Goldin & Homonoff - DataSpace at Princeton University
Goldin & Homonoff - DataSpace at Princeton University Goldin & Homonoff - DataSpace at Princeton University
or away from cigarettes, depending on whether the other goods covered by the sales tax are primarily substitutes or complements to cigarettes (the substitution effect). In theory, either of these effects could be more negative for low-income consumers. For example, the other sales-taxed goods could be important substitutes with cigarettes for well-off consumers, but not for low-income consumers. Similarly, the loss in real income associated with a sales tax increase could induce a bigger reduction in cigarette demand for low-income consumers. We present two pieces of evidence that tax base effects are not responsible for all of the observed differences in consumer behavior by income. Our first check is motivated by the fact that some states impose a general sales tax, but exempt cigarettes from it. 27 In states that exempt cigarettes from the sales tax, changes in the sales tax rate would not directly affect the price of cigarettes; the sales tax would not have a direct effect on cigarette consumption. However, sales tax changes would still affect the price of other sales tax-eligible goods. Hence, the indirect effect of the sales tax would still occur. Consequently, analyzing the effect of the sales tax in cigarette-exempting states allows us to measure income differences in the indirect effect of the sales tax. If indirect effects were responsible for the observed differences in responsiveness to the sales tax by income, responsive to the sales tax should decline by income, even in states that exempted cigarettes. Table VII compares the effect of the sales tax in states that exempt cigarettes from the sales tax (“exempt states”) with the effect of the sales tax in states that include cigarettes in the sales tax base (“non-exempt states”). To do so, we modify our econometric model to allow heterogeneity in the effect of the sales tax between exempt and non-exempt states: yismt = α + β1τ e smt + β2τ s smt ∗ Es + β3τ s smt ∗ (1 − Est) + ρ1τ e smtLIismt + ρ2τ s smtLIismt ∗ Es + ρ3τ s smtLIismt ∗ (1 − Est) + φEst + ϕEst ∗t + ηLIismt + γxsmt + δzismt + µs + λt + πm + εismt where Es indicates whether state s exempts cigarettes from the sales tax base. Table VII shows that the effect of the sales tax on cigarette demand appears to vary substantially 27 In our sample, seven states exempt cigarettes from the sales tax base for at least one year. 22 (12)
more by income in non-exempt states than in exempt states. The estimated sales*low-income coefficient in exempt states, ρ2, is close to zero and is statistically insignificant on both the intensive and extensive margins. In contrast, the sales*low-income coefficient in the non-exempt states, ρ3, remains large and significant. Moreover, on the extensive margin, we are able to reject the hypothesis that the sales*low- income coefficient in the exempt states is as large as in the non-exempt states. These findings suggest that income differences in indirect effects are not driving the results in Section II.C. We also present a second check that tax base effects are not driving our results. Tax base effects are most likely to dampen the impact of the sales tax relative to the excise tax when the excise tax exempts important substitutes for cigarettes. 28 Because other tobacco products constitute likely substitutes for cigarettes, there is less potential for tax base differences to play a role in states where the excise tax also applies to other tobacco products. Consequently, we restrict the analysis in Section II.C to states that apply the excise tax to cigars and smokeless tobacco. Table VIII shows that our results are largely unchanged by this restriction. In summary, there are plausible reasons to believe that differences in the excise and sales tax bases could generate results similar to those presented in Section II.C. However, the evidence in Tables VII and VIII suggests that tax base effects cannot fully supplant attentiveness as an explanation for the large differences in behavior that we find between high- and low-income consumers. E. Robustness Checks 1. Including Pre-Tax Prices in the Regression One variable not included in our basic econometric model is the pre-tax price of cigarettes. On the one hand, the pre-tax price depends on both supply and demand; including it as a regressor could bias our re- sults if it were correlated with unobserved shocks to consumer demand (the classic simultaneous systems problem). On the other hand, the pre-tax price enters the consumer’s demand function symmetrically with the excise and sales tax rates; excluding it from the regression may create an omitted variable bias 28 For example, raising the excise tax might reduce cigarette demand substantially by inducing cigarette smokers to switch to cigars. In contrast, raising the sales tax would raise the price of both cigarettes and cigars, dampening the effect on cigarette consumption. 23
- Page 1 and 2: Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette
- Page 3 and 4: cigarette’s posted price, and a s
- Page 5 and 6: form BCi : (p +tp +tr)xi + yi ≤ M
- Page 7 and 8: tax types: R(tp,tr) = (tp +tr)(xA +
- Page 9 and 10: ∂yB = −x. ∂tr Substituting th
- Page 11 and 12: consumers. An implication of the re
- Page 13 and 14: Data on state-level cigarette excis
- Page 15 and 16: variable (y) represents cigarette d
- Page 17 and 18: and is not statistically significan
- Page 19 and 20: Table IV presents our results. Colu
- Page 21: D. Tax Base Differences Between the
- Page 25 and 26: with the variable assigned a value
- Page 27 and 28: to cigarette register taxes decline
- Page 29 and 30: References [1] Becker, Gary, Michae
- Page 31 and 32: Appendix A: Welfare Analysis Under
- Page 33 and 34: Again, the first term represents a
- Page 35 and 36: Appendix C: A Cognitive Cost Model
- Page 37 and 38: income yields: ∂Gi ∂Mi = 1 2 t2
- Page 39 and 40: Table I: Summary of Cigarette Tax C
- Page 41 and 42: Table III: Effect of Taxes on Cigar
- Page 43 and 44: Table V: Effect of Taxes on Cigaret
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- Page 47 and 48: Table IX: Instrumenting for Price w
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more by income in non-exempt st<strong>at</strong>es than in exempt st<strong>at</strong>es. The estim<strong>at</strong>ed sales*low-income coefficient<br />
in exempt st<strong>at</strong>es, ρ2, is close to zero and is st<strong>at</strong>istically insignificant on both the intensive and extensive<br />
margins. In contrast, the sales*low-income coefficient in the non-exempt st<strong>at</strong>es, ρ3, remains large and<br />
significant. Moreover, on the extensive margin, we are able to reject the hypothesis th<strong>at</strong> the sales*low-<br />
income coefficient in the exempt st<strong>at</strong>es is as large as in the non-exempt st<strong>at</strong>es. These findings suggest<br />
th<strong>at</strong> income differences in indirect effects are not driving the results in Section II.C.<br />
We also present a second check th<strong>at</strong> tax base effects are not driving our results. Tax base effects are<br />
most likely to dampen the impact of the sales tax rel<strong>at</strong>ive to the excise tax when the excise tax exempts<br />
important substitutes for cigarettes. 28 Because other tobacco products constitute likely substitutes for<br />
cigarettes, there is less potential for tax base differences to play a role in st<strong>at</strong>es where the excise tax<br />
also applies to other tobacco products. Consequently, we restrict the analysis in Section II.C to st<strong>at</strong>es<br />
th<strong>at</strong> apply the excise tax to cigars and smokeless tobacco. Table VIII shows th<strong>at</strong> our results are largely<br />
unchanged by this restriction.<br />
In summary, there are plausible reasons to believe th<strong>at</strong> differences in the excise and sales tax bases<br />
could gener<strong>at</strong>e results similar to those presented in Section II.C. However, the evidence in Tables VII<br />
and VIII suggests th<strong>at</strong> tax base effects cannot fully supplant <strong>at</strong>tentiveness as an explan<strong>at</strong>ion for the large<br />
differences in behavior th<strong>at</strong> we find between high- and low-income consumers.<br />
E. Robustness Checks<br />
1. Including Pre-Tax Prices in the Regression<br />
One variable not included in our basic econometric model is the pre-tax price of cigarettes. On the one<br />
hand, the pre-tax price depends on both supply and demand; including it as a regressor could bias our re-<br />
sults if it were correl<strong>at</strong>ed with unobserved shocks to consumer demand (the classic simultaneous systems<br />
problem). On the other hand, the pre-tax price enters the consumer’s demand function symmetrically<br />
with the excise and sales tax r<strong>at</strong>es; excluding it from the regression may cre<strong>at</strong>e an omitted variable bias<br />
28 For example, raising the excise tax might reduce cigarette demand substantially by inducing cigarette smokers to switch<br />
to cigars. In contrast, raising the sales tax would raise the price of both cigarettes and cigars, dampening the effect on cigarette<br />
consumption.<br />
23
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