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192 Appendix
purchased abroad. There are of course economic consequences. For the gener­
als, these include commissions on contracts. At the lowest level, the military
is a small manual labor force recruited largely from among the unemployed.
Iran lacks a solid economic-military structure.
Nor is there an army ideology. Never in the history of Iran has the army
been allowed to take on the role of molding the nation or of developing the
type of political project that can be found in the South American armies since
the wars of independence. The Iranian army has never liberated anything. It
has been marked successively with Russian, English, and then American in­
signia. The army protected its rulers and stood guard side by side with fo reign
troops, around the foreign concessions. It never had the opportunity to iden­
tify with Iran. Nor did it want to take charge of the country's destiny. One
day a general seized power, but he commanded the Cossack legion and was
pushed forward by the English. He was the father of the current king. 14
Of course, things can happen again. The ·American ambassador can replay
the Ironside coup that allowed Reza Khan to substitute himself for the
Qajars, 15 or at least impose an ironhanded general on the shah as prime min­
ister. But this would only be a temporary solution. It would not be a military
dictatorship under the direction of a caste of officers showing internal solidarity
despite personal rivalries. The Pinochet or Videla formulas seem to be
off the agenda. 16
Thank heavens.
Let us say, thanks to Allah.
One day, twenty-four Iranian officers were executed for communism. The
next day, the shah laid down his crown at the feet of a statue of Lenin. The
victims of the earlier bloodbath were never replaced. 17
The army's anti-Marxism stems from two sources. Among those who are
inclined toward the opposition, it is justified by the Soviet Union's policies
and its at least tacit support, since the fall of Mossadeq, of the shah's policies.
A lot of physical, intellectual, and moral courage would be necessary today
in order to be a nationalist oppositionist and at the same time a Soviet-type
Marxist. For these people, anti-Marxism undergirds nationalism. And for the
simple-minded, there is of course government propaganda. 1 was shown internal
army circulars that said one must never kill women or children, except
of course if they are communists.
Because it is so solidly anti-Marxist, is it not possible that the army would
intervene forcefully in national life, as unrest spreads and as the government
blames this unrest on "international communism "?
Some friends arranged for me, in a well-scrubbed place on the outskirts
of Tehran, a meeting with high-ranking officers, all from the opposition.