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Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...

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7. Closing Remarks<br />

75<br />

Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />

It was my aim that this paper would give my fellow <strong>Reformed</strong> Christians a good<br />

introduction to the topic of free will <strong>and</strong> moral responsibility. I hope to have<br />

made clear that <strong>Reformed</strong> theology is a kind of determinism, <strong>and</strong> that there are<br />

some confessional statements that serve as a perimeter fence which protect us<br />

from going too far but also allow a wide range of movement inside the fence. The<br />

<strong>Reformed</strong> doctrines that get us determinism are taken from statements on God’s<br />

decree, God’s providence, <strong>and</strong> God’s knowledge. The information we have in our<br />

<strong>Reformed</strong> confessions is enough to give us some general rules to go by, but it<br />

does not present to us a robust <strong>and</strong> worked-­‐out model of compatibilism. Thus,<br />

<strong>Reformed</strong> believers have freedom to develop or latch on to their own favored<br />

models, two of which I presented in this paper. 99<br />

I also presented the view of freedom held by the majority of Christians today,<br />

especially in academia. I sought to provide a brief introduction to this view, which<br />

we called ‘libertarianism’, <strong>and</strong> I also briefly presented a few arguments <strong>Reformed</strong><br />

Christians could bring to bear against this view. I also interacted with a view I<br />

called “<strong>Reformed</strong> libertarianism (or something near enough).” This view is gaining<br />

in popularity but was seen to be subject to vagueness, ambiguity, <strong>and</strong><br />

philosophical-­‐theological objections. It wasn’t clear that the motivations for this<br />

view gave us anything that theological determinism could not provide.<br />

I did not attempt to prove determinism in this paper, or that there was a<br />

99 Michael McKenna offers several more in the article “Compatibilism” written for<br />

the SEP, see , last accessed<br />

7/18/11.

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