Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology - Analytic ...
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74<br />
Paul L. Manata © 2011<br />
advance, what a person with libertarian freedom will do. In theological circles,<br />
this position is known as Open Theism. But other libertarians, like philosopher<br />
Dave Hunt, agree with this argument, <strong>and</strong> he is no Open Theist; he is, however, a<br />
narrow source incompatibilist.<br />
6.7 Incompatibilist Mountain <strong>and</strong> the Libertarian Dilemma<br />
The above objections represents what libertarian Robert Kane has referred to as<br />
“Incompatibilist Mountain <strong>and</strong> the Libertarian Dilemma.” He represents it with<br />
this picture. 98<br />
The <strong>Reformed</strong> exegesis <strong>and</strong> teachings, <strong>and</strong> compatibilist positions, claim the<br />
ascent has been achieved; moreover, objections 6.1 <strong>and</strong> 6.2 argue that<br />
determinism in fact obtains. Objections 6.3 – 6.6 show that the descent is<br />
tortuous, that indeterminism actually threatens free will. Thus, it is not as if<br />
<strong>Reformed</strong> Christians must always be on the defensive by seeking to show that<br />
free will <strong>and</strong> moral responsibility are compatible with God’s determining decrees.<br />
Moreover, <strong>Reformed</strong> Christians who opt for libertarianism (or something near<br />
enough) must answer the ascent <strong>and</strong> descent objections. So, <strong>Reformed</strong> Christians<br />
may go on the offensive <strong>and</strong> argue positively that libertarian free will is false <strong>and</strong><br />
also does not allow for free will or moral responsibility.<br />
98 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Will</strong> (Oxford University Press,<br />
2005), p. 34.