Verrichtinghen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische
Compagnie, zedert haer Begin, tot het Eynde van ’t Jaer Sesthien-hondert ses-en-dertich; Begrepen in Derthien
Boecken, ende met verscheyden Koperen Platen Verciert (Leyden: Bonaventura ende Abraham Elsevier, 1644); The
modern Dutch edition is De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische
Compagnie; A Portuguese edition was published in Brazil between 1916 and 1925. Johannes de Laet, Historia ou
Annaes dos Feitos da Companhia Privilegiada das Indias Occidentaes desde o seu Começo até ao fim do Anno de
1636, trans. José Hygino Duarte Pereira and Pedro Souto Maior (Rio de Janeiro: Officinas Graphicas da Bibliotheca
Nacional, 1925).
226

in the company’s financial history. 12 But their texts can also tell us a great deal about how
lobbying was conducted and the way in which mathematics came to inhabit a central place in
mercantile rhetoric of the Dutch Republic.
Numeracy in early modern political and economic debates is often associated with the
work of the Englishman William Petty, who coined the term “political arithmetic” in the early
1670s, but recent scholarship has traced a longer evolution. Paul Slack places the growing use of
numbers within the context of a more general development of the use of statistics in the
formulation of government policy. 13 Drawing on both medieval practices of information
gathering and Bacon's emphasis on “number, weight, and measure,” he argues that European
states increasingly consulted quantitative sources to facilitate centralization and empire building.
By 1660, even if conventional political considerations sometimes trumped the logic of
quantitative analysis, calculation had become a “fashion” in political rhetoric. 14 The trend
reached its mature form in Petty's work on Ireland and in British debates about population, trade,
and finance in the early eighteenth century. 15
Looking more closely at language, Mary Poovey has argued that this period represented a
critical moment in the development of a new kind of mercantile rhetoric in which the language of
accounting emerged as a powerful tool with which to enhance the credibility of arguments in
favor of specific policies and political priorities. 16 Her book traces the diffusion of double-entry
12 The most important of these are the subscription book for the Amsterdam chamber from 1623-26, NA 1.05.01.01,
inv.nr. 18*; a list of investors and their capital from February 10, 1656, NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 18*; and subscription
books for the verhoging in Middelburg, Vlissingen, and Veere in 1636-37 discussed in the previous chapter, NA.
1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 77-79. Assorted bills of lading, calculations of subsidy payments, and other isolated records can
be found throughout the company's archive. To my knowledge no record books of income or expenses survived the
fire and sale to rag merchants in the nineteenth century.
13 Slack, “Government and Information in Seventeenth-Century England.”
14 Ibid., 65.
15 McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic.
16 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
227

ookkeeping from late-fifteenth century Italy to early-seventeenth century England, and, with it,
“Reason of State” arguments developed by writers such as Jean Bodin and Giovanni Botero.
Drawing on these traditions, Poovey shows how the English merchant Thomas Mun rejected the
formal rules of classical rhetoric in favor of a direct style that employed simple, hypothetical
calculations to show that trade should be actively promoted by the state. Following Mun, the
inclusion of quantities and formal calculations made writing appear to be transparent, rather than
performative, and conferred a new kind of legitimacy, independent of the author's social status.
In this way facts, and especially facts about trade and industry, became the new currency of
persuasion.
While Slack, Poovey, and many others have focused largely on England, contemporaries
were well aware that the relationship between commerce and politics was more intimately
intertwined in the Dutch Republic than anywhere else in Europe. 17 Jacob Soll has argued that
Amsterdam was acknowledged as Europe's “center of good bookkeeping,” and that it was in this
and other Dutch trading cities that the ruling elite's familiarity with “the minutiae of finance,
industry, and trade” played a decisive role in “changing the language of political economy.” 18
Since merchants made up the core of the Dutch state, Soll suggests, “the ars mercatoria was a
rich part of everyday urban life and an essential element of state government.” The distinctive
character of the Republic fascinated subjects of Europe's territorial monarchies and encouraged
17 Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces of The Netherlands; Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology
in Seventeenth-Century England; Charles Wilson, England’s apprenticeship 1603-1763, 2nd ed. (London:
Longmans, 1984); Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in
European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Hont, Jealousy of Trade; Jardine, Going Dutch;
Thomson, “The Dutch Miracle, Modified. Hugo Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Commercial Governance and Imperial
War in the Early-Seventeenth Century.”
18 Soll, “Accounting for Government: Holland and the Rise of Political Economy in Seventeenth-Century Europe.”
The quotations are taken from pages pp. 229, 223, and 217, respectively.
228

princes, if not to learn the vulgar practice of accountancy, then at least to surround themselves
with experts who had. 19
Despite this vanguard role, almost nothing has been written about the ways that
quantitative analysis shaped specific debates over policy in the Dutch Republic in the
seventeenth century. 20 Building on the preceding narrative and analysis, this chapter examines
the WIC's efforts to lobby the States General, the States of Holland, and the Prince of Orange
during the critical period 1644-1645. It asks how arguments concerning colonial politics were
communicated to a largely mercantile elite, taking De Laet and Specx’s texts as a comparative
case study. It looks at how their calculations were organized, what assumptions they made, and
how each author aimed to frame and defend the WIC's imperial project for specific groups of
decision-makers. The first section of the paper explores Specx's calculations and the manner in
which he clothed a number of dubious assumptions about the value of the company’s trade
within the simple and elegant format of double-entry bookkeeping. The second traces the origins
of De Laet’s unusual history and places it within the context of the debate over renewal of the
company's charter. By parsing De Laet’s calculations, it demonstrates the growing salience of
numeracy in company politics after the late-1630s and suggests ways in which arguments based
on the logic of “reason of state” could gain support from, and in turn empower, a quantitatively
precise—if still rudimentary—method of calculating national wealth.
Crucial to both texts was an element of imagination. Throughout, the chapter interprets
the figures themselves as a means of articulating and even fueling imperial fantasies and
19 Ibid., 216.
20 For a recent history of financial management, see Smidt, Van Tresorier tot Thesaurier-Generaal; On debates in
political economy generally, see Gelderblom, The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic.
229

ambitions. 21 Although neither Specx nor De Laet could have known this, the early 1640s marked
the high-water point of Dutch territorial expansion in the Atlantic Basin and the apex of colonial
enthusiasm, especially around the trades in Brazilian sugar and African slaves. The chapter
argues that their detailed calculations of value involved fantasy, as well as facts, and that the
tension between these two elements was a crucial part of the company's lobbying campaign in
the winter of 1645. In finally deciding to send a relief fleet to Brazil, the States of Holland and
the States General reasoned that the colony’s value outweighed both the risks and the costs of
military action.
2. Calculating the Value of the New World
Jacques Specx was not present at the meeting of the Heren XIX in Middelburg, but by this time
he had become an influential voice in the Amsterdam chamber and in the company's negotiations
with the States of Holland. In March 1644 he represented the WIC in the latter body, arguing its
case in favor of a merger with the VOC, and in mid-September of 1645 he was one of the
Amsterdam directors who carried the company's request to the States of Holland for 700,000
guilders to send additional soldiers to Brazil. 22 During discussions in early October, Specx was
asked by the States of Holland to review the company’s books and provide a complete, up-to-
date record of all the subsidies the company had received from each of the provinces, as a pre-
condition for further support. 23 And at the Haags Besogne in early December he was responsible
21
Schmidt, Innocence Abroad; Nicolás Wey Gómez, The Tropics of Empire: Why Columbus Sailed South to the
Indies (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
22
Den Heijer, “Plannen voor Samenvoeging van VOC en WIC.” For a biographical sketch see Chapter Four.
23
Staten van Holland en Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties, entry for October 7, 1645.
230

for generating a budget for the relief expedition. 24 By this time majorities within the States
General and the States of Holland approved granting a subsidy, but Amsterdam continued to
stall, first insisting on assurances that the money would only be used to relieve Brazil, and then,
when these assurances were provided, asking for more time to consider the question. 25 The
subsidy had also become inter-twined with the ongoing debate over whether, and on what terms,
to renew both the WIC and the VOC charters, with several provinces arguing that the money to
fund relief for Brazil should be paid by the VOC in return for renewing its charter. 26 In the States
General planning went ahead without Amsterdam's formal consent and Specx, together with
Alewyn van Halewyn, a director from the chamber of the Maas, was responsible for producing
“an estimate and calculation of the cost of the foresaid assistance [to Brazil].” 27
As we saw in Chapter Four, earlier in 1645 Specx had been offered the honor of serving
as President of the High Council in Recife, the company’s most prestigious administrative
position in the Western Hemisphere. When he declined, Specx had proposed instead that he draft
“a review of the company's conquests” to assist the company in organizing its finances and in
planning. 28 Evidently the company accepted this offer, for amongst his private papers in The
Hague can be found a lengthy analysis, composed at precisely this time, of the income and
24 NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 2*, entry for December 2, 1645. The Haags Besogne was a series of consultative meeting
held annually at The Hague to resolve issues with a direct bearing on the state, including public financing, military
commissions, and military planning. The term itself is borrowed from the VOC, which held consultations with the
States General each spring to review the correspondence recently arrived from Asia. Since WIC fleets were not
subject to the same seasonal pattern, the company's contacts in The Hague tended to be more ad hoc, but the severity
of the problems at the end of 1645 meant that meetings were held daily from the beginning of December until just
before Christmas. See Den Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie, 129.
25 Staten van Holland en Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties, entries for October 13, November 29, December 2,
December 5, December 6, 1645
26 NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entry for December 1, 1645; Staten van Holland en Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties,
entries for November 29 and November 30, 1645.
27 NA 1.05.01.01 inv 2*, entries for December 2, December 4, December 5, December 6, and December 7, 1645.
“[…] een overslach ende calculatie te maeken vant gene de voors. versorginge sal comen te monteren.” Their report
called for 36 companies, or 5,400 men in total—significantly more than the 20 ships carrying 2,000 soldiers that
ultimately set sail during the cold spring of 1646. See Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 177.
28 NA 1.01.07 inv.nr. 12564.17, extracts dated April 26 and May 2, 1645.
231

expenses at each of the company's colonies, along with an estimate of its expenses at home.
Though not the only document of its kind, it is by far the most comprehensive. 29 As such it
provides a rare glimpse of the world the company was trying, with considerable success, to
create, and of the assumptions that underlay claims for its future profitability.
Little is known of Specx's early life, but the trajectory of his career makes plain that he
would have received training in mathematics and accounting as a young man. In 1607, at the age
of nineteen, Specx sailed with the VOC to the East Indies as Onderkoopman (Junior Merchant),
a role in which he would have been responsible for keeping detailed records of trade. 30 He soon
rose to the position of Opperhoofd (Chief Factor) at the trading colony in Japan and, in 1622,
was selected to serve as Raad Extra-ordinair (Extraordinary Councilor) on the Council of the
Indies in Batavia. During a brief return trip to the Netherlands, Specx was promoted by the
Heren XVII to the position of Eerste Raad (First Counselor). At this point his career took a most
fortunate turn: when his ship arrived in Batavia he learned that Jan Pieterz. Coen (1587-1629),
the famed Governor General of all the VOC's affairs in Asia, had passed away the previous day.
Specx was named as his temporary replacement and remained in the post for three years. 31 This
important position opened doors into the Dutch elite and at Court: like so many regents in the
Republic itself, his ascent traced a path from direct involvement in trade and accounting to
29 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8. Specx's private papers include a dozen other sets of calculations, mostly dedicated to Brazil
and to the slave trade with Angola. A model for his work, if he was not its author, was the Calculatie van de
Incomptsten ende Lasten van Brasil, ende Incompsten nu ter tydt Instato, fols. 120-122. Boxer printed another
version of this document with the title, a “Tentative Balance-Sheet of Netherlands Brazil and West Africa in 1644”
as Appendix II in his study of Dutch Brazil, but he either inserted or reproduced from his source several errors,
especially in the calculations for the value of the trade in slaves. See Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 277–
279.
30 "Jacques of Jacobus Specx" in Molhuysen, Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, vol. 6, 1251–1253.
On the various positions in company employment, their compensation, and responsibilities, see Boxer, The Dutch
Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800; Ratelband, Vijf Dagregisters van het Kasteel São Jorge da Mina aan de Goudkust,
lviii–lxii.
31 Molhuysen, Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, 1258.
232

political and administrative authority—in this case over a trade network that stretched from East
Africa to the Persian Gulf, the Indonesian archipelago, Ceylon, Japan, and China. 32
Specx's “State of Income and Expenses,” probably composed in May or June of 1645,
would have drawn on this extensive experience. Following the “Italian style of bookkeeping,” as
one company official characterized it, Specx organized the document in ledger form, with
estimates for the company's annual income and expenses set against one another on opposing
pages. 33 Each conquest was dealt with separately and resolved into a single balance; these
balances were then carried over and summed at the end to yield an overall estimate for the
company’s annual profit. This structure meant that there was no region-wide account for the
expense of ships or soldiers, though these were sent to every conquest area, nor for the separate
revenues from sugar, which was grown both in Brazil and on the island of São Tomé. This may
simply have been the easiest way to organize the information Specx had at its disposal, but it also
had the virtue of allowing the reader to independently assess the viability of each of the
individual conquests. Among these it was easy to see the overwhelming importance of Brazil to
the company’s finances, and thus to grasp the urgency of ensuring its military defense.
Included in the review were five conquests: Brazil, Guinea, Angola, São Tomé, and the
area around the Gambia River, including Cape Verde. New Netherland, which by this time had a
population of approximately 2,000 settlers, but whose trade was relatively small, was not
32 Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company; Burke, Venice and Amsterdam.
33 NA 1.01.07, inv.nr. 12564.17, no. 7. Report Sommierlyck gedaen by die Heeren vander Cappelen toe-Ryssel,
Herbers, en Nykerck van di principaelste Poincten inde besoignes van die vergaderinge der Negentien t'Amsterdam
voorgevallen zeder Martio 1645. In this meeting a point of discussion had been to determine how the company
could calculate the finance of lands, livestock, and ammunition “not by the Italian method of bookkeeping, but in the
same manner as these are calculated by the Receivers and Commissioners of Lands in the Council of State.” The
original reads, “niet naer Italiaens Boekhouden, maer na ordre dat die Ontvangers en Commisen des Landts voorden
Raedt van State Rekenen.”
233

included. 34 In Specx’s estimation Brazil was the company's most lucrative colony: it accounted
for more than half of annual expenses and revenue and required by far the largest military
presence. Following the 1641 Treaty with Portugal, the company's directors and the States
General had pursued a policy of reducing the number of officers and soldiers in Dutch Brazil.
Down from a high of 5,300 men in 1638, Specx estimated expenses for the current troop-strength
of only 2,700 men, with greatly reduced numbers of support staff and officers; he also reduced
the budget for the High Council, which under Maurits had represented a considerable expense.
Together, military and administrative personnel accounted for 795,000 guilders. Livestock, the
second greatest expense and a perennial source of trouble for the company, Specx estimated at
675,000 guilders. Ships accounted for 252,000 guilders, while the repair of forts and replenishing
munitions—also casualties of peace with Portugal—together accounted for 110,000 guilders. 35
The income side of the ledger was of course dominated by revenues from the trade in
sugar. Specx estimated that private merchants, to whom the trade had been reopened in 1638,
would carry 15,000 chests each year, of which a fourth would go to the company as recognitie
(recognition), a payment for the right to trade within the area of the company's charter. This was
estimated to yield 750,000 guilders, with an additional 843,500 guilders in convoy charges, dues,
and recognition payments on manufactured and other goods private merchants exported to
Brazil. 36 At 1,593,500 guilders this was a substantial sum, but still considerably less than the 2.5
million guilders in income from recognitie and fees that Amsterdam estimated in 1637, when the
34 Specx makes no mention of New Netherland. The earlier Calculatie van de Incompsten..., composed in 1644, also
did not include New Netherland, but did mention the colony along with Curaçao, Bonaire, and several parts of
Brazil as “still other places” from which the company derived revenue. Calculations by De Laet in his Iaerlyck
Verhael report income from the New Netherland trade in pelts at 705,117 guilders for the years 1624-1635, or
approximately 58,000 guilders per annum, making it substantially less lucrative than the territories included in
Specx’s analysis. De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol.
4, 297. Jaap Jacobs considers De Laet's figures to be accurate. See Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 110.
35 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fols. 115v and 116v.
36 Ibid., fols. 116 and 117.
234

debate over free trade to Brazil had generated the first great wave of commercial calculations. 37
Other sources of revenue included taxes paid by Portuguese settlers, which amounted to 300,000
guilders; 911,200 guilders on the sale of livestock; and 300,000 guilders for Brazilian dyewoods,
an important input for the Republic's cloth-dying industry. Total revenue was thus projected at
3,260,700 guilders. 38 Against total expenses of 1,974,000 guilders, this yielded a handsome
estimated annual profit of 1,286,700 guilders.
Guinea was the company's second most important source of revenue. As we saw in
Chapter Five, the company's conquests were still fresh and the nature of the trade somewhat in
flux. Specx estimated that the company’s forts could be defended by 150 soldiers and support
personnel at a cost of only 36,000 guilders. Even after seizing Elmina and Axim, and unlike in
Brazil, the majority of expenses were still directly linked to trade: in exchange for gold, ivory,
and slaves, the company would need four ships yearly carrying a combined cargo costing
720,000 guilders. 39
Specx estimated that Guinea could provide annual income of 1,294,000 guilders, the vast
majority from 3,600 marks of gold, worth 1,044,000 guilders—a modest increase from the 3,200
marks traded in 1644 and the reason, Specx indicated in a marginal note, that the company
should increase the number of ships devoted to the trade. 40 The rest of the income came from
slaves and ivory. By this time the company had reduced its expectations for Guinea to serve as a
major source of slaves for Brazil, in favor of the trade at São Paulo do Loanda, but Specx still
expected to trade 1,400 slaves, of whom 1,200 might survive, for revenue of 150,000 guilders.
Specx estimated the trade in ivory would bring in another 100,000 guilders yearly. These
37 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5754, fols. 304-310 and 340-350. Specx had copies or extracts of the calculations from both
documents. NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fols. 123-127, and 144-159.
38 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fol. 117.
39 Ibid., fol. 117v.
40 Ibid., fol. 118.
235

calculations yielded a profit of 418,750 guilders—hardly the windfall from Brazil, but
nevertheless a consistent, and thus predicable, revenue stream. 41
Calculating the value of the trade at São Paulo do Loanda was far more difficult. 42 The
most vexing problem was to accurately estimate the volume of the trade in slaves. Johan Maurits,
who had been responsible for organizing the Dutch fleet that seized Loanda, believed that 15,000
slaves could be traded there each year, but in the preceding three years the actual numbers had
been much smaller. 43 Specx’s excerpts and notes on a report by Pieter van der Hagen, financial
counselor on the Hoge Raad in Brazil, state that the company imported 3,040 slaves to Brazil in
1642 and 3,428 in 1643. 44 Although Van der Hagen’s numbers were incomplete for 1644, Specx
evidently knew from other sources that the trade had increased dramatically that year, to 5,565
slaves, for he used an estimate of 5,600 slaves annually. 45 Calculating the death rate during the
middle passage at 1/7, and the price of slaves at 125 guilders apiece, he estimated income of
600,000 guilders. Ivory and copper added 93,600 guilders for total revenue of 693,600 guilders. 46
Against this were expenses of 124,800 guilders to pay 550 soldiers and support personnel,
270,000 guilders for trade goods, and 174,000 guilders for ships and supplies. 47
41 Ibid.
42 On the Dutch in Angola and São Tomé, see Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika 1600-1650.
43 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 351. See also Den Heijer, Goud, Ivoor
en Slaven, 18. One of the sets of calculations in Specx’s possession indicated that 15,000 slaves had previously been
traded at Angola, but that now an estimate of 12,000 was more appropriate. NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fol. 121-122. This
document is mistranscribed in Boxer, stating the numbers as 15,000 and 1,200, respectively. The value per slave is
incorrectly transcribed as 49 guilders instead of 40 guilders. Boxer also failed to indicate that these calculations were
based on free trade to Angola, with the income representing only recognition fees, rather than the full sale value of
the slaves. C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 277-279.
44 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fol. 224. Aanteekeningen door Jacques Specx uit de Memorie van der Haghen betreffende
de financien der WI Compagnie in Brazilie. The majority, though not all, of these slaves came from Loanda. These
numbers diverge somewhat from those in Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um capitulo da
historia colonial do seculo XVII, 487. For the origins of slaves sold in Brazil see the online Trans-Atlantic Slave
Trade Database: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/index.faces.
45 Ibid.
46 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fol. 118.
47 Ibid., fol. 118v.
236

Overall, this meant an annual profit of 124,800 guilders, a fraction of the profits from
Brazil or Guinea and considerably less than the company had anticipated. But there may have
been more to this than meets the eye: Specx’s figures assumed that the slave trade remained a
company monopoly, but he used a very low estimate for the sale price of slaves, which Van der
Hagen's report showed had varied between 204 and 357 guilders apiece. 48 Separate sets of
calculations, also in Specx’s possession, used the higher figure of 200 guilders. One, probably
composed in 1644, argued that an open and free trade of 12,000 slaves each year would yield a
much more attractive annual profit to the company of 720,000 guilders in recognitie and fees. 49
Another set of calculations, almost certainly drafted by an opponent of opening the trade,
estimated that 10,000 slaves would yield recognitie and fees worth 540,000 guilders, but that this
income would be offset by expenses on the coast equal to 408,400 guilders, for an overall profit
of only 131,600 guilders. 50 The implication was that the high fixed costs of the slave trade,
including forts and soldiers in Loanda, made it disadvantageous for the company to open the
trade to private merchants. If the company kept the trade to itself, however, this author believed
it could earn 1.8 million guilders against expenses of 910,000 guilders, for a profit of 990,000
guilders. 51
That these numbers diverge so widely—in terms of the number of slaves traded, the sale
price in Recife, and fixed costs in Angola—provides some indication of the fluidity of the market
and the wide margin of error that could be expected from this sort of calculation. Specx was
careful to use a reliable figure for the volume of the trade, but his price estimates, along with his
48
NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fol. 224. Van den Boogaart and Emmer report that sale prices in Recife for slaves from
Angola varied from a low of 161 guilders in 1636 to a high of 639 guilders in 1638. In 1644 the price was 172
guilders and in 1645 it was 244 guilders. See Van den Boogaart and Emmer, “The Dutch Participation in the
Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650,” 371.
49
NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8. Calculatie van de Incomptsten ende Lasten van Brasil, ende Incompsten nu ter tydt Instato,
fol. 121v.
50
NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8. Calculatie van de Proffyten die den open handel op Angola soude geven. fol. 142v.
51 Ibid., fol. 144.
237

notes on these documents, suggest that we should count him among the advocates for lifting the
company’s monopoly on the slave trade. 52
Specx devoted little attention to calculations for the region around the River Gambia,
recording only that expenses of 125,000 guilders, mostly for trade goods and ships, were
rewarded with revenues of 200,000 guilders, for a tidy profit of 75,000 guilders. 53 But he paid
much closer attention to the island of São Tomé, the company's most recent conquest and a trade
hub within the South Atlantic. 54 A major producer of sugar under the Portuguese throughout the
sixteenth century, by this time the island was becoming a transit point for slaves. Unlike the
other regions, Specx calculated the costs of the trade in terms of slaves, cotton, and gold, all of
which could be exchanged for sugar. By trading goods valued at 94,060 guilders, plus expenses
of 73,600 guilders for 220 soldiers and support personnel, he expected the company to take away
541,200 guilders worth of sugar. 55
This was already the highest rate of profit of any of the conquest areas, and Specx
believed it could be made even more profitable by planting indigo, tobacco, and East Indian
pepper. Even more important, though—and perhaps drawing on his experience with the VOC,
which had supplemented both its income and its access to silver by facilitating the vast and
profitable intra-Asia trade—he imagined that São Tomé might one day serve as a staple-market
for all of West Africa. 56
The accumulated annual profits from all five conquests amounted to just less than 3
million guilders. Against this figure Specx counted the company's overhead in the Netherlands,
52 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fols. 123-127, fol. 186, fols. 187-190.
53 Ibid., fols. 118v and 119.
54 Den Heijer, Goud, Ivoor en Slaven. See also Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the Making of
the Atlantic World, 1450-1680 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
55 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fols. 118v-119v.
56 Ratelband, Nederlanders in West-Afrika 1600-1650; Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company.
238

so that foreign trade as a whole made up income and the company's operations its expenses.
Most of these were fairly modest: house rental, “fire and light,” and payments to company
personnel accounted for 200,000 guilders, while compensation to the company's directors
amounted to 103,000 guilders. 57 Much greater were the costs necessary to sustain the company's
enormous debt. To service 6,000,000 guilders the company had borrowed at 5% it needed to pay
300,000 guilders annually. And to this Specx added the largest and most controversial figure: a
6% dividend on the entire invested capital of more than 17 million guilders, equal to 1,050,000
guilders. This dividend had only been paid twice in the company's history—1643 and 1644—and
its inclusion here suggest that Specx anticipated it would be paid again in 1645. 58 With the
expenses deducted, and the government’s promised 500,000 guilders annual subsidy added in,
Specx estimated the company’s annual profit at 1,335,010 guilders. 59
This, in short, was the value of the New World. With simple precision and clarity Specx’s
review integrated disparate trades that had developed over more than half a century and
conquests in which the Dutch were yet to fully consolidate their authority. It was a synthetic
vision of an empire still under construction. Where possible, Specx based his estimates of
expenses and revenues on figures from the years immediately preceding; where this proved
impossible—either because the information was unavailable or because the company’s
experience was simply too limited—he gave apparently plausible explanations for his
projections. Together these showed the basis for a profitable company, able not only to
compensate its investors, but to make a modest annual profit as well.
57 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fols. 119v. and 120. “Tractamenten van Suppoosten, arbeyts, volck vocatie gelden van
Bewinthebberen huys huur, vuur en licht.”
58 Heijer, De Geoctrooieerde Compagnie, 250.
59 NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fol. 119v.
239

It was, of course, a fiction. With the possible exception of his calculations for the slave
trade from Angola, the problem wasn't that Specx’s figures were inaccurate, or his math
somehow deficient. It was that his elegant calculations were based on numerous assumptions,
several of which proved terribly wrong. In Brazil he assumed there would be peace, even though
rumors of war by this time abounded, and his calculations for income presumed payment, which
was not forthcoming. As the British would later learn in the Caribbean, in a colonial economy
goods, and especially slaves, often were purchased on credit, a problem that was especially
serious in Pernambuco. 60 Specx’s notes on Van der Hagen's report show debts of 757,000
guilders; modern historians believe the total was closer to 2 million guilders. 61 In this sense
Specx’s estimates for Brazil were highly misleading on both sides of the ledger, a fact that
readers aware of the company's desperate financial condition must have immediately
recognized. 62 In Guinea, where intra-European competition was already beginning to erode the
company's presumed monopoly, and in Loanda, where the slave trade ground to a halt following
the Portuguese revolt, profits lagged far behind Specx’s estimates. Just as Dutch still life painters
assembled highly realistic bouquets from flowers that bloomed months apart, Specx created an
imaginary economy, cobbled together from the stolen treasures of the Iberian powers, and used
this to advance the company’s imperial vision. By the winter of 1645 that vision was beginning
to collapse. Specx’s careful calculations stand both as one of the last testaments to the company’s
grand pretensions for an Atlantic empire, and as an important tool in the political effort to save it.
60
Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um Capitulo da Historia Colonial do seculo XVII; Boxer, The
Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654; K. G. Davies, The Royal Africa Company (New York: Atheneum, 1970).
61
NA 1.10.78, inv.nr. 8, fol. 224. Wätjen, O Dominio Colonial Hollandez no Brasil: Um Capitulo da Historia
Colonial do seculo XVII, 332–334.
62
As discussed in the previous chapter, Artichewski looked very unfavorably on the calculations produced by both
chambers in 1637. Artichewski, “Missive van den Kolonnel Artichofsky aan Graaf Maurits en de Hoogen Raad in
Brazilië, 24 Juli 1637,” 227.
240

3. History Counts
Where Specx’s calculations were meant to capture the company’s current situation, and thus to
project the prospective value of its trade into an indefinite future, Johannes de Laet's work less
than a year earlier looked to justify and defend the company’s existence on the basis of its
accomplishments in the past. And where Specx had assessed value in the familiar terms of raw
commercial profit, based on income and expenses, De Laet argued that the company's value
could only be assessed through a much more inclusive calculation that took into account not only
its trade, but also its feats of organized piracy, its contributions to ship-building, consumption,
and employment, and the heavy costs that it had imposed upon the King of Spain. This very
different sort of calculation, no less mathematical, drew upon established tropes but showed
impressive new sensitivity to the importance of precise quantification in mercantile and political
rhetoric.
In November of 1644, Elsevier in Leiden published De Laet’s Iaerlyck Verhael, a
comprehensive, richly illustrated history of the WIC that chronicled the period from the
company’s first voyages in 1623 until the end of 1636. 63 De Laet dedicated the book to the States
of Holland with the following words:
The most important means by which the King of Spain has held the whole World, and especially
Christendom, in uproar for so many years, and attacked these United Provinces so mightily, is his
income from the rich lands of America. [...] Since the Chartered West India Company was
established and has begun its work, men can only guess how the King’s treasure and income has
been reduced and his former strength weakened, so that it is now already clear that his arms begin
63 De Laet, Historie Ofte Iaerlijck Verhael van de Verrichtinghen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie,
zedert haer Begin, tot het Eynde van ’t Jaer Sesthien-hondert ses-en-dertich; Begrepen in Derthien Boecken, ende
met Verscheyden Koperen Platen Verciert. The modern Dutch edition is De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de
Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie.
241

to hang from the body [...] This short account of the company's achievements each year which is
presented to your Honors shall serve witness [to the fear now felt by this mighty power]. 64
It was a bellicose statement of the company’s contributions to the war effort and a call for
acknowledgement of this from the States of Holland. Year by year, in exhaustive and often dry
detail, De Laet’s book recounted each of the company’s many successful conquests at sea and on
land and catalogued the riches it had appropriated at the Spanish King’s expense. For men “to
guess how the King’s treasure and income had been reduced” was not sufficient: these were
spelled out ship-by-ship, sugar chest by sugar chest, and assigned precise monetary values. At
the end of the book, De Laet then abandoned narrative altogether and combined the subtotals
from each year to arrive at a precise reckoning of the company’s overall contribution to the
Dutch state. 65
De Laet’s unusual book—the first work published in the Netherlands to address the
history of a joint stock company, rather than of a city or a prince, and possibly the first history of
a mercantile company published anywhere in Europe—has received far less attention from
historians than it deserves. 66 While considered highly accurate, and thus often mined as a unique
64 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 1, 3. “De
meeste middelen waermede den Koningh van Haspagnien de gantsche Weerelt, ende insonderheyt Christenrijck, soo
vele Jaren in roeren heft ghehouden, ende dese Gheunieerde Provintien soo machtich bestreden, sijn voornementlick
hem toe-ghekommen uyt de over-rijcke Landen van America […] Naer dat de Geoctroyeerde West-Indsiche
Compagnie is opgericht, ende heeft begonnen to wercken, heeft men konnen speuren hoe des selves Koninghs
schatten en in-komsten hebben komen te minderen ende sijne vorige macht te verflauwen. De swacheyt van dat
groot Lichaem laet sich nu klaerlijck sien; door do swacken teghen-partije soo merckelijcken verminckt zijnde, dat
de armen beginnen te hanghen.” The States of Holland recognized the book with a payment of 300 guilders and
ordered that the copy he sent them “be displayed on the table of the High and Mighty [States of Holland].” Staten
van Holland and Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties, entry for November 25, 1644. Two letters De Laet composed to
accompany copies of the book that he sent to the States General and the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC can be
found in the Special Collections of the Leiden University Library, PAP 2, Brieven van Johannes De Laet aan
Bestuurders der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie Amsterdam, November 28, 1644.
65 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 4, 279.
66 A history of the VOC would be published two years later. Isaac Commelin, Begin ende Voortgangh, van de
Vereenighde Nederlantsche Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Amsterdam: Johannes Janssonius, 1646).
242

source for specific nuggets of information about the company’s early history, scholars have yet
to carefully examine either the book’s form or its place within contemporary Dutch politics. 67
Building on research by Henk den Heijer, Jaap Jacobs has observed that the book was
written during protracted negotiations within the States of Holland to renew the WIC's charter,
set to expire in 1645. 68 Sensing an ugly debate, the company requested special assistance from
the States General in July 1643. The latter passed the issue to the States of Holland, who in
January 1644 replied with an unexpected proposal to combine the WIC and the VOC into a
single joint venture. In this way the two companies could project even greater military might
overseas, while the VOC’s superior financial resources would help to re-capitalize the ailing
WIC, at no cost to the state. To the WIC and its directors the proposal came like “a gift from the
heavens,” but it was swiftly and unequivocally dismissed by the VOC, whose directors
recognized that in accepting combination they would both dilute their regular profits from Asia
and inherit the WIC's considerable debts. 69 De Laet’s book contributed to this discussion by
highlighting the company's many years of service and thus the importance of renewing its
charter.
But it is fairly clear that De Laet's work on the Iaerlyck Verhael extended further back in
time. In Book I, he explained that the project arose as a “necessary consequence” and
complement to his earlier geographical compendium, the Nieuwe Wereldt, ofte Beschrivinghe
67 See L’Honoré Naber’s introduction to the 1931 edition, along with Bekkers, “Introduction”; Jacobs, “Johannes de
Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld”; Den Heijer, “Plannen voor Samenvoeging van VOC en WIC”; Bremmer, Jr., “The
Correspondence of Johannes de Laet as a Mirror on his Life.”
68 Den Heijer, “Plannen voor Samenvoeging van VOC en WIC,” 115–117; Jacobs, “Johannes de Laet en de Nieuwe
Wereld.”
69 Twee Deductien, aen-gaende de Vereeninge van d’Oost ende West-Indische Compagnien, aen de ... Staten van
Hollandt ende West Vrieslandt, vande West-Indische Compagnie overgelevert. (’s-Gravenhage, 1644); Den Heijer,
“Plannen voor Samenvoeging van VOC en WIC,” 116. “[…] als een geschenk uit de hemel.”
243

van West-Indien (New World, or a Description of the West Indies), published in 1625. 70 This
book—the only other text De Laet published in Dutch—was not a piece of original scholarship,
but rather a learned synthesis of geographical, ethnographic, and historical information that De
Laet appropriated from leading English and Continental navigators, travelers, and historians. 71
As De Laet made clear in a “Note to the Reader,” he intended the book to serve as a guide to the
New World for the directors and servants of the WIC, which had been established four years
earlier. As references to the book in accounts and correspondence by Dutch navigators and
company servants attest, the book was used in precisely this way. 72
By the time De Laet began preparing a new edition, which was published in 1630, the
company's expansion was well under way: following failed attempts in Brazil and Guinea in
1625, Piet Heyn captured a Spanish silver fleet off the coast of Matanzas in 1628 and Hendrick
Loncq succeeded in capturing Recife and Olinda in 1630. Images of Heyn and Loncq graced the
70 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 1, 2. “De
Beschrijvinge van America ofte Nieuwe Wereldt, die ick voor eenige Jaren in druck hadde uytgegeven, scheen mede
desen tweede arbeydt, als een noodigh gevolgh te vereysschen (mijne Vrienden oordelen ‘t selve) door dien dat uyt
de menighfuldighe Reysen, de onderscheydelijcke ondeckingen van vele gewesten, ende 't gene soo te water als te
lande by des Compagnies Vlooten ende Legers is verricht, een groot licht konde geschept werden ende meerder
kennisse van die nieuwe ondeckte landen verkregen; ‘t sal ook in 't vervolgh blijcken.”
71 De Laet, Nieuwe Wereldt: Ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien. A manuscript in the New York Public Library in
which De Laet can be seen extracting from these sources indicates that he began collecting historical and
geographical material for this book at least as early as 1620.
72 Govert Loockermans, who traded on the Hudson and Delaware Rivers in 1648-49, wrote in a letter that he had
been guided by de Laet’s Nieuwe Wereldt. See Jacobs, “Johannes de Laet en de Nieuwe Wereld.” A second example
can be found in the WIC archives. In March of 1640, the Zeeland chamber received a lengthy report from Gideon
Morris, a Zeelander of Scottish descent, along with a letter from his brother, William. The report contained a
detailed description of Maranão. The report detailed the weakness of Portuguese positions in the area and advocated
an alliance with politically disaffected local Indians. To this report Gideon’s brother added a brief letter suggesting
Maranão might provide access, by way of the Amazon, to the famous silver mines at Potosi. To buttress his case,
William offered a number of block quotations from the 1630 edition of De Laet’s Nieuwe Wereldt, which he
presented “towards the service of your excellencies, in order to better understand the wealth of Potosi and the
possible manner of its capture, by means of an extract out the striking description of that place by the gentlemen
Johan de Laet (who is well enough known by your excellencies).” As it turned out, De Laet was wrong that the
Amazon might provide access to Potosi, and in any case the company chose to invest instead in attacks overland and
via Chile. When Maurits organized a successful mission to seize Maranão in November 1641 Gideon Morris was
selected to serve as commander of the neighboring captaincy of Céara. NA 1.01.01.05, inv.nr. 43, Morris to the
Kamer Zeeland, March 3, 1640. “[…] die ick ten dienst van ewe edele […] loflijcke […] van het rijkdom van Potosi
te verhalen by wege van extract uyte trefelicke beschrivinge van Brazil van d’heer Johan de Laet (die is by eue edele
genoeg bekende).”
244

Illustration 13. Frontispiece to the second edition of Nieuwe Wereldt
ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien, by Johannes de Laet (Leiden:
Bonaventura and Abraham Elzevier, 1630). From a copy in the
Universiteitsbibliotheek, Leiden. Portrayed are Piet Heyn (left) and
Hendrik Loncq (right).
245

title page of the revised edition and, within the text, De Laet incorporated important new
information he had gathered from company travel journals, correspondence, and conversations
with merchants and sailors. 73 For the French edition, published in 1640 and dedicated to Cardinal
Richelieu (1585-1642), De Laet added still more information, this time of a historical nature. 74
The greatly expanded section on northeastern Brazil retained the older description by John
Lancaster, an Englishman who visited the region in 1595, but now included new information
from Dutch sources, along with an account of the seizure of Olinda by the Dutch in February of
1630. 75 On the following page, De Laet recounted the entire story of the WIC from its founding
in 1621 to the ongoing Dutch offensives under Johan Maurits. 76
This was the germ of the Iaerlijck Verhael: although De Laet began by incorporating new
information within the existing structure of the Nieuwe Wereldt, the spatial organization of the
text ultimately became too constricting. The company’s conquests and discoveries were too
disparate to be sandwiched into a small section on
Brazil, and the information taken from foreign texts were increasingly made obsolete by the
reports of Dutch explorers, navigators, and soldiers. Having spent much of the past two decades
writing and editing histories of European and distant states for Elsevier, De Laet evidently
considered the company to be a legitimate subject for historical analysis. 77 It is likely that he first
considered, or even began composing, the Iaerlijck Verhael as early as 1640 or 1641, and that it
73
Johannes de Laet, Nieuwe Wereldt Ofte Beschrijvinghe van West-Indien (Leyden: Bonaventura ende Abraham
Elsevier, 1630).
74
Johannes de Laet, L’histoire du Nouveau Monde (Leyde: Bonaventura et Abraham Elzevier, 1640).
75
Ibid., 532. “Mais depuis que nos Belges ont pris Olinde, il y a plusiers des plus riches qui se sont retires a cette
ville”; “cette ville fut prise a l'improviste par les nostres au commence de May de l’an [1632]. Il y eut plus de cent
Portugais de tues, beaucoup pris, un bon butin en fut tire, une bonne partie de la ville ruinee par leu feu; & il y fut
gaste une grande quantite de vivres, principalement di vin, que l'on y gardoit pour les troupes […]”
76
Ibid., 533.
77
Gruys, “De Reeks ‘Republieken’ van de Elzeviers en Joannes de Laet.”
246

took on its specific rhetorical function only later, as renewal of the charter came to dominate
public discussion of the company’s status within the Republic.
As indicated previously, the Iaerlyck Verhael was organized chronologically, with each
of thirteen books corresponding to a single year in the company’s history. De Laet indicated in
Book I that he would leave aside any discussion of the company’s management at home, on the
rather flimsy explanation that the company’s charter—a copy of which was included at the
beginning of the book, along with a complete list of the company’s directors to 1636—could
adequately speak for its organization and the company's relationship to the States General. In
fact, as several scholars have noted, this permitted him to avoid the contentious and sometimes
bitter debates between the company’s five chambers that had dominated the company’s early
history. He also made clear that the text mainly covered the company’s military conquests and
that he “did not trouble himself with trade and shipping to the gold-rich lands of Guinea and the
islands of America not yet claimed by the enemy.” 78 Only where “trade and conquest were
intermingled” were they included in the narrative. What remained, De Laet declared, was proof
enough that the company “had done such great things for the state, and much more than men had
ever expected of it.” 79
Critical to the book's authority was De Laet’s privileged access to the company’s archives
and the thoroughness and care with which he used original sources to assemble and document
the company’s history. He described his task thus:
78 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 1, 3. “sonder
my te bemoeyen met den handel ande bevaeringhe die by de selve Compagnie van den beginne is anghestelt op de
gout-rijcke Landen van Guinea ende beyde de ghedeelten van America en de Eylanden noch niet beslagen ende
verheert by den Vyandt; als alleen in ’t voorbygaen ende wanneer de Koophandel met den oorloge is vermenght
gheweest.”
79 Ibid., vol. 1, 4. “[…] dat dese Compagnie seer groote dinghen voor desen staet heeft ghedaen, ende veellicht meer
als men van haer hadde verwacht ofte konnen eysschen.”
247

It occurred to me that these miraculous deeds of the West India Company, executed for the wellbeing
of our dear fatherland, should not to be kept silent from future generations, and that I, who
from the beginning have been in the service of the [company], having attended and assisted all
the deliberations, and having seen and read all the journals, letters, and papers, should not be
blamed for picking up these descriptions, and capturing only the naked truth (which I knew best)
by arranging the material in separate books in annalistic form, and preparing it to be easily
understood and exhibited to the world, just as another, with a better pen, might have done. 80
De Laet’s work was so thorough that Caspar Barlaeus, commissioned at roughly this time by
Johan Maurits to write a history of the latter’s tenure in Brazil, dismissed the need to review the
company's early history, since “the widely known and celebrated gentlemen Johannes de Laet, in
his historical work, has already told of these affairs, having articulated the truth directly, not on
the basis of hearsay or rumor, but following the documents and day-books of those who have
themselves been eyewitnesses to these events.” 81 Just as in his argument with Grotius over the
origins of the Native Americans, De Laet’s history was empirically well informed and supremely
sensitive to his sources. 82
From the perspective of the history of accountancy, the most important part of the
Iaerlyck Verhael is without question its final part, the Kort Verhael wt de voorgaende Boecken
ghetrocken van de diensten ende nuttigheden die desen Staet heeft genooten by de West-Indische
Compagnie, ende de schaden die deselve den Koningh van Spanien heeft ghedaen sedert haer
80 Ibid. “My docht daer benevens dat dese wonderlijcke daden by de West-Indische Compagnie tot welstandt van
onse lieve Vaderlandt uyt-ghewroght, de naerkomelinghen niet en konden offte behoordenversweghen te worden;
ende dat my, die van den beginne in bedieninge van de selve was gheweest, alle de ghewichtighe raetslagen hadde
bygewoont ende helpen bevorderen, ende alle de Journalen, Brieven ende Geschriften ghesien ende gelesen, niet
qualijck en konde af-ghenomen worden de Beschrijvinghe van de selve by der handt te nemen, ende de naeckte
waerheyt alleen (die my ten besten bekent was) in onderscheyden Boeken volgens de ordre der Jaren te vervatten,
ende alsoo de stoffe te bereyden voor beter verstanden, die de selve hier naer met een beter penne naer hun
verdiensten mochten ten thoone stellen voor de gantsche wereldt.”
81 Caspar van Baerle, in Nederlandsch Brazilië onder het bewind van Johan Maurits, Grave van Nassau, 1637-1644
(’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1923), 23. “Die zaken heeft de zeer wijdluste en zeer vermaarde Heer Johannes
de Laet in zijne geschiedwerken verhaald, onomwonden de waarheid uitgesproken hebbende, niet van hooren
zeggen of op grond van losse praatjes, maar volgens de opgaven en de dagverhalen van hen die de feiten hebben
bijgewoond.”
82 Rubiés, “Hugo Grotius’s Dissertation on the Origin of the American Peoples and the Use of Comparative
Methods”; Schmidt, “Space, Time, Travel: Hugo de Groot, Johannes de Laet, and the ‘Advancement’ of Geographic
Learning”; De Laet, Suiker, Verfhout & Tabak.
248

egin tot het eynde van den Jaere 1636 (Short Account pulled from the preceding Books, of the
Service and Utility that this State has enjoyed by the West India Company, and the damage that
the same has done to the King of Spain since its beginning until the year 1636). 83 It seems likely
that this independent section was composed as an after thought, in direct response to the
discussions about the WIC's charter. De Laet explained that it was intended to “gather together in
brief” all the evidence already presented in the preceding narrative, especially since “some men
think little of [the company], others hold it in low esteem, and still others speak of it so
unkindly.” 84 He apologized for the roughness of the calculations, which
rest upon such a slender footing, in terms of the estimates of both goods and harm done, that
each may judge whether the actual numbers might be higher or lower. Nevertheless, any reader
will hereby conclude how great is the service that this Company has given to the state. 85
The Kort Verhael was divided into five sections, each of which contained a distinct set of
calculations; the sum from each was then carried over and combined for a grand total at the end.
To these De Laet added two additional sections devoted exclusively to the value of the
company’s trade, which had not been discussed in the book but nevertheless contributed to his
presentation of the company's value. The text ran to 29 folio pages of dense statistics and
explanatory notes. In effect, De Laet reduced history to the frozen, synchronic, one-
dimensionality of accountancy: each quantity appeared three times in the Iaerlyck Verhael: first
in the narrative, second as a partial sum at the end of the description of each fleet or year, and
83 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 4, 277–298.
84 Ibid., vol. 4, 279. “[…] soo hebbe goedt gheacht hier in ’t korte by een te brenghen, ’t ghene door de
Verrichtinghen van de welghemelde Compagnie, tot dienste van dese Vereenigde Nederlanden, ons lieve
Vaderlandt, is te weghe gebracht; ended at te meer, om dat sommighe het by-wijlen weynigh ghedencken, vele oock
weynigh achten; ende oock wel eenighe daer wat leppigh van spreken.”
85 Ibid. “De Calculatie die hier op hebbe gemaeckt, is genomen op soo slendrern voet, soo wel inde estmatie van
goederen, als begrootinghe vande schaden, dat vertrouwe een yeder sal konnen oordeelen, daer in eer ghesondight te
sijn in verminderinghe, als in vergrootinge. Eenighe leser sal hier uyt konnen sien wat dienst desen Staedt by de
Compagnie is gedaen.”
249

third in the Kort Verhael. This repetition neatly mimicked that in the memorial, journal, and
ledger—the three books that, in their increasing formalization and abstraction, represent the chief
innovation of double-entry booking. 86
The first section dealt with ships and shipping. De Laet offered a list of the number of
ships constructed by each chamber, totaling 220 over the thirteen years. By estimating their value
and multiplying by the number of voyages, he established a rough figure for the number of
sailors the company had employed and the total cost of armaments, provisions, and wages. This
yielded a sum of 45,183,430 guilders, much of which was spent on employing and feeding the
67,010 men who had worked in the company's service. 87
The next four sections dealt with damage done to the King of Spain. Section two listed
547 Iberian ships the company had “seized, destroyed, or otherwise made unusable” and, from
an estimate of their unit value, assessed the damage at 6,710,000 guilders. 88 Section three
continued in like fashion, focusing on goods that had been seized “and brought to land for sale,
or otherwise put to use in the [company's] conquests.” 89 These included 39,355 chests of sugar,
valued at 7,871,000 guilders, 2,356 slaves, and varying amounts of dyewood, indigo, cloth,
ginger, oil, copper, ivory, coin, and many other goods. Piet Heyn’s capture of the Spanish silver
fleet in 1628, with its 12,000,000 guilders worth of silver and precious stones, was given a line
of its own. De Laet reckoned that all these goods, “taken from the King and offered to the use of
this state,” totaled 30,309,736 guilders. 90 Section four examined damages from which the
86 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact.
87 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 4, 280–282.
88 Ibid., 282. “Lijste van de schepen, bercken, carveelen, die by de vloten ende schepen vande compagnie de vyandt
benomen, verdestrueert ofte anders onnut zijn ghemaeckt, gheduyrende de selve jaren.”
89 Ibid., 286. “Lijste ende estimatie vande goederen die inde voorgaende ghenomen schepen by de compagnie zijn
bekommen, ende hier te lande in-gebracht ende verkocht, ofte elders in hare conquesten verbesight.”
90 Ibid., 287. “Sulcks dat de boven-gheschreven goederen de Koning van Spagnien ende sijne Onderdanen afghenomen,
ende tot nuttigheydt van desen Staet ghebracht beloopen een somme van guldens […]”
250

Republic derived no direct benefit; the burning of ships, towns, sugar mills, and other assets
amounted to 7,580,000 guilders. 91
Finally, in the fifth—and most intriguing—section, De Laet attempted to calculate the
revenues the King had forfeited as a result of the company's predations, along with the additional
“expenses he had incurred to protect against them.” 92 Lost revenues from Pernambuco,
Itamaricá, Paraiba, and Rio Grande amounted to 5 million guilders; the attack on Bahia, and the
joint Spanish-Portuguese fleet that returned it to Iberian control in 1625, cost a further 10 million
guilders. Convoys to protect the annual treasure fleets, newly constructed forts, and ships run-
aground because they sailed out of season in an attempt to evade Dutch fleets, added up to
28,500,000 guilders. Here De Laet offered what modern economists would call a form of
opportunity-cost reasoning: it was self-evident that the Dutch chipped away at Spanish revenues
by blocking trade and seizing or destroying goods, but by continuously applying pressure
throughout the Atlantic Basin, De Laet reasoned that the company could impose costs even for
events that never took place. 93
Adding the totals from all five sections, De Laet estimated that the King of Spain had
sustained damage worth a staggering 118,283,166 guilders, all of which, he argued, might
otherwise have been used against the Dutch. Instead, it had made them considerably richer. And
De Laet was careful to point out that this had been done on the relatively small initial investment
of 7 million guilders, the capital raised by the company in the early and mid-1620s. 94
91 Ibid., 288–291.
92 Ibid., 291. “Op-reeckeninghe vande schaden die de koning van Spagnien heeft gheleden in sijne inkomsten door
toe-doen vande compagnie, ende de onkosten die daer tegen heft moeten doen.”
93 I would like to acknowledge my debt on this point to Eric Schliesser, Research Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Ghent.
94 De Laet, Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtingen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie, vol. 4, 293.
251

This extraordinary conclusion might strike the modern reader as fundamentally flawed: it
is not at all clear why the company’s expenditures on ships and personnel in the first section
should be counted as damage done to Spain—a problem that De Laet himself acknowledged
when he repeated this sum at the end of the Kort Verhael, in a supplementary section that briefly
examined each chamber's expenditures and the total value of the goods the company carried
home in trade. 95 But this need not be taken as evidence of confusion. De Laet was manifestly not
trying to provide a balance sheet for the company’s income and expenses, as had Specx. A
truthful accounting of this information would show considerable losses and thus shine a most
unfavorable light upon the company. Instead, by treating as commensurate the activities the
company had organized against Spain, De Laet was articulating its role in building the finances
and power of the state, at the expense of other states—what Botero and others referred to as
grandezza. 96 With its solid quantitative basis, and its intermixture of consumption, investment,
and profits from trade, he provided what looks very much like an estimate of the company’s total
contribution to the national economy—a concept that would not be employed for another
century, and the beginnings of which are conventionally associated with William Petty, some
two decades later. 97 That Petty called on De Laet during his stay in Leiden sometime during the
summer of 1644, at precisely the moment De Laet would have been completing the Kort
Verhael, raises a whole host of intriguing questions about De Laet’s role in stimulating Petty’s
95 Ibid., 294.
96 Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State and The Greatness of Cities, trans. P.J. Waley (London: Routledge & K.
Paul, 1956); Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the
Language of Politics, 1250-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard Tuck, Philosophy and
Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
97 McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic.
252

fascination with national statistics and the more general application of mathematics to problems
of politics. 98
De Laet’s immediate model for this exercise appears to have been a remonstrance to the
States General composed in 1633 that argued against the Republic’s tentative moves to reach a
peace treaty with Spain. 99 The document was submitted by the directors of the Amsterdam
chamber and, although it is impossible to know whether De Laet had any hand in its
composition, he would certainly have known about it, since he was often in Amsterdam at this
time and among other responsibilities he previously had served on the committee within the
Heren XIX tasked with making recommendations to the States General concerning peace with
Spain. 100 The 1633 document set out to catalogue “the vast services this Company has, from its
inception until now, conferred on this state, and what it can further perform hereafter.” 101 The
sections then proceeded in roughly the same manner as those of the Kort Verhael. It listed,
sequentially, the company’s outfitting of ships, consumption of goods, and employment of
soldiers and seamen; the duties that were collected on re-exports of colonial goods the company
imported to the Netherlands; the company’s contribution to trade in precious metals and
manufactures; its construction of ships; the aid it had offered to the state, especially soldiers to
help protect the Veluwe in 1632; and, finally, the “damage [the company] had inflicted on the
98 McCormack writes that Petty was in Leiden in April and May of 1644 and that he met there with a “Mr. de Laet,”
among others. See pp. 32-35. He ascribes national accounting to Petty’s work in 1664. See McCormack, 157.
99 NA 1.01.04, inv. 5753, Remonstrance of the West India Company against a Peace with Spain, 1633. A
translation, originally printed in E. B. O'Callaghan's Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New
York, vol. 1, can be found in Goslinga. The author of this remonstrance is unknown, beyond the fact that it was
submitted on behalf of the Amsterdam chamber of the company. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the
Wild Coast 1580-1680, 500–506.
100 NA 1.01.04, inv.nr. 5752.
101 Remonstrance of the West India Company against a Peace with Spain, 1633. In Goslinga, The Dutch in the
Caribbean and on the Wild Coast 1580-1680, 500.
253

enemy” and the positive effects of “forcing the King to great expense of fleets” to protect his
galleons and territories. 102
Where the 1633 remonstrance differed dramatically, however, was in its relative lack of
quantitative precision. In contrast to the labored and explicit calculations found in the Kort
Verhael, the components of each section were presented with only the slightest attention to exact
quantities. The language is of “innumerable quantities,” “excessively large amounts,” and
“excessive damage.” The contrast is not total, of course: the 1633 remonstrance included some
figures and estimates, especially for the number of ships the company had built, but these were
few and far between, never extracted from the text, and never summed up at the end to reinforce
the conclusions generated by the narrative. There was, in short, nothing comparable to the
exhaustive, independent quantitative and mathematical treatment that De Laet devoted to almost
exactly the same problems eleven years later in his calculations in the Kort Verhael.
And this difference is evident as well in other printed materials from the period 1644-
1645. The company's official statement in favor of the potential merger between the VOC and
the WIC—the Twee Deductien (Two Deductions), published in February of 1644—employed
considerable quantitative information, much of it drawn from a draft of De Laet's Kort
Verhael. 103 More revealing is a separate pamphlet written in the company’s defense, also
published in 1644. The anonymous Kort Discours (Short Discourse) included a series of
calculations to establish the damage the company had done to Spain, but its author’s access to
internal company documents was much inferior to De Laet's. 104 In lieu of hard numbers, the
102 Ibid., 501.
103 Twee Deductien, aen-gaende de Vereeninge van d’Oost ende West-Indische Compagnien, aen de ... Staten van
Hollandt ende West Vrieslandt, vande West-Indische Compagnie overgelevert. That this text borrowed De Laet’s
calculations, rather than the other way around, can be seen from the fact that totals for the final year covered in De
Laet’s work, 1636, were omitted. This strongly suggests that De Laet loaned an incomplete manuscript to the
pamphlet's author, and that he was completing the text of the Iaerlyck Verhael in January or early February of 1644.
104 Kort Discours, Ofte Naardere Verklaringe van de onderstaende V. Poincten, 1644.
254

author offered a framework of several categories and nominal values, each complete with blank
lines in the text that could be filled in to arrive at complete calculations. At one point in the text,
the author explained that he
hoped that one or another lover of the Company will take the trouble to resume, amplify, and
correct this calculation, and to arrange all the figures in terms of money, which may be done by
someone who has greater familiarity [than I do] with [the costs] of equipment in Spain. 105
The many figures that the author of the Kort Discours did provide were broken into three
categories: extra costs incurred by the Spanish King, lost income, and damage to ships, goods,
and property. Although these categories match De Laet’s, the author calculated many of his
estimates in tonnes of gold, rather than guilders, and included a plethora of examples from the
late 1630s and early 1640s that cannot be found in De Laet’s text. In addition, whereas the Twee
Deductien and two other 1644 pamphlets concerning the WIC were all published by Jan Velli, a
bookseller in The Hague known for his offerings of pamphlets and newspapers, the Kort
Discours listed no publisher. 106 We can only guess that its author was a merchant involved in
some way in the company’s activities, though at a greater distance from its inner circles. Even at
this remove, however, he recognized the advantages of buttressing his arguments with numbers.
In this sense, De Laet’s work takes on significance not only for its novelty but as part of a
more general trend in which quantification became central to Dutch political and commercial
rhetoric. At least among the documents related to the WIC, systematic attempts at quantification
105 Ibid., 4. “Dan omme evenwl dit soo nae ende duydelijck mogelijck voor te stellen, ende hier ter plaetse vast te
maeken, dat desen staet niet soo simpelijck eenighe diensten: maer een Extra-ordinarie groote verlichtinghe by, ende
wegen de voorsz. Compagnie, heeft genoten, sullen hier onder in ‘t korte aenwijsen, waer inne de voorsz. lasten.
verliesen en schade van de Koninck van Spanjen voor het meesten-deel, ende so veel wy die hebben konnen
bedencken, bestaan, sonder nochtans daer achter eenige somme uyt te trecken, om geen mis-slagen te begaen, hoe
wel ‘t selve sonderlingh ‘t onser intentie soude dienen; dan willen verhoopen dat d’een of ander Liefhebber de
voorsz. hier onderstaende Calculatie ofte overslach siende, de moeyte sal nemen deselve te resumeren, amplieren, of
corrigeren, ende met eenen alles in ghelde brenghen, gelijck dat by sommige (kennisse hebbende van Equipagien
van Spanjen) heel lichtelick sal konnen werden ghedaen.”
106 Keblusek, Boeken in de Hofstad, 118–121.
255

appeared in the late 1630s in the context of the debate over free trade to Brazil. The sharp
disagreement between Amsterdam and Zeeland and its allies stimulated what Artichewski
described as literally hundreds of pages of text and calculations, focused primarily on
determining profit under alternative monopoly policies. 107 Although estimates differed widely,
and Artichewski himself questioned their credibility, after the late 1630s it appears to have
become more difficult to make a credible argument about commercial policy without furnishing
quantitative information to back it up. By the mid-1640s we find calculation at the heart of the
company's campaign to lobby the States of Holland and the States General. Even if the
relationship between accounting and government can be traced back to Simon Steven's lessons
for Prince Maurits in the 1590s, or earlier, it appears that an important threshold was passed in
the early 1640s. 108
4. Conclusion
Given De Laet’s immersion in Leiden's scholarly community, where Cartesian science already
had become controversial, and Specx’s connections by marriage to the Huygens family, there is
good reason to see in their respective work examples of early experimentation with new methods
in mathematics and statistics, and their application to realms of inquiry and argumentation that
previously had been qualitative in character. Quantification in an emerging field of political
economy, in other words, was almost exactly coincident with quantification in other branches of
107 Artichewski, “Missive van den Kolonnel Artichofsky aan Graaf Maurits en de Hoogen Raad in Brazilië, 24 Juli
1637,” 227.
108 Soll, “Accounting for Government: Holland and the Rise of Political Economy in Seventeenth-Century Europe,”
223–224.
256

early modern science. 109 Just as in Petty’s case, the problems to which these methods were
applied first became visible in a colonial context, where the primary challenge was to organize
the spoils of conquest and to represent them in a meaningful way to central organs of the state. 110
De Laet and Specx used mathematics to quantify and divide the Atlantic, much as Petty would
do in the wake of Cromwell’s conquest of Ireland, and they presented their findings in a
synthetic form designed for consumption by the States of Holland and the States General.
However, whereas Petty both contributed to, and was able to ride, England’s growing power and
influence, Specx and De Laet’s work was overtaken by events. The collapse of the company and
its empire effectively relegated their work to the dustbin of history. 111
Despite their similarities, there were also important differences between De Laet and
Specx. A merchant by training, and a veteran of the VOC, the whole organization of Specx’s
calculations reflected his experience in Asia: rather than focusing on piracy or settlement, he
emphasized the potential for peacetime profits from trade and the circulation of goods between
the United Provinces and a stable set of conquests. This was a vision broadly shared by
Amsterdam’s merchant community, many of whom opposed the WIC’s monopolies in Brazil
and Angola, preferred that the Atlantic be opened entirely to private trade, and supported a
policy of peace with Spain. By contrast, De Laet was more deeply invested (literally as well as
metaphorically) in the WIC and its early ideological debates over the relative merits of conquest
109 See, for example, Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about
Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also
Harold J. Cook, Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2007).
110 McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic.
111 There is no record of Specx’s effort other than the document itself. De Laet’s Iaerlyck Verhael was displayed in
the States of Holland and there are scattered references to the book in contemporary correspondence, as well as
Barlaeus’ work on Maurits, but none of these discuss the contents of the Kort Verhael. Neither author features in any
history of economic or political thought of which I am aware. See, for instance, the correspondence between Grotius
and his brother in law, Nickolaes van Reigerberch, H. C. Rogge, ed., Brieven van Nickolaes van Reigerberch aan
Hugo de Groot (Amsterdam: Johannes Muller, 1901).
257

versus settlement. He was also more firmly committed, as was the Leiden community generally,
to the Protestant cause and to continuing to prosecute the war against Spain. These were political
commitments and they gave to his analysis a more overtly political and bellicose tone. If Specx
and De Laet both calculated, they did so within the framework of widely divergent conceptions
of value pitched at very different audiences within the Dutch elite.
In somewhat idealized terms, these audiences were the States General and the Prince of
Orange, on the one hand, and specific cities within the States of Holland, on the other; of the two
the latter were the less receptive. Despite criticism of the company's management, fed in part by
pamphlets published at the behest of the Portuguese ambassador in The Hague, action to save the
colony in Brazil was broadly popular. 112 At the States General the company could count on
support from Zeeland, Gelderland, and Groningen, and at court the WIC was still regarded as
part of the war effort and thus had the ear of the Prince of Orange and his advisors. The company
also had important allies in Holland—including the cities of North Holland, Leiden, and
Dordrecht—and powerful constituencies in Delft, Rotterdam, and, most critically, Amsterdam. 113
In different measure, these cities evidently saw the company's value as a thorn in the side of
Spain, a promoter of trade and employment, and an agent to seize and govern lucrative territories
overseas. There were serious problems in each of these, but as De Laet and Specx’s texts aimed
to show, the good side of the ledger outweighed the bad. With Pernambuco beginning to produce
sugar again, the slave trade accelerating from Angola, and a new government to put down the
revolt in Brazil, the 700,000 guilders subsidy the company had requested in mid-September was
a relatively modest price to pay.
112 Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, 179.
113 NA 1.01.03, inv.nr. 4845, entries for December 5, and December 8, 1645; Staten van Holland and Westvriesland,
Gedrukt Resoluties, entry for December 16 and December 19, 1645.
258

By the second week in December, Amsterdam had consented to the subsidy and only
Delft, Rotterdam, and Haarlem were still opposed. 114 Shortly after De Laet made his impassioned
speech in the States of Holland on November 25, 1645, Specx began drawing up and revising
estimates for the cost of sending this force and held meetings with potential candidates to lead
it. 115 Both men, on behalf of the WIC, reached out to critical power brokers in The Hague. On
December 7, De Laet and two other directors met with Johan Maurits to discuss military
preparations; three days later Specx met with Constantijn Huygens, Secretaris to the Prince of
Orange, to discuss commissions that were still awaiting the Prince’s signature. Huygens
explained the delay and agreed to speak with the Prince concerning “means to raise troops
following the intentions of the States General.” 116 Separately, the company's board sent
delegations or letters to Willem Frederick, Stadholder of Vriesland, Jacob Cats, Raadpensionaris
of the States of Holland, and Cornelis Musch, Griffier to the States General. And present at
nearly every meeting was either Hendrik van der Capellen or his brother, Alexander, who would
come to play an increasingly visible role coordinating the levy of troops. 117 De Laet and Specx’s
texts, in other words, were matched by their active roles in lobbying and planning for military
action, and almost certainly served as the basis for their respective discussions with these
influential individuals. In the end this was a success: on December 19, 1645 the States of
Holland approved the subsidy of 700,000 guilders, virtually ensuring its approval in the States of
General and thus the dispatch of a relief fleet to Brazil.
114 Staten van Holland and Westvriesland, Gedrukt Resoluties, entry for December 16, 1645; NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr.
2*, entry for December 19, 1645.
115 These included Sigismond Schoppe as commander of the land forces. NA 1.05.01.01, inv.nr. 2*, entries for
December 2 and 4, 1645.
116 Ibid., entries for December 7 and 10, 1645.
117 Ibid., entries for December 2, 4, 7, 8, and 14, 1645. On Alexander van der Capellen, see W.J. van Hoboken, Witte
de With in Brazilië, 1648-1649. (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitg. Mij., 1955).
259

An exceptionally cold winter delayed the fleet’s departure until spring, however, so that
members of the new High Council, including Wolter Schonenborch, did not arrive in Brazil until
July of 1646. 118 The 2,000 troops carried by this fleet prevented the complete surrender of
Recife, but they were insufficient to recapture territory lost over the preceding year. Negotiations
thus began in 1647 to dispatch a second, even larger fleet, to be paid for not by the States
General, but by 1.5 million guilders that the VOC was forced to hand over to the WIC in return
for a new charter and as an alternative to combining the two companies. 119 Once again, the States
General had found an ingenious means to cover the expense of overseas conquest largely with
private capital, in this case diverting profits from the Asia trade to underwrite a colony in the
New World. But by this time key figures in Amsterdam—including Andries Bicker, with whom
this dissertation began—had become vehemently opposed to any further action to save Brazil,
and were unwilling to commit additional funds. Zeeland and several of the other provinces
protested, but it was only by withholding its signature from the treaty of Münster that Zeeland
could make any headway at all: in return for accepting peace with Spain, Zeeland exacted a
commitment from Amsterdam for a final attempt to rescue Dutch Brazil. 120 This effort, led by
the renowned admiral Witte de With, was ultimately unsuccessful. 121 Having lost Angola in
1648, the Dutch finally abandoned Brazil in 1654. With the loss of New Netherland a decade
later, all that was left of the WIC’s empire were Surinam, a handful of Caribbean islands, and the
forts along the Gold Coast. It was a shadow of the worlds De Laet and Specx had imagined and
lobbied so hard to preserve in the fall of 1645.
118 Haecxs, “Het Dagboek Van Hendrik Haecxs, Lid Van Den Hoogen Raad Van Brazilië (1645-1654).” On the cold
winter and the need for additional coal in Zeeland, see H.M. Kesteloo, “De Stadsrekeningen Van Middelburg. VI.
1626-1650.,” in De Stadsrekeningen Van Middelburg. V. 1600-1625. (Middelburg: J.C. & W. Altorffer, 1899), 91.
119 Heijer, “Plannen Voor Samenvoeging Van VOC En WIC,” 120; Hoboken, Witte de With in Brazilië, 1648-1649.
120 Kluiver, De Souvereine en Independente Staat Zeeland, 184-186.
121 Van Hoboken, Witte de With in Brazilië, 1648-1649.
260

Chapter Seven
The Fall of Dutch Brazil
The collapse of the empire imagined by the company’s founders and directors was not the end of
the WIC. The company continued to trade in gold and other products from Guinea and to provide
slaves to Spanish America and to French and English plantation colonies in the Caribbean well
into the eighteenth century. But with increasing competition, and protective trade policies
enforced by England and France, the company’s debts caught up with it. In 1674 the WIC was
reorganized to concentrate on its core business along the coast of Guinea: in line with this more
modest mandate its board of directors was reduced from nineteen members to ten, and
shareholders were encouraged to pay a percentage of the value of their investment in return for
shares in what would become known as the Second WIC. 1 At home, directorships in the new
company became, as one historian described it, an “obligatory stop” along the career trajectory
of the urban patriciate, especially in Holland and Zeeland. 2 What began with radical Calvinist,
anti-Spanish sentiment and ambitious aims to seize all of the New World was now a staid
monopoly firm managed by a merchant elite, in effect a sinecure in a “mature” economy based
on market access, business organization, and finance. 3
This dissertation set out to tell the story of an earlier, more tumultuous period. As in
statistics, trends can be defined by moving the bounding dates. Instead of looking back on the
1 Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC.
2 Van Dillen, “De West-Indische Compagnie, het Calvinism en de Politiek.”
3 De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy.
261

failure of Dutch imperialism from the perspective of the 1660s and later, the dissertation aimed
to confine our view to the narrow window from late August to December of 1645. During this
period the company’s empire, though clearly under stress, was formidable, and expectations for
the dispatch of a relief fleet in the spring of the following year held out hope, at least for the
company's directors and investors, that its fortunes would improve. Quite apart from the role that
Dutch merchants played during this period in helping to bring sugar to Barbados, and slaves to
the Caribbean, it was the persistence and (temporary) success the WIC displayed in aggressively
attacking the Iberian powers in the New World and Africa that so fascinated the Dutch
Republic’s European contemporaries. The ultimate failure of this strategy offered a lesson of its
own: beginning with Cromwell’s “Western Design” in the mid-1650s, the contest for colonies
moved to the fringes of the Iberian world, especially to North America. 4
At a more practical level, the dissertation asked who was involved in the WIC, what
models they drew upon, and how they worked together to reach collective decisions on
commercial and colonial policy. Looking first at the news from Brazil, and then at the meetings
in Middelburg and subsequent discussions in The Hague, the dissertation showed how the WIC
managed a crisis in its most important colony and sought to animate the many gears of the Dutch
state to organize a relief expedition. This required generating a more precise understanding of the
structure of the Heren XIX than was previously available and taking a closer look at the political
processes the company used to administer territories and manage trade. It also required
excavating the key personalities involved in company politics—including relatively obscure
figures like Gerard van Arnhem, David Baute, Jacques Specx, and the brothers Hendrik and
Alexander van der Capellen—and providing a new angle on more familiar personalities like
4 David Armitage, “The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Languages of Empire,” The Historical Journal 35, no. 3
(September 1992).
262

Johannes de Laet. Hardly all merchants, these individuals’ backgrounds and perspectives help to
explain the company’s imperial bent in the period 1618-1645.
The dissertation aimed to explain company politics and decision-making by providing a
coherent, synchronic account of the company’s inner life: that is, the quotidian rhythms of the
company’s board, its rituals to ensure secrecy and loyalty, its methods for processing and sharing
information, and the ways that it worked to reach consensus, both within the company and with
other centers of power in the Dutch Republic. This meant recovering controversies over policy
and outcomes from the otherwise banal details of resolutions, formal procedure, meeting
agendas, and seating arrangements. By doing so, the dissertation revealed problematics that had
escaped the attention of previous historians, and helped to revise our understanding of several
key episodes in the company’s history. In contrast to studies that have looked at Amsterdam as a
center for information exchange, the dissertation demonstrated that secret information flowed
through its own channels and to other destinations, especially The Hague. Against the emphasis
on merchant interests in Holland, it showed that the company’s charter incorporated important
concessions to the States General and the Court. As an alternative to arguments that emphasized
conflicting interests between Amsterdam and Zeeland, it showed the importance of colonial
finance, colonial policy, and the question of slavery to debates over free trade. And, as a
departure from a long historiography that focuses on Dutch merchants, it firmly established the
role of the nobility in Dutch overseas expansion, especially in the New World.
These findings are based on extensive use of manuscript sources in the archives of the
WIC and the States General. These sources are heavily weighted towards political
considerations, and indeed a fundamental contribution of the dissertation is to balance
interpretations based largely on markets, trade, and the interests of merchants with an analysis
263

that focuses on political and imperial considerations. In terms of method, the dissertation has
shown that meeting minutes can be successfully used to access politics, not for evidence of
specific positions or final resolutions, but for the practical process of negotiation and
compromise. The dissertation argues that politics is not simply the confrontation of opposing
positions. These are rather the means that actors use to pursue their interests; they are the tools of
politics. Politics itself is the art of compromise and of reaching agreement, unless it is the simple
imposition of one party's will on another. Compromises can only be reconstructed from
negotiations and the records they leave behind. Only rarely do these compromises become
visible in the printed record of pamphlets and books. And this should change the way we study
political history.
The dissertation reached three main substantive conclusions. First, it has shown that the
company represented broad regional interests within the Dutch Republic. This is clearest in the
way that the Heren XIX was assembled and in the difficulties it encountered during its first
meetings between 1622 and 1624. But it can also be seen in the way that information circulated
and the way that coalitions formed to resolve the company’s problems in Brazil. Cities like
Groningen, Deventer, and Arnhem, as well as more prominent trading cities like Middelburg,
Dordrecht, and Leiden, were important investors and exercised significant power within the
company’s board. The WIC was responsible for resolving the divergent interests of these cities
and, overseas, for representing the United Provinces as a whole. In a newly forming and
decentralized Republic, the company served as an important agent of integration. This helps to
explain Eli Heckscher’s paradox, cited in Chapter Three, that the Dutch companies received
strong support from the state, even though the state itself was weak. Even more than for the
VOC, which relied on a narrower geographic base, the WIC's effort to manage Atlantic colonies
264

served to coordinate and align interests at home. Emphasis on the antagonism between
Amsterdam and Zeeland within the company is warranted, but this antagonism was a symptom
of advancing centralization, rather than evidence for its failure. The Dutch Revolt made the state,
both at home and abroad and, in this sense, the WIC was an important part of state-building in
the Dutch Republic.
Second, the States General played an active and important role in WIC management, in a
fashion quite distinct from the VOC. This arose from the negotiations to create the company and,
at least in part, drew inspiration from Willem Usselincx’s idea for a Raedt van Indien that would
balance merchants’ interests in profit with the nobility’s traditional roles administering justice,
governing territories, and commanding forces in war. The final charter did not include this
proposal, but in accepting a prominent role for representatives of the States General in the
meetings of the Heren XIX it created the opportunity for what amounted to a standing committee
on West Indian affairs in The Hague staffed by noblemen and influential delegates at the States
General. At the same time that the Prince of Orange, Frederik Hendrik, was centralizing power in
his own hands and pursuing broader dynastic ambitions in Europe, the WIC and its friends in the
States General worked in concert to conquer Iberian territories and exploit them to enhance the
wealth, power, and prestige of the Republic. Here Spanish examples were of paramount
importance, including to crucial debates over how to govern and populate colonies in the New
World. The Dutch did not only steal Iberian colonies, they stole the institutional models on
which these colonies were run. This is an important counterpoint to work on the influence of the
image of Venice as a stable, commercial republic.
At the same time, the States General and the ailing Prince were limited in what they
could to do on the company’s behalf. The provinces, and especially Holland, provided crucial
265

support to the WIC, but they also imposed important political and financial constraints. Although
on several occasions the company was promised annual subsidies, in practice these lapsed after
1633 and the company was left to cover the mounting costs of war, not least in Brazil. It did so
by raising additional private capital in the form of new shares and, later, interest-yielding bonds.
In effect, and from the very beginning, the entire project of New World conquest was to be
funded by private investment, in return for the granting of monopoly rights by the States
General. This took the form of a series of compromises, including the charter itself, the 1636
verhoging and subsequent decision to re-impose the company's monopoly on trade to Brazil, and
the renewal of the VOC charter in return for 1.5 million guilders to fund the relief. On the one
hand, the States General's limited ability to guarantee these monopolies in the face of private
merchant interests left the company perpetually on the edge of bankruptcy. On the other, the
opportunity for private initiative transformed the company’s conquests into a potential target for
speculative capital. It is interesting in this context to consider that the height of enthusiasm for
Brazil followed the Tulip Bubble by less than ten years, and popped just as quickly.
One of the important consequences of this approach to colonial management was that the
company's revenues from Africa, its most reliable area of operation, increasingly were used to
fund riskier undertakings in the New World—just as the Amsterdam merchants trading to Africa
had feared they would during the negotiations to create the WIC in the first two decades of the
seventeenth century. We have been taught to think of Africa as a source of labor, but this is only
part of the story. During the 1620s and early 1630s, the company derived considerable profits
from gold, ivory, and pepper; after 1636 the focus shifted to the trade in slaves. The slave trade
was initially conceived of as a means to populate Brazil and to offset the financial burdens of
expanding and defending the colony. But after the revolt in Pernambuco, the slave trade became
266

an activity in its own right, oriented both towards profit and towards new markets throughout the
Atlantic. Slave labor was perceived as “necessary” to the new system of plantation agriculture.
But Africa was also a source of wealth and profit, whether those profits were invested in stately
houses in cities like Middelburg or used to fund New World expansion.
The third substantive conclusion is that noblemen played a central role in the WIC. At
home they were investors, advocates, and facilitators, while abroad they served as colonial
administrators and military officers. The figure of Johan Maurits is well known, but behind him
there were others, such as Johan van Goch, Gerard van Arnhem, and Hendrik and Alexander van
der Capellen. These individuals set the tone for the meetings of the Heren XIX and, along with
Prince Maurits and Frederik Hendrik, helped to mediate otherwise debilitating disputes among
the company's five chambers. Merchants controlled decision-making in the chambers themselves
and made up the vast majority of the delegates to the Heren XIX, but in the latter body noblemen
often cast the deciding vote. In the mid-seventeenth century the nobility were present not only as
an aspiration for second- and third-generation merchants; they were present in the flesh—at
court, in the corridors and meeting chambers of the provincial assemblies and the States General,
and in the boardroom of the WIC. This offers an important corrective, especially for English
language scholarship in which the nobility is often invisible, and serves as a basis for a fuller
comparative treatment of European overseas expansion.
Together, these three findings permit an alternative interpretation for the collapse of
Dutch Brazil. As the dissertation has demonstrated, up to and including 1645, Brazil enjoyed
broad political support within the Dutch elite and, despite serious challenges, plans were being
set into motion to integrate the colony with other conquests and to revive a profitable sugar
industry. What stopped these developments was the Portuguese revolt, an event that Johan
267

Maurits predicted and which was not launched until more than a year after his departure. At a
structural level, conflicts between central authority and the nobility, on the one hand, and
merchant interests, on the other, were a recurrent theme in the history of the WIC, stretching
back to the discussions over a Raedt van Indien in the late-1610s. Merchants were interested in
overseas conquest, but not in ceding authority to noblemen who might restrict their independence
or negatively impact the profitability of their trade. Noblemen, in turn, were unwilling to subject
themselves to management by people they perceived to be their social inferiors.
Although the battle between Holland and the Prince of Orange began to tilt in Holland's
favor during the early 1640s, in 1645 neither side was powerful enough to impose its own vision
for imperial management on the other. This balance of forces created a space in which contingent
factors played an important role: the effort to replace Johan Maurits, whose success derived at
least in part from his courtly display and military leadership, took more than two years as
merchants and noblemen could not reach agreement and suitable candidates politely declined the
position. We can only guess what would have happened had Maurits been permitted to stay in
Brazil after 1644, as he indicated he wanted to do, or if either Jacques Specx or Alexander van
der Capellen had accepted the office of President and arrived in time either to discourage the
plotters of the revolt or to effectively crush it. This was evidently beyond Wolter Schonenborch,
who equivocated at a crucial time, delaying the new council's departure by almost six months,
and in any case proved ineffective once he arrived in Brazil. The WIC famously struggled to
recruit settlers to this and its other colonies, but it also struggled to recruit qualified leadership,
and in the summer and fall of 1645 it was the latter, as much as the former, that doomed Dutch
Brazil. It was this failure that is ultimately responsible for the familiar image of the sober Dutch
merchant, and for the new world he helped to create.
268

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