foucault-and-the-iranian-revolution-janet-afary

240 Appendix
at arm's length a dying regime, with which they were all too compromised,
they prefer to allow the development of a Chilean-type situation, to allow the
sharpening of the internal conflicts and then to intervene. And perhaps they
think that this movement, which; deep down, worries all of the regimes of
the region, will accelerate the realization of an agreement in the Middle East.
Thi!! was what the Palestinians and the Israelis at once felt, with the fo rmer
appealing to the ayatollah for the liberation of all the holy places and the
latter announcing one further reason not to give up anything.
With respect to the obstacle of the army, it was clear that it was para­
lyzed by the political currents running through it. But this paralysis, which
constituted an advantage for the opposition as long as the shah was still in
power, became a danger, since each current felt free, in the absence of all
state power, to have its own way. It was necessary to unite the army sector by
sector, without breaking it up too soon.
But the dash occurred much faster than was expected. Whether from
provocation or accident, it did not matter. A cell of "hard-liners" attacked the
part of the army that had joined with the ayatollah, precipitating between
that part of the army and the crowd a rapprochement that went well beyond
merely marching side by side. Quickly thereafter came the distribution of
arms, the pinnacle par excellence of all revolutionary uprisings.
It is solely this distribution of arms that made everything seesaw back
and forth, avoiding a civil war. The military command realized that a major
part of the troops was escaping its control and that in the arsenals there were
enough weapons to arm tens of thousands of civilians. It was better to go over
as a bloc before the population took up arms, perhaps for years. The religious
leaders imme d iately returned the compliment: they gave the order to hand
back the arms .
Today, we are still at this point, in a situation that has not come to a head.
The " revolution" showed, at certain moments, some of its familiar traits, but
things are still astonishingly ambiguous.
The army, which went over to the religious leaders without ever having
been really broken up, is going to weigh heavily. Its different currents are
going to confront each other in the shadows in order to determine who will
be the "new guard" of the regime, the one that protects it, enables it to hold
on, and takes hold of it.
At the other extreme, it is certain that all will not give up their arms . The
" Marxist-Leninists, " who played no small role in the movement, probably
think that it is necessary to move from the unity of the masses to the class
struggle. Also, not having been the "vanguard" that rallies and rouses, they