Mr Michael Atherton

Mr Michael Atherton 

IPCC investigation into the granting, 

management and review of his shotgun 

certificate and firearm licence by Durham 

Constabulary 

Independent Investigation 

Final Report 

IPCC Reference: 2012/000063

IPCC Final Report Mr Michael Atherton 

Contents 

Redaction Code Index ....................................................................................................... 3 

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 4 

Terms of reference ............................................................................................................ 4 

Subjects to the investigation .............................................................................................. 5 

Chronological summary of events ..................................................................................... 6 

Michael Atherton’s application for a shotgun certificate ................................................ 6 

Michael Atherton’s application for a firearm licence .................................................... 16 

Review of Michael Atherton’s licences in September 2008 ......................................... 20 

Legislation, policies and procedures ............................................................................... 29 

Firearms Act 1968 ....................................................................................................... 29 

Home Office Guidance: Firearms Law (Guidance to the Police) 2002 ........................ 31 

Administration of Firearms and Explosive Licensing Procedural Good Practice guide 

2002 ............................................................................................................................ 33 

Force Policy ................................................................................................................ 33 

Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 34 

Michael Atherton’s application for a shotgun certificate .............................................. 34 

Michael Atherton’s application for a firearm licence .................................................... 37 

Review of Michael Atherton’s licences in September 2008 ......................................... 39 

Copy for publication Page 2 of 42


Redaction Code Index 

Code Meaning 

A Information is personal or sensitive personal data. 

B 

Disclosure of information may prejudice law enforcement by 

revealing law enforcement techniques. 

C Non-disclosure is for the purposes of the prevention or 

detection of crime, or the apprehension or prosecution of 

offenders. 

D Information subject to legal professional privilege. 

E Information is relevant to, or may be used in, any actual or 

prospective criminal proceedings. 

F Non-disclosure is required on proportionality grounds. 

G Non disclosure is otherwise necessary in the public interest. 



Introduction 

1. This report concerns the way in which Durham Constabulary granted 

a shotgun certificate and firearms licence to Mr Michael Atherton 

who subsequently used a registered weapon to kill Susan 

McGoldrick, Alison Turnbull, Tanya Turnbull and himself on 1 

January 2012. There were a number of incidents known to Durham 

Constabulary which should have cast doubt upon Mr Atherton’s 

suitability to hold firearms. 

2. Further, following an incident in September 2008, Mr Atherton’s 

firearms were removed from his possession which led to 

consideration being given to the revocation of his certificate and 

licence. A decision was taken to return his weapons where they 

remained until the tragic shootings in 2012. 

3. Durham Constabulary referred the case to the IPCC following the 

deaths and it was decided that there should be an independent 

investigation into the handling of Mr Atherton’s lawful access to 

firearms and the associated practices employed by the force. The 

IPCC investigation is focused entirely upon these matters and does 

not deal with the deaths that resulted; that work being carried out by 

Durham Constabulary on behalf of HM Coroner. 

Terms of reference 

4. The terms of reference for the investigation were: 

1. To investigate the circumstances surrounding the granting of 

shotgun and firearms licence(s) to Mr Atherton as follows: 

a) To examine the assessments made following Mr Atherton’s 

initial application for a shotgun certificate in 2006 and 

firearms certificate in 2008 and the subsequent approval 

and granting of licences to Mr Atherton. With particular 

regard for Mr Atherton’s background including previous 

reports of domestic incidents and local and national 

policies, protocols and guidance in relation to the 

administration of firearms licensing, in place at that time. 

b) To examine the circumstances surrounding subsequent 

reviews of Mr Atherton’s licence(s), including the police 

response to reports of domestic incidents, having regard for 

local and national policies, protocols and guidance in 

relation to the administration of firearms licensing, in place 

at those times 

c) To examine the decision to return shotguns and firearms to 



Mr Atherton, after their temporary removal in 2008 

d) The IPCC will not investigate the police response to the 

incident on 1 January 2012. Any enquiries falling outside of 

the IPCC remit will be investigated by Durham 

Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Coroner. The IPCC lead 

investigator will ensure that a copy of the IPCC 

investigation report is disclosed to Her Majesty’s Coroner 

2. To assist in fulfilling the state’s investigative obligation arising 

under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by 

ensuring as far as possible that: 

a) the investigation is independent on a practical as well as an 

institutional level; 

b) the full facts are brought to light and any lessons are 

learned. 

3. To identify whether any subject of the investigation may have 

committed a criminal offence and, if appropriate, send a copy 

of the investigation report to the Director of Public 

Prosecutions (DPP) for him to decide whether criminal 

proceedings are to be brought. 

4. To identify whether any subject of the investigation may have 

breached their standards of professional behaviour. If such a 

breach may have occurred, to determine whether that breach 

amounts to misconduct or gross misconduct and whether there 

is a case to answer. 

5. To consider and report on whether there is organisational 

learning, including: 

whether any change in policy or practice would help to 

prevent a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct 

investigated; 

whether the incident highlights any good practice that 

should be disseminated. 

Subjects to the investigation 

5. Schedule 3, Paragraph 19B (1) of the Police Reform Act 2002 

requires that if during the course of an investigation there is an 

indication that a criminal offence may have been committed, or any 

person has behaved in a manner which would justify the bringing of 

disciplinary proceedings, then the investigation must be declared 

subject to ‘special requirements’ and an assessment made regarding 

the severity of the alleged conduct. Once the severity of the alleged 

conduct has been assessed the Police (Complaints and Misconduct 



Regulations) 2004 also requires that any officer whose conduct has 

fallen below the Standards of Professional Behaviour is served with a 

Regulation 14A Notice. The investigation found no evidence of the 

conduct described above which would justify the investigation being 

declared subject to ‘special requirements’ or the service of a 

Regulation 14A Notice against any officer, in this instance. 

6. The majority of the officers and police staff involved in the decisionmaking 

process, including those who have since retired from the 

force, fully cooperated with the IPCC and provided witness accounts 

in relation to their involvement. The only officer who declined to 

provide a statement was former Police Constable Damian Cobain. 

Chronological summary of events 

Michael Atherton’s application for a shotgun certificate 

7. On 10 October 2006, Michael Atherton made an application to 

Durham Constabulary for a shotgun certificate. The file relating to this 

application shows that on that day an internal memorandum was sent 

to the Special Branch, by the Firearms Licensing Unit (FLU), 

requesting a routine check be conducted in relation to Mr Atherton’s 

application. On 11 October 2006, the Special Branch responded by 

indicating that according to their records, they held no intelligence in 

relation to Mr Atherton. 

8. On his application form, Mr Atherton indicated that he had not been 

convicted of any offence. The Police National Computer (PNC) record 

holds indefinite records of a person’s convictions both pending and 

concluded. No previous convictions were listed on Mr Atherton’s 

record. However, it does show that on 24 April 2004 he was arrested 

and cautioned for a common assault on his partner Susan 

McGoldrick. The guidance notes on the application form state that an 

applicant must disclose any previous convictions, including absolute 

and conditional discharges. The form does not make reference to the 

disclosure of cautions. 

9. Durham Constabulary’s systems also indicated that Mr Atherton had 

been brought to the attention of the force on four separate occasions 

for domestic incidents involving Ms McGoldrick. The IPCC obtained 

copies of all incident logs and domestic incident reports relating to 

those occurrences. The circumstances of those domestic incidents 

are as follows; 

10. 14 July 2002 Police were called to a domestic disturbance at the 

home address of Mr Atherton and Ms McGoldrick, as a result of an 

alcohol fuelled argument. The record of the incident shows that Ms 

McGoldrick is alleged to have thrown a bowl, containing food, at Mr 



1 Redaction Code A 


Atherton who reacted by threatening to hit her. No allegation of an 

assault was made or recorded by the attending officers; however Mr 

Atherton was arrested to prevent a breach of the peace. He was later 

released with no further action. 

11. 26 April 2003 Police were called to a domestic disturbance at their 

home address. This followed a telephone call from a friend of Ms 

McGoldrick who stated that Mr Atherton had pushed Ms McGoldrick 

down a flight of stairs following an argument. Police attended and 

both Mr Atherton and Ms McGoldrick were found to be intoxicated. Mr 

Atherton was recorded as having scratches to his face and Ms 

McGoldrick was found at the bottom of the stairs with an injury to her 

arm. She informed the officers that she had accidentally fallen down 

the stairs during the argument and declined to provide a statement. 

12. No arrests were made on that occasion and, although an ambulance 

attended, Ms McGoldrick refused to go to the hospital for a check up 

and left the address to stay with a friend. The record relating to this 

incident also contains a note from one of the responding officers, 

Officer A 1 , indicating her concerns for Ms McGoldrick. Officer A 2 also 

recorded that Ms McGoldrick was displaying ‘classic symptoms of 

emotional abuse’. Police left details of a refuge for Ms McGoldrick to 

make contact for advice and support. 

13. 31 August 2003 Police were called following a domestic dispute. Ms 

McGoldrick alleged that she had been assaulted by Mr Atherton on a 

night out and, after making her way home separately, found that he 

had locked her out of the family home. Police forced entry to the 

address and Mr Atherton, described by the attending officers, as 

being in an intoxicated state, was arrested on suspicion of assault. 

Although Ms McGoldrick made a statement alleging she had been 

assaulted and had sustained injuries to her arm, she declined to 

make a formal complaint or to cooperate with the police investigation. 

Mr Atherton was interviewed and later released with no further action. 

14. 24 April 2004 Police were called to a domestic disturbance at their 

home address by Ms McGoldrick who stated that she had been 

beaten up by her boyfriend. Police described both Mr Atherton and 

Ms McGoldrick as being intoxicated. Ms McGoldrick alleged that Mr 

Atherton had dragged her out of bed, by her hair, and repeatedly 

kicked her in the ribs. Mr Atherton was arrested on suspicion of 

assault and later cautioned. 

15. Mr Atherton’s application for a shotgun certificate was allocated to 

Former Police Constable and Firearms Enquiry Officer (FEO) 1898 



Damian Cobain who carried out an initial assessment by way of a 

home visit and an interview. PC Cobain declined the opportunity to 

provide a statement to the IPCC. 

16. Records show that PC Cobain completed a standard enquiry form 

outlining the results of his assessment. The enquiry form indicates 

that various checks in relation to Mr Atherton were conducted, 

including a PNC and domestic violence check which both produced a 

record of previous police contact in relation to Mr Atherton. PC 

Cobain also recorded the following in the general comments section: 

‘Applicant recorded on PNC for assault (not disclosed) on partner in 

2004, various domestic incidents and previous arrests listed on 

protect, applicant claims he does not drink and has not done so for a 

while now, partner present upon re interview no apparent concerns 

on her behalf, I think that having so many domestic incidents and a 

caution only two years ago Mr Atherton should be sent a warning 

letter with regard to conduct if granted a certificate…’ 

17. Question 29 on the enquiry form asks whether the application is 

recommended. PC Cobain indicated ‘Yes’ to this question. The 

enquiry form is dated 31 October 2006. 

18. The National Firearms Licensing Management System (NFLMS) is a 

register of all persons who have applied for, or have been granted, a 

certificate for a firearm or shotgun. It is used by all police forces in 

England and Wales and updates the Police National Computer with 

details of individuals who own firearms and / or shotguns, in addition 

to anyone who has been refused a certificate or had one revoked. 

There is also a facility on the system for recording any relevant 

information in relation to a certificate holder on the system. 

19. Mr Atherton’s NFLMS record shows that on the 25 October 2006, PC 

Cobain informed the Firearms Licensing Unit, during a telephone call, 

that after interviewing Mr Atherton he had checked PROTECT which 

had indicated ‘3 hits’. PROTECT is a recording system previously 

used by Durham Constabulary to record all aspects of safeguarding 

and protecting vulnerable people, including domestic incidents. 

According to the NFLMS entry on 25 October 2006 PC Cobain also 

informed the FLU, in the same telephone call, of his intention to reinterview 

Mr Atherton regarding these incidents. Although the enquiry 

form dated 31 October 2006 refers to the re-interview of Mr Atherton, 

there are no further entries on the NFLMS record stipulating when 

that further visit took place. 

20. Mr Atherton’s shotgun file contains copies of the PROTECT reports 

regarding the aforementioned domestic incidents. No other reports or 

incident logs are contained in the file. The PROTECT printouts only 

provide a brief summary of each of the incidents and do not provide 

the same level of detail as the domestic incident reports. 






21. As former PC Cobain declined to provide a statement, it has not been 

possible to establish what information he used to inform his decision 

or to examine his deliberation process. It was also not possible to 

ascertain whether he contacted the domestic violence unit or 

attempted to obtain the full circumstances regarding the incidents 

during his assessment of Mr Atherton’s application. 

22. Mr Atherton made his application for a shotgun certificate some two 

and half years after the last reported domestic incident. Mr Atherton 

was described by the police in all four previous domestic incidents, as 

being in an intoxicated state. On his application form, Mr Atherton 

stated that he did not suffer from any medical conditions, including 

any alcohol related conditions. During his interview with PC Cobain, 

he explained how he had abstained from drinking for a period of time. 

23. Mr Atherton also specified that any guns would be stored in a gun 

cabinet installed at his father’s address. Under the ‘security’ heading 

on the enquiry form, PC Cobain recorded ‘None in place’. He 

contradicts this by indicating on the form that the security 

arrangements are satisfactory. Contained within Mr Atherton’s 

shotgun file is an email dated 31 January 2007 from Officer B 3 

requesting that Officer C 4 conduct a visit to Mr Atherton’s father’s 

address to conduct a security inspection. Officer C 5 later endorsed 

the email on 6 February 2007, to show that a security inspection had 

been conducted, but in relation to Mr Atherton’s home address. There 

is no further record or formal documentation as to when and why 

there was a change of address from that indicated on Mr Atherton’s 

initial application. 

24. Background checks were conducted in relation to the 

countersignatory listed on Mr Atherton’s application form. No adverse 

issues were found in relation to the referee. Mr Atherton had indicated 

on his application that the reason for requiring a shotgun certificate 

was to partake in clay pigeon shooting. Checks carried out by PC 

Cobain confirmed that Mr Atherton was a member of a clay pigeon 

shooting club, therefore satisfying Mr Atherton’s ‘good reason’ for 

acquiring a shotgun. 

25. Following PC Cobain’s enquiries, Mr Atherton’s application was 

passed to Karen Bromley, the Firearms Licensing Supervisor (FLS), 

for review. Contained within Mr Atherton’s shotgun file is a 

handwritten ‘post-it’ note written by Ms Bromley which states: 




‘4 domestics – last one 24/4/04 – was cautioned for assault. Still 

resides with partner & son & daughter 6 . Would like to refuse – have 

we sufficient info – refuse re public safety.’ 

26. Following her consideration of the application, on 18 January 2007 

Ms Bromley passed the file to the Deputy Force Solicitor Stephen 

Mooney for his consideration and legal advice. Mr Mooney 

subsequently produced a memorandum, dated 26 January 2007, 

outlining his legal advice. 

27. In his memorandum Mr Mooney refers to having been provided with 

papers in order to formulate his advice; however there is no record of 

exactly what information or incident reports he received. Mr Mooney 

concluded that there were two serious incidents of domestic violence, 

the most recent being some 21 months previously, none of which had 

resulted in a conviction. He described it as a ‘borderline case’ due to 

the fact that Mr Atherton had shown irresponsible behaviour. He 

acknowledged that the violence was some time ago and that Mr 

Atherton had not shown a propensity to use weapons during any 

incident. He also referred to the fact that Mr Atherton had stopped 

drinking and that Ms McGoldrick had displayed no concerns during 

the interview with PC Cobain. His memorandum also states; 

‘…In addition, if ATHERTON appealed any decision to refuse his 

application then I fear we would hit an evidential cul-de-sac as Miss 

McGoldrick would be unwilling to give evidence against her partner.’ 

28. Mr Mooney recommended that Mr Atherton’s application be granted, 

with a very stern warning letter regarding the consequences should 

there be any relapse in his behaviour. 

29. Ms Bromley then passed the decision upwards to Chief 

Superintendent Carole Thompson. Following a discussion with 

C/Supt Thompson she recorded the following on Mr Mooney’s 

decision report: 

‘Spoken to Ch/Supt Thompson 31/1/01. OK to grant.’ 

30. On 7 February 2007, Mr Atherton’s shotgun certificate was granted. 

The following day, Ms Bromley sent him a letter outlining the granting 

of his certificate which included the following warning: 

‘…Having reviewed the details of the incidents, and although I 

consider your actions to be unbecoming of that of a certificate holder, 

indicating evidence of irresponsible and uncontrollable behaviour, I 

note that the last domestic report was in 2004 and there has been no 

further reports since that date …should I receive any further reports of 

this nature, or any matter that discredits your character, I will give 

immediate consideration to the revocation of your certificate… ‘ 



Karen Bromley 

31. Prior to leaving the FLU in 2009, Karen Bromley was the Firearms 

Licensing Supervisor (FLS) within the unit. At the time of Mr 

Atherton’s shotgun application Ms Bromley was acting up in the role 

of Firearms Licensing Manager (FLM), in the absence of the usual 

FLM Laraine Ellison. Ms Bromley provided statements to the IPCC on 

29 February 2012 and 22 March 2012. 

32. Ms Bromley explained that as the supervisor she had line 

management responsibility for the clerical unit and the FEO’s. She 

also had responsibility for applications for shotgun certificates and 

grants, renewals and variations to firearms licences. She explained 

that she could make a decision on an application if she felt 

comfortable in making that decision. However, any contentious 

decisions would ordinarily be passed to the Firearms Licensing 

Manager (FLM) to assess. If an application was to be refused or a 

licence was to be revoked, then the FLM would compile a decision 

report setting out any recommendations for the decision of the Chief 

Superintendent. 

33. Ms Bromley explained that the unit worked to the Home Office 2002 

Firearms Law guidance and that Durham Constabulary had no local 

polices in place. 

34. Ms Bromley explained that when an application was received, it 

would be checked and processed by the clerical unit within the FLU, 

who would then pass the application to an FEO for a home visit and 

an enquiry form to be completed. She stated that although she had 

direct supervisory responsibility for the FEO’s, it was their 

responsibility to conduct any home visits and to carry out the 

necessary intelligence checks. Ms Bromley explained that prior to 

2007, only FEO’s had access to the PROTECT system so the unit 

was reliant upon them to provide such information. She explained that 

she could go back to a FEO, if it was felt that insufficient information 

had been provided following an assessment. 

35. Ms Bromley recalled that PC Damian Cobain was the FEO in this 

instance. She explained that any assessment of an applicant would 

be left to the judgement of the FEO who, during a home visit, would 

be expected to assess the family dynamics and to look out for any 

warning signs. She could not recall whether PC Cobain had liaised 

with the domestic violence unit. However, as PC Cobain had 

recorded there were no apparent issues with Mr Atherton’s partner; 

she stated that she had to take this assessment on face value, to 

trust that the information provided was factually correct and that all 

the necessary checks had been carried out. 



36. Ms Bromley explained that Mr Atherton would not have been 

penalised for non-disclosure of his caution, as this was a ‘grey area’ 

and was unclear on the application form. She also stated that it was 

not unusual for applicants not to consider a caution to be a conviction. 

37. Ms Bromley confirmed that the handwritten ‘post-it’ note belonged to 

her. She described how her usual practice was to place a note on the 

front of an enquiry form if there were any issues, in order to highlight 

to herself what her concerns were. She stated that the note was 

solely for her own purposes and was never intended to be a formal 

record of her rationale. She also explained that usual practice would 

have been to record any comment on a decision report or a signed 

entry on the FEO’s enquiry form. Ms Bromley could not recall who 

would have had sight of her note and why she did not complete a 

report in this instance. 

38. She explained that her reference to refusing on the grounds of ‘public 

safety’ was in relation to the fact that there were previous domestic 

incidents, during some of which Mr Atherton had displayed violent 

tendencies. As such, she did not consider him to be a fit and proper 

person to hold a licence. She also recognised that there was a period 

of time during which Mr Atherton had not come to the attention of the 

police. Ms Bromley therefore decided to seek the advice of Deputy 

Force Solicitor Stephen Mooney in order to ascertain from him 

whether they had sufficient evidence to refuse Mr Atherton’s 

application. When asked why she did not produce a separate report 

given that her recommendation differed from Mr Mooney’s, Ms 

Bromley felt that the guidance of the Force Solicitor would have 

superseded any decision of hers and that she would have acquiesced 

to his professional opinion. She therefore did not want to duplicate his 

report. 

39. Ms Bromley could not recall whether she brought her note to the 

attention of C/Supt Thompson during their discussion regarding the 

application. She subsequently sent Mr Atherton a warning letter dated 

8 February 2007 advising him that his shotgun certificate had been 

granted. When asked why the warning letter was sent out in her 

name given that her rationale differed from the Chief Superintendent, 

Ms Bromley explained that she worked to a chain of command and 

she would not have gone against a decision taken at the top of that 

chain. She further explained that it was part of her role to send out the 

warning letters. 

40. When asked about the change of address in relation to the storage of 

Mr Atherton’s shotguns from his father’s address, Ms Bromley could 

not recall receiving any formal notification in relation to this. 

Stephen Mooney 



41. On 1 March 2012, Deputy Force Solicitor Stephen Mooney agreed to 

be interviewed by the IPCC and a statement was obtained. Mr 

Mooney could not recall his involvement in this case but referred to a 

copy of the memorandum he produced, outlining his advice in relation 

to Mr Atherton’s application. 

42. Mr Mooney explained that the usual process would be for the FLU to 

prepare a detailed report when seeking legal advice. He assumed 

that the reason a report was not provided to him in this instance, was 

due to the temporary change in the role of FLM. He also explained 

that the FLU would usually request advice if they were uncomfortable 

with a particular applicant and were seeking advice around a decision 

to refuse or renew a certificate, or what Durham Constabulary’s 

prospects would be if a refusal or revocation were to be taken to 

appeal. 

43. In his advice, Mr Mooney refers to Mr Atherton’s application as being 

a ‘borderline case’. He explained that this would have been due to a 

number of factors, as outlined in his original memorandum. Mr 

Mooney stated that his advice was swayed towards granting a 

certificate, but he did indicate that any further relapse in behaviour 

should give rise to Durham Constabulary seriously considering 

revocation of his certificate. There was no record of the 

documentation supplied to Mr Mooney and he could not recall what 

information he used to assist in providing his legal advice. 

44. Mr Mooney explained that he approached his advice from the point of 

Durham Constabulary’s prospects, if it were to go to appeal, in 

addition to the FEO’s enquiries. He also stated that it was unlikely 

that Ms McGoldrick would have given evidence against Mr Atherton, 

as such his advice was that he feared Durham Constabulary would 

have ‘hit an evidential cul-de-sac’ had the case gone to appeal. 

45. He described how the Home Office 2002 Firearms Law guidance 

states that domestic violence and alcohol issues are only factors to 

be taken into consideration and each case has to be assessed on its 

own circumstances. He also stated that he would not necessarily treat 

a caution as a conviction, as it is not a finding by the court. 

46. Mr Mooney also described how the guidance sets out different tests 

for shotgun certificates and firearms licences. He explained that the 

test for firearms licences refers to the fitness to hold a licence, 

intemperate habits and being of unsound mind as well as the danger 

to public safety and peace, whereas the test for shotgun certificates 

only refers to the latter point. He stated that where possible he tries to 

apply as much of the guidance to both types of applications however 

he has to be mindful of the potential for legal challenges from the 

application of the firearms test to a shotgun applicant. 




47. Mr Mooney was shown the statement of Ms McGoldrick in relation to 

the 31 August 2003 domestic incident, in which she refers to being 

assaulted by Mr Atherton but refused to make a formal complaint. He 

was also shown the handwritten letter of Officer A 7 outlining her 

concerns. Mr Mooney could not recall being made aware of those 

documents; he also could not recall having previous sight of Karen 

Bromley’s note. 

48. Mr Mooney stated that he simply provided advice from a legal 

perspective and having regard for Durham Constabulary’s prospects 

on appeal, should the application have been refused. He explained it 

was the responsibility of the Firearms Licensing team to liaise with the 

Chief Superintendent in making a final decision, based on all the 

available evidence. 

Carole Thompson (formerly 186 Chief Superintendent) 

49. Chief Superintendent Carole Thompson retired from Durham 

Constabulary on 13 May 2010. She agreed to be interviewed by the 

IPCC and a statement was obtained on 15 March 2012. 

50. At the time of Mr Atherton’s application for a shotgun certificate Mrs 

Thompson had responsibility for the FLU. She described how the unit 

at that time was managed by FLM Laraine Ellison and also comprised 

of FLS, Karen Bromley, a small number of administrative clerks and a 

number of locally based FEO’s. Mrs Thompson stated that it was the 

responsibility of the FEO’s to interview individuals in relation to new 

applications and to carry out any necessary enquiries including 

undertaking intelligence checks, conducting home visits and 

assessing the security measures an applicant had in place. 

51. She explained that any contentious applications were passed to the 

Chief Superintendent, along with any applications to revoke or review 

a licence. She also explained that the authority to deal with such 

matters was delegated by the Chief Constable in a formal document 

issued by the Force Solicitor Stephen Mooney. Mrs Thompson 

recalled that the unit worked to the Home Office Firearms Law 

Guidance 2002. She also confirmed that there were no local policies 

either in relation to firearms licensing matters or regarding the role 

and remit of the FLU staff and officers. 

52. She clarified that matters would usually be referred to her in a 

decision report, compiled by the FLM. She also explained that legal 

advice would generally be sought where it was a borderline decision 

as to whether a certificate should be granted. 




53. Having had recent sight of Mr Atherton’s file, Mrs Thompson had a 

vague recollection of her involvement in the granting of his shotgun 

certificate in 2007. She recalled that at that time Karen Bromley was 

acting up in the role of FLM and that the process differed in that 

instance, in that initial advice had initially been sought by the Force 

Solicitor and there was no decision report from the FLM. She 

surmised that the absence of a decision report was probably due to 

the fact that legal advice had already been sought which covered all 

the relevant issues. 

54. Mrs Thompson also recalled that her rationale for granting Mr 

Atherton’s shotgun certificate had not been recorded and usual 

practice would be to record this on the bottom of the FLM’s decision 

report. As such she could not provide her definitive rationale for the 

decision to grant, but surmised that this was likely to have been due 

to the fact that Mr Atherton had disclosed that he had stopped 

drinking and was a member of a clay pigeon shooting club which 

indicated an element of responsible behaviour. She also cited the fact 

that no issues had been raised by Mr Atherton’s partner; although she 

recognised that there were no processes in place to speak to partners 

at that time. 

55. She explained that any issues around domestic violence would form 

part of the FEO’s research. Based on the contents of Mr Atherton’s 

shotgun file she stated that the research conducted by the FEO in 

that instance, comprised of the PROTECT printouts which provided a 

slightly different picture regarding the situation at that time. On 

reflection she now suspects that, in the majority of instances, 

information was obtained via the PROTECT system in the absence of 

any direct liaison with the domestic violence unit. 

56. When shown Ms McGoldrick’s statement in relation to the domestic 

incident on the 31 August 2003 and the handwritten letter of Officer 

A 8 Mrs Thompson stated that she was not aware of those documents 

but that she was reliant upon her staff to provide her with a complete 

and accurate file. 

57. She could not recall having sight of the note made by Karen Bromley 

but stated that it is evident that a conversation took place as this is 

indicated in Ms Bromley’s handwritten entry at the end of Stephen 

Mooney’s report. 

58. Mrs Thompson stated that the assessment of an applicant’s fitness to 

hold a certificate was reliant upon the interview by the FEO and was 

therefore taken and considered at face value alongside any referees. 

She explained that an applicant’s GP would only be written to if there 



was any indication of a medical issue, either disclosed on the 

application form or as a result of the FEO’s enquiries. She also stated 

that the fact that Mr Atherton did not disclose his caution would not 

have been a factor against him as it is not a conviction. 

59. Mrs Thompson also alluded to the fact that the criteria for establishing 

suitability for a shotgun certificate, is not as in-depth as that laid out 

for a firearms licence. As such she generally found the decision 

making processes around firearms much more clear cut. She further 

explained that the case law around shotgun certificates made the 

process particularly difficult and had there been an intention for them 

to be treated the same then those distinctions would not have been 

made. 

60. The possibility of an appeal upon refusal was not a primary factor for 

Mrs Thompson, however she did state that Stephen Mooney’s advice 

that they were unlikely to win any appeal, would have had some 

influence on the decision-making process. She also stated that the 

circumstances of each case were always considered on their own 

merits and that the final decision rested with her. 

Michael Atherton’s application for a firearm licence 

61. On 7 February 2008, Mr Atherton made an application to Durham 

Constabulary for a firearm licence. During the course of the 

investigation the IPCC obtained a copy of Mr Atherton’s firearms file 

held by Durham Constabulary. The file shows that upon receipt of his 

application a further Special Branch check was conducted. On 11 

February 2008, the Special Branch again responded by indicating 

that according to their records, they held no intelligence in relation to 

Mr Atherton. 

62. On his application form, Mr Atherton indicated that he had not been 

convicted of any offence. Mr Atherton’s PNC record shows an arrest 

for affray subsequent to the granting of his shotgun certificate. 

Records show that the incident which led to the arrest was not of a 

domestic nature and did not lead to a conviction. 

63. Former PC Damian Cobain was the FEO responsible for the 

assessment of Mr Atherton’s application for a firearm licence. On 18 

February 2008, PC Cobain completed a standard enquiry form in 

relation to his findings. 

64. Mr Atherton’s application form stated that he required a firearms 

licence for the purposes of vermin control and target shooting. PC 

Cobain indicated on his enquiry form that a land survey had been 

completed; that the land specified was suitable for the purposes 

stated and that Mr Atherton had permission to use it. PC Cobain also 






verified that Mr Atherton was a member of a gun club and conducted 

a security inspection of Mr Atherton’s home address, the indicated 

place of storage for the weapons and ammunition. 

65. Background checks were conducted in relation to the referees listed 

on Mr Atherton’s application form. No adverse issues were found. 

66. The enquiry form shows that various checks were conducted, which 

identified Mr Atherton’s arrest for affray in January 2008, in addition to 

the aforementioned domestic incidents. PC Cobain requested that 

further enquiries be made by the FLU in relation to Mr Atherton’s 

arrest for affray. He also clarified that there had been no recent or 

further reports of domestic incidents. He then recorded on his enquiry 

form that Mr Atherton appeared to be of ‘temperate habits’ and was 

not taking any medication. He also noted that Mr Atherton resided 

with his partner, who was involved in the previous domestic incidents, 

and his children. 

67. PC Cobain subsequently endorsed the enquiry form to show that Mr 

Atherton’s application for a firearm licence was recommended. 

68. On 11 April 2008, FLM Laraine Ellison emailed Officer D 9 , the officer 

who dealt with Mr Atherton as a result of his arrest for affray, 

requesting further information regarding the incident. A copy of the 

email is contained within Mr Atherton’s firearms file. 

69. Mr Atherton’s NFLMS record shows that on 15 May 2008, he 

attended Durham Constabulary Headquarters to enquire as to the 

status of his application. Following this visit, Ms Ellison sent a further 

request to Officer D 10 for information regarding Mr Atherton’s arrest 

for affray. On 20 May 2008, Officer D 11 replied to Ms Ellison clarifying 

that the reason for the initial police attendance was in relation to an 

unknown male who had been causing a nuisance. He further stated 

that Mr Atherton had placed a pre-emptive strike to the unknown male 

who looked as though he was about to hit Mr Atherton. He further 

added that Mr Atherton was unlucky to be arrested. 

70. On 28 May 2008 Ms Ellison recorded an entry on NFLMS stating that 

Mr Atherton’s application had been approved. The standard enquiry 

form held on Mr Atherton’s firearm file is not endorsed to show the 

date the application was granted. 

71. Mr Atherton’s firearm licence was subsequently issued along with a 

further warning, in the form of a second letter from Ms Ellison. The 

letter made reference to Mr Atherton’s recent arrest for affray and the 



previous warning, regarding his behaviour, given with the issue of his 

shotgun certificate. Ms Ellison confirmed that Mr Atherton was 

permitted to retain his shotgun certificate and that his application for a 

firearm certificate was approved. The letter also included a warning 

regarding his future behaviour and possible revocation of his 

certificates should any further reports be received by the unit. 

72. The conditions of Mr Atherton’s firearm certificate permitted him to 

acquire firearms for the purposes of vermin control and target 

shooting at a Home Office approved shooting club. He later applied to 

vary his certificate to include the shooting of deer and fox which was 

also granted. 

Statement of Laraine Ellison 

73. On 11 April 2012, Laraine Ellison agreed to be interviewed by the 

IPCC and a statement was obtained. Ms Ellison was the Firearms 

Licensing Manager for the FLU at the time of Mr Atherton’s 

application for a firearms licence. Ms Ellison has been the FLM for 

Durham Constabulary, since June 1991. 

74. Ms Ellison clarified that as the FLM she has responsibility for the dayto 

day management of the unit and overall supervisory responsibility 

for the staff within the unit including the FEO’s. She also explained 

that any problematic files are brought to her attention. 

75. Ms Ellison stated that usual procedure upon receipt of an application 

would be for this to be checked for accuracy by the administrative 

team within the FLU. The application would then be passed to the 

relevant FEO based out on division for further enquiries. She 

explained that the FEO’s are responsible for interviewing the 

applicant; conducting relevant background, intelligence and PNC 

checks; verifying any security arrangements and establishing that the 

applicant has the necessary permission to use the land stated on 

their application or the relevant club membership where indicated. 

76. Ms Ellison described how an application can be granted by the FLU 

where there are no issues. She explained that the authority to do so 

is contained within their job descriptions and that the unit also has the 

authority to use the Chief Constable’s stamp in respect of rubber 

stamping the certificates themselves, although she was unsure as to 

where that authority came from. 

77. Ms Ellison specified that the guidance the unit worked to at the time 

of Mr Atherton’s application and continues to work to is the Home 

Office Firearms Law Guidance 2002 and the ACPO Procedural Good 

Guidance 2002. 

78. Having had recent sight of the files relating to Mr Atherton, in order to 



refresh her recollection of the circumstances, Ms Ellison stated that 

Mr Atherton’s application and PC Cobain’s enquiry form had shown 

that he had ‘good reason’ for requiring a firearms licence. She 

explained that Mr Atherton had indicated that the purpose of requiring 

a firearms licence was for vermin control and he also had the required 

permission to use the land specified on his application. She also 

explained that PC Cobain had also established that he was a member 

of a shooting club; as such his ‘good reason’ was satisfied. 

79. Ms Ellison could not recall why Mr Atherton’s application had been 

referred to her although she explained that any contentious issues 

would usually be passed to her. She surmised that this was probably 

due to Mr Atherton’s previous domestic incidents and his recent 

arrest for affray. She could not recall whether details of the domestic 

incidents were supplied to her, but explained that they could already 

have been held on his file, as these had been subject to previous 

assessment in relation to his shotgun application. 

80. Apart from her email dated 11 April 2008 requesting further 

information regarding Mr Atherton’s arrest for affray, Ms Ellison could 

not recall having any further conversation with the officer who dealt 

with him. She also could not recall whether any attempts were made 

to establish whether Mr Atherton had consumed alcohol at the time of 

the incident. 

81. Ms Ellison recalled Mr Atherton’s attendance at headquarters 

regarding his application. She explained that Durham Constabulary 

has a service level agreement to process an application and to make 

a decision within 56 days and that Mr Atherton’s application had 

exceeded the 56 days. She recalled that it was a brief visit and that 

Mr Atherton understood the reasons for the delays. She also recalled 

that no pressure was placed on her and that his visit had no bearing 

on the subsequent granting of his licence. 

82. Ms Ellison confirmed that she made the decision to grant Mr 

Atherton’s licence and it was not passed up to the Chief 

Superintendent, because she felt comfortable dealing with it. Ms 

Ellison explained that there had been no further action following Mr 

Atherton’s arrest for affray, and there were no issues with regards to 

Mr Atherton’s ‘good reason’ for requiring a firearm. She also 

explained that the previous domestic incidents had already been 

assessed, by the Designated Officer at the time of his shotgun 

application. Therefore the only other decision was whether Mr 

Atherton was a danger to public safety. As Ms Ellison did not feel that 

he presented a danger at that time, she made the decision to grant 

his licence. 

83. Ms Ellison explained that it was not normal practice as the FLM to 

record her rationale in relation to the granting of a licence. She 













clarified that the only reference to her decision was the entry on 

NFLMS dated 28 May 2008 which indicated that Mr Atherton’s licence 

had been granted and that a final warning letter had been issued. 

84. Ms Ellison described how she issued Mr Atherton with a warning as a 

means of making him aware that his application had required 

additional assessment, due to the fact that he had come to police 

attention. She stated that this was normal practice and could not 

recall why she had referred to this on his NFLMS record as a final 

warning letter or what her thought processes were at that time. She 

also could not recall how the warning letter was delivered or whether 

it had simply been sent to Mr Atherton along with his certificate. 

Review of Michael Atherton’s licences in September 2008 

85. Approximately 11.40pm on 10 September 2008, police were called to 

Mr Atherton’s home address following a call from his partner Susan 

McGoldrick. The incident log notes that Ms McGoldrick reported how 

Mr Atherton had threatened to shoot his head off. This followed an 

altercation involving them both and Ms McGoldrick’s sister. Ms 

McGoldrick also informed the police that he was the holder of a gun 

licence. 

86. Mr Atherton’s two children, aged 14 and 16 12 , were present in the 

house at the time. Person A 13 was reported to be upstairs retrieving 

the key for the gun cabinet. The call handler advised Ms McGoldrick 

to get herself and the children out of the address. 

87. The police later contacted Person A 14 who had gone to his 15 

grandparent’s home. Person A 16 confirmed that he 17 had the keys to 

the gun cabinet in his 18 possession and believed the cabinet to still 

be locked. Person A 19 reported entering the bedroom and seeing Mr 

Atherton sat on the bed crying. Person A 20 also stated that he 21 

believed Mr Atherton to have made the threat in the heat of the 

moment. 

88. NFLMS and PNC checks were conducted which established that Mr 

Atherton was a current shotgun and firearms certificate holder and 




armed police were deployed to the address. After speaking to Mr 

Atherton, who was described as being fully compliant and not armed, 

police removed all his firearms from the address and Mr Atherton was 

arrested for a Breach of the Peace. A copy of the force SLEUTH 

domestic abuse report regarding the incident indicates that at the time 

of his arrest, Mr Atherton was found to be drunk in bed. 

89. At 12.22am on 11 September 2008, some 40 minutes following the 

initial call to police, Officer E 22 informed Chief Superintendent Ian 

Macdonald, and FLM Laraine Ellison, by email of the incident and the 

fact that Mr Atherton’s gun had been removed for safekeeping. There 

is no mention in this email whether any of Mr Atherton’s certificates 

had also been seized. 

90. Mr Atherton was taken to Peterlee police station. His custody record 

shows that he was initially assessed by the Custody Sergeant as 

being heavily intoxicated. Mr Atherton denied having any self harm 

issues and denied making such a threat. His detention was 

authorised and he was placed on appropriate levels of observation. 

Mr Atherton was subsequently released with no further action. 

91. On 12 September 2008, Mr Atherton contacted the FLU to ask when 

his guns could be returned to him. The NFLMS entry in relation to this 

contact indicates that Mr Atherton was informed that the unit was 

awaiting further information from the officer in the case before making 

a decision regarding whether his guns could be returned. On the 

same day a further entry was made on NFLMS by Ms Ellison 

indicating that Mr Atherton’s file had been referred to her as the FLM. 

She also noted that Mr Atherton had received two previous warnings 

since the granting of his shotgun certificate in 2006, for previous 

domestic incidents and his arrest for affray. 

92. On 3 October 2008, FLM Ms Ellison wrote to Mr Atherton to inform 

him that the FLU had been notified of the removal of his firearms and 

shotguns and that his suitability was now subject to investigation. On 

24 October 2008, Mr Atherton contacted the FLU requesting to clean 

his guns. He was informed that this would not be possible and that a 

decision was still being made in relation to his suitability to retain his 

certificates. A further entry was made on NFLMS with regards to this 

contact. 

93. Ms Ellison subsequently compiled a decision report regarding the 

continued suitability of Mr Atherton to hold his licences, for the 

attention of Chief Superintendent Ian Macdonald. The report is signed 

and dated 27 October 2008. It outlines the certificates held and guns 

possessed by Mr Atherton. It also outlines his certificate history 





including his previous domestic disputes and arrest for affray in 

addition to the circumstances of the recent incident and contact to 

date. Ms Ellison concluded her report by drawing attention to the fact 

that Mr Atherton was already subject to two previous warnings. She 

stated that although the incident on 10 September did not involve any 

acts of violence, the possible outcome of events was unknown, had it 

not been for the quick thinking/actions of Person A 23 . She also 

questioned whether Mr Atherton’s verbal threat to shoot himself was 

a cry for attention, owing to his distress at the time. Ms Ellison then 

made the following recommendation; 

‘My initial assessment of all known factors would err towards the 

revocation of both firearm and shotgun certificates registered to 

ATHERTON. However, I would recommend that a final stern and 

clear warning letter be personally served to Mr ATHERTON… 

additionally supported by a verbal warning…together with the return 

of guns and firearm certificate (the shotgun certificate was not 

removed by the local officer at the time of the incident).’ 

94. Ms Ellison’s decision report was then passed to C/Supt Macdonald. 

On 10 November 2008, he added his decision to the report: 

‘I note with some concern the pattern of behaviour exhibited by the 

certificate holder however I have decided that the proportionate 

response is to send a final letter warning ATHERTON about his future 

behaviour.’ 

95. A final warning letter was sent to Mr Atherton acknowledging that it 

was the third occasion there had been a need to write to him 

regarding his behaviour. It also advised him that any further reports 

indicating any form of irresponsible or irrational or uncontrollable 

behaviour would result in the immediate revocation of his certificates. 

The letter is signed by C/Supt Macdonald and dated 18 November 

2008. 

96. A further entry was placed on NFLMS to show that Mr Atherton’s 

guns were returned to him on 24 November by Officer F 24 . 

Statement of Laraine Ellison 

97. At the time of the review of Mr Atherton’s licences following the 

seizure of his weapons in September 2008, Ms Ellison was the 

Firearms Licensing Manager within the FLU. 

98. Ms Ellison had no recollection of how she was notified that Mr 

Atherton’s weapons had been seized but upon recently viewing the 





file noted the email from Officer E 25 . She explained that the expected 

procedure would be for the unit to receive the full circumstances of 

events that led to the seizure of the guns and that Officer E’s 26 email 

would not have been considered sufficient notification. She could not 

recall at what point the unit received the full circumstances of the 

incident. 

99. Ms Ellison explained that usual procedure would be to collate all 

relevant information and produce a decision report for the 

consideration of the Designated Officer. She could not recall what 

information she relied on to inform her report or whether there was 

any liaison with the officers who dealt with the incident on 10 

September. She also could not recall whether any updated 

intelligence or background checks were completed or if there was any 

liaison with the domestic violence team. She did state that information 

regarding the incident would have been accessible via the incident 

logs. 

100. When asked what checks were conducted in relation to Mr Atherton’s 

partner and any concerns she may have had following the seizure of 

the guns, Ms Ellison explained that it was not usual procedure to do 

so at that time. 

101. Ms Ellison could not recall whether any action was taken to retrieve 

Mr Atherton’s shotgun certificate. She also could not recall whether 

she directed any action to be taken to recover the certificate. Ms 

Ellison stated that the FLU must have been in possession of the 

firearms licence given that this was referred to in her report. However 

she could not account for why there was no formal record of its 

receipt or return to Mr Atherton. 

102. Ms Ellison confirmed that no further interview or home visit of Mr 

Atherton took place to reassess his continued suitability to hold a 

licence and that no request was made for medical information via his 

General Practitioner in relation to his threat to self-harm. She 

explained that this would not have been the process at that time. She 

also stated that the Designated Officer could have requested further 

information if he was not satisfied with the enquiries that had been 

made. 

103. When asked how she ensured Mr Atherton was fit to hold a licence 

Ms Ellison recalled obtaining the details of the incident on 10 

September, together with Mr Atherton’s previous history, but could 

not recall how she reached the recommendation to return his guns. 

She stated that her rationale would have been as it is recorded in her 




decision report. Ms Ellison’s recommendation was referred to Chief 

Superintendent Macdonald who made the final decision to send Mr 

Atherton a final warning letter. She explained that she was likely to 

have drafted the letter for C/Supt Macdonald’s approval. Ms Ellison 

stated that her instruction in accordance with her decision report was 

for the final warning to be hand delivered supported by a verbal 

warning upon the return of Mr Atherton’s guns. She could not confirm 

who delivered the final warning or whether her instructions were 

carried out. 

104. When asked what checks were carried out to establish how Person 

A 27 came to have access to the keys to the gun cabinet at the time of 

the incident, Ms Ellison could not recall any enquiries taking place 

around this. 

Statement of Chief Superintendent 1179 Ian Macdonald 

105. Prior to leaving the FLU in July 2009, Chief Superintendent Ian 

Macdonald was the Designated Officer for the unit with the delegated 

authority from the Chief Constable. He agreed to be interviewed by 

the IPCC and a statement was obtained on 21 March 2012. 

106. During the time he had responsibility for the unit, C/Supt Macdonald 

explained that the FLU was managed by FLM Laraine Ellison. He 

recalled that the unit was made up of approximately three Firearms 

Licensing Clerks, a FLS, who at that time was Karen Bromley and 

approximately four locally based FEO’s. 

107. C/Supt Macdonald explained that all responsibility for decisionmaking 

around firearms licences and shotgun certificates fell to him, 

but as a general rule the FLU tended to seek his advice where there 

were issues around an applicant or if there was likely to be a 

revocation or refusal. In such instances the circumstances would be 

set out in a decision report for his attention. C/Supt Macdonald stated 

that a decision report would always be accompanied by the original 

file relating to that particular individual. He further stated that if a file 

lacked detail then he would request that this be addressed, but that 

there was a degree of reliance upon the staff within the unit to provide 

him with the relevant information. 

108. He confirmed that in 2008 the FLU worked to the Home Office 2002 

Firearms Law Guidance. He was not aware of any local guidance in 

place at that time. He also stated that the unit did refer to case law to 

assist them in the decision-making process, but at times found it 

contradictory and confusing to apply. 



109. With regards to the incident on 10 September 2008, C/Supt 

Macdonald recalled that the FLU was informed within 40 minutes of 

the incident occurring that this had involved the seizure of firearms. 

He explained that in 2008 there was no automated operational link 

between the command and control system and the NFLMS. As such 

the fact that a licence holder had been brought to the attention of 

police would not automatically be apparent and further searches were 

only conducted where there was a known threat or intelligence 

around weapons. C/Supt Macdonald also explained that there were 

no formal policies or procedures in relation to the optimum times for 

the notification of such incidents to the FLU. 

110. He clarified that Mr Atherton’s certificates should have been removed 

at the time of the incident, but explained that he was only made 

aware of this fact in November 2008 when he received Laraine 

Ellison’s decision report. He stated that if the FLU had identified an 

issue around the removal of certificates then his expectation would 

have been for the FLU to have taken steps to remedy this, by sending 

an FEO round to Mr Atherton’s address. He could not recall enquiring 

with Laraine Ellison around what action the unit had taken to address 

this and did not direct any action to be taken to address this at the 

time he was made aware. 

111. He did not know whether there was any direct liaison with the 

domestic violence unit by the FLU following the incident. He did 

explain that usual procedure would be to conduct a paper based 

assessment of the information via the domestic violence system, 

PROTECT. He also explained that he would not have expected a 

partner to have been spoken to as part of that review. C/Supt 

Macdonald was aware that there had been previous domestic 

incidents but stated that no adverse information was brought to his 

attention at that time by other family members and he was not aware 

of the dynamics within the household at that time. However he did 

state that this was not actively sought. 

112. He was also aware that no further home visit or interview had taken 

place with Mr Atherton and he did not direct this as he felt they had 

sufficient information in order to make a decision. He stated that there 

was no new investigation into Mr Atherton’s suitability but that he 

revisited the previous decision-making in relation to the granting of Mr 

Atherton’s licences. He explained that the only information that had 

changed was in relation to the 2008 incident and he understood this 

to be a domestic incident in which Mr Atherton was released with no 

further action and denied making the threat to self-harm. As such 

C/Supt Macdonald concluded that there was no significant change to 

Mr Atherton’s circumstances or any aggravating features to justify the 

revocation of his licences. 

113. He stated that his review of Mr Atherton’s suitability to hold a licence 






would have been based on the decision report produced by Laraine 

Ellison and the file held on Mr Atherton given that he recorded this 

fact at the end of the decision report. He could not recall what 

information was contained within the file at that time as it was a live 

document and confirmed that he did not request any further 

information prior to making his decision. C/Supt Macdonald also 

explained that during the life of a licence, medical information would 

only be requested if there was significant cause to believe that a 

licence holder was of unsound mind and he did not believe this to be 

the case from the information provided in relation to Mr Atherton’s 

behaviour. 

114. He explained that there was no available guidance in relation to the 

review of licence holders, other than that contained within Chapter 12 

of the Home Office guidance which deals with fitness to be entrusted 

with a firearm. He stated that a re-application process would be a 

welcome inclusion to the 2002 guidance. 

115. He recalled personally amending the warning letter to Mr Atherton to 

ensure that it conveyed the sternest of warnings. He believed it to be 

a proportionate response given the decisions which had gone before 

him and it was his intention that this was to be Mr Atherton’s absolute 

final warning. He stated that on the face of it this had the desired 

effect, in that for three years Mr Atherton did not come to the attention 

of the police. However with hindsight he wondered whether this could 

potentially have made the family actively decide not to report any 

further domestic incidents. His understanding was that the warning 

letter was to be hand delivered and reinforced with a verbal warning 

as per Ms Ellison’s decision report. He stated that if this did not occur 

then he could not account for why that was, as this was for the FLU to 

process. 

116. C/Supt Macdonald confirmed that the circumstances in which Person 

A 28 had accessed the keys to the gun cabinet was not identified or 

investigated by the FLU. He stated that this should have been a 

cause for concern and investigated further however, he could not 

account for why that was. 

Statement of Officer F 29 

117. Officer F 30 was tasked with returning Mr Atherton’s weapons following 

their temporary removal in September 2008. He agreed to be 

interviewed by the IPCC and a statement was obtained on 13 March 

2012. 







118. In 2008 Officer F 31 was performing the role of an FEO and during this 

time was asked to cover the Peterlee area, due to a resourcing issue. 

Officer F 32 could not recall who made the request or the specifics of 

the request. He had a vague recollection of the return of the weapons 

on 24 November 2008 and recalled checking and signing off the guns 

with Mr Atherton. As it was a routine matter, nothing struck him as 

being out of the ordinary. He also recalled that Mr Atherton’s partner 

was present and stated that there was nothing to suggest any 

problems within the household. Officer F 33 had no recollection of 

being asked to hand deliver a warning or the issuing of a warning at 

that time. He also did not recall returning any certificates. 

119. Entry no 170064 from Officer F 34 receipt book for the return of the 

weapons shows the itemised list of the guns which were returned to 

Mr Atherton on 24 November 2008. This shows the return of six 

weapons along with a sound moderator and ammunition. There is no 

record of the return of any certificates. 

Forensics / Scene examination 

120. Records obtained from Durham Constabulary’s Major Investigation 

Team, responsible for investigating the events which occurred on 1 

January 2012, confirmed that six weapons were recovered from the 

scene. This included the shotgun used at the time of the incident. In 

accordance with the records held on the NFLMS system, all weapons 

recovered were appropriately registered and legally held by Mr 

Atherton. 

Statement of Mark Groothuis 

121. Mark Groothuis is the Firearms and Explosives Licensing Officer for 

Hampshire Constabulary. He has worked for the Firearms Licensing 

Branch of Hampshire Constabulary since 1979 and was also 

appointed the Licensing Officer Manager in 1993. Mr Groothuis also 

represents the South East Regional Police Forces on the Association 

of Chief Police Officers Firearms & Explosives Licensing Working 

Group. Mr Groothuis was asked to examine the decisions made by 

Durham Constabulary in relation to the granting of Michael Atherton’s 

shotgun and firearms licences and the decision to return his guns 

following their temporary removal in 2008, alongside the national 

arrangements. 

122. Significant points arising from the review are as follows: 



123. Putting Mr Atherton’s suitability aside, Mr Groothuis noted that the 

shotgun application process was administered appropriately with 

regards to the application form completed by Mr Atherton, the fees 

received and the background vetting of his countersignatory. Mr 

Groothuis also stated that he was satisfied that Mr Atherton had ‘good 

reason’ to possess a shotgun and that it had been confirmed that he 

was a member of a clay pigeon shooting club. 

124. Mr Groothuis clarified that a caution is not a conviction and therefore 

Mr Atherton was not required to declare this on his applications. He 

did however state that the circumstances which led to the caution 

could be taken into consideration by the decision-maker when arriving 

at a decision as to whether a person can possess a shotgun without 

danger to public safety or the peace. 

125. Mr Groothuis was surprised that PC Cobain did not produce a more 

comprehensive report in relation to Mr Atherton’s suitability to hold a 

shot gun certificate, given the history of domestic incidents involving 

Ms McGoldrick. He also stated that he would have expected PC 

Cobain to have attempted to speak to Ms McGoldrick privately to 

discuss her relationship and any concerns she may have had with Mr 

Atherton’s potential access to firearms. 

126. In reference to Mr Mooney’s comment that Ms McGoldrick would 

have been unlikely to have given evidence in support of a decision to 

refuse Mr Atherton’s application, Mr Groothuis explained that 

decisions concerning firearms licensing matters are decided upon a 

civil standard. As such, hearsay evidence is admissible in any 

subsequent appeal. Therefore the officers who dealt with the four 

domestic incidents could have been called to give evidence of their 

dealings with Ms McGoldrick, should this have been necessary. 

127. In relation to Mr Atherton’s application for a firearms certificate again 

Mr Groothuis noted that the application process was correctly 

administered and that Mr Atherton had demonstrated his ‘good 

reason’ for requiring a firearms licence. 

128. Mr Groothuis was concerned that there appeared to be a lack of 

clarity around whether Mr Atherton had consumed alcohol at the time 

of his arrest for affray, given that he had indicated on his application 

for a shotgun certificate that he had ceased to drink anymore. He was 

also surprised that there was no apparent explanation as to why the 

security of Mr Atherton’s guns had changed to his home address. 

129. With regards to the incident on the 10 September 2008, Mr Groothuis 

was concerned that no interview was conducted with Mr Atherton 

about the circumstances which led to his arrest. He also noted that no 

enquiries were made with Ms McGoldrick or any other family 

members present following the alleged threats to self-harm and the 





fact that he was witnessed crying on his bed, thereafter by Person 

A 35 . Mr Groothuis was surprised that no enquiries were made with Mr 

Atherton’s GP in relation to his medical history and the current state 

of his mental health, including any alcohol addiction. He further noted 

that enquiries were not made in relation to how Person A 36 came to 

access the keys to his gun cabinet. Mr Groothuis also emphasised 

the importance of ensuring the removal of firearms and shotgun 

certificates at the time that firearms are seized, to prevent the 

acquisition of additional firearms. 

130. Mr Groothuis also noted that the enquiry form used by Durham 

Constabulary does not allow supervisors and Designated Officers to 

endorse or record their concerns or recommendations. He considered 

this to be a weakness in the system, in so far as there is no clear 

audit as to how a certificate comes to be granted. Mr Groothuis 

further noted the absence of any policy or procedural documents 

dealing with how Durham Constabulary conducts the administration 

of firearms licensing in its jurisdiction, including who has the 

delegated authority from the Chief Constable to grant applications. 

Legislation, policies and procedures 

Firearms Act 1968 

131. The Firearms Act 1968 and subsequent amendments stipulate the 

criteria for controlling the use and possession of firearms. Section 1 

of the Firearms Act 1968 sets out the criteria for legally acquiring and 

possessing a firearm. Section 2 sets out the criteria for legally 

acquiring and possessing a shotgun. Points relevant to the 

circumstances of this case are as follows: 

132. Section 26A of the Act covers applications for firearms certificates 

and states that they must be made to the chief of police in the 

prescribed form. Section 26B defines the application process for 

shotgun certificates. 

133. Section 27 subsection 1A sets out when the chief officer can grant a 

firearms certificate. Namely that a firearm certificate shall be granted 

where the chief officer of police is satisfied: 

(a) that the applicant is fit to be entrusted with a firearm to which 

section 1 of this Act applies and is not a person prohibited by this Act 

from possessing such a firearm; 

(b) that he has a good reason for having in his possession, or for 

purchasing or acquiring, the firearm or ammunition in respect of which 



the application is made; and 

(c) that in all the circumstances the applicant can be permitted to 

have the firearm or ammunition in his possession without danger to 

the public safety or to the peace. 

134. Section 28 subsection 1A stipulates that a shotgun certificate shall be 

granted or renewed by the chief officer of police if he is satisfied that 

the applicant can be permitted to possess a shotgun without danger 

to the public safety or to the peace. It further states that no such 

certificate shall be granted or renewed if the chief officer of police 

(a) has reason to believe that the applicant is prohibited by this Act 

from possessing a shotgun; 

or 

(b) (b) is satisfied that the applicant does not have a good reason 

for possessing, purchasing or acquiring one. 

135. ‘Good reason’ is defined as use for sporting or competition purposes 

or for shooting vermin. 

136. Section 29 of the Act allows for the conditions of the certificate to be 

varied by the chief officer of police, at any time. 

137. Section 30A of the Act sets out the criteria around the revocation of 

firearm certificates. Section 30A subsection 2 stipulates that a 

firearm certificate may be revoked by the chief officer of police where 

they have reason to believe that the certificate holder is: 

a) of intemperate habits or unsound mind or is otherwise unfit to be 

entrusted with a firearm. 

or 

(b) that the holder can no longer be permitted to have the firearm or 

ammunition to which the certificate relates in his possession without 

danger to the public safety or to the peace. 

138. A firearm certificate may also be revoked where the chief officer of 

police is satisfied that the holder is prohibited by the Act from 

possessing a firearm (subsection 3); where the holder no longer has 

good reason for possessing, purchasing or acquiring the firearm or 

ammunition (subsection 4), or where the holder fails to comply with a 

notice under section 29(1) for the Act requiring the holder to deliver 

up the certificate to the chief officer of police for the purpose of 

amending the conditions of the certificate (subsection 5). 

139. Subsection 6 stipulates that a person aggrieved by the revocation of a 

certificate under subsections 2, 3 or 4 may in accordance with section 

44 of the Act appeal against the revocation. 

140. Section 30C of the Act sets out the criteria around the revocation of 

shotgun certificates. Section 30C subsection 1 stipulates that a 

firearm certificate may be revoked by the chief officer of police if he is 

satisfied that the holder is prohibited by this Act from possessing a 



shotgun or cannot be permitted to possess a shotgun without danger 

to the public safety or to the peace. Section 30C subsection 2 sets 

out the criteria by which a person aggrieved by the revocation of a 

shotgun certificate may appeal against the revocation. 

Home Office Guidance: Firearms Law (Guidance to the 

Police) 2002 

141. The 2002 Home Office Firearms Law Guidance provides consolidated 

guidance to police on firearms legislation and the application of the 

various Firearms Acts. It stipulates that the wider interests of public 

safety are paramount. The guidance affirms that Chief Officers of 

Police have the power to revoke a firearm or shotgun certificate in 

certain circumstances and sets out the procedures for each. Factors 

significant to the circumstances of this case are as follows: 

142. Chapter 10 which pertains to the firearms certificate procedure states 

that the judgement as to whether a person is fit to be entrusted with 

firearms rests in law with the police and the Courts. Considerations 

for Chief Officers when granting a firearm licence are to ensure an 

applicant is not prohibited under the Firearms Act 1968 as a result of 

previous convictions and that they are not of ‘intemperate habits’, 

‘unsound mind’ or unfit to be entrusted with a firearm, for any other 

reason. In addition the police should also ensure an applicant has 

‘good reason’ for requiring the firearm and can hold a firearm without 

danger to public safety or the peace. 

143. The section entitled ‘Medical Information’ contained within Chapter 10 

explains that the authority for the police to approach an applicant’s 

General Practitioner (GP) is to assist the police in cases where there 

are genuine concerns around an applicant’s suitability to possess 

firearms. Whilst it states that approaches to an applicant’s GP should 

not be routinely made, it also specifies that a person’s consent at the 

point of application is not time barred. Therefore the police may 

approach a GP at any time during the life of a certificate where there 

are concerns about an applicant’s continued fitness to possess 

firearms. 

144. Chapter 11 specifically deals with the procedure for administering 

shotgun certificates. As with a firearms certificate the police should be 

satisfied that an applicant is not prohibited under the Firearms Act 

1968. However Chapter 11 also sets out the distinction between the 

procedures for firearm and shotgun certificates in relation to the 

application of the ‘good reason’ test. For shotgun applications the 

onus is on the police to prove that the applicant does not have good 

reason for requiring a shotgun. Furthermore a shotgun certificate 

holder may possess an unlimited number of shotguns without the 

need for approval in respect of each individual gun. Reference is 

made within Chapter 11 around the need for the police to ensure that 



an applicant does not pose a danger to public safety or the peace 

however; there are no specific references around fitness to be 

entrusted with a shotgun. 

145. In contrast Chapter 12 of the 2002 guidance provides a dedicated 

section around fitness to be entrusted with a firearm. This goes so far 

as to state that it does not ‘concern itself with shot gun related 

issues’, thereby drawing a clear distinction. Factors specific to this 

case include the following: 

146. When assessing ‘fitness’ Chapter 12 makes reference to the fact that 

consideration should be given to any previous cautions held by an 

applicant and any criminal intelligence particularly involving the threat 

of violence or firearms. It also details evidence of alcohol or drug 

abuse as being a factor for consideration in relation to establishing 

‘intemperate habits’. It also refers to evidence of aggressive or 

antisocial behaviour including domestic disputes and disturbing or 

unusual behaviour giving rise to fears about the future misuse of 

firearms. Chapter 12 also specifies that whilst patterns of behaviour 

may cause concern, ‘one-off incidents’ may also call into question a 

person’s fitness. 

147. Guidance is also offered within chapter 12 in relation to considering 

whether a person is of ‘unsound mind’. It refers to Chief Officers 

being alert to GP reports revealing that an applicant has exhibited 

signs of depression, suicidal tendencies, and longstanding or 

intermittent periods of emotional instability or unpredictable 

behaviour. It also warns that Chief Officers should be alive to any of 

these signs exhibited by existing certificate holders. Whilst treatment 

for any of the above is not an automatic exclusion from holding a 

firearms licence, it is a factor to be considered alongside all other 

available evidence. 

148. Chapter 12 also deals with the safekeeping and handing of firearms. 

It states that consideration should be given to any evidence of access 

to firearms by any unauthorised person such as family members or 

associates. It specifies that any history of serious incidents involving 

firearms or a careless approach should receive close consideration 

including the likelihood of repetition. Chapter 19 provides further 

guidance on security measures and reinforces this by specifying that 

any knowledge of the keys to any security device by an unauthorised 

person may lead to a breach of the statutory security condition. 

149. Chapter 12 also refers to the police approaching other agencies, 

shooting clubs, or owners of land specified for shooting, where 

information has cast doubt on the suitability of a person to be 

entrusted with a firearm. No guidance is offered in relation to 

approaches to family members or partners regarding suitability. 



150. The guidance advises that decisions regarding applications and 

revocations should always be made on an assessment of all relevant 

information and on the individual merits of each case. It further states 

that previous convictions or intemperate behaviour should not be an 

automatic bar if the applicant has since led a law-abiding life and has 

shown a capacity to be entrusted to possess a firearm. 

151. Whilst the 2002 guidance offers information around the process for 

renewals it does not offer any guidance around the process of 

reviewing an applicant during the life of a certificate. 

Administration of Firearms and Explosive Licensing 

Procedural Good Practice guide 2002 

152. The Administration of Firearms and Explosive Licensing Procedural 

Good Practice guide 2002 sets out the national standard for 

procedures and good practice in the administration of firearms 

licensing. Points of relevance are as follows: 

153. The guidance makes reference to Lord Cullen’s Report and his 

observations on what he regarded as weaknesses in the system used 

by Central Scotland Police. One such observation emphasises the 

importance of the Senior Officer responsible for determining the 

outcome of an application having all relevant information put before 

them to ensure that they are in the position of making a decision in 

light of all information. 

154. In relation to the decisions surrounding applications for shotgun and 

firearms certificates the guidance states that: 

‘A clear decision making process must be followed with the objectives 

being defined determining that all relevant information has been 

considered and feasible options assessed. The decision must be 

documented and open to potential review’ 

155. It further specifies that the Firearms Enquiry Officer should make a 

recommendation which subject to force procedure should be 

approved by a Supervisor and where local policy dictates a Chief or 

Designated Officer should make the final decision. It further specifies 

that this decision should be recorded along with the application itself 

the weapons to be acquired and the security arrangements in place. 

Force Policy 

156. Durham Constabulary has no local policy in relation to the 

administration and management of the firearms licensing process 

within its jurisdiction. 



Conclusions 

Michael Atherton’s application for a shotgun certificate 

157. It would appear that no apparent issues were identified in relation to 

Mr Atherton’s ‘good reason’ for acquiring a shotgun. Subsequent 

checks revealed that Mr Atherton was a member of a clay shooting 

club, thereby satisfying that requirement. The countersignatory 

recorded on Mr Atherton’s application was also vetted as per 

procedure and no adverse issues were identified. Checks revealed 

that Mr Atherton had no previous convictions however; four domestic 

incidents involving police attendance at his home address were 

identified. One such incident resulted in Mr Atherton receiving a 

caution. Although the 2002 Home Office Guidance states that 

cautions may be taken into consideration when assessing an 

applicant’s fitness to hold a licence, Mr Atherton was not required to 

disclose this as part of the application process. 

158. The investigation found that issues of concern arose around the initial 

enquiries and assessment conducted by former Police Constable 

Damian Cobain and the subsequent assessment and deliberation 

process involving Firearm Licensing Manager, Karen Bromley, 

Deputy Force Solicitor, Stephen Mooney and former Chief 

Superintendent Carole Thompson as the final decision-maker. 

159. As previously identified the task of conducting the initial enquiries and 

assessment in relation to Mr Atherton’s application was allocated to 

former PC and Firearms Enquiry Officer Damian Cobain. As such 

only he was in a position to provide an explanation into the enquiries 

he undertook including his interview with Mr Atherton and the 

information he relied upon during the course of his assessment. The 

Commission finds it disappointing that he declined to provide a 

witness statement. The IPCC was therefore left only with the option of 

examining the record of PC Cobain’s enquiries as documented on the 

enquiry form, held on Mr Atherton’s file. From this, the initial enquiries 

and assessment conducted by PC Cobain into Mr Atherton’s 

suitability do not appear to have been particularly robust. The enquiry 

form lacks significant content given Mr Atherton’s previous domestic 

background. 

160. Specifically, following the identification of the domestic incidents, 

there does not appear to have been any attempt to obtain the full 

circumstances of each of those incidents. Instead practice has 

developed, within the Firearms Licensing Unit, consisting of a cursory 

check on the police safeguarding system; PROTECT, in the absence 

of any substantial interrogation of the domestic violence records held 

by the domestic violence unit, or any direct liaison with that unit. 

Thereby removing any possibility of identifying any underlying issues 



37 Redaction Code C 

which would not be apparent from the summary provided by the 

PROTECT records. 

161. Had the full details been obtained in this instance, this would have 

presented a somewhat different picture of the previous domestic 

incidents involving Mr Atherton and Susan McGoldrick. It would also 

have uncovered the contact between Mr Atherton’s partner and 

officers from the Domestic Violence Unit, prompting direct liaison with 

the unit and potentially Ms McGoldrick herself. Whilst it was 

incumbent upon PC Cobain to obtain all available information during 

the course of his enquiries it was also the responsibility of all parties 

within the decision-making chain to have identified that further 

information was required prior to arriving at a decision. 

162. PC Cobain made reference to the fact that no concerns were 

apparent in relation to Ms McGoldrick during his visit. This is flawed 

by its very nature, given that Durham Constabulary has no processes 

in place to approach partners or family members in such instances. It 

is therefore implausible to expect a partner to proactively raise any 

concerns in the presence of an applicant with whom there has been a 

previous history of domestic incidents. 

163. It is evident that the Home Office guidance states that previous 

convictions or ‘intemperate behaviour ‘should not be an automatic bar 

if an applicant has since led a law-abiding life. It is also clear that Mr 

Atherton had not been brought to the attention of the police in the two 

years preceding his application for a shotgun certificate. However, 

there does not appear to have been any cognisance of the fact that 

all of Mr Atherton’s previous incidents had occurred whilst he was in 

drink. Had the complete information of each of the domestic incidents 

been obtained from the Domestic Violence Unit then this may have 

alerted those within the whole decision-making chain to a possible or 

emerging pattern of behaviour and prompted further enquiries around 

his claims to be alcohol free. Whilst it would appear that PC Cobain 

re-interviewed Mr Atherton, the fact that this was not recorded on 

NFLMS is demonstrative of poor record keeping by the Firearms 

Licensing Unit. 

164. The investigation also found that other than a written endorsement by 

Officer C 37 on an email, there is no formal record explaining when and 

why Mr Atherton’s intended place of storage for his weapons differed 

from the address recorded on his original application form. Although 

the security inspection appears to have been undertaken at the 

correct address, this is once again indicative of poor record keeping 

by the unit. 



165. Karen Bromley had concerns with regards to Mr Atherton’s 

application indicated by her handwritten note which stated that she 

was minded to refuse his application. Whilst Ms Bromley clarified that 

this was intended as a note to herself, her concerns and assessment 

were not formally recorded in any other form. Ms Bromley stated that 

the reason for this was that the Deputy Force Solicitor’s advice would 

have supplanted any decision of hers. Whilst any legal advice would 

have been a strong consideration, the final decision rested with the 

Firearms Licensing Unit and specifically C/Supt Thompson. It was 

therefore incumbent upon Ms Bromley to ensure that her concerns 

were properly documented and formerly raised, irrespective of the 

advice of the Force Solicitor. 

166. Similarly the investigation found no record of the discussion between 

Ms Bromley and Chief Superintendent Thompson regarding Mr 

Atherton’s application. As such it cannot be established whether Ms 

Bromley’s concerns were brought to the attention of C/Supt 

Thompson during that discussion. Had Ms Bromley’s concerns been 

formally documented, this would have ensured that they were taken 

on board by any person being asked to subsequently assess the 

application. Other than Ms Bromley’s one-line entry on the bottom of 

Mr Mooney’s report which simply states ‘ok to grant’, the investigation 

found no formal record of Chief Superintendent Thompson’s rationale 

and decision to grant Mr Atherton’s shotgun certificate. The 

Commission finds this unacceptable. The Administration of Firearms 

and Explosive Licensing 2002 Procedural Good Practice Guide 

clearly emphasises the need to record the decision-making process 

to ensure that there is an appropriate audit of that process. 

167. The comments of Deputy Force Solicitor, Stephen Mooney, contained 

within his memorandum of legal advice, also caused the Commission 

concern. In particular, Mr Mooney’s reference to the fact that had 

Durham Constabulary refused Mr Atherton’s application that he 

feared they may have hit an ‘evidential cul-de-sac’, on appeal, due to 

Ms McGoldrick unwillingness to have given evidence against her 

partner. Whilst it is understandable that the Constabulary’s prospect 

upon appeal is a factor which cannot be ignored, the 2002 Home 

Office Guidance clearly states that the emphasis should be on public 

safety. Without the prospect of giving evidence being put directly to 

Ms McGoldrick, the basis of Mr Mooney’s assumption is unsupported. 

Furthermore it does not appear that Mr Mooney considered the 

prospect of hearsay evidence in relation to the previous domestic 

incidents, in the event of an appeal. However, Mr Mooney could only 

provide advice in his capacity as the Deputy Force Solicitor. As such 

Ms Bromley’s decision to acquiesce to his advice, when her opinion 

differed is not tenable given that the final decision rested with the 

Firearms Licensing Unit and specifically Chief Superintendent 

Thompson in her capacity as the Designated Officer. 



168. In considering the assessments made following Michael Atherton’s 

application for a shotgun certificate in 2006 and the subsequent 

approval and granting of his certificate, it is necessary to look at the 

information which was available to those involved in the decisionmaking 

process and the policies and guidance in place at that time. In 

the absence of any clear guidance specific to the circumstances of 

this case, the decision to grant Mr Atherton’s shotgun certificate was 

a subjective decision for Durham Constabulary. The 2002 Home 

Office Guidance stresses the importance of judging each case on its 

own merits with any previous evidence of intemperate behaviour not 

being an automatic bar. However, it is clear that there were significant 

omissions on the part of former PC Cobain, Ms Bromley and former 

Chief Superintendent Thompson which led to a decision being taken 

in the absence of all available information. 

169. It was incumbent upon former PC Cobain, Ms Bromley and former 

Chief Superintendent Thompson to ensure that all relevant 

information was obtained prior to making a decision of this nature. 

Which along with an adequate level of record keeping should have 

ensured that appropriate and due consideration was given to Mr 

Atherton’s application. It is not possible for this investigation to 

establish whether Mr Atherton’s application would have been granted 

had the full circumstances of the previous incidents been made 

available, as this will always remain a subjective test for the final 

decision-maker. However the absence of significant information did 

mean that a decision was made on partial facts, thereby removing 

that opportunity. 

Michael Atherton’s application for a firearm licence 

170. With regards to Mr Atherton’s application for a firearm licence, it 

would appear that he had demonstrated his ‘good reason’ for 

acquiring each of the proposed firearms by virtue of the fact that he 

was a member of a shooting club; he had the required permission to 

use the land indicated on his application and the land had been 

assessed as fit for purpose. No adverse issues were identified in 

relation to his referees. 

171. Former PC Damian Cobain was the Firearms Enquiry Officer 

allocated the task of conducting the initial enquiries and assessment 

into Mr Atherton’s application. The intended place of storage for the 

firearms was indicated as being at Mr Atherton’s home address and a 

security inspection of Mr Atherton’s home address was subsequently 

carried out by PC Cobain. 

172. Checks conducted by PC Cobain revealed a recent arrest for affray, 

just prior to Mr Atherton’s application for a firearm licence. Further 

enquiries established that Mr Atherton was unfortunate to have been 

arrested and that he was released with no further action. It is unclear 



whether Mr Atherton had consumed alcohol at the time of his arrest 

and no enquiries appear to have been made to establish that fact. 

This was an important fact to establish given Mr Atherton’s previous 

history of arrest whilst in drink. It should also have prompted PC 

Cobain and Firearms Licensing Manager, Larraine Ellison to reexamine 

Mr Atherton’s previous claims to have abstained from 

drinking and to establish whether there had been a change in 

circumstances or a potential cause for concern. Mr Atherton’s 

application for a firearm licence offered a further opportunity to 

reassess the previous intelligence relating to Mr Atherton alongside 

his most recent arrest, at the very least to satisfy the decision maker 

that this was not indicative of a pattern of behaviour affecting his 

suitability . 

173. Laraine Ellison decided that there was no requirement for the 

decision to be passed to the Chief Superintendent in this instance 

and therefore accepted responsibility for the decision in relation to Mr 

Atherton’s application. Ms Ellison referred to the fact that the 

domestic incidents had previously been assessed at the time of Mr 

Atherton’s shotgun application and as she did not feel that Mr 

Atherton presented a danger at that time she made the decision to 

grant his licence. It is clear that by doing so Ms Ellison did not reevaluate 

the decisions which had gone before her. Her explanation 

that these had previously been assessed is unacceptable given that 

Mr Atherton had been brought to the attention of Durham 

Constabulary once again. The 2002 Home Office Guidance refers to 

being mindful of patterns of behaviour including evidence of 

aggressive or anti-social behaviour and domestic disputes. As such 

Mr Atherton’s latest arrest should have been viewed as an 

opportunity to review the facts as a whole in light of any additional 

intelligence and should not have been a blanket acceptance of 

decisions which had gone before. 

174. Other than a one line entry on NFLMS, Ms Ellison’s decision and 

rationale for granting Mr Atherton’s firearm licence does not appear to 

have been recorded. Furthermore there is no specific reference as to 

who made the final decision. Ms Ellison stated that it is not normal 

practice for her to record her rationale in relation to the granting of a 

licence. The Commission finds this to be unacceptable. The 2002 

Procedural Good Practice Guide clearly states that decisions around 

applications for shotguns and firearms should be documented and 

open to potential review. As an experienced Firearms Licensing 

Manager Ms Ellison should have understood the importance of 

documenting the rationale and the decision to grant Mr Atherton’s 

firearms licence. The fact that this was not carried out in this instance 

is quite simply poor practice on the part of Ms Ellison and indicative 

once again of inadequate record-keeping. 

175. The decision to grant Mr Atherton’s firearm licence was a subjective 



decision taken by Ms Ellison. Based on the responding officer’s 

comments in relation to Mr Atherton’s arrest for affray it would appear 

that Mr Atherton’s circumstances had not changed substantially since 

his shotgun application. However the enquiries made, failed to 

ascertain whether Mr Atherton had consumed alcohol at the time of 

his arrest and no attempts were made by either PC Cobain or Ms 

Ellison to satisfy themselves that this was not an emerging pattern. 

Although it cannot be established whether such enquiries would have 

changed the ultimate decision to grant Mr Atherton his firearm 

licence, this was a missed opportunity for Mr Atherton’s suitability as 

a certificate holder to be reassessed. 

Review of Michael Atherton’s licences in September 2008 

176. Following armed police attendance at the home of Michael Atherton 

on 10 September 2008, the decision to temporarily remove Mr 

Atherton’s shotguns and firearms and the subsequent review of his 

licences was good practice and wholly appropriate given the 

circumstances. In the absence of any national guidance around 

reviews of licence holders the only option was to assess Mr 

Atherton’s continued suitability to hold both his shotgun certificate and 

firearm licence. Once again, the investigation found an absence of 

any further or intrusive enquiries which subsequently led to an illconsidered 

assessment of Mr Atherton’s suitability by both Laraine 

Ellison, in her capacity as the Firearms Licensing Manager and Chief 

Superintendent Ian Macdonald, in his capacity as the Designated 

Officer. 

177. Mr Atherton had a previous history of domestic incidents and arrest 

whilst in drink. Despite his assertions on his shotgun application that 

he abstained from alcohol, he was found to be heavily intoxicated at 

the time of his arrest for the September 2008 incident. The most 

recent assessment of Mr Atherton’s status as a licence holder had 

been just prior to the issue of his firearm licence on account of his 

arrest for affray. As previously identified it was not established by 

either PC Cobain or Larraine Ellison as to whether Mr Atherton had 

consumed alcohol at the time of his arrest for affray. This incident 

came some four months following the granting of his firearm licence, 

despite Mr Atherton being subject to a second warning. Yet no 

attempt was made by Laraine Ellison whose responsibility it was to 

conduct enquiries and compile a decision report in this instance, to at 

the very least re-interview Mr Atherton or to direct an FEO to make a 

further home visit. 

178. It is important to note that during the incident on 10 September, Mr 

Atherton was found to be in an emotional state and was alleged to 

have made threats to self-harm by using a gun. However, no 

attempts were made by Ms Ellison to contact his General Practitioner 

or to request that Mr Atherton make a medical appointment which 




would have ensured that he was properly assessed. Ms Ellison 

explained that this would not have been the process at that time. 

However, the 2002 Home Office Guidance clearly states that 

approaches to applicants GP’s are not time barred and can occur at 

any time during the life of a licence, where there are concerns about 

an applicant’s continued fitness to possess firearms. 

179. In addition, it was Chief Superintendent Macdonald’s understanding 

that this was a domestic incident, following which Mr Atherton was 

later released with no further action and denied making the threat to 

self harm. He also stated that medical attention would only be 

requested if there was significant cause to believe that a licence 

holder was of unsound mind and he did not deem this to the case. It 

would appear that this was misguided given that Mr Atherton’s 

partner had deemed the threat serious enough to warrant the 

attendance of police at their home, in addition to the fact that Mr 

Atherton was found to be in a distressed state by Person A 38 

immediately following his threats to self-harm. As such it was 

imperative for Laraine Ellison to have made those enquiries and for 

Chief Superintendent Macdonald to have ensured that those 

enquiries were conducted if they were to establish firm grounds for Mr 

Atherton’s continued suitability. The fact that no such enquiries were 

made, the Commission finds unacceptable. 

180. It is inconceivable that a review took place in the absence of a further 

interview with Mr Atherton, or home visit to assess the dynamics of 

the household, given the seriousness of the incident. In addition there 

was no liaison, by Ms Ellison, with the officers who dealt with the 

incident on the 10 September, or any liaison with the Domestic 

Violence Unit, to revisit Mr Atherton’s previous history of domestic 

incidents and to satisfy themselves that there were no underlying 

issues. This was particularly significant given that this incident had 

once again arisen as a result of a domestic dispute. Neither were 

those enquiries directed by Chief Superintendent Macdonald who 

stated that although he revisited the previous decision-making in 

relation to the granting of Mr Atherton’s licences, there was no new 

investigation into Mr Atherton’s suitability. As a result the opportunity 

to establish the full circumstances of the previous domestic incidents, 

which had been overlooked on previous assessments, was lost. 

181. The investigation also found that no attempt was made to establish 

any concerns Susan McGoldrick may have had in relation to Mr 

Atherton having continued access to firearms. Although it is accepted 

that this was a delicate situation and there are a lack of processes 

and procedures in place both locally and nationally for doing so, the 

investigation found no evidence of any consideration or recognition of 




the potential vulnerability of other household members by either Ms 

Ellison or Chief Superintendent Macdonald. 

182. The lack of consideration regarding the welfare of the family and the 

wider public was further demonstrated by the fact that despite the 

identification that Mr Atherton’s shotgun certificate had not been 

removed at the time of the incident, by Ms Ellison who later brought 

this to the attention of Chief Superintendent Macdonald, no action 

was taken to remedy that situation. As such, Mr Atherton could have 

acquired additional shotguns at any time during the intervening period 

of his review. In addition the investigation could not find any formal 

record of the seizure of the firearms licence other than the reference 

made in Ms Ellison’s decision report, once again indicative of poor 

record-keeping. 

183. Of further concern is that no enquiries appear to have been made in 

relation to how Person A 39 came to have access to the keys to the 

security cabinet, irrespective of whether this was an assisting factor at 

the time of the incident. In accordance with the 2002 Home Office 

guidance this represented a serious security breach and at the very 

least warranted further investigation. The Commission finds the lack 

of action in both instances by Ms Ellison and Chief Superintendent 

Macdonald to be inexcusable. 

184. The IPCC investigation also established that the letter sent to Mr 

Atherton, along with the return of his licences and guns, following the 

September 2008 incident, represented his third warning, raising 

questions around the robustness of the use of warning letters by the 

Firearms Licensing Unit. It also casts doubt on the appropriateness of 

warning letters in such instances. In particular, the potential deterrent 

effect on family members in relation to reporting further domestic 

incidents to the police. 

185. Whilst there was a strong case for revocation in this instance, in the 

absence of any specific or prescriptive guidance, the decision to 

return Mr Atherton’s guns and firearm certificate was a subjective 

decision. However, the investigation found a lack of any substantial or 

intrusive assessment into Mr Atherton’s continued suitability as a 

licence holder following the 2008 incident. Instead what occurred was 

a simple paper review of evidence collated on previous assessments, 

in the absence of any further investigative process. There was a 

failure by Laraine Ellison and Chief Superintendent Macdonald to 

recognise the importance of reviewing the circumstances as a whole 

and a general willingness to blindly accept decisions which had gone 

before. Once again, this resulted in significant information at the 

disposal of the unit, via the Domestic Violence Unit, being overlooked 



Simone Thompson 

Lead Investigator, IPCC 

12 September 2012 

It is inconceivable that a review took place in the absence of any 

meaningful dialogue with Mr Atherton or his family to establish the 

dynamics of the household, or any attempt to medically establish Mr 

Atherton’s suitability given the circumstances. In the absence of such 

significant information it is impossible to understand how any 

meaningful review could have taken place. The Commission finds this 

unacceptable. 

186. Durham Constabulary has since initiated a review into the process 

and procedures employed by the Constabulary around the 

administration of applications for firearms licences and shotgun 

certificates. 

187. During the course of the investigation, staff spoken to across each of 

the respective roles within the Firearms Licensing Unit commented 

that they had received little or no formal training by Durham 

Constabulary. As this falls outside of the IPCC terms of reference, 

Durham Constabulary may wish to consider a review of the training 

provided to staff within the unit. 

188. A supplementary learning report is attached which outlines localised 

learning in relation to the issues identified during the course of the 

IPCC investigation. The investigation also identified national learning 

recommendations which are being finalised.

Mr Michael Atherton

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